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                                                         Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on collective dominance in horizontal concentrations as regulated under 
the EU Merger Regulation 139/2004. Chapter 1 introduces the issues that this thesis will 
examine.  Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of collective dominance in mergers by setting out 
the characteristics of its analysis, its link with tacit collusion and the judgments that have 
formulated the conditions that must be met in order to establish such a position. Chapter 3 
examines the economics of collective dominance as it demonstrates the models of 
oligopolistic interaction, it emphasises on the game theoretic model of tacit collusion and the 
related criticism, while it also focuses on the structural features that must be assessed in order 
to determine the oligopolists’ collusive incentives. Chapter 4 emphasises on the policy 
considerations related to each Phase of the evolution of the collective dominance analysis and 
inspects the policy objectives pursued by the regulation of such positions. Chapter 5 
examines the alterations brought about by the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test 
on the appraisal of collective dominance, it focuses on the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ 
analysis of coordinated effects and makes a comparison to the approach adopted in the 2010 
US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Chapter 6 compares the concept of collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation to the concepts of Article 102 collective dominance and Article 
101 concerted practices by demonstrating their distinctive approach on tacit collusion. 
Chapter 7 scrutinizes the relationship between unilateral and coordinated effects by 
emphasising on their distinctions in economic theory, the set of necessary conditions required 
to be established and the applicability of econometric analysis. Chapter 8 highlights the proof 
of collective dominance in mergers as it focuses on the allocation of the burden of proof, it 
discerns the applicable standard of proof and examines the judicial review of the 
Commission’s decisions. Lastly, Chapter 9 offers a conclusion on this thesis. 
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                                                    CHAPTER 1  
                                                                - 
                                                 INTRODUCTION 
 
  
This thesis focuses on collective dominance in horizontal mergers as regulated by the 
EU Merger Regulation 139/2004
1
. Horizontal mergers refer to concentrations between firms 
operating at the same level of trade, i.e. actual or potential competitors within the same 
relevant market
2
. In principle, horizontal mergers are more likely to result in anticompetitive 
effects than non-horizontal mergers, because they reduce the number of active participants in 
the relevant industry and consequently they lead to an increase in market concentration. 
Collective dominance under the Merger Regulation is regarded as an anticompetitive position 
that may produce highly inefficient market outcomes and important detrimental effects on the 
consumers’ welfare, analogous to those resulting from a cartel or a monopolistic market 
structure. Accordingly, the control of horizontal mergers which create or strengthen a 
collective dominant position is of outmost importance to the Commission and the Courts.  
 
The EU case precedent and the relevant legislative scheme reveal that collective 
dominance is a legal concept which has been highly influenced by economic theory and 
                                                          
1
 Merger Regulation 139/2004 (Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 Of 20 January 2004 On The Control Of 
Concentrations Between Undertakings, [2004], OJ L24/1 [2004], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R0139:EN:HTML). 
2
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Guidelines On The Assessment Of Horizontal Mergers Under The Council 
Regulation On The Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings, [2004], OJ C31/5 [2004], available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02):EN:HTML) para. 5. 
15 
                                                                                 Chapter 1 
policy considerations. On the one hand, the legal and economic perspectives of collective 
dominance in mergers are inextricably linked to the extent that the existence and exercise of a 
collective dominant position constitutes an economic phenomenon that exclusively takes 
place in oligopolies. Accordingly, the legal assessment employed in collective dominance 
merger cases is heavily based on economic principles. On the other hand, policy 
considerations have affected to a significant degree the progress of the legal analysis applied 
in collective dominance cases. Specifically, policy considerations have played a key role in 
the evolution of the analytical tools that constitute the foundation of the collective dominance 
merger assessment and they have also set out the objectives pursued by the regulation of such 
anticompetitive positions. Therefore, the framework of collective dominance under the 
Merger Regulation revolves around three pillars which are consisted by its legal context, the 
underlying economic theory and the relevant policy considerations. These pillars interact and 
affect the proof of collective dominance in mergers.  
 
(A) LEGAL CONTEXT 
(1) Concept, Substantive Test And Proof Of Collective Dominance 
The issue of proof plays a pivotal role in the examination of mergers for collective 
dominance, since it determines the extent to which a case is deemed to be established as a 
matter of law. In that context, the concept of collective dominance is interrelated with the 
requirements that need to be established in order to demonstrate such a position, whilst the 
substantive test of the Merger Regulation sets out the threshold that must be met before a 
prohibition or a clearance decision is adopted. 
 
The concept of collective dominance revolves around the notion that a concentration 
may lead to a fundamental change in the nature of competition on the relevant industry and 
16 
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either increase the likelihood of tacit collusion or reinforce an existing situation of such 
collusion between the market participants post-merger. Tacit collusion constitutes 
anticompetitive conduct that may only be proved by evidence acquired from an economic 
analysis of the relevant market, as by definition there is absence of any hard evidence of the 
type that would facilitate the establishment of explicit collusion, whilst such conduct must be 
distinguished from the neighbouring notion of unconscious parallelism. In Airtours v. 
Commission the GC equated the concept of collective dominance with the economic theory 
of tacit collusion and presented the four cumulative and necessary conditions which must be 
fulfilled in order to establish such a position, whilst in Impala v. Commission the GC 
introduced the indirect test for the establishment of those conditions
3
. In Sony v. Impala the 
ECJ inserted the requirement that such tests should be assessed on the basis of a hypothetical 
coordination mechanism, whilst in ABF/GBI the Commission practically applied the Airtours 
test in conjunction with the Sony mechanism of coordination
4
.  
 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 along with the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
consist the present EU legislative framework for the appraisal of horizontal concentrations. 
On the one hand, Articles 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 modified the 
substantive test applicable in the assessment of the compatibility of mergers with the 
Common Market by adopting the ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ standard 
and this amendment marked an alteration of direction as the EU Merger Control system 
moved away from the appraisal of concentrations on the basis of the ‘dominance’ standard 
                                                          
3
 Airtours v. Commission (Case T-342/99 [2002], ECR II-2585 [2002], 5 CMLR 317 [2002]) and Impala v. 
Commission (Case T-464/04 [2006], ECR II-2289 [2006], 5 CMLR 19 [2006]). 
4
 Sony v. Impala (Case C-413/06 [2008], ECR I-4951 [2008]) and ABF/GBI (Case COMP/M.4980 [2008]). 
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contained in Articles 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation 4064/89
5
. The substantive test 
sets out the legal requirements that must be met in order to establish anticompetitive effects 
and defines the type of appraisal that should be carried out in the examination of 
concentrations. Accordingly, the amendment of the substantive test affected the threshold of 
intervention as well as the type of assessment employed in the appraisal of horizontal 
mergers. On the other hand, despite the fact that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
constituted soft law, they produced important legal effects, since they interpreted the manner 
in which the substantive test contained in the Merger Regulation 139/2004 would be 
practically applied. In that context, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines presented the 
Commission’s approach in the analysis of the coordinated effects theory of harm, which 
corresponds to the concept of collective dominance, and set out in detail the requirements that 
it would seek to fulfil in order to demonstrate such an anticompetitive theory.    
 
The individual components on the issue of proof are comprised by the burden of 
proof, the standard of proof and judicial review. On the one hand, in collective dominance 
merger cases the Commission bears the onus to prove that a concentration would 
‘significantly impede effective competition’ by creating or reinforcing a situation of tacit 
collusion post-merger. On the other hand, the formulation of the standard of proof is 
influenced by the fact that the Commission employs an ex-ante assessment in mergers, as the 
predictive nature of analysis leads to the adoption of probability thresholds. Specifically, the 
standard of proof applicable in collective dominance merger cases is higher than a ‘pure 
balance of probabilities’ standard and takes the form of a reasonable likelihood threshold. 
                                                          
5
 Merger Regulation 4064/89 (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 Of 21 December 1989 On The Control 
Of Concentrations Between Undertakings, [1989], OJ L395/1 [1989], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31989R4064:EN:HTML). 
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Moreover, the Commission must bring forward ‘convincing evidence’ based upon a sound 
economic analysis in order to fulfil the relevant standard of proof. Also, the Courts have 
introduced the application of a symmetrical standard of proof between clearance and 
prohibition decisions in horizontal mergers which means that the Commission must meet the 
same evidentiary threshold in both instances. Lastly, judicial review is governed by the 
principle that the Courts have restrained control and they must respect the Commission’s 
margin of discretion when they are reviewing the correctness of its appreciation in complex 
economic matters.   
 
(2) The Comparative Angle 
The concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation is interrelated to 
the concepts of collective dominance under Article 102 and concerted practices under Article 
101 as they can all target collusive conduct in oligopolies. Also, in the examination of 
horizontal concentrations two types of anticompetitive concerns may arise in the form of 
coordinated or unilateral effects. 
 
The concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation enjoys a crucial 
role within the framework of EU Competition Law, as its specific focus on the ex-ante 
prevention of tacit collusive behaviour aimed to close the enforcement gap related to the lack 
of ex-post deterrence against such anticompetitive conduct by the concepts of Article 102 
collective dominance and Article 101 concerted practices. The concept of concerted practices 
under Article 101 condemns cooperation that goes beyond formal agreements as its emphasis 
is on the conduct of the market participants to informal understandings between competitors. 
The focus of enforcement under the concerted practices concept is on the regulation of 
explicit collusion, whilst there is lack of emphasis against tacit collusion and this position is 
19 
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inextricably linked to the legal requirements needed in order to establish concertation and the 
applicability of a very high evidentiary threshold. Also, even though collective dominance in 
mergers and Article 102 collective dominance are overlapping on the inclusion of tacit 
collusion within their conceptual boundaries, in the enforcement of collective dominance 
under Article 102 there is total lack of precedent tackling tacit collusion and this position is 
strongly related to the more demanding evidentiary requirements that must be demonstrated 
under such a provision.  
 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test introduced the assessment of 
unilateral effects in EU Merger Control and verified that coordinated effects form an integral 
part of merger analysis in the EU. These theories of harm are distinctive as regards the 
underlying economic principles and the elements that need to be fulfilled in order to establish 
each anticompetitive theory. Such differentiation also extends to elements of proof, as for 
example the demonstration of unilateral effects has been facilitated by the availability of 
econometric methods of analysis, whilst on the contrary there is no single accepted method of 
quantifying the increased likelihood of tacit collusion attendant to a merger. 
  
(B) ECONOMIC THEORY 
The legal concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation is based on 
the economic theory of tacit collusion and accordingly the examination of a concentration for 
the likelihood to create or strengthen a collective dominant position post-merger is carried out 
by the application of economic principles. Specifically, in undertaking such an assessment the 
Commission and the Courts heavily rely on the findings of game theory, which models 
oligopoly behaviour by focusing on tacit collusion and sets out the necessary conditions for 
the existence of collusive equilibria. Moreover, according to game theoretic dictations, the 
20 
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question emphasising on whether a concentration in an oligopolistic market may lead to 
collusive effects depends on the nature of the oligopoly under examination, as determined by 
the structural characteristics of the relevant market that influence the firms’ competitive 
conduct and such factors form the basis of the assessment focusing on whether the 
oligopolists would adopt and sustain a common policy of tacit collusion post-merger. 
Therefore, economics have provided a compass for the assessment of collective dominance in 
mergers. Nevertheless, the nature of game theoretic models is problematic as economic 
analysis based on such models does not deliver any straightforward answers and this affects 
the Commission’s ability to legally demonstrate collective dominance.  
 
(C) POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The policy considerations related to the concept of collective dominance are 
expressed by a set of legal rules and case precedent aiming to prevent the creation or the 
strengthening of market structures which would give rise to tacit collusion between 
competitors after the completion of the concentration. Policy considerations have played a 
key influencing role on the evolution of the collective dominance analysis and they have 
gradually led to the current type of assessment that is characterised by a more economic 
approach, an effects-based analysis as well as the examination of a mixture of structural 
criteria and behavioural incentives, which reflects a more demanding examination as 
compared to the earlier approach employed in the assessment of collective dominance
6
.  
 
                                                          
6
 The more economic approach refers to the increased use of industrial economic models in the assessment of 
mergers. The effects-based analysis focuses on the impact of a concentration on the future market structure and 
its competitive performance. 
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The policy objective that underlines the regulation of collective dominant positions in 
mergers focuses on the preservation of effective competition in the EU as a means to protect 
the consumers’ welfare. Such an objective is embodied in the Merger Regulation 139/2004 
and its substantive test to the extent that evidence of likely consumer harm must be 
demonstrated in order to prohibit a concentration. The detrimental effects of a collective 
dominant position on the consumers’ welfare derive from the acknowledgment that a market 
would not be able to achieve the best possible outcome if a group of firms would implement 
and sustain a tacit collusive policy post-merger, since such behaviour leads to increased 
prices, it undermines the incentives to innovate or reduces the quality and the variety of 
products.   
 
(D) RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on the question of how evidential requirements and capabilities 
may explain the development of the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation. From that perspective it employs a critical analysis of the various elements of 
collective dominance in mergers. Specifically, this thesis offers three different angles related 
to the underlying research question as it focuses on the legal requirements needed to be 
established in order to demonstrate the incompatibility of a concentration on the basis of 
collective dominance and encompasses a comparison of such a concept with relative theories, 
it comprises an economics part that focuses on how and the extent to which the dictations of 
game theory facilitate the legal establishment of collective dominance, whilst it emphasises 
on the policy developments that have affected the analysis of collective dominance in 
mergers. 
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The methodology used in this thesis centred on literature survey and caselaw 
examination. Accordingly, the sources of information comprised journal articles, books and 
caselaw that were collected by use of the university library and online resources, i.e. the 
Athens system and SSRN, while conference proceedings were attended and related material 
was gathered. The purpose was to accomplish an independent interpretation of such materials 
in order to develop a theoretical overview and a critical perspective on the issues related to 
the underlying research question.  
 
This thesis focuses on collective dominance in horizontal concentrations as related to 
the economic theory of tacit collusion and emphasised on the relevant EU legal framework by 
identifying the Airtours judgment as a focal point in the analysis. Thus, this thesis employs an 
increased focus on the Airtours and post-Airtours analysis, whilst it entails limited review of 
the pre-Airtours framework and of the US scope of coordinated effects, while it offers 
minimal review of peripheral issues such as non-horizontal mergers. 
 
(E) CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is divided into nine Chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of 
collective dominance in mergers by setting out the characteristics of its analysis, its link with 
tacit collusion and the judgments that have formulated the conditions that need to be met in 
order to establish such a position. Chapter 3 examines the economics of collective dominance 
as it demonstrates the models of oligopolistic interaction, it emphasises on the game theoretic 
model of tacit collusion and the related criticism, while it also focuses on the structural 
features that must be assessed in order to determine the oligopolists’ collusive incentives. 
Chapter 4 emphasises on the policy considerations related to each Phase of the evolution of 
the collective dominance analysis and inspects the policy objectives pursued by the regulation 
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of such positions. Chapter 5 examines the alterations brought about by the Merger Regulation 
139/2004 substantive test on the appraisal of collective dominance, it focuses on the EU 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ analysis of coordinated effects and makes a comparison to the 
approach adopted in the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Chapter 6 compares the 
concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation to the concepts of Article 102 
collective dominance and Article 101 concerted practices by demonstrating their distinctive 
approach on tacit collusion. Chapter 7 scrutinizes the relationship between unilateral and 
coordinated effects by emphasising on their distinctions in economic theory, the set of 
necessary conditions required to be established and the applicability of econometric analysis. 
Chapter 8 highlights the proof of collective dominance in mergers as it focuses on the 
allocation of the burden of proof, it discerns the applicable standard of proof and examines 
the judicial review of the Commission’s decisions. Lastly, Chapter 9 offers a conclusion on 
this thesis. 
24 
                                                                                 Chapter 2 
 
                                                CHAPTER 2 
                                                           - 
THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE UNDER THE 
EU MERGER REGULATION 
 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
According to economic theory, the existence of an oligopolistic market structure is not 
in itself problematic, since oligopolies may produce highly competitive outcomes, but under 
certain circumstances such markets may produce anticompetitive results and in particular 
where the competitors resort to collusive behaviour
1
.  
 
The EU competition legal system encompasses various tools that aim to control 
anticompetitive performance in oligopolies and prevent collusion between the market 
participants. Specifically, the Commission and the Courts have interpreted the substantive 
test contained in the Merger Regulation 4064/89 in such a manner as to apply to situations of 
collective dominance and the evolution of such a concept has authorised them to control 
concentrations which are likely to enable or further facilitate tacit collusion in a given 
                                                          
1
 J. Langer, The Airtours Judgment: A Welcome Lecture On Oligopolies, Economics And Joint Dominance, 
C.J.E.L., 2003, 10, 105-117, p. 107 and A. Winckler and M. Hansen, Collective Dominance Under The EC 
Merger Control Regulation, C.M.L.R., 1993, 30, 787-828, pp. 789-790. 
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oligopoly, while the concepts of collective dominance under Article 102 and concerted 
practices under Article 101 principally focus on explicit collusion
2
.  
 
            This Chapter analyses the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation. Section B examines the general characteristics of the collective dominance 
analysis in horizontal concentrations. Section C defines the relationship between collective 
dominance, tacit collusion and coordinated effects, as well as the differences of tacit 
collusion in relation to explicit collusion and mere parallel behaviour. Section D focuses on 
the Airtours cumulative criteria of a common policy, transparency, retaliation and absence of 
external countervailing reactions which are necessary to be fulfilled in order to reach a 
collective dominance finding. Moreover, it scrutinizes the Impala indirect test, it 
demonstrates the Sony requirement of a plausible coordination mechanism and it presents the 
decision in ABF/GBI. Lastly, Section E offers a conclusion on this subject. 
  
(B) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS   
            (1) Introduction 
                                                          
2
 D. Ridyard, Economic Analysis Of Single Firm And Oligopolistic Dominance Under The European Merger 
Regulation, E.C.L.R., 1994, 15(5), 255-262, p. 258, J. Briones, Economic Assessment Of Oligopolies Under 
The Community Merger Control Regulation, E.C.L.R., 1993, 14(3), 118-122, p. 118, B. Etter, The Assessment 
Of Mergers In The EC Under The Concept Of Collective Dominance – An Analysis Of The Recent Decisions 
And Judgments By An Economic Approach, World Competition, 2000, 23(3), 103-139, pp. 108-109, N. Petit 
and D. Henry, Why The EU Merger Regulation Should Not Enjoy A Monopoly Over Tacit Collusion – A Close 
Look At Five Common Misconceptions, In: Changes In Competition Policy Over The Last Two Decades, 2010, 
available at http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download.php?plik=8562, 181-197, pp. 181-183 and B. Hawk and G. 
Motta, Oligopolies And Collective Dominance: A Solution In Search Of A Problem, Fordham University 
School Of Law, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301693, 59-104, pp. 68, 
79 and 87. 
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            Collective dominance refers to a position held by two or more independent 
undertakings that jointly enjoy significant market power. The appraisal of a merger for the 
likelihood to create or strengthen a collective dominant position is prospective in nature and 
centres on the fulfilment of the substantive standard for the assessment of concentrations 
contained in the Merger Regulation 139/2004. Also, the focus of the analysis is on the 
structural conditions and behavioural incentives that would prevail in the relevant market 
post-merger.  
 
            (2) Two Or More Parties 
            The concept of collective dominance does not apply to unilateral market conduct 
exercised by a single firm
3
. On the contrary, a dominant position must be held collectively by 
the merged entity together with one or more competing undertakings within the same relevant 
market
4
. In such circumstances, none of the firms is individually dominant, but the strong 
position on the relevant market is based on the collective exercise of market power by a 
group of undertakings.  
 
            (3) Market Power 
                                                          
3
 G. Stirati, The Appraisal Of Collective Dominance And Efficiency Gains Under The Substantive Test Of The 
New EU Merger Regulation, Erasmus Law And Economic Review, 2004, 1(3), available at 
http://www.eler.org/include/getdoc.php?id=44&article=12&mode, 249–286, p. 257. 
4
 France v. Commission (Kali and Salz) (Cases C-68/94 and 30/95 [1998], ECR I-1375 [1998], 4 CMLR 829 
[1998]) para. 221, Gencor v. Commission (Case T-102/96 [1999], ECR II-753 [1999], 4 CMLR 971 [1999]) 
para. 163, Airtours para. 59, Impala para. 245 and Sony para. 120. See also, A. Hinds, The New EC Merger 
Regulation – The More Things Change The More They Stay The Same?, E.B.L.R., 2006, 17(6), 1693-1713, p. 
1703 and G. Elliott, Case Comment - The Gencor Judgment: Collective Dominance, Remedies And 
Extraterritoriality Under The Merger Regulation, E.L.Rev., 1999, 24(6), 638-652, p. 638. 
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            In the assessment of collective dominance the Commission’s focus is on whether 
the concentration under investigation would allow the remaining firms to jointly exercise 
market power post-merger. The legal definition of collective dominance in mergers 
requires that the undertakings involved must be able to prevent effective competition from 
being maintained in the relevant market by acting to a considerable extent independently 
of their competitors, their customers and their consumers
5
. Thus, the external competitive 
forces must be impeded to such an extent that these are unable to render the actions of the 
undertakings unsuccessful and confers upon them the ability to profitably set a price 
substantially above the competitive level
6
. Such a situation directly corresponds to the 
economists’ notion of market power, i.e. power over price, even though the modern 
approach to market power extends its width to non-price factors such as quality and 
                                                          
5
 France v. Commission para. 221, Gencor para. 163, Airtours para. 59, Impala para. 245, Sony para. 120 and 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 2. See also, D. Geradin, P. Hoferm, F. Louis, N. Petit and M. Walker, The 
Concept Of Dominance In EC Competition Law, Global Competition Law Centre - Research Paper On The 
Modernization Of Article 82 EC, 2005, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=770144, 
1-31, p. 2, F. Jenny, Collective Dominance And The EC Merger Regulation, In: Annual Proceedings Of The 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute - International Antitrust Law And Policy 2001, Edited By B. Hawk, 2002, 
361-373, p. 361, M. Walker and J. Azevedo, Dominance: Meaning And Measurement, E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(7), 
363-367, p. 364, H. Niemeyer, G. Drauz, F. Jenny and J. Lang, Collective Dominance/Oligopoly Behaviour 
Under Articles 81/82 And The EC Merger Regulation, In: Annual Proceedings Of The Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute - International Antitrust Law And Policy 2001, Edited By B. Hawk, 2002, 375-391, p. 376 and I. 
Kokkoris, The Development Of The Concept Of Collective Dominance In The ECMR – From Its Inception To 
Its Current Status, World Competition, 2007, 30(3), 419-448, p. 422. 
6
 J. Lang, Oligopolies And Joint Dominance In Community Antitrust Law, In: Annual Proceedings Of The 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute - International Antitrust Law And Policy 2001, Edited By B. Hawk, 2002, 
269-359, pp. 317-318. 
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innovation
7
. Also, mere external stability is not sufficient for the collective exercise of 
market power, as internal stability is necessary to the extent that each firm’s profits 
depend not only on its own actions but also on the actions of the other oligopolists 
comprising the collective group
8
. Lastly, it should be emphasised that market power is a 
question of degree, since the goal of EU Merger Control in collective dominance cases is 
to prevent the build-up of significant, as opposed to marginal, market power
9
. 
 
(4) The Creation Or Strengthening Of Collective Dominance And The 
Prospective      Analysis 
               Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 prohibits concentrations that would 
significantly impede effective competition through the creation or the strengthening of a 
collective dominant position post-merger
10
. Therefore, the Commission’s appraisal focuses 
on whether a concentration may significantly impede effective competition either by 
increasing the likelihood of coordination between the oligopolists post-merger, i.e. the 
                                                          
7
 Sony para. 121 and Horizontal Merger Guidelines para 8. See also, D. Geradin et al., above note 5, pp. 3 and 5, 
F. Mezzanotte, Tacit Collusion As Economic Links In Article 82 EC Revisited, E.C.L.R., 2009, 30(3), 137-142, 
p. 138, M. Walker and J. Azevedo, above note 5, p. 366, C. Caffarra and J. Ysewyn, Case Comment - Two's 
Company, Three's A Crowd: The Future Of Collective Dominance After The Kali & Salz Judgment, E.C.L.R., 
1998, 19(7), 468-472, p. 469 and D. Ridyard, Joint Dominance And The Oligopoly Blind Spot Under The EC 
Merger Regulation, E.C.L.R., 1992, 13(4), 161-164, p. 161. 
8
 L. White, Market Power: How Does It Arise? How Is It Measured?, 2012, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056708, 1-50, p. 14. 
9
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 8. See also, D. Geradin et al., above note 5, p. 4 and A. Amelio, P. Asbo, 
M. De La Mano, R. Maximiano and V. Porubsky, ABF/GBI Business: Coordinated Effects Baked Again, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_1_22.pdf, 91-96, p. 91. 
10
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 39. 
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‘creation’ of collective dominance, or by reinforcing an existing situation of coordination 
between the market participants after its completion, i.e. the ‘strengthening’ of collective 
dominance.  
 
               In assessing the creation of collective dominance, the Commission must determine 
whether the merger changes the ability and the incentive of the oligopolists to collude so that 
‘firms that previously were not coordinating their behaviour, are now significantly more 
likely to coordinate’ 11 . Specifically, the Commission must prove that the particular 
concentration under investigation causes a significant alteration in the future market structure, 
which influences the firms’ behaviour and increases the likelihood of coordination, in order 
to establish that the merger leads from a competitive environment pre-merger to collective 
dominance post-merger
12
. In such a case the level of competition at the time of notification of 
the concentration is taken into account, but the principal focus is on the post-merger market 
structure
13
. 
 
               The strengthening of collective dominance refers to the situation where ‘a merger 
may make coordination easier, more stable or more effective for firms which were 
                                                          
11
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 22 and 39.  
12
 G. Robert and C. Hudson, Past Coordination And The Commission Notice On The Appraisal Of Horizontal 
Mergers Under The Council Regulation On The Control Of Concentrations Between Undertakings, E.C.L.R., 
2004, 25(3), 163-168, p. 163. 
13
 Airtours paras 59, 63 and 82 and Impala para. 250. See also, A. Nikpay and F. Houwen, Case Comment - 
Tour De Force Or A Little Local Turbulence? A Heretical View On The Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 2003, 
24(5), 193-202, p. 199. 
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coordinating prior to the merger’14. In such cases the market is characterised by a degree of 
coordination between the competitors pre-merger and the concentration has the effect of 
reinforcing such collusive behaviour post-merger
15
. The examination of the strengthening of 
collective dominance mandates an actual-based analysis of the market position of the 
undertakings at the time of the adoption of the decision and the past conduct of the firms, 
but again the principal emphasis is on a prospective outlook of the future market structure
16
. 
 
               Thus, the analysis of both the creation and the strengthening of collective 
dominance in mergers is prospective in nature, since the Commission examines the pre-
merger market structure in order to assess ex-ante whether the proposed concentration would 
increase the likelihood of or reinforce coordination between the remaining firms post-
merger
17
. 
 
               (5) The Nature Of The Commission’s Assessment 
               Two further characteristics constitute the core of the legal assessment employed in 
collective dominance merger cases. Firstly, the compatibility of concentrations with the 
Common Market is appraised on the basis of the threshold level contained in Article 2(3) of 
                                                          
14
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 22 and 39. See also, F. Mezzanotte, Direct Versus Indirect Proof Of The 
Airtours Criterion In Impala, World Competition, 2008, 31(4), 523-540, p. 528. 
15
 G. Robert and C. Hudson, above note 12, p. 163. 
16
 Impala para. 250. See also, I. Kokkoris, Assessment Of Mergers Inducing Coordinated Effects In The 
Presence Of Explicit Collusion, World Competition, 2008, 31(4), 499-522, p. 505 and G. Aigner, O. Budzinski 
and A. Christiansen, The Analysis Of Coordinated Effects In EU Merger Control: Where Do We Stand After 
Sony/BMG And Impala?, E.C.J., 2006, 2(2), 311-336, p. 326. 
17
 France v. Commission para. 221, Airtours paras 59 and 63, Impala paras 245, 522 and 532, Sony para. 120 
and ABF/GBI para. 146.  
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the Merger Regulation 139/2004, which prohibits concentrations that would ‘significantly 
impede effective competition’18. Accordingly, the maintenance of ‘effective competition’ is 
the basic legal standard according to which a merger examined for collective dominance will 
be assessed and this appraisal is a matter of degree as only the ‘significant’ impediment of 
such competition will be prohibited
19
. Secondly, the Commission’s assessment entails a case-
by-case analysis of the structural features of the relevant market that affect the probable 
strategic behaviour of the oligopolists, in order to examine whether these parameters enhance 
the scope for the remaining firms to attain and sustain a collusive outcome post-merger
20
.  
 
                (C) TACIT COLLUSION  
                (1) Introduction  
                The Commission must prove that the market participants would tacitly collude 
post-merger in order to establish collective dominance. Tacit collusion is an economic theory 
which provides that in markets with certain oligopolistic characteristics the competitors may 
adopt a parallel behaviour and collectively exercise market power, without entering into an 
                                                          
18
 Note also the discussion on the substantive standard under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 at Ch. 5. 
19
 J. Lang, above note 6, pp. 272 and 316. 
20
 France v. Commission para. 222, Airtours para. 63, Impala para. 248 and Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 
13. Note also the discussion on the structural market features and their influence on the firms’ behaviour at Ch. 
3. See also, A. Winckler and M. Hansen, above note 1, p. 790, I. Kokkoris, above note 5, p. 426, E. 
Kloosterhuis, Joint Dominance And The Interaction Between Firms, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(3), 79-92, p. 80, D. 
Geradin et al., above note 5, p. 10, H. Haupt, Collective Dominance Under Article 82 E.C. And E.C. Merger 
Control In The Light Of The Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(9), 434-444, pp. 443-444, I. Kokkoris, The 
Reform Of The European Control Merger Regulation In The Aftermath Of The Airtours Case - The Eagerly 
Expected Debate: SLC v. Dominance Test, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(1), 37-47, p. 47 and F. Bektashi, Collective 
Dominance In EC Competition Law: Role Of Structural Links - Case Law Analysis Under The EC Merger 
Regulation, VDM Verlag, First Edition, 2008, p. 29. 
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agreement or resorting to a concerted practice, but through recourse to implicitly collusive 
conduct
21
. The implementation of such behaviour results in the collective maximization of 
profits for the colluding firms, by avoiding effective competition in their internal relationship 
and by eliminating competition from their external competitive forces
22
. 
 
                (2) Collective Dominance v. Tacit Collusion And Coordinated Effects 
                The basic principle underlying the concept of collective dominance in horizontal 
concentrations is consisted by the economic theory of tacit collusion
23
. Also, the concept of 
collective dominance corresponds to the coordinated effects theory of harm
24
. 
 
    In Gencor v. Commission the GC identified for the first time the concept of 
collective dominance in mergers with the theory of tacit collusion, as it refered to the rivals’ 
alignment of conduct by the recognition of their interdependence and in the absence of an 
                                                          
21
 S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, Collective Dominance Under EC Merger Control - After Airtours And The 
Introduction Of Unilateral Effects Is There Still A Future For Collective Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(3), 
148-160, p. 149, I. Kokkoris, above note 16, pp. 499-500 and F. Mezzanotte, Can The Commission Use Article 
82 EC To Combat Tacit Collusion?, CCP Working Paper 09-5, 2009, available at 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.111282!ccp09-5.pdf, 1-36, p. 7. 
22
 Airtours para. 63. See also, J. Lang, above note 6, pp. 269 and 314 and F. Mezzanotte, above note 21, p. 6. 
23
 Note also the discussion on the economic theory of tacit collusion at Ch. 3. See also, J. Langer, above note 1, 
p. 108, T. Kaseberg, Bertelsmann AG And Sony Corporation Of America v. Independent Music Publishers And 
Labels Association (Impala), C.M.L.R., 2009, 46, 255-267, p. 260, F. Mezzanotte, above note 14, pp. 524-525, 
S. Stroux, US And EC Oligopoly Control, Kluwer, First Edition, 2004, p. 220 and J. Vickers, Competition 
Economics And Policy, E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(3), 95-102, p. 101.  
24
 M. Motta, E.C. Merger Policy And The Airtours Case, E.C.L.R., 2000, 21(4), 199-207, p. 203 and S. Bishop 
and D. Ridyard, Prometheus Unbound: Increasing The Scope For Intervention In EC Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 
2003, 24(8), 357-363, p. 358. 
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agreement or a concerted practice, while it also focused on the retaliatory reaction of the 
collusive group to a firm’s deviatory action25. Nonetheless, the Commission in Airtours/First 
Choice departed from this approach, since it did not rely on tacit collusion as the economic 
theory underlying the concept of collective dominance. In particular, the Commission 
focused exclusively on the degree of interdependence between the oligopolists and on the 
rational incentives of the undertakings to avoid or reduce competition among themselves, 
whilst it ruled out the strict necessity of retaliation in the event of deviation and accordingly it 
attempted to expand the scope of the concept of collective dominance so as to apply not only 
to tacit collusive behaviour, but also to the unilateral non-collusive exercise of market 
power
26
. The GC’s judgment in Airtours rejected this misapplication of the concept of 
collective dominance by clearly departing from the Commission’s views and restored tacit 
collusion as its central economic theory
27
. Specifically, the GC held that collective 
                                                          
25
 Gencor paras 276-277. See also, K. Kuhn and C. Caffara, Joint Dominance: The CFI Judgment On 
Gencor/Lonrho, E.C.L.R., 1999, 20(7), 355-359, p. 356, G. Niels, Collective Dominance: More Than Just 
Oligopolistic Interdependence, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(5), 168-172, p. 168, Ş. Ardıyok, Comparative Analysis Of 
Collective Dominance, 2006, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1162187, 1-39, 
pp. 27-28 and I. Kokkoris, above note 16, p. 500. 
26
 Airtours/First Choice (Case IV/M.1524 [1999], OJ L93/1 [2000], 5 CMLR 494 [2000]) paras 53-55 and 150. 
See also, I. Kokkoris, above note 5, p. 434, A. Nikpay and F. Houwen, above note 13, pp. 200-201, J. Briones 
and A. Padilla, The Complex Landscape Of Oligopolies Under EU Competition Policy – Is Collective 
Dominance Ripe For Guidelines?, World Competition, 2001, 24(3), 307-318, pp. 307 and 310-312, F. Jenny, 
above note 5, pp. 367-368, V. Rabassa and P. Christensen, The Airtours Decision: Is There A New Commission 
Approach To Collective Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(6), 227-237, pp. 228 and 235, S. Stroux, Is EC 
Oligopoly Control Outgrowing Its Infancy?, World Competition, 2000, 23(1), 3-50, pp. 39-40, J. Langer, above 
note 1, pp. 108-110 and B. Etter, above note 2, pp. 133 and 135-136. 
27
 Airtours para. 61. See also, J. Langer, above note 1, pp. 106 and 116, F. Mezzanotte, above note 14, p. 530 
and I. Kokkoris, above note 5, p. 439. 
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dominance should be understood as a situation in which a merger creates a risk of tacit 
collusion, thereby unifying these two theories by an integral link of causation, i.e. tacit 
collusion functions as the underlying condition for a collective dominance finding, and 
clarifying that unilateral non-collusive conduct cannot be examined under the concept of 
collective dominance
28
. 
 
Also, in Airtours the GC essentially identified and the subsequent Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines upheld the notion that the concept of collective dominance and the coordinated 
effects theory of harm closely correspond to each other
29
. In particular, the concept of 
collective dominance reflects the theory of coordinated effects, as they are both based on the 
establishment of tacit collusion and accordingly they refer to identical market behaviour. 
Thus, collective dominance arises as a result of a merger giving rise to an increased risk of 
tacit coordination after its completion and a concentration is characterised as generating 
coordinated effects if it significantly increases the likelihood of tacit collusion between the 
oligopolists post-merger.  
               
                (3) Tacit Collusion v. Explicit Collusion  
                                                          
28
 R. Whish, Analytical Framework Of Merger Review - Substantial Lessening Of Competition/Creation Or 
Strengthening Of Competition, ICN First Annual Conference, 2002, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc565.pdf, 1-4, p. 2 and S. Albaek, P. 
Møllgaard and P. Overgaard, Transparency And Coordinated Effects In European Merger Control, 2010, 
available at http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2010_S4.5_Paper.pdf, 1-7, p. 3. 
29
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 39-57. Note also the discussion on the analysis of coordinated effects in 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Ch. 5. See also, A. Nikpay and F. Houwen, above note 13, p. 197 and S. 
Albaek et al., above note 28, p. 3. 
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                The current formation of the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation is in principle concerned with the possibility of tacit as opposed to explicit 
collusion. This is evident by the judgments in Gencor, Airtours and Impala which held that in 
analysing collective dominance the Commission should prove that the firms involved can 
plausibly carry out the alleged coordination by adopting and sustaining a tacit collusive 
strategy post-merger. This position holds firm, despite the ECJ’s obiter dictum in Sony that 
seemingly integrated explicit collusion as a type of coordinated conduct leading to a 
collective dominance finding. 
 
                As regards the relationship between the two forms of collusion, tacit collusion 
concerns market behaviour that appears to be explicit collusion in that the firms act ‘as if’ 
they had expressly colluded and the outcome is similar in both types of collusion, since it 
consists of increased prices and/or reduced output
30
. However, tacit differs from explicit 
collusion in relation to the form by which the undertakings enter into the common strategy of 
coordination. In particular, explicit collusion involves a concrete agreement concluded 
between rivals or a concerted practice formed by contacts between competitors, while tacit 
collusion involves a self-enforcing mechanism which results in the coordination of the firms’ 
market behaviour simply by observing and anticipating the conduct of their rivals and in the 
absence of any direct or indirect contact or any kind of agreement between them
31
. It follows 
that from a legal perspective there are different requirements of proof in order to demonstrate 
explicit as opposed to tacit collusion. Specifically, the Commission must produce direct or 
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hard evidence of an agreement or a concerted practice in order to establish explicit collusion, 
whereas tacit collusion can only be inferred indirectly by analysing the relevant market 
conditions which affect the likely future behaviour of the undertakings in terms of their 
ability and incentives to coordinate on a sustainable basis
32
. This material difference 
highlights the point that tacit collusion is a more sophisticated form of coordination when 
compared to explicit collusion, because it produces no hard evidence and this makes its 
detection more difficult for the Commission
33
. 
 
                Despite the established EU precedent, which has recognised the present status of 
collective dominance under the Merger Regulation with tacit collusive behaviour, in Sony the 
ECJ attempted to expand the legal theory of collective dominance by the inclusion of explicit 
collusion within its conceptual boundaries. In particular, even though the ECJ recognised that 
tacit collusion constitutes the principal economic theory behind collective dominance, it held 
that ‘unless they can form a shared tacit understanding of the terms of the coordination, 
competitors might resort to practices that are prohibited by Article 101 in order to be able to 
adopt a common policy on the market’34. Thus, the ECJ suggested that, as an alternative to 
tacit collusion, the Commission may reach a collective dominance finding on the basis of 
explicit collusion formed by an agreement or a concerted practice. Nonetheless, two principal 
considerations limit the value of the ECJ’s statement. On the one hand, such a situation may 
arise only where the Commission assesses the strengthening of a collective dominant 
position. Specifically, in a merger appraisal focusing on the creation of collective dominance, 
the Commission would be unable to prove by an ex-ante assessment and at the required 
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standard of proof that a concentration in a competitive market pre-merger would lead to 
explicit collusion by the de novo formation of an agreement or a concerted practice between 
the oligopolists post-merger. Therefore, in a prospective assessment it would be impossible to 
demonstrate that explicit collusion would be the cause of the creation of a collective 
dominant position, because there would be lack of any hard evidence at the Commission’s 
disposal. Conversely, two marginal scenarios may be identified where explicit collusion may 
be established and lead to a finding of the strengthening of a collective dominant position. 
Firstly, such a situation may materialize where there is a history of past explicit collusion in 
the market and the Commission proves that this type of anticompetitive behaviour is feasible 
to reoccur post-merger, provided that at the time of notification of the concentration the 
market circumstances have not been substantially altered from the previous occasion of 
collusion, i.e. there is a degree of coordination between the market participants
35
. Secondly, 
the Commission may establish the strengthening of collective dominance where at the time of 
completion of the concentration there are links between the competitors in the form of 
agreements or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 101(1), which are likely to 
lead to a concrete explicit collusive policy post-merger and the structural characteristics of 
the relevant market would be favourable towards such an outcome. On the other hand, the 
value of the ECJ’s statement on explicit collusion is limited by the fact that it was only an 
obiter dictum and it was also unrelated to the circumstances of the case which focused 
exclusively on tacit collusion. Lastly, a peripheral consideration concerns the fact that the 
Commission’s ability and incentive to establish explicit collusion is diminished by the limited 
time frame within which it is obliged to collect the relevant hard evidence in merger 
investigations, whilst the mere undertaking of an economic analysis entailed under tacit 
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collusion would be more suitable in that regard, and also by the reason that ex-post 
enforcement is fully capable to capture express (in contrast to tacit) collusion. Overall, the 
Sony dictum should be interpreted as merely opening up the theoretical and rather marginal 
possibility to establish collective dominance in mergers on the basis of explicit collusion. 
Accordingly, the present position in EU Merger Control still holds that collective dominance 
principally refers to and encompasses situations of tacit collusion.  
 
                (4) Tacit Collusion v. Mere Parallel Behaviour 
                In the absence of explicit collusion, parallelism in an oligopolistic market post-
merger may be explained by two alternative hypotheses: firms may either adopt a non-
collusive conduct of unconscious parallelism, i.e. mere parallel behaviour, or they may tacitly 
collude
36
. In order to establish collective dominance, the Commission must positively prove 
that tacit collusion would be the cause of parallelism in the relevant market as opposed to 
mere parallel behaviour.  
 
                The theory of interdependence occupies a central role in the analysis of oligopolies, 
as it asserts that in any oligopolistic market there is a tendency between the rivals to parallel 
their conduct due to the particular structure of such markets, i.e. a small number of firms and a 
high degree of concentration, which prevents the undertakings to set their prices by totally 
disregarding their competitors
37
. Therefore, each oligopolist must consider the behaviour of 
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its rivals in order to determine its own best policy and in such circumstances each 
undertaking may legitimately adapt its strategy to that of the other market participants
38
.  
  
                Mere parallel behaviour concerns the situation of intelligent adaptation by 
competitors to the market conduct of their rivals, which is considered as legitimate behaviour 
and does not violate the provisions of the Merger Regulation, since it is attributed to the 
interdependence inherent in oligopolies and accordingly it results from the normal operation 
of such markets
39
. The underlying rationale for the legality of the competitors’ intelligent 
alignment to the conduct of their rivals is centred on the fact that it would be illogical to 
prohibit the firms to behave rationally in oligopolistic markets. Consequently, it is considered 
as acceptable behaviour for the oligopolists to be aware of their interdependence and take it 
into account thereof in their market decisions, as long as they take all their decisions 
unilaterally, without tacitly coordinating
40
. 
 
                The focus of EU Merger Control is not on mere parallel behaviour, but on the 
influence of the concentration under investigation on the likelihood of anticompetitive 
parallel conduct in the form of tacit collusion between the oligopolists post-merger
41
. The 
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main difference between these two theories is that even though tacit collusion entails a high 
degree of interdependence and the recognition of such interdependence by the oligopolists is 
a prerequisite for coordination, as it leads to the adoption of an implicit common policy, 
interdependence by itself is insufficient for the collective exercise of market power, since the 
common policy also needs to be sustainable towards both the internal and external 
destabilizing forces
42
. Thus, for the establishment of collective dominance, tacit collusion 
must be demonstrated and such market behaviour takes place when, in a market with the 
appropriate characteristics, the players recognise their interdependence, but in addition they 
act upon such interdependence by aligning their conduct, ceasing to compete effectively with 
each other and collectively exercise sustainable market power
43
. 
 
               (D) THE AIRTOURS FACTORS FOR COORDINATION AND BEYOND 
               (1) Introduction 
                In collective dominance cases the Commission must initially assess whether the 
merger would result in a market structure which would make it possible and would create an 
incentive for the remaining rivals to adopt a tacit common understanding of coordination so 
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as to avoid or reduce active competition between them
44
. Nonetheless, the positive conclusion 
on such an assessment is insufficient in itself to establish collective dominance, since it also 
needs to be shown that the common understanding would be sustainable
45
. Sustainability 
constitutes the backbone of tacit coordination and refers to the fact that the common 
coordinated understanding must be stable over time, i.e. the concentration must produce a 
lasting adverse impact on competition as opposed to a quick erosion of such an 
anticompetitive conduct. 
 
                The GC in Airtours clarified the conditions which are necessary to be fulfilled in 
order to demonstrate the adoption of a common coordinated understanding between the 
oligopolists as well as the sustainability of such an understanding post-merger and establish 
collective dominance in horizontal concentrations
46
. These conditions, i.e. the ‘Airtours 
factors’, refer to the criteria of a common policy, transparency, retaliation mechanisms and 
absence of external countervailing power
47
. On the one hand, the condition of common policy 
and the criterion of transparency, as an element which facilitates the formation of such a 
policy, relate to the analysis of the adoption of a common consensus on a tacit understanding 
of coordination. On the other hand, the conditions of transparency, as an element which 
facilitates the monitoring of deviations, retaliation mechanisms and the absence of external 
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countervailing power aim to legally establish the sustainability of the coordinated 
understanding. These are cumulative criteria in so far as insufficient evidence in support of 
one of these conditions will exclude a collective dominance finding. Conversely, the 
cumulative establishment of these conditions is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of 
effective internal or external competition in relation to the collusive group and results in a 
collective dominance outcome. In particular, the fulfilment of the conditions of a common 
policy, transparency and retaliation mechanisms establishes the absence of internal 
competition between the members of the collusive group, while the fulfilment of the 
condition relating to the lack of outsiders’ countervailing power demonstrates the absence of 
external competition.  
 
                   (2) Common Policy 
                The analysis of the common policy condition focuses on the ability and the 
incentive of the oligopolists to adopt a tacit common consensus on a coordinated 
understanding by recognising the interaction between themselves and their competitors in 
order to align their market conduct and cease to compete effectively
48
. Specifically, the 
establishment of coordination necessitates the adoption of a tacit common understanding 
between the market participants on the parameters that will form the focal point of the 
proposed coordination, such as the type of coordination, how coordination should work and 
the implicit rules that should govern such an understanding
49
. Nevertheless, the implicit 
formation of a common policy may be problematic in practice owing to the fact that there 
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may be a considerable gap between the oligopolists’ desire to engage in a coordinated 
interaction and the ability to do so successfully, as for example each supplier may have 
different preferences on the collusive price which should be adopted according to its costs 
conditions and market shares
50
. 
 
    In order to establish that the oligopolists would have the ability and the incentive to 
adopt a common policy of coordination post-merger, the structural characteristics of the 
relevant market must be favourable towards such an outcome
51
. For example, a factor 
facilitating the formation of a common collusive understanding is the presence of links, since 
two or more undertakings due to ‘factors giving rise to a connection between them’ will be 
able to adopt a common policy on the market
52
. Specifically, some form of a connecting 
factor is needed in order to show collective behaviour and in that regard the relationship of 
mutual interdependence is sufficient, of itself, to satisfy the requirement of a link between the 
oligopolists
53
.  
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                Lastly, it should be noted that, even though the adoption of a common coordinated 
policy must result in a significant restriction of effective competition between the members of 
the collusive group, the total elimination of competition among the colluding firms is not 
necessary and accordingly it is sufficient if the oligopolists would adopt a common 
understanding on some instances of competition, for example prices, but not in relation to 
others
54
. Nonetheless, it is difficult for the Commission to prove the formation of a common 
coordinated understanding if the market would be characterised by intense competition 
between the oligopolists
55
. 
 
                   (3) Transparency/Monitoring 
                Transparency is a necessary condition for coordination and it relates to the ability 
of each oligopolist to monitor the market variables and the reactions of its competitors
56
. 
Transparency plays a crucial twofold role, since it contributes towards both the identification 
of a common understanding of coordination as well as to its sustainability
57
. On the one hand, 
high market transparency facilitates the adoption of a common coordinated policy, as it 
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eliminates strategic uncertainty between the oligopolists, it assists each competitor to 
independently assess whether the implementation of tacit collusive conduct would be rational 
and it assists the identification of focal points for coordination thereby making it possible to 
establish the implicit terms of the collusive understanding
58
. On the other hand, for the 
common coordinated policy to be sustainable, market transparency must be high enough in 
order to enable each member of the collusive group to monitor how the market conduct of the 
other coordinating firms is evolving and check whether they are complying with the common 
collusive understanding or whether they are deviating from it, to distinguish cheating from 
mere adjustments deriving from a volatility of demand as well as to discourage cheating by 
ensuring that any deviation from the common collusive understanding can be detected and 
effectively punished
59
. Lastly, it should be highlighted that the degree of transparency 
depends on the characteristics of the relevant market under investigation
60
. 
 
                (4) Retaliation Mechanisms 
                Retaliation refers to the colluding firms’ reaction against a deviation by a member 
of the collusive group which attempts to skim additional profits in the short term. In 
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particular, the colluding firms typically find it difficult to stabilise a tacit coordinated policy 
over time, because there is a tension between the undertakings’ incentive to maintain the 
common collusive understanding in order to collectively profit from the imposition of supra-
competitive prices and the individual incentive of each member of the coordinated group to 
deviate from the common collusive policy by undercutting the fixed price in order to benefit 
from higher sales volumes
61
. In those circumstances, the presence of an adequate deterrent 
mechanism functions as a means to punish deviations and it is a necessary condition for the 
sustainability of tacit coordination, since it constitutes a discipline measure towards the 
members of the coordinated group that persuades them to comply with certain collusive market 
behaviour and it ensures that there is a long term incentive among the coordinating firms not 
to depart from the common policy
62
. Accordingly, the colluding firms will individually 
consider it rational to abstain from independent competitive action only if they anticipate that 
an adequate punishment awaits them if they deviate from the common policy and this in turn 
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stabilises the collusive understanding by minimizing the incentive to cheat
63
. Conversely, the 
inability to punish cheating will result in a very unstable parallel behaviour and in such 
circumstances a finding of collective dominance will be impossible. The analysis of 
retaliation focuses on the relevant market characteristics which influence the ability and the 
incentive of the collusive group to punish deviations
64
.  
 
                The sustainability of collusion is measured by the critical discount factor which 
compares the profit trade-off between the individual short-term income that any firm could 
gain by deviating from the common coordinated policy and the loss that it would suffer in 
later periods by the retaliatory reaction of the collusive group to such cheating, as opposed to 
the long-term profits of adhering to the coordinated consensus
65
. Collusion is sustainable only 
if the firms attach considerable weight to future profits and in particular if the income 
expected to be gained in the long run by colluding is greater than the income anticipated to be 
gained through the maximization of short-run own profits by undercutting the collusive price 
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and the loss resulting from the retaliatory response of the rivals
66
. In circumstances where 
deviations can be detected and effectively punished by the collusive group, the discount 
factor will be sufficiently large and the benefits of cheating will be minimal
67
.  
 
    Moreover, for an adequate retaliation mechanism to be established the punishment 
must be timely, credible and effective
68
. Timely punishment refers to the fact that the 
collusive group must be able to detect quickly if a firm deviates from the common 
coordinated policy and respond by an equally quick retaliatory measure, because the longer 
the detection and any subsequent reaction lags the more heavily future profits are discounted 
in which case cheating becomes more likely
69
. The credibility of punishment revolves around 
the fact that where deviation by a firm is detected, there must be sufficient certainty that some 
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retaliatory mechanism will be activated
70
. Accordingly, for the retaliation to be credible the 
collusive group must have the means as well as the willingness to punish cheating, while the 
deterrents may not be credible due to the high costs they entail for the firms implementing the 
punishment
71
. The effectiveness of punishment depends on the degree of severity of retaliation 
and in order to convince the coordinating firms to stick to the common collusive policy the 
punishment must imply a significant loss of profits for the deviating firm as compared to the 
profits that such a firm would have obtained by maintaining the collusive understanding
72
.  
 
                Lastly, a retaliation mechanism usually takes the form of trigger strategies 
implemented by the colluding firms, which react to a deviation by reverting to the 
competitive level of prices in the subsequent period
73
. Also, punishments are typically 
symmetric and entail collective sacrifice
74
. However, if the colluding firms can single out the 
deviator, they may deploy punishments that are specifically targeted at reducing the profits of 
that particular undertaking, such as the threat of a price war in the defector’s territories75. 
  
                                                          
70
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 52.  
71
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 54. See also, B. Etter, above note 2, p. 119, I. Kokkoris, above note 5, p. 
437 and F. Mezzanotte, above note 21, p. 24. 
72
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 52. See also, G. Stirati, above note 3, p. 258, G. Niels, above note 25, p. 
171 and S. Ardıyok, above note 25, p. 7. 
73
 B. Etter, above note 2, pp. 120-121, G. Werden, above note 63, pp. 730 and 733, Europe Economics, above 
note 62, pp. 15-16, U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, above note 66, p. 225, D. Yao and S. DeSanti, Game Theory 
And The Legal Analysis Of Tacit Collusion, The Antitrust Bulletin, 1993, Spring, 113-141, p. 131 and A. 
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74
 R. Porter, above note 66, p. 231. 
75
 J. Harrington and A. Skrzypacz, Collusion Under Monitoring Of Sales, Rand Journal Of Economics, 2007, 
38(2), 314–331, p. 329. 
50 
                                                                                 Chapter 2 
 
                (5) Countervailing Power Of Competitors, Customers And Consumers 
               In order to establish the sustainability of coordination it is also necessary to prove 
that the foreseeable countervailing reaction of current and future competitors, customers and 
consumers would not undermine the results expected from the common collusive policy, i.e. 
such external competitive forces should not be able to react in a manner that would make the 
common policy unprofitable
76
. There are three elements of external competitive constraints 
that must be analysed under this condition, namely competitors already present in the market, 
potential competitors and buyer power. The analysis of current competitors focuses on 
fringe firms incumbent in an oligopolistic market, in which case the Commission assesses 
whether the competitive fringe as a whole can lower its prices in response to price increases 
imposed by the coordinating group, so that the gains of the colluding firms would be reduced 
and the common collusive policy would be destabilised
77
. It also focuses on maverick firms, in 
which case the Commission assesses whether such firms are present in the oligopoly and 
whether they would be capable to constrain the exercise of market power by the colluding 
firms
78
. In the appraisal of potential competition the issue which must be examined is 
whether future entry is feasible to occur in the relevant market and in that context the 
assessment of barriers to entry is an important consideration
79
. In the analysis of the buyer 
side the emphasis is on whether the customers or the consumers possess strong countervailing 
buyer power, which may mitigate the bargaining strength of the colluding suppliers and may 
                                                          
76
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respond to an anticompetitive price increase imposed by the coordinating firms in a way that 
would make such a price strategy unprofitable
80
.  
 
                (6) The Impala Indirect Test 
                (Ι) Introduction 
     Despite the significance of the Airtours test that is related to its solid reliance on 
economic theory and the clarity that it affords on the elements relevant in the establishment 
of collective dominance, it is problematic due to its strictness. Such strictness refers to the 
demanding evidentiary threshold that derives from the requirement to establish directly the 
cumulative presence of the Airtours criteria, whilst the inability to prove one limb of the test 
would undermine the Commission's entire case. In addition, such conditions are ‘internally’ 
cumulative, since they require the totality of the structural characteristics which are relevant 
in the determination of each one of those factors to be favourable towards coordination. In 
Sony/BMG the Commission employed an exact application of the Airtours test and the 
decision clearly demonstrates that the inability to fully establish by direct evidence one limb 
of the Airtours test, i.e. transparency, leads to the exclusion of collective dominance
81
. In 
Impala the GC reacted to the strict formulation of the Airtours test by introducing a more 
flexible test to be met in the assessment of the strengthening of pre-existing collective 
dominance in order to avoid the delimitation in the applicability of such a concept.  
 
                                                          
80
 Note also the discussion on countervailing buyer power at Ch. 3. See also, I. Kokkoris, Buyer Power 
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    In Impala the GC principally focused on the analysis of the strengthening of a pre-
existing collective dominant position. Such an analysis involves a two-step assessment 
whereby in the first step the existence of coordination between the oligopolists in the pre-
merger market must be examined, i.e. whether there is a ‘pre-existing collective dominant 
position’, whilst in the second step the emphasis of the appraisal is on whether the 
concentration under investigation would make coordination ‘easier, more stable or more 
effective’ post-merger, i.e. whether the concentration would ‘strengthen’ such a position82. 
The significance of the Impala judgment lies in that the GC introduced the indirect test which 
created an alternative avenue to prove pre-existing collective dominance, i.e. the first step of 
the assessment, as in such a context it relaxed the necessity to establish the Airtours criteria 
directly by asserting that under certain circumstances these conditions may also be 
established indirectly
83
.  
 
                (II) The Rationale And The Conditions Of The Indirect Test 
    The Impala indirect test is comprised by two parts which essentially constitute the 
rationale of the test and the conditions for its fulfilment. Specifically, the GC set out the 
rationale of the indirect test by holding that in the assessment of pre-existing collective 
dominance the Airtours criteria may be established indirectly ‘on the basis of a very mixed 
series of indicia and items of evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena 
inherent in the presence of a collective dominant position’84. Therefore, the Court stated in 
essence that the existence of mere indicia and evidence of coordination may establish 
indirectly the Airtours criteria. Also, the GC expressly referred to the conditions that may 
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fulfil the indirect test as it held that ‘in particular, close alignment of prices over a long 
period, especially if they are above a competitive level, together with other factors typical of 
a collective dominant position, might, in the absence of an alternative reasonable explanation, 
suffice to demonstrate the existence of a collective dominant position, even where there is no 
firm direct evidence of strong market transparency, as such transparency may be presumed in 
such circumstances’85. Thus, the GC seemingly asserted that proof of the firms’ parallel 
market conduct along with other factors and the absence of a competitive explanation may be 
sufficient to demonstrate pre-existing collective dominance and presume the presence (each 
one or all) of the Airtours criteria
86
.  
 
  The Impala test sets out three cumulative conditions which may suffice to 
demonstrate a pre-existing collective dominant position and presume the indirect 
establishment of the Airtours criteria. Firstly, it must be illustrated that there is close 
alignment of prices over time and at an above the competitive level. Therefore, price 
parallelism may constitute evidence of coordination
87
. Nevertheless, proof of parallel prices 
in themselves, even if they are sustained over time, does not suffice to prove coordination, 
because such pricing conduct may not be inconsistent with intense competition or it may be 
attributed to pure oligopolistic interdependence and consequently it must be established that 
the prices prevailing in the relevant market are higher than the competitive level, but also that 
                                                          
85
 Impala para. 252. 
86
 F. Mezzanotte, above note 14, pp. 525 and 540. 
87
 S. Stephanou, Collective Dominance Through Tacit Coordination: The Case For Non-Coordination Between 
Article 82 And Merger Control ‘Collective Dominance’ Concepts, G.C.P., 2009, October, 1-8, p. 7. 
54 
                                                                                 Chapter 2 
 
the other conditions of the indirect test are satisfied
88
. Secondly, it must be examined whether 
there are other factors typical of a collective dominant position and in that context the GC 
sets out a few such factors as an example, i.e. the ‘power of undertakings in an oligopoly 
situation’ and the ‘stability of market shares’ 89 . Accordingly, this stage of the indirect 
analysis assesses the structural characteristics of the pre-merger market. Nonetheless, these 
structural characteristics must not be examined in isolation from the overall analytical 
framework, but on the contrary the focus of the assessment should be on whether such factors 
are consistent with the firms’ behavioural incentives to adopt a common coordinated policy 
of parallel prices above the competitive level and to sustain such an understanding over time. 
Thirdly, it must be established that there is absence of an alternative reasonable explanation 
than coordination. Thus, this condition revolves around the fact that tacit collusion must form 
the specific cause for the oligopolists’ parallelism of behaviour, whilst the alternative 
explanation of intelligent alignment to the competitors’ market conduct must be positively 
ruled out
90
. 
  
               (III) Significance And Problems 
               The indirect test constitutes an important development which produces extensive 
implications on the concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation for a 
number of reasons.  
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Firstly, the Impala test is capable to establish each one or all of the Airtours criteria 
and accordingly it introduces a wide framework for their indirect fulfilment
91
. On the one 
hand, even though the GC focused on the applicability of the indirect test to the factor of 
market transparency, it seems that this limitation was merely confined to the circumstances of 
the case, since the general nature of the indirect conditions implies that such a test is equally 
capable to indirectly establish each one of the other Airtours criteria
92
. Specifically, the 
existence of high parallel prices over time in conjunction with the presence of structural 
characteristics that facilitate coordination and the absence of an alternative explanation than 
tacit collusion may also presume the adoption of a common collusive policy of price 
alignment above the competitive level or the presence of an adequate retaliation mechanism 
that effectively eliminates the individual incentives of the colluding firms to deviate or the 
inability of outsiders to counteract the oligopolists’ supra-competitive pricing conduct. On the 
other hand, since the cumulative fulfilment of the same Impala conditions may presume the 
individual presence of each Airtours factor, it follows that the fulfilment of the indirect test 
may also infer the simultaneous establishment of all the Airtours criteria. This is confirmed 
by the rationale of the indirect test as it implies that the presence of phenomena inextricably 
linked with a position of collective dominance, such as those prescribed by the conditions of 
the Impala test, may establish indirectly all the Airtours factors.  
 
Secondly, the Impala test sets out a flexible framework for proving the strengthening 
of a pre-existing collective dominant position. This is evident by the fact that the indirect test 
relaxes the stringency attached to the fulfilment of the necessary criteria for coordination in 
the assessment of pre-existing collective dominance as regards the requirement to establish 
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these conditions directly. Additionally, the Impala test sets out different evidentiary 
requirements applicable in the appraisal of the strengthening as opposed to the creation of a 
collective dominant position, since it suggests that the Airtours criteria could be more easily 
satisfied in the former situation, where they may be established indirectly, rather than the 
latter
93
. In particular, the indirect test is exclusively confined to the analysis of the 
strengthening of pre-existing collective dominance, because it refers to instances, such as 
parallel pricing behaviour over time, which require the observation and examination of 
specific past market conduct pointing towards coordination. Conversely, the indirect test is 
not suitable to be employed in the examination of the creation of collective dominance, as it 
cannot be applied solely on the basis of likely future behaviour.  
 
Thirdly, the Impala indirect test can facilitate the enforcement of the strengthening of 
pre-existing collective dominance in ‘grey area’ cases, i.e. close cases which present some 
difficulties in the establishment of tacit collusion in the pre-merger market through the direct 
fulfilment of the Airtours factors. In particular, the requirement to directly establish the 
cumulative and necessary Airtours conditions leads to an enforcement problem as a merger 
would be declared incompatible with the Common Market only in ‘clear-cut’ cases, i.e. 
where direct evidence would demonstrate the cumulative presence of those conditions which 
in turn means that evidence on all relevant market characteristics would be favourable 
towards pre-existing coordination and provided that the concentration would make 
coordination easier, more stable or more effective post-merger. Nevertheless, two types of 
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grey area cases may be identified where the Impala test would facilitate the demonstration of 
collective dominance and concern situations where either the Commission would have 
difficulties to positively establish pre-existing collective dominance due to the lack of some 
direct evidence in favour of collusion or complexities would arise due to the presence of 
some direct evidence pointing against coordination. In the first type of ‘grey area’ cases, i.e. 
‘lack of some direct evidence’, the Impala test relaxes the stringency attached to the Airtours 
criteria, since it opens the way for their indirect establishment in such circumstances, and its 
applicability in these cases is straightforward as evident by the statement of the GC which 
expressly refers to the establishment of pre-existing collective dominance even where there is 
‘no firm direct evidence of market transparency’. In the second type of grey area cases, i.e. 
‘presence of some adverse direct evidence’, most evidence would be in favour of 
coordination, but the presence of adverse direct evidence flowing from even one structural 
factor pointing against collusion would render the direct establishment of the Airtours 
conditions impossible. Nonetheless, an expansive interpretation and application of the Impala 
test may bypass this problem, as it may facilitate the indirect establishment of the Airtours 
factors even in the presence of some - but not many - contradictory evidence, i.e. a distinction 
needs to be made between ‘some’ and ‘many’ adverse evidence as the former points to a grey 
area case while the later would point towards a clear-cut clearance decision. Thus, if the 
Commission could fulfil the Impala conditions, then the Airtours factors would be 
established indirectly even if there were some contradictory evidence as regards the relevant 
market circumstances. For example, the Commission would be able to establish indirectly the 
existence of a common collusive policy even in the presence of direct evidence of 
asymmetries, as the availability of sufficient indirect evidence on coordination could 
demonstrate that, as a matter of fact, the firms have indeed found a way to bypass this 
complexity. This may also be illustrated by the second condition of the Impala test which 
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focuses on the structural characteristics of the relevant market by referring to ‘other factors 
typical in a collective dominant position’ and seems to inquire for other ‘plus factors’ aside 
price parallelism by implying the absence of a strict necessity that ‘all’ the relevant structural 
factors should be favourable towards such an outcome. Despite the fact that the Impala test 
makes no express reference to situations where there is some direct evidence pointing against 
collusion, its validity can be justified by the rationale of the test which does not include any 
limitation to its application and accordingly it can be employed in such a context. Therefore, 
the application of the Impala test in both types of grey area cases is capable to expand the 
enforcement boundaries of collective dominance beyond its current strict limits to clear-cut 
cases.  
 
Fourthly, the indirect test is based on an analysis which focuses on the oligopolists’ 
pre-merger conduct and such an approach is overlapping to the ex-post assessment applied in 
Article 102 collective dominance. Therefore, the indirect test may constitute a means to 
shield the EU competition legal system from undetected or problematic collective dominance 
cases under Article 102 and this is an important development in view of the absence of 
effective regulation of tacit collusion under the concept of Article 102 collective 
dominance
94
. Specifically, even when collective dominance cannot be established directly 
under an Article 102 analysis, in a merger assessment in the same relevant market the 
Commission may rely on the Impala indirect test in order to detect and remedy a case of past, 
                                                          
94
 Note also the discussion on the absence of Article 102 collective dominance precedent tackling tacit collusion 
at Ch. 6.  
59 
                                                                                 Chapter 2 
 
but still evolving, tacit coordination that would be ‘easier, more stable or more effective’ 
post-merger
95
. 
 
       Despite the fact that the indirect test constitutes an important development on the 
concept of collective dominance in mergers, it does have certain limitations. Most 
importantly, the fact that the indirect test exclusively applies to the analysis of the 
strengthening of a collective dominant position diminishes its effects, as the creation of such 
a position can only be proved by the direct fulfilment of the Airtours criteria. Furthermore, 
there is a relative vagueness on the rationale of the Impala test, because the GC does not 
expressly clarify the meaning of ‘signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the 
presence of a collective dominant position’ and this ambiguity is also related to the question 
of whether the cumulative conditions of the indirect test are exhaustive
96
. Specifically, it 
appears that numerous types of such ‘signs’ or ‘phenomena’ may form part of the indirect 
conditions, while the wording of the judgment introduces such conditions by the phrase ‘in 
particular’, which implies that they may only be the primary example of the rationale of the 
test or that they may be solely confined to the particular circumstances of the case and these 
considerations may diminish their applicability in prospective collective dominance cases. 
Moreover, the first condition of the indirect test appears to be problematic in its nature, 
because it is practically difficult to determine what the competitive level of prices is and how 
much above such level should they be in order to distinguish competitive from collusive 
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pricing
97
. Also, it should be emphasised that the rationale of the indirect test as well as its 
conditions are obiter dicta and this in turn limits their value as a legal precedent. Lastly, it is 
notable that the Commission has not applied yet the Impala indirect test in practice and this 
may undermine its significance, but also exposes a gap in the enforcement of the concept of 
collective dominance under the Merger Regulation. 
 
                (7) The Sony Mechanism Of Coordination 
                In Sony the ECJ qualified the Airtours criteria, as it asserted that the Commission 
has to avoid assessing each one of those conditions in an isolated manner, but on the contrary 
such an appraisal should be carried out by using a hypothetical tacit coordination mechanism 
as a basis
98
. Also, the ECJ held that the establishment of a coordination mechanism is 
necessary in the analysis of the Impala indirect test
99
. Thus, post-Sony the Commission must 
identify a plausible mechanism of hypothetical tacit coordination and connect the Airtours 
factors or apply the indirect test to such coordination as related to the circumstances of each 
case. Accordingly, the effect of this requirement was that it codified the structure of the 
collective dominance analysis by placing a hypothetical coordination mechanism at the centre 
of the assessment. The necessity of such a mechanism is illustrated by the consideration that 
separate verification of each one of the Airtours criteria and with ignorance of the underlying 
framework for coordination may provide misleading answers. 
 
                (8) The Overall Application In ABF/GBI 
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                The formulations of the Courts in Airtours and Sony were implemented in ABF/GBI 
where the Commission sought to understand how coordination would actually work in 
practice by assessing the dynamics of the relevant industry and it analysed coordinated 
effects by restructuring the relevant test in three parts
100
. In the first part, the structural 
characteristics of the market were assessed in order to determine whether they were 
favourable towards the adoption of a common coordinated policy and its sustainability
101
. In 
the second part, the Commission set up a hypothetical coordination mechanism related to the 
circumstances of the case and on that basis it tried to determine the extent to which the 
market characteristics facilitated the emergence of the Airtours conditions
102
. In the third part, 
the Commission assessed the effects of the merger on competition by ascertaining whether 
the alternation in the relevant market structure would significantly impede effective 
competition by making coordination easier, more stable or more effective
103
. Nevertheless, 
even though on the facts of the case the Commission examined whether the concentration 
would make coordination ‘easier, more stable or more effective’ post-merger, it adhered to an 
exact application of the Airtours test, whilst it did not consider the potential applicability of 
the Impala indirect test in the pre-merger market and this later point illustrates that the 
concept of collective dominance has not been settled, as it is imperative for the Commission 
and the Courts to explore this alternative avenue in their future decisions
104
.  
 
                (E) CONCLUSION 
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                The concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation has been 
developed in order to control anticompetitive concentrations in oligopolistic markets. 
 
                Collective dominance refers to a position where two or more independent 
undertakings would jointly enjoy significant market power after the completion of the 
concentration. The Commission assesses the creation or the strengthening of a collective 
dominant position by employing a prospective analysis, the ‘significant impediment to 
effective competition’ consists the substantive standard against which it appraises the 
compatibility of concentrations with the Common Market and its focus is on the structural 
factors that would affect the firms’ behavioural incentives in the relevant market post-merger.  
 
                The concept of collective dominance in mergers is based on the economic theory of 
tacit collusion and it corresponds to the coordinated effects theory of harm. Tacit differs from 
explicit collusion in that tacit collusion is formed by an implicit understanding to coordinate 
without any type of communication between the oligopolists and can only be demonstrated 
by an economic analysis of the relevant market, while explicit collusion is formed by an 
express agreement or a concerted practice among the market participants and requires the 
Commission to bring forward hard evidence. Despite the fact that the relevant precedent 
illustrates that the concept of collective dominance in mergers focuses on tacit collusion, the 
Sony dictum opened up the theoretical and rather marginal possibility to establish collective 
dominance on the basis of explicit collusion. Furthermore, tacit collusion constitutes 
anticompetitive conduct and accordingly it must be distinguished from mere parallel 
behaviour, which is considered legally acceptable conduct as it is based on oligopolistic 
interdependence and the intelligent alignment of a competitor to the actions of the other 
market participants. 
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                In order to establish collective dominance the Commission must demonstrate that 
the oligopolists would adopt a common coordinated understanding and that such an 
understanding would be sustainable. The fulfilment of these requirements depends on the 
establishment of the cumulative and necessary Airtours criteria of a common policy, 
transparency, retaliation mechanisms and absence of external countervailing reactions. The 
common policy condition refers to the fact that the oligopolists must have the ability and the 
incentive to adopt a tacit consensus on a collusive understanding. Transparency facilitates the 
adoption of a common policy and it also contributes to its sustainability by affording the 
ability to monitor deviations. Retaliation mechanisms stabilize a collusive understanding, 
since they reduce the individual incentive of the coordinating firms to deviate from the 
common policy. Lastly, the countervailing reaction of competitors, customers and consumers 
must not be able to distort the common understanding. Despite its significance, the Airtours 
test is problematic due to its strictness and this led the GC in Impala to introduce the more 
flexible indirect test. The rationale of the indirect test provided that in the assessment of pre-
existing collective dominance the presence of mere indicia and evidence of coordination may 
establish indirectly the Airtours criteria, whilst the cumulative conditions of the indirect test 
focus on the demonstration of parallel pricing above the competitive level over time along 
with other factors and the absence of an alternative explanation than coordination. The 
indirect test brings many benefits to the analysis of the strengthening of collective dominance 
as it is capable to establish indirectly each one or all of the Airtours criteria, it sets out a 
flexible framework for proving such a position, it can facilitate its enforcement in ‘grey area’ 
cases and it may form a shield from undetected or problematic Article 102 collective 
dominance cases. In Sony the ECJ held that the Commission must firstly set up a hypothetical 
tacit coordination mechanism and then assess the Airtours factors or the Impala indirect test 
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on the basis of such a mechanism. Lastly, in ABF/GBI the Commission applied in practice the 
Airtours test in conjunction with the Sony mechanism of coordination but it refrained to apply 
the Impala indirect test.         
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            CHAPTER 3  
                                                                -  
                  THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 
 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
The formulation of the concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation 
has been highly influenced by economic theory. Specifically, despite the fact that collective 
dominance is a legal concept that has no direct equivalent or any specific significance in 
economics, it is approached and assessed with economic principles and in particular the 
theory of tacit collusion
1
.  
 
An oligopoly constitutes a prerequisite for the establishment of tacit collusion and it is 
defined as a market in which the control over the supply of a product is held by a small 
number of producers that possess large market shares
2
. From a structural point of view, 
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oligopolistic markets fall somewhere in between perfect competition and monopoly, since 
only a few firms are present as opposed to numerous competitors or a single player 
respectively, while the functionality spectrum of oligopolies is very wide because they can 
operate in a near competitive fashion as measured in terms of prices and output or in ways 
where the prevailing prices and output are close to the monopolistic level
3
. Moreover, an 
important difference between these market structures is that in an oligopoly the competitors 
interact and influence each other’s behaviour, since the strategic decisions of one firm affect 
the other market participants due to their interdependence, whereas in a perfectly competitive 
market the competitors interact with the market as a whole, i.e. competitors, customers and 
consumers, while in a monopoly there is no interaction at all since the market is dominated 
by a single firm
4
.  
 
This Chapter analyses the economics of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation. Section B examines the static and dynamic models of oligopolistic interaction, 
while it also sets out the characteristics of the game theoretic model of tacit collusion. Section 
C presents the dictations of economic theory on the necessary conditions for coordination and 
the market characteristics which must be assessed in order to evaluate whether the 
                                                          
3
 F. Mezzanotte, Can The Commission Use Article 82 EC To Combat Tacit Collusion?, CCP Working Paper 09-
5, 2009, available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.111282!ccp09-5.pdf, 1-36, p. 15, S. Stroux, Is EC 
Oligopoly Control Outgrowing Its Infancy?, World Competition, 2000, 23(1), 3-50, pp. 5-6, J. Briones, 
Economic Assessment Of Oligopolies Under The Community Merger Control Regulation, E.C.L.R., 1993, 
14(3), 118-122, pp. 118-119, V. Rabassa and P. Christensen, The Airtours Decision: Is There A New 
Commission Approach To Collective Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(6), 227-237, p. 227 and S. Martin, 
Industrial Organization, Oxford, First Edition, 2001, p. 57. 
4
 U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, Law And Economics In European Merger Control, Oxford, First Edition, 2009, 
p. 26 and S. Stroux, above note 2, p. 5. 
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oligopolists would have the ability as well as the incentive to adopt and sustain a common 
collusive understanding post-merger.  Section D sets out some critical insights on the results 
and assumptions of game theoretic models. Section E concludes by outlining the status of 
economic theory that underlines collective dominance. 
 
(B) OLIGOPOLISTIC MODELS 
(1) Static Games 
(I) Introduction 
The traditional oligopoly theories as represented by the Cournot, Stackelberg and 
Bertrand models are static, single period and non-cooperative games
5
. 
 
In static games each firm makes its strategic decisions in anticipation of what its 
competitors will do and on the basis of these expectations the market participants unilaterally 
select an action that maximises their own profits through independent rational evaluation of 
the situation
6
. The market price is subsequently determined by the interaction of these 
decisions and the demand function. Each player does not have any knowledge of the move of 
the other players, since the firms make their decisions simultaneously, with the exception of 
the Stackelberg model, and the competitors do not consider the effects of future responses or 
past outcomes, i.e. only profits in the current period influence each firm’s incentives7.  
 
                                                          
5
 S. Martin, above note 3, p. 49. 
6
 Europe Economics, above note 2, p. 12. 
7
 R. Rees, Tacit Collusion, Oxford Review Of Economic Policy, 1993, 9(2), 27-40, p. 29, S. Stroux, above note 
2, p. 11, D. Yao and S. DeSanti, Game Theory And The Legal Analysis Of Tacit Collusion, The Antitrust 
Bulletin, 1993, Spring, 113-141, p. 134 and M. Stenborg, Forest For The Trees: Economics Of Joint 
Dominance, E.J.L.E., 2004, 18, 365-385, p. 371. 
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In single period games the competitors only meet once and never again
8
. Such games 
tend to produce competitive outcomes, because the firms which adopt low prices in the 
current period cannot be punished in the subsequent period and accordingly the incentives to 
undercut drive prices down to marginal costs
9
. This can be illustrated by the single period 
prisoner’s dilemma which dictates that there are only two possible prices that the firms may 
charge for a homogeneous product and these are the monopoly price or the competitive price. 
If both firms charge the monopoly price, they share the monopolistic profit and they are 
better off than if they charge the competitive price, yet firms fail to reach a collusive 
equilibrium because they distrust each other
10
. The reason for this lies in that, if one firm 
charges the monopoly price and the other firm charges the competitive price, the high-price 
competitor suffers losses while the low-price competitor takes the whole market demand
11
. 
Therefore, the most rational behaviour and the outcome of this game is that both firms set the 
competitive price thereby earning lower profits than would have been possible by setting the 
monopoly price
12
.  
 
(II) Bertrand, Stackelberg And Cournot Oligopoly Models 
The Cournot model assumes that the oligopolists compete by choosing output for a 
homogeneous product and they set their quantities only once. Also, each firm chooses 
                                                          
8
 Europe Economics, above note 2, p. 10. 
9
 M. Stenborg, above note 7, p. 371, J. Kattan and W. Vigdor, Game Theory And The Analysis Of Collusion In 
Conspiracy And Merger Cases, George Mason Law Review, 1996-1997, 5(3), 441-456, pp. 445-446, H. 
Friederiszick and F. Maier-Rigaud, Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond A Passive EU Cartel 
Policy, J.C.L.&E., 2008, 4(1), 89-113, pp. 90-91 and D. Yao and S. DeSanti, above note 7, p. 134. 
10
 F. Mezzanotte, above note 3, p. 16. 
11
 F. Mezzanotte, above note 3, p. 16. 
12
 S. Stroux, above note 2, p. 12 and B. Etter, above note 1, p. 117. 
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simultaneously with the other firms its individual output level by taking into account the 
quantities it expects its rivals to produce and the price effects of expanding total output
13
. The 
result of such a model is that each firm produces a level of output that exceeds the level at 
which the competitors would agree to collude, because each rival considers only a part of the 
price effects induced by its decision
14
. In such circumstances, the higher the number of 
market participants, the more the overall output will increase and prices will move towards 
the perfectly competitive level. However, in this model the prices will always remain above 
the level which would prevail in a perfectly competitive market, since the price effect of a 
quantity expansion is at least partly taken into consideration. 
 
The Stackelberg model constitutes a variation of the Cournot quantity model and 
dictates that the firms do not make their decisions simultaneously, but the player which 
makes a choice of output first is a leader while the other firms are the followers that form 
their profit-maximising response by taking the leader’s decision as given 15 . In those 
circumstances, the leader has a first-mover strategic advantage in that a quantity expansion on 
his part will induce the followers to cut the quantities they supply
16
. The result of this model 
is that the leader produces a larger quantity and has a higher market share than in the Cournot 
model, while the followers produce a smaller quantity and have lower market shares as 
compared to that model
17
.  
 
                                                          
13
 S. Martin, above note 3, p. 24 and Europe Economics, above note 2, p. 10. 
14
 Europe Economics, above note 2, p. 51. 
15
 Europe Economics, above note 2, p. 11. 
16
 B. Etter, above note 1, p. 113.  
17
 U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, above note 4, p. 35. 
70 
                                                                                 Chapter 3 
 
The Bertrand model assumes that the rivals compete by setting their prices only once, 
simultaneously and independently, the product is homogeneous, the consumers buy from the 
firm which sells at the lowest price and the competitors have similar costs. In such a case, if a 
competitor sets a price above marginal cost, its rivals have an individual incentive to undercut 
this price in order to capture the whole market demand
18
. The limit to such undercutting is 
reached if one competitor charges a price that equals marginal costs, in which case no firm 
has an incentive to deviate from this strategy, because if it would charge a lower price it 
would not be able to cover its production costs while charging a higher price would not be 
profitable since it would lose sales to its rivals
19
. Consequently, the outcome of this model is 
that the prevailing price in a market with oligopolistic competition is the same as in a market 
with perfect competition, i.e. prices equal marginal costs
20
.  
 
All in all, in static oligopolistic games the strategic variable under consideration has 
an important effect on the market outcome, because the Bertrand price competition model 
yields the same results as perfectly competitive markets, while in the Cournot model outputs 
are lower and prices are higher than in perfect competition
21
. 
 
(2) Dynamic Games (Game Theory) 
(I) Introduction 
                                                          
18
 S. Martin, above note 3, p. 45. 
19
 U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, above note 4, p. 30. 
20
 S. Martin, above note 3, p. 45 and U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, above note 4, p. 30. 
21
 C. Holt, Equilibrium Models Of Tacit Collusion In Oligopoly Experiments With Price-Setting Firms, Center 
For Economic Research - University Of Minnesota, Discussion Paper No. 80, 1980, 1-26, p. 11 and G. Werden, 
Economic Evidence On The Existence Of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law With Oligopoly Theory, 
Antitrust L.J., 2003-2004, 71, 719-800, pp. 723-724. 
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Static single period games are not suitable to analyse collective dominance, because 
of the lack of repeated interaction and the consequent absence of retaliation
22
. Instead, 
dynamic games are more appropriate for such an assessment and in particular the findings of 
game theory in relation to tacit collusion constitute the basis of the analysis of collective 
dominance in mergers. 
 
The game theoretic models produce market outcomes based on predictions about how 
rival firms interact with each other and they revolve around the search for an equilibrium that 
represents the best strategy for every competitor thereby constituting a Nash equilibrium
23
. 
Specifically, game theory assumes that each firm is a rational market player which 
independently adopts its best strategy based on the assessment of its competitors’ optimal 
strategies
24
. Within that context there is dependence of each firm’s choice of strategy on how 
it expects its competitors to react which is attributable to oligopolistic interdependence
25
.  
 
Game theory purports that market performance is a reflection of numerous variables 
that collectively influence the market outcome and tries to predict how the players will react 
                                                          
22
 C. Engel, How Much Collusion? A Meta-Analysis Of Oligopoly Experiments, J.C.L.&E., 2007, 3(4), 491-
549, p. 520 and D. Yao and S. DeSanti, above note 7, p. 133. 
23
 A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if, holding the strategies of all the market participants constant, no 
firm can obtain a higher pay-off by choosing a different strategy. See also, R. Rees, above note 7, p. 29 and B. 
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24
 S. Stroux, above note 2, p. 11. 
25
 J. Vickers, Strategic Competition Among The Few – Some Recent Developments In The Economics Of 
Industry, Oxford Review Of Economic Policy, 1985, 1(3), 39-62, p. 41, R. Blair and J. Herndon, Inferring 
Collusion From Economic Evidence, Antitrust, 2001, 15, 17-21, p. 17, D. Yao and S. DeSanti, above note 7, p. 
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under a variety of assumptions
26
. Accordingly, a game is defined by the set of market players, 
the strategies available to each competitor, the information rivals have about their 
environment and about the other firms, the payoffs each player gets given the actions adopted 
by all the market participants and the equilibrium model that indicates which strategy is best 
given these payoffs
27
. Also, each competitor adopts its market strategy by taking into account 
the history of the game, as the rivals’ past responses to a game affect each firm’s current 
feasible strategies
28
. 
 
(II) Cooperative v. Non-Cooperative Games  
Two fields of game theory can be distinguished, namely cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory. In cooperative games the competitors make explicit and binding 
agreements to carry out certain actions that restrict their feasible strategies
29
. However, in 
principle the cooperative theory is not used to analyse oligopoly games, because in 
oligopolies the competitors tend to behave independently on the market and decline to adopt 
contractual agreements
30
. In non-cooperative games the firms do not engage in explicit 
agreements or communications over a proposed course of conduct
31
. Instead, each firm 
decides independently the choice of strategy which is in its own best interest given the 
strategies adopted by its competitors
32
. The result of such games is that each firm’s choice of 
                                                          
26
 D. Ridyard, Economic Analysis Of Single Firm And Oligopolistic Dominance Under The European Merger 
Regulation, E.C.L.R., 1994, 15(5), 255-262, p. 259. 
27
 J. Vickers, above note 25, p. 42 and G. Werden, above note 21, p. 721. 
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 S. Stroux, above note 2, p. 15. 
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 B. Etter, above note 1, p. 116. 
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 J. Vickers, above note 25, p. 45. 
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its best strategy will result in equilibria that are non-cooperatively optimal given its 
competitors’ similarly calculated optimal strategies, i.e. the players’ strategies are mutually 
consistent best replies in that no player has any incentive to deviate from its strategy
33
. 
Therefore, an apparently cooperative performance might result from non-cooperative games, 
since in such circumstances the players act ‘as if’ they cooperate34.  
 
(III) Repeated Games 
In dynamic games the framework for analysing the interaction between competitors is 
the repeated game theoretic model where precisely the same stage game is repeated and is to 
be played many, possibly infinite times by the same players
35
. Repeated interaction explains 
the adjustment process between competitors and a solution strategy of such a game leads to a 
tacit collusive outcome
36
. In particular, repeated interaction facilitates and stabilizes 
collusion, as stable coordination enforced by the threat of retaliation is most likely when the 
same game is repeated with minimal variation
37
. 
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 U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, above note 4, p. 28. 
34
 B. Etter, above note 1, p. 114. 
35
 S. Stroux, above note 2, p. 13. 
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There are two types of repeated games, i.e. finite and infinite. In a repeated game with 
a finite horizon the numbers of periods in the game are known, fixed and limited. In finite 
games there will be no rewards for cooperation nor will there be any punishment in the last 
period for charging a low price in the preceding period and accordingly each firm will charge 
the low price irrespective of what its rival does
38
. Since neither firm has any incentive to 
cooperate in the last period it will also refrain from cooperating in the previous period and so 
on until the first period and accordingly this backward induction predicts that each firm 
chooses the low price strategy in every period
39
. On the contrary, in infinite games there is no 
pre-determined last round or competitors have no knowledge of which is the last round and in 
those circumstances the punishment of deviations is a feasible strategy
40
. These games 
consist of an infinite repetition of the same stage game and give rise to a plethora of different 
equilibrium outcomes, such as the monopoly price, the competitive price and prices in 
between which means that collusive outcomes are possible depending on the particular set of 
market characteristics
41
. 
 
(IV) Tacit Collusion 
Tacit collusion forms the underlying economic framework of the legal concept of 
collective dominance and the Commission and the Courts rely on game theory in order to 
                                                          
38
 J. Kattan and W. Vigdor, above note 9, p. 447 and S. Stroux, above note 2, p. 13.  
39
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40
 U. Schwalbe and D. Zimmer, above note 4, p. 228 and G. Niels, above note 39, p. 171. 
41
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assess the creation or the strengthening of a collective dominant position post-merger
42
. Tacit 
collusion concerns market conduct which enables the firms to substitute coordination for 
competition and thereby obtain prices close to the monopolistic levels and significantly above 
what unilateral conduct alone would allow in a perfectly competitive market or in a static 
single-period oligopoly game
43
.  
 
Game theory dictates that tacit collusion is a dynamic non-cooperative game with 
infinite repeated interaction. On the one hand, tacit collusion refers to a non-cooperative form 
of coordination by which the market participants are able to engage in and sustain a common 
course of conduct by recourse to independent actions
44
. On the other hand, infinitely repeated 
games present more opportunities for coordination and accordingly they facilitate the 
adoption of a tacit understanding, whilst the existence of an implicit collusive consensus 
                                                          
42
 Note also the discussion on tacit collusion and its integration in the legal concept of collective dominance 
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cannot be inferred from single period games
45
. Also, infinitely repeated interaction is a 
prerequisite for tacit collusion to be sustained as it enables each firm to react to its 
competitors’ past behaviour, while such an outcome is not possible to materialize in markets 
where the duration of competition is finite because in such circumstances retaliation cannot 
take place
46
. Moreover, infinitely repeated games facilitate the players to learn from 
experience as to how to coordinate their future conduct, because past and present behaviour is 
taken into account in setting their market strategies
47
.  
 
The theory of oligopolistic interdependence is strongly linked to the attainment of 
tacit collusion
48
. In particular, tacit collusion is based on the assumption that with repeated 
interaction the oligopolists recognise their interdependence and even though they act 
independently, they stick together at a supra-competitive price level and do not compete in an 
active way
49
.  
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Collusion may take various forms such as setting prices above the competitive level 
or limiting production
50
. However, prices are more flexible in comparison to other 
competitive variables and accordingly they are the most prominent form of collusion
51
. 
Furthermore, in situations of semi-collusion, i.e. when collusion is successful only in one 
dimension of competition but not in others, the firms do not replicate a monopolist in all 
regards, yet they may still have the effect of leading to an analogous anticompetitive outcome 
as full collusion, even though they may yield lower equilibrium profits than when they 
collude in all stages
52
. 
 
(C) FACTORS RELEVANT IN THE ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE 
DOMINANCE 
(1) Introduction 
When parallel behaviour between competitors appears likely to occur in an 
oligopolistic market post-merger, the Commission must determine whether such parallelism 
would be the result of a tacit understanding which leads to anticompetitive outcomes or of 
mere parallel behaviour which is fully in line with the competition rules
53
. Economic theory 
assists the Commission to resolve such a dilemma, as it provides indirect proofs of tacit 
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collusion by emphasising those market circumstances that may lead to such behaviour
54
. In 
particular, game theory purports that the alteration of the market characteristics by a merger 
affects the firms’ strategic behaviour and may facilitate the attainment of a tacit collusive 
policy and its sustainability, while such indirect proofs of tacit collusion have been directly 
imported within the legal analysis of collective dominance in mergers
55
. 
 
(2) The Airtours Factors In Economic Theory 
The dictations of economic theory and in particular the authoritative declarations of 
Stigler have set out the conditions which must be present in order to establish a collusive 
outcome in repeated game theoretic models. Specifically, Stigler purports that successful 
coordinated interaction depends on the fulfilment of three conditions revolving around the 
establishment of a common collusive policy, the detection of deviations and the punishment 
of such deviations, while he also focused on peripheral circumstances relating to the absence 
of destabilising factors such as entry or buyer power
56
. These conditions have been directly 
integrated into the legal concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation and in 
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particular the GC in Airtours set out these criteria as the necessary and cumulative elements 
which must be fulfilled in order to establish the adoption of a common consensus on 
coordination and the sustainability of such an understanding post-merger
57
.  
 
The Commission must assess the structural characteristics of the market under 
investigation in order to determine the extent to which it is possible to establish the Airtours 
criteria
58
. The relevance of structural factors in the assessment of coordination and the effects 
of such characteristics on collusive behaviour derive from the findings of game theory, which 
have been fully implemented within the legal analysis of collective dominance in mergers. 
The assessment of the market characteristics is a fact finding exercise and the practice of the 
Commission is to examine these factors on a case-by-case basis
59
. However, the competitive 
assessment is not based on a mechanistic application of a checklist of market characteristics 
that indicate the theoretical risk of coordination by merely ticking off a sufficient number of 
conditions
60
. On the contrary, the Commission employs an overall assessment of the 
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foreseeable impact of the concentration under investigation on competition in the light of the 
relevant structural factors
61
. 
 
(3) Market Characteristics Facilitating Tacit Collusion 
The assessment of a merger for collective dominance depends on the analysis of the 
relevant market characteristics post-merger and their influence on the future behaviour of the 
oligopolists, i.e. the structural characteristics of the market affect the firms’ ability and 
incentive to collude
62
. The nature of such structural conditions is related to the demand and 
the supply structure of the relevant market as well as to the characteristics of the relevant 
product under investigation
63
.  
 
(I) Market Shares/Degree Of Concentration 
Market shares and concentration thresholds provide a useful preliminary tool for the 
assessment of the relevant market structure and the competitive importance of both the 
merging parties and their competitors
64
.  
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A merger that increases the combined market shares of the largest firms in the 
relevant industry raises concerns about collective dominance, because the higher the sum of 
their market shares the higher their ability to exercise market power and to raise prices. 
Furthermore, the stability of market shares overtime is considered as a key indicator of 
collective dominance
65
. In practice, the Commission considers that a proposed concentration 
may lead to collective dominance post-merger when there would be a duopoly holding a 
combined market share higher than 60% on the relevant market and there have been no 
substantial fluctuations of market shares in the past
66
.  
 
The degree of market concentration also provides an indication on the assessment of 
whether or not the relevant industry is suitable for the oligopolists to adopt and sustain a 
collusive policy
67
. Thus, the higher the level of market concentration post-merger the more 
likely it is that the major firms will have the ability to coordinate and the higher their 
incentives to collude
68
. Conversely, in low concentrated markets the incentives to collude are 
weaker and collusion is more difficult to be sustained
69
. Concentration is measured by the 
                                                          
65
 Nestle/Perrier para. 46, Kali and Salz (Case IV/M.308 [1993], OJ L186/30 [1994], 4 CMLR 526 [1994]) para. 
57, Airtours para. 111 and ABF/GBI paras 209, 306 and 339. See also, H. Friederiszick and F. Maier-Rigaud, 
above note 9, p. 106. 
66
 Nestle/Perrier para. 119, Kali and Salz para. 52, France v. Commission para. 226, Gencor para. 207 and 
ABF/GBI para. 119. See also, C. Doerr, above note 51, p. 121 and J. Briones, Oligopolistic Dominance: Is There 
A Common Approach In Different Jurisdictions? A Review Of Decisions Adopted By The Commission Under 
The Merger Regulation, E.C.L.R., 1995, 16(6), 334-347, p. 337. 
67
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 14, 16 and 21.  
68
 Y. Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, Antitrust L.J., 1977, 46, 826-863, p. 836, E. Baranes, F. 
Mirabel and J. Poudou, Collusion Sustainability With Multimarket Contacts: Revisiting HHI Tests, 2009, 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/lam/wpaper/09-05.html, 1-15, p. 2 and S. Bishop, above note 55, p. 38. 
69
 E. Baranes et al., above note 68, pp. 2 and 4. 
82 
                                                                                 Chapter 3 
 
concentration ratio of the most important players in an oligopoly and the Commission relies 
on the HHI, which is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the largest 
competitors, while the change of the HHI post-merger is known as delta and provides a safe 
harbour above which the likelihood of adverse competitive effects is raised
70
. Nonetheless, 
the HHI is not a reliable predictor for the analysis of coordination, since it is unable to assess 
the interplay between the different structural factors and it implicitly considers collusion to be 
more likely in asymmetric market structures than in symmetric ones
71
.  
 
(II) Number Of Competitors 
The number of competitors which participate in the relevant market under 
investigation is decisive to the likelihood of coordination.  
 
The presence of a small number of large firms in an oligopoly enhances the rivals’ 
ability and their incentive to reach a consensus on a tacit collusive understanding, since it is 
easier to coordinate the behaviour of a limited number of competitors and also under such 
circumstances the market participants are closer to each other in terms of their 
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interdependence
72
. As regards the sustainability of collusion, the participation of a limited 
number of firms in the relevant industry increases market transparency that facilitates the 
identification as well as the punishment of deviations and this factor diminishes any cheating 
incentives
73
. 
 
The presence of numerous market participants renders it more difficult to reach a tacit 
collusive consensus, because this fact lowers oligopolistic interdependence, it increases the 
likelihood that the firms will have divergent preferences on the choice of the collusive 
equilibrium and the number of paired relationships rapidly grows thereby reducing the ability 
to identify a focal point of coordination
74
. On the other hand, collusion becomes harder to 
sustain with numerous firms, because in such circumstances there is a strong incentive to 
deviate from the coordinated equilibrium which is attributable to the fact that each firm 
would normally have a relatively small market share and it would significantly increase its 
gains by undercutting the collusive price and capturing the entire market, i.e. for each firm 
the long-run benefit of maintaining the collusive understanding is reduced while the short-
term gain from cheating is increased
75
. Also, the existence of numerous market participants 
reduces the ability to monitor deviations from the common policy, since cheating will give 
rise to smaller quantity changes in demand
76
. 
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The Commission’s practice illustrates that it has principally focused on duopolistic 
market structures, as it has repeatedly held that the reduction from three to two major 
suppliers in an oligopoly would increase the likelihood of collective dominance, while only in 
Airtours/First Choice it held that a market would give rise to collective dominance by virtue 
of three players, and it has expressly considered such an outcome to be unlikely where it 
involves more than three or four suppliers
77
.  
 
(III) Symmetry  
Symmetries refer to similarities in market shares, costs structures, capacities and the 
degree of vertical integration between the oligopolists, while what is required is that the firms 
are relatively although not completely symmetric
78
. 
 
Symmetries between the market participants facilitate the adoption of a common 
policy of coordination, because similar firms will have a commonality of interests and 
aligned incentives and perceptions as regards the coordinated equilibrium
79
. Moreover, 
symmetries increase market transparency, since they reduce the degree of uncertainty that 
each undertaking faces in relation to the cost and demand conditions of its competitors. 
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Additionally, symmetries enhance the stability of the collusive outcome by implying a 
similar ability to punish cheating
80
.  
 
Asymmetries reduce the oligopolists’ ability to adopt a common understanding of 
coordination, because in such circumstances it is more difficult to achieve convergence of the 
competitors’ views on the level of prices and output, while the choice of strategic dimensions 
is much less straightforward with the consequence that there may be no focal point for the 
formation of a common policy
81
. Furthermore, asymmetries diminish the retaliatory power of 
firms and the stability of collusion by creating different incentives to collude or deviate
82
. 
Nevertheless, asymmetries do not necessarily make tacit collusion impossible, since sharing 
the collusive profits unevenly with larger profits granted to the low-cost firms could 
potentially solve these problems
83
. 
 
(IV) Product Homogeneity 
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The nature of the product is important, because homogeneous product markets are 
more susceptible to collusion than markets with differentiated products
84
.  
 
A high degree of product homogeneity facilitates the ability to reach a tacit 
coordinated policy, as it assists the identification of a focal point of collusion
85
. Moreover, 
product homogeneity enhances transparency, since it makes the comparison of prices easier, 
which in turn leads to an improved detection of cheating that increases the ability to retaliate, 
it reduces the incentives to undercut and consequently it facilitates the sustainability of a 
collusive outcome
86
. 
 
The presence of products with heterogeneous characteristics generates market 
complexity which makes it difficult to reach a consensus on coordination
87
. Also, product 
differentiation reduces the sustainability of collusion, because the presence of numerous 
products renders it harder to impose a credible retaliatory measure and this factor minimizes 
the ability to punish cheating
88
. However, a certain degree of product differentiation does not 
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exclude the possibility of homogeneity in prices, particularly when there are focal points that 
would simplify pricing
89
.  
 
(V) Demand  
In principle, a high growing or declining market is less conducive to coordination than 
a market that has stable or moderately growing demand
90
. 
 
It is easier to adopt a common collusive understanding when demand conditions are 
relatively stable, because in such circumstances the incumbent firms’ incentives to compete 
are minimized for the reason that any attempts to engage in rigorous competition would be at 
the expense of one another and would possibly end in a damaging price war
91
. Also, a stable 
demand makes deviations more easily detectable as it helps to distinguish cheating from mere 
capacity adjustments attributable to the market conditions and accordingly such a market 
reduces the incentives to deviate while it simultaneously enhances the incentives to sustain a 
collusive understanding
92
.  
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In a moderate growing market it is easier to sustain tacit collusion, since where there 
are high barriers to entry the gains from undercutting a competitor in the present period are 
relatively low as compared to the future profits of maintaining the collusive policy and this 
factor increases the incentives to stabilise the coordinated equilibrium
93
. Furthermore, a 
modest growth rate does not encourage new entry and accordingly it protects the coordinated 
policy from any destabilisation caused by firms outside the collusive group
94
.  
 
High demand growth limits the firms’ ability as well as their incentives to sustain a 
tacit collusive policy. Specifically, high demand growth produces demand fluctuations, which 
minimize the firms’ ability to monitor rivals in order to determine whether changes in 
demand reflect deviation or whether they are caused by an overall alteration in industry 
demand and this in turn increases the difficulty to detect cheating as well as it reduces the 
efficacy of punishment
95
. Moreover, the incentives to deviate are higher during periods of 
high growth, since a cheating firm has the ability to gain a large market share combined with 
a possible less effective punishment in the future periods of lower demand
96
. Lastly, high 
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demand growth may lead to new entry which minimizes the ability to collude and to sustain 
such collusion
97
.  
 
In declining markets collusion is difficult to be sustained, as the undertakings have 
less to gain from maintaining the collusive equilibrium and consequently there is a strong 
incentive to deviate from any tacit understanding in order to make additional short term 
profits while demand is still high, whilst the cost of punishment is less severe as it will occur 
in the future when demand has declined
98
.  
 
(VI) Elasticity Of Demand 
Elasticity refers to the degree of consumer demand for a product that changes as a 
result of a change in its price and accordingly the ability of the oligopolists to raise their 
prices post-merger is directly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.  
 
Inelasticity of demand increases the oligopolists’ incentives to form a common 
collusive understanding, since in such circumstances demand will not be severely affected by a 
price increase to supra-competitive levels and consequently the coordinating firms will receive 
greater profits
99
. Moreover, an inelastic demand stabilises a collusive policy, because it decreases 
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the incentives to cheat in view of the fact that any punishment will involve a significant reduction of 
profits for the deviating firm and in those circumstances it would be more profitable to coordinate 
rather than deviate
100
.   
 
High demand elasticity decreases the ability to collude, because if the consumers can 
easily switch between producers, a price increase imposed by the coordinating firms will lead 
to a significant fall in the demand for their products, which will be diverted to competitors 
outside the colluding group or new entrants and result in profit losses for the collusive 
firms
101
. Also, high elasticity provides a strong incentive to cheat, since in the situation where 
a firm deviates by implementing even a small cut in its prices, it will be able to market more 
of its output. 
 
(VII) Innovation  
High product or process innovation reduces the likelihood of coordination post-
merger, while the feasibility of collusion is increased in a market where there is technological 
maturity
102
. 
 
A collusive policy is less likely to be adopted in a market characterised by a high 
degree of innovation, because such markets are subject to rapid and unpredictable 
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technological changes that produce significant market instability
103
. Also, innovation 
destabilises coordination, since a firm which has developed a new or improved product would 
be less motivated to sustain the collusive equilibrium for the reason that innovation allows 
such a competitor to gain a significant advantage over its rivals thereby increasing its 
incentive to deviate and reducing the possible effect of retaliation on such a firm
104
.  
 
Conversely, a technologically mature market facilitates the sustainability of a 
coordinated policy, because in those circumstances no firm would cheat on the collusive 
consensus as it would not gain a significant advantage over its rivals and also such a market 
contributes to the detection of deviations
105
.  
 
(VIII) Multimarket Contacts 
Multimarket contacts refer to the meeting of firms in more than one market
106
. 
Multimarket contacts create reciprocal dependencies between the market players and increase 
the frequency of their interaction, which heighten their incentives to implement a common 
collusive understanding and increase their ability to identify a focal point of such a policy
107
. 
Also, multimarket contacts increase the transparency of the market, as they assist the firms to 
obtain information about their competitors
108
. Furthermore, such contacts facilitate the 
sustainability of collusion by softening asymmetries that arise in individual markets, while 
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they also increase the possibility and severity of punishment by giving a further opportunity 
to retaliate in case a deviation occurs, since cheating in one market can be wiped out by 
punishment in all markets or in another different market
109
.  
 
(VIV) Structural Links 
Structural links between the oligopolists increase the likelihood of coordinated 
behaviour
110
. In particular, structural links foster the ability to collude by creating a large 
degree of commonality of interests between the market participants and diminish their 
incentive to compete, since in the presence of such links the reduction of the competitors’ 
profits through aggressive competition would also adversely affect the deviating firm’s own 
profits
111
. Moreover, structural links lead to heightened market transparency, as they provide 
a means for the exchange of information between the oligopolists and accordingly they 
facilitate the detection of deviations
112
. Lastly, structural links enhance retaliation, because 
they increase the scope of punishment
113
. 
 
(X) Capacity  
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Another factor relevant in the assessment of the likelihood of coordination post-
merger revolves around the existence of excess capacity and capacity constraints. 
 
A factor which affects the likelihood of collusion is excess capacity
114
. On the one 
hand, the existence of symmetrical excess capacity among the oligopolists stabilises 
coordination, since it enables one firm to discipline another in case a deviation occurs, i.e. 
when demand is inelastic excess capacity possessed by all the oligopolists increases the 
severity of punishment and strengthens the ability to retaliate against any deviator
115
. 
Additionally, excess capacity possessed by the colluding group can deter potential 
competitors from entering the market
116
. On the other hand, a firm which individually has the 
ability to afford high excess capacity may find collusion less attractive, because such a firm 
can attain greater short-run profits by deviating and accordingly this factor increases the 
difficulty to sustain tacit collusion
117
.  
 
Moreover, capacity constraints may facilitate or hinder collusion
118
. On the one hand, 
a firm will have an incentive to deviate from the coordinated policy if it can easily increase 
its output and if it cannot be punished by its competitors, because of the existence of capacity 
constraints on the latter which reduce their retaliatory power
119
. On the other hand, capacity 
constraints on all the colluding firms lowers their incentive to cheat, as the profits from 
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deviating will be small if the cheating firm cannot easily expand its output and in such 
circumstances the competitors have less to gain from undercutting their rivals
120
.  
 
(XI) Entry Barriers/Potential Competition 
Barriers to entry relate to the ability of firms outside a particular market to constrain 
the incumbent firms’ exercise of market power within that market121. Barriers to entry may 
take various forms such as legal barriers, vertical integration, economies of scale, sunk costs, 
customer loyalty etc.
122
.  
 
The existence of high entry barriers facilitates the sustainability of a collusive policy, 
because third parties will not easily penetrate the market, they will not be able to disrupt the 
coordinated understanding by undercutting the collusive price and accordingly such a factor 
shields the coordinating group from competition exercised by outsiders
123
.  
 
In the presence of low entry barriers any attempt of the colluding firms to raise their prices 
at supra-competitive levels would trigger entry, since it would be profitable for an outsider to enter 
the market and set lower prices in order to capture the whole market demand, which would 
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frustrate the objective of coordination, it would jeopardise the sustainability of coordination and it 
would counteract the effects of anticompetitive mergers
124
.  
 
Barriers to entry are closely associated with the factor of potential competition, which 
refers to firms that threaten to enter the market attracted by the supra-competitive profits that 
could be earned, i.e. the threat of competition rather than actual competition
125
. Potential 
competition makes collusion unlikely, because it reduces the incentive to sustain the 
coordinated policy and it increases the desirability of cheating as it enhances the importance 
of short-term profits
126
. Potential competition is acknowledged only if entry is likely, it can 
be expected to occur within a limited time span and it is sufficient in its magnitude, character 
and scope to offset any anticompetitive effects
127
.  
 
(XII) Fringe Or Maverick Firms 
The presence of fringe firms or of a maverick competitor may constrain and 
destabilise a coordinated policy
128
.  
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A maverick firm is an aggressive competitor, who exhibits a market conduct that 
differs from its rivals due to its competitive advantages, such as lower cost structures, higher 
production capacity or improved product quality
129
. The existence of a maverick firm in an 
oligopoly decreases the likelihood of sustainable collusion, if such a firm is capable of output 
expansion and declines to be part of the collusive understanding
130
. Accordingly, a merger 
may constrain a collusive equilibrium in the situation where it involves the creation of a 
maverick firm post-merger. Conversely, a merger acquiring and thereby eliminating a 
maverick will tend to facilitate collusion, since in such a circumstance the possibility of 
collusive pricing is raised
131
.  
 
Fringe firms are those competitors which do not participate in the coordinated group 
and are individually so small that they do not have a significant effect on the market 
parameters. The importance of fringe competitors lies in that taken as a whole they may be 
able to respond to a price raise initiated by the colluding firms and lower their prices or 
increase their output in order to capture more of the profitable market, thus provoking a 
reduction in the market price which in turn counteracts the coordinated policy
132
. For such an 
outcome to occur, the group of fringe firms as a whole must have strong market presence and 
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the ability as well as the incentive to exercise a competitive constraint so as to hinder the 
coordinated conduct of the oligopolists
133
. The strength of fringe firms depends on their 
market shares, the existence of capacity constraints on such firms and the differences between 
their cost structures as opposed to the cost structures of the large players
134
. Conversely, the 
inability of fringe firms to pose a sufficient competitive constraint on the oligopolists makes 
collusion more likely to evolve
135
.  
 
(XIII) Countervailing Buyer Power 
The assessment of countervailing buyer power focuses on the extent to which buyers 
may counteract the supra-competitive prices imposed upon them by the colluding firms
136
. 
The degree of countervailing power of buyers is principally linked to their size, as the more 
concentrated is the buyer side the lesser is the ability of sellers to elevate their prices
137
. 
 
A strong countervailing buyer power may undermine the sustainability of 
coordination by offering large and long term supply contracts to the members of the collusive 
group, which increase their incentive to cheat on the coordinated consensus and they reduce 
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the colluding firms’ frequency of interaction138. Alternatively, strong buyers may reduce the 
ability of the colluding firms to increase their prices post-merger by credibly threatening to 
start producing the goods in question themselves
139
. Also, strong buyers may switch to 
alternative sources of supply or encourage new entry into the supplier's market
140
.  
 
An insignificant buyer power facilitates collusion, as it lacks the ability to constrain a 
potential post-merger price increase by the collusive group
141
. Also, arrangements to restrict 
competition are more likely to be stabilised when the buyer side is unconcentrated and 
fragmented, because such a factor reduces the likelihood of cheating
142
.   
 
 (XIV) Past Behaviour 
The assessment of past behaviour facilitates the understanding of the main 
competitive forces present in the relevant market and it assists the appraisal of the impact of 
the concentration on the likelihood of post-merger coordination
143
. Specifically, past 
collusive conduct may assist the establishment of coordination, provided that the market 
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characteristics have not been substantially modified from the previous occasion of collusion, 
the incentives of the undertakings would not be altered as a result of the concentration and the 
type of past collusive conduct observed is broadly similar to the type of collusion anticipated 
in the post-merger market
144
. Thus, evidence of past collusive conduct may assist the 
Commission to assess whether the oligopolists may adopt a common policy of tacit or even 
explicit collusion post-merger. Also, past cartel behaviour may provide an indication as to 
whether credible deterrent mechanisms are feasible to be established post-merger as well as it 
may facilitate the identification and evaluation of external competitive constraints
145
.  
 
(D) CRITICISM OF GAME THEORY  
Various types of criticism have been formulated in relation to the results of game 
theoretic models as well as on the assumptions that underline such models. This criticism 
casts doubt on the unitary value of game theory to predict merger outcomes and exposes its 
problematic features.  
 
(1) The Oligopoly Problem 
Criticism as regards the results of game theoretic analysis on tacit collusion has grown 
and such criticism is directly related to the oligopoly problem. Specifically, it has been 
claimed that game theory produces a large variety of possible outcomes in oligopolistic 
markets, as each model is based on a number of assumptions, but remains imprecise on the 
process of equilibrium selection by the oligopolists and on the question as to how firms 
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actually coordinate
146
. Also, game theory sets out the general conditions under which the 
oligopolists may collude, but it cannot predict whether or not the firms will indeed coordinate 
once certain conditions are met
147
. In particular, while collusion can sometimes be excluded 
for theoretical reasons, there is no way to assert that such conduct is the only possible 
outcome under a particular set of market circumstances, since even where the relevant market 
structure is highly favourable towards collusion, the firms may choose not to coordinate but 
to vigorously compete
148
. Hence, the discussion on which factors make it easier or more 
difficult to achieve a collusive equilibrium relies merely on a degree of plausibility, because 
there is always a possibility that the firms may fail to coordinate for various reasons, even in 
market settings which increase the likelihood of coordination
149
. Additionally, the predictions 
of game theoretic models as to how changes in the market structure affect the likelihood of 
collusion highly depend on what parameters each model is using which in turn limit the value 
of their results, i.e. these models are sensitive to the initial assumptions about the firms’ 
reactions which have been adopted
150
. This vagueness on the actual post-merger behaviour of 
the firms in the context of specific market circumstances, which relates to the multiplicity of 
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possible equilibria, makes game theory problematic for predicting merger outcomes
151
. In 
turn, these problems have affected the application of the concept of collective dominance in 
mergers, as evidenced by the low level of its enforcement and the Commission’s difficulty to 
discharge the burden of proof in order to prohibit a concentration on the basis of coordinated 
effects, i.e. the oligopoly problem has produced complexities in the regulation of collective 
dominant positions
152
.  
 
Another line of criticism supports that since game theoretic models are merely 
‘possibility theories’, i.e. they are based on specific assumptions and describe what might 
happen in specific cases, they can only be relied upon in order to predict the effects of a 
merger if they state a testable hypothesis, survive a falsification test and facilitate the 
resolution of the dispute in question
153
. On the one hand, possibility models, given their 
assumptions, must generate testable hypotheses for the future state of competition
154
. 
Nevertheless, game theoretic models present the problem that it is often difficult to formulate 
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testable hypotheses related to the models’ critical assumptions155. On the other hand, in order 
to test the predictions and support the hypotheses of a specific game theoretic model, 
empirical evidence drawn from natural experiments associated with comparable changes in 
structure would be needed, i.e. ‘systematic events’ or ‘shock events’, while without such 
evidence they would require case-specific support before being used to predict the effects of a 
merger
156
. Thus, game-theoretic models need evidence supportive of their testable hypotheses 
and it has been suggested that merely theoretical analysis should be excluded, whilst such 
models present the problem that they have not been subjected to any systematic empirical 
verification
157
. Lastly, a case-specific analysis would also need to show that the game 
theoretic analysis is also relevant to the case at hand and in that regard a chain of causation 
must be established
158
. Essentially, these requirements present a strict framework that 
demands game theoretic models to be strongly tied to the facts of the case, while in order to 
survive falsification they must explain past outcomes of the competitive process in the 
relevant market.  
 
(2) Behavioural Economics  
Game theory is based on the assumption that market participants are rational, self-
interested profit maximizers with perfect willpower and such an assumption has been directly 
integrated within the analysis of coordinated effects in mergers
159
. However, behavioural 
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economics condemn this approach and emphasise on departures of human conduct from 
rational performance by supporting the premise that the behaviour of individuals within the 
firm is imperfectly rational as they rely on heuristics in making decisions and bias can affect 
their choices, they have limited willpower since they may behave against their stated 
preferences due to an overvaluation or undervaluation of present or future welfare prospects 
and they may act contrary to their economic self-interest in situations where they are aspired 
by a norm of fairness
160
.  
 
Several principles which derive from behavioural economics imply that the 
oligopolists may tacitly collude in settings where game theory would predict a competitive 
outcome or they may refrain from colluding in situations where a rational choice would point 
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towards collusion. In particular, risk-averse bias may affect the individuals’ cost-benefit 
analysis by leading them to overestimate the costs of the rivals’ retaliation and decide to stick 
irrationally to the tacit collusive policy
161
. Conversely, cheating may occur contrary to the 
estimations of the cost-benefit analysis under game theory in situations where overconfidence 
bias may cause individuals to overestimate the likelihood to avoid detection in case of 
deviation or where hyperbolic discounting may lead individuals to place an exceptionally 
high weight on short-term profits and decide to cheat despite the larger future revenues
162
. 
Furthermore, reputational considerations may affect the individuals’ decision to sustain or 
abstain from a collusive strategy, as an executive may refrain from adopting a profitable price 
cutting strategy, because he is reluctant to attract a reputation of being a cheater or on the 
contrary it may prevent an executive from approving the adoption of a collusive strategy and 
charge supra-competitive prices if that could damage the firm’s reputation to its customers163. 
Lastly, individual decision makers may be disinclined to approve the participation in a 
collusive scheme and raise prices due to fairness considerations
164
.  
 
Behavioural economics also provide insights in relation to some structural features 
that are taken into account in the analysis of coordinated effects. Thus, the behavioural 
economics literature illustrates that demand elasticity may be affected by framing effects, as 
the consumers are more sensitive to price increases than when the manufacturer eliminates a 
discount even if they have an equivalent impact, while the consumers would also be risk-
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seeking when avoiding a loss and thus more willing to switch to alternative products
165
. 
Moreover, strong buyers may not provide a countervailing power to a collusive scheme, as 
their reactions might be dependent upon how the price increase is framed
166
. Furthermore, the 
individuals’ tendency to be risk-adverse in relation to gains may cause entry not to occur, 
even when it is economically rational and a profit maximising response, thereby failing to 
defeat the collusive group’s price increase167.  
 
Despite the fact that behavioural economics may provide insights into ways to further 
sharpen the analytical tools of merger review, they cannot at present accurately facilitate the 
identification of anticompetitive from pro-competitive concentrations, since they fail to offer 
a rigorous basis for the systematic prediction of whether an individual will demonstrate any 
irrational bias that would affect its decisions, due to the interaction of multiple biases within a 
single individual as well as doubts about whether the individual’s bias will survive the group 
level or the incentives to view things through an unbiased lens
168
. To that extent, behavioural 
economics do not set out a more accurate theory for predicting merger effects than game 
theoretic predictions, as they also suffer from the multiplicity of outcomes and they are 
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unable to provide a single organizing principle for merger assessment. In addition, 
behavioural economics are problematic due to their sole reliance on subjective elements of 
human conduct, whilst game theory derives conclusions on likely market behaviour on the 
basis of objective market characteristics. Nevertheless, behavioural economics could 
prospectively improve merger analysis, if they could provide tested learning on individual 
decision making. 
 
(3) Experimental Economics 
Experimental economics have provided some important insights in relation to the 
likelihood of collusion in laboratory settings. Specifically, experimental evidence illustrate 
that the number of firms has a crucial effect on market behaviour, as even though collusion 
can emerge without any communication among subjects in duopolies, such outcomes are very 
rare with three firms and non-existent with four or more firms
169
. Also, even though collusion 
in duopolies has been found to exist in both price competition games with homogeneous 
goods and in quantity games, the variable of competitive interaction plays an important role 
as in quantity duopoly games collusion has been found to materialise only in some cases, 
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whilst in price duopoly games collusion occurred in the majority of situations
170
. 
Furthermore, contrary to game theoretic dictations, experimental findings illustrate that 
repeated interaction in not a necessary ingredient for the achievement of tacit collusion, since 
it can occur even when there is random matching, i.e. the participants play the game several 
times but do not face the same rivals in each round, and suggest that it is the build-up of 
experience that plays the most significant role in achieving collusive equilibria rather than 
mutual cooperation achieved through repeated interaction of the same market participants
171
. 
Lastly, experimental evidence reveal that an infinite number of periods is not required to 
make cooperation possible, as collusion can be sustained in duopolies even when there is a 
finite number of rounds to be played
172
.  
 
These results highlight some fundamental limitations of game theory to predict 
whether a merger will enable the competitors to collude, which could suggest that the 
Commission’s exact application of the Airtours test in Sony/BMG and ABF/GBI may not be 
appropriate. Nevertheless, these findings should not merely be seen as a criticism towards the 
game theoretic analysis, but they should also be contrasted with the Commission’s gradually 
reduced focus on tackling collusion in merger review, as experimental results essentially 
reveal that such anticompetitive conduct may occur even more often than the estimations of 
game theory and accordingly they would suggest an increased emphasis on enforcement. In 
any case it should be pointed out that, despite the significance of their results, experimental 
economics are somewhat degraded by the fact that laboratory experiments cannot precisely 
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reflect real world economic situations, as for example the subjects of these experiments, be it 
either college students or random individuals, cannot be equated with ‘real-life’ executives or 
firms competing in pragmatic market circumstances. Thus, the findings of experimental 
economics are debatable due to the particular methodology used and accordingly their 
applicability to make wide policy prescriptions should be questioned.   
 
(4) The Interface Between Law And Economics 
The final issue to be considered concerns the fact that, despite the strong interface 
between law and economics, which is illustrated by the direct integration of the economic 
theory of tacit collusion and the factors set out therein in the legal analysis of collective 
dominance in mergers, there are also some distinctive elements. Firstly, economic theory is 
indifferent as to whether collusion is tacit or explicit, since from an economic point of view 
the focus is on the result of both types of collusion, as measured in terms of supra-
competitive prices, but not on the specific type of collusion
173
. On the contrary, the legal 
analysis centres on the distinction of the type of collusion examined, since the quality of 
evidence that is required in order to prove tacit collusion is different to those which must be 
presented in order to demonstrate explicit collusion
174
. Secondly, the focus of economic 
theory is on whether prices will rise or fall as a result of a given set of factors. Conversely, 
the emphasis of the legal analysis is on the reason why prices will be increased or decreased 
post-merger, as for example both mere parallel behaviour and tacit coordination may lead to 
the same heightened level of prices in a market but only the latter constitutes anticompetitive 
behaviour
175
. Lastly, economic theory is mainly based on assumptions and focuses on 
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theoretical paradigms which draw up the relevant models, while the legal analysis is 
concerned with a given market situation in real circumstances. 
 
(E) CONCLUSION 
Economic theory constitutes a highly influencing parameter on the formulation of the 
legal concept of collective dominance in mergers.  
 
The two main economic theories of oligopolistic interaction are constituted by the 
static and dynamic oligopoly models. On the one hand, the static oligopoly models are single 
period non-cooperative games that are not considered appropriate for the assessment of 
collective dominance, because in the absence of repeated interaction retaliation does not take 
place which means that cheating is always the individual rational decision and accordingly 
these models result in near competitive (Cournot) or competitive (Bertrand) prices. On the 
other hand, the dynamic game theory models provide that a potential outcome of the 
competitive interaction in oligopolistic markets is tacit collusion that is characterised as a 
non-cooperative game with infinite repeated interactions and forms the economic foundation 
of the legal concept of collective dominance in mergers.  
 
Economic theory has set out the necessary requirements for the emergence of tacit 
collusion and such conditions have been integrated within the legal analysis of collective 
dominance under the Merger Regulation in the form of the Airtours criteria. Moreover, 
economic theory provides that the establishment of the necessary conditions for coordination 
must be assessed on the basis of the relevant structural characteristics which affect the firms’ 
market behaviour. Specifically, in the situation where the largest firms account for high 
market shares or high concentration indices the concern for coordination is raised, whilst the 
110 
                                                                                 Chapter 3 
 
reverse holds true in case their combined market shares are negligible and concentration 
levels are low. The presence of a limited number of competitors facilitates the adoption of a 
common coordinated policy and its sustainability, while numerous firms reduce the 
likelihood to implement and sustain a collusive equilibrium. Symmetries between the largest 
firms increase their incentives to coordinate and to stabilise a collusive understanding, 
whereas asymmetries make collusion difficult to achieve and to sustain. Product homogeneity 
facilitates the adoption of a common coordinated policy and its stability, in contrast to 
product differentiation which generates difficulties in attaining and sustaining collusion. A 
stable or moderately growing demand increases the incentives to stabilise a collusive 
understanding, whereas high growth or declining markets decrease the ability and the 
incentives to sustain a coordinated equilibrium. An inelastic demand facilitates the 
implementation and the sustainability of a collusive understanding, as opposed to a high 
elasticity of demand which reduces the ability to collude and the incentive to sustain a 
collusive policy. Highly innovative markets are not conductive to coordination, but on the 
contrary mature technology markets assist the enforcement of a collusive consensus. The 
existence of structural links and multimarket contacts heighten the ability as well as the 
incentives to collude and assist the sustainability of such an outcome. Excess capacity and 
capacity constraints may facilitate both collusion and deviation and accordingly their effects 
on coordination depend on whether they affect all or some of the oligopolists. High entry 
barriers assist the stability of coordination, whereas low entry barriers jeopardise the stability 
of a collusive policy. The presence of a maverick firm or a strong group of fringe competitors 
may disrupt a coordinated equilibrium, in contradiction to a merger that absorbs a maverick 
or the marginal presence of fringe firms which increase the likelihood of sustainable 
collusion. A strong buyer power may destabilize a collusive understanding, while a weak 
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buyer side facilitates the stability of a collusive policy. Lastly, past collusive behaviour may 
facilitate the establishment of collusion in certain circumstances. 
 
Criticism on game theory is directed towards its results and its underlying 
assumptions. Thus, it has been pointed out that game theoretic models are inconclusive in 
their predictions, as they produce multiple possible equilibria, and it has been suggested that a 
very strict framework would be needed to be met before their predictions would be admitted 
into evidence, which produces complexities on the control of collective dominance under the 
Merger Regulation. Also, behavioural economics denounce the game theoretic assumption 
that market participants are rational profit-maximising subjects by focusing on imperfect 
rationality that leads to results contradictory to the predictions of game theory, but such a 
theory also presents the weakness of producing multiple possible outcomes. Moreover, 
experimental economics have illustrated laboratory results which contradict some of the 
standard insights of game theoretic models, but the validity of such results is questionable 
due to the employed methodology. Lastly, despite the interface between law and economics 
in the formulation of the concept of collective dominance, there are also some distinctive 
features as, in contrast to economics, the legal analysis focuses on the distinction of the type 
of collusion examined due to evidential issues and emphasises on the underlying reason for 
potential price increases in order to determine the legality or illegality of conduct. 
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                                                     CHAPTER 4 
                                                                - 
    POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: DEVELOPMENT AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
Policy considerations play an important role in the formulation of competition rules in 
the EU. The ultimate goal of EU competition policy is contained in the Preamble of the 
TFEU, which focuses on the objective of ‘fair competition’ within the EU internal market by 
removing any existing obstacles
1
. In accordance with this policy objective, the EU Merger 
Control system has been introduced since 1989 and it has become a central instrument of EU 
competition policy
2
. 
 
EU merger policy aims to prevent firms from exercising substantial market power by 
classifying concentrations into one of two groups: they are either compatible with the 
Common Market as long as they do not overly restrain competition or they are incompatible 
with the Common Market if they threaten to significantly impede the maintenance of 
effective competition
3
. In the assessment of collective dominance cases the primary target of 
                                                          
1
 Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union ([2010], OJ C/83/47 [2010], 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF). 
2
 A. Christiansen, The ‘More Economic Approach’ In EU Merger Control – A Critical Assessment, 2006, 
available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000196093.PDF, 
1-26, p. 2. 
3
 G. Zekos, The New E.U. Approach To Mergers And Market Integration, E.C.L.R., 2000, 21(1), 37-44, p. 40, J. 
Vickers, Competition Economics And Policy, E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(3), 95-102, p. 101, Communication From The 
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EU merger policy is to ensure that companies compete rather than collude and as a policy 
concern concentrations that pose a serious risk of leading to collusion are prohibited.  
 
This Chapter focuses on the development of policy considerations and their objectives 
in collective dominance under the Merger Regulation. Section B focuses on the schools of 
economic thought which have formed the foundation of policy considerations in collective 
dominance. Moreover, it highlights the development of policy considerations that have 
affected the evolution of collective dominance in its various Phases as classified by the 
corresponding change of analysis. Section C examines the policy objective that focuses on 
the regulation of collective dominance in mergers so as to preserve effective competition and 
protect the consumers’ welfare. Also, it considers the emphasis attributed on price and non-
price effects in the assessment of the potential detrimental impact of concentrations examined 
for collective dominance. Furthermore, it evaluates whether non-competition policy 
objectives are considered in the analysis of collective dominance merger cases. Finally, 
Section D sums up the position on the development and objectives of policy considerations in 
collective dominance under the Merger Regulation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission, A Pro-Active Competition Policy For A Competitive Europe, 2004, COM (2004) 293 Final, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0293:FIN:EN:PDF, 1-20, p. 6, 
D. Gerber, Modernising European Competition Law: A Developmental Perspective, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(4), 122-
130, p. 124, S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, Switching To Substantial Impediments Of Competition (SIC) Can Have 
Substantial Costs - SIC!, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(9), 584-590, p. 584, M. Wise, Competition Law And Policy In 
Finland, OECD Journal Of Competition Law And Policy, 2005, 6(4), available at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/competition-law-and-policy-in-
finland_clp-v6-art9-en, 1-67, p. 17 and B. Lyons, Cases In European Competition Policy – The Economic 
Analysis, Cambridge, First Edition, 2009, p. 14. 
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(B) POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
(1) Schools Of Thought  
Various schools of economic thought have formed the basis of policy considerations 
in collective dominance, from the initial steps of the introduction of such a concept up to its 
recent evolution. In particular, such policy considerations have been founded on the ideas of 
the ordoliberalists, the Harvard and Chicago schools of thought as well as the new industrial 
organisation theorists.  
 
Ordoliberalism viewed competition as a process driven by rivalry between firms, 
based on the idea that such rivalry would eventually lead to vigorous competition and aimed 
to control entrenched market power in order to protect the economic freedom of rival 
undertakings to compete
4
. Accordingly, the Ordoliberalists’ focus was shed on guaranteeing 
the maintenance of a minimum number of competitors in the market, where none of them 
would have any significant market power, in order to preserve a certain degree of rivalry and 
prevent the coercion of smaller market participants
5 . Also, the Ordoliberalists’ views 
supported the notion that the state must protect the process of competition from distortion and 
                                                          
4
 D. Hildebrand, The Role of Economic Analysis In The EC Competition Rules, Kluwer, Second Edition, 2002, 
pp. 160-161, I. Lianos, Some Reflections On The Question Of The Goals Of EU Competition Law, CLES 
Working Paper Series 3/2013, 2013, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-
papers/cles-3-2013#, 1-64, pp. 24-26, A. Weitbrecht, From Freiburg To Chicago And Beyond - The First 50 
Years Of European Competition Law, E.C.L.R., 2008, 29(2), 81-88, p. 82 and A. Pera and V. Auricchio, 
Consumer Welfare, Standard Of Proof And The Objectives Of Competition Policy, E.C.J., 2005, 1(1), 1-30, p. 
9. 
5
 C. Ahlborn and C. Grave, Walter Eucken And Ordoliberalism: An Introduction From A Consumer Welfare 
Perspective, C.P.I., 2006, 2(2), 197-217, p. 212 and S. Eibl and J. Schultze, From Freiburg To Brussels And 
Back Again? The Seventh Revision Of Germany's Competition Law, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(9), 526-531, p. 531. 
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intervene in markets that are characterised by imperfect competition, i.e. they proposed 
limited yet powerful government intervention
6
. 
 
The Harvard school ideas were based on the belief that competition was the key to 
economic progress and viewed firms with large market power as threats to the competitive 
process due to their ability to limit smaller dealers’ freedom to compete7. Also, the Harvard 
school claimed that the aim of competition is good performance in a particular market so as 
to increase general material welfare, without concentrating solely on consumer welfare, 
whilst the unfair outcomes of market processes should be corrected by governmental 
intervention. Moreover, it purported that workable competition could be defined by structure, 
conduct and performance norms, i.e. the ‘SCP paradigm’, but also that there existed a causal 
link between these factors, since the structure of a given market determined the conduct of 
firms and conduct in turn influenced performance
8
. This approach focused primarily on the 
                                                          
6
 D. Hildebrand, above note 4, pp. 159-160 and 162 and P. Nedergaard, The Influence Of Ordoliberalism In 
European Integration Processes, 2013, available at mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52331/1/MPRA_paper_52331.pdf, 
1-32, pp. 5-6. 
7
 W. Kovacic and C. Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century Of Economic And Legal Thinking, Journal Of 
Economic Perspectives, 2000, 14(1), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/century.pdf, 43-60, p. 
49, B. Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, Fordham Law Review, 2013, 81, available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4883&context=flr, 2253-2277, p. 2269, J. Baker, A 
Preface To Post-Chicago Antitrust, 2001, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=296119, 1-24, pp. 8-9 and W. Page, The Ideological Origins 
And Evolution Of US Antitrust Law, Issues In Competition Law And Policy, 2009, 1, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=692821, 1-17, p. 17. 
8
 C. Ahlborn and C. Grave, above note 5, p. 214, L. Gormsen, The Parallels Between The Harvard Structural 
School And Article 82 EC And The Divergences Between The Chicago And Post-Chicago Schools And Article 
82, E.C.J., 2008, 4(1), 221-241, pp. 222-223 and D. Evans and C. Grave, The Changing Role Of Economics In 
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structural limb of the paradigm by giving particular emphasis on concentration levels and 
entry barriers, which were believed to facilitate anticompetitive behaviour and eventually 
poor performance, while efficiency claims were considered irrelevant and possibly a factor 
weighing against the approval of mergers
9
. Overall, these views were based on ideas 
favourable to deconcentration and produced an aggressive merger policy in the US. 
 
The Chicago school arose as a reaction to the extreme level of enforcement that 
occurred during the prevalence of the Harvard School, as it detested comprehensive 
regulation and emphasized on efficiency explanations
10
. Specifically, on the one hand the 
Chicago school rejected the previous approach which was based on trader 
freedom/competitor protection and purported that the maximisation of efficiencies directed 
towards the consumers’ welfare, which operationalised as aggregate consumer surplus, was 
the only legitimate goal of competition policy thereby proposing the assessment of business 
practices on the exclusive basis of their effects on efficiency
11
. On the other hand, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Competition Policy Decisions By The European Commission During The Monti Years, C.P.I., 2005, 1(1), 133-
154, pp. 148-149. 
9
 M. Oinonen, Does EU Merger Control Discriminate Against Small Market Companies?: Diagnosing The 
Argument With Conclusions, Kluwer, First Edition, 2010, pp. 43-45 and 47, W. Kovacic and C. Shapiro, above 
note 7, p. 51 and J. Vickers, above note 3, p. 96. 
10
 W. Kovacic and C. Shapiro, above note 7, pp. 52-54, B. Kobayashi and T. Muris,  Chicago, Post-Chicago 
And Beyond: Time To Let Go Of The 20
th
 Century, 2012, available at 
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1231ChicagoPostChicago.pdf, 1-28, p. 23 
and F. Scherer, Some Principles For Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, Case Western Reserve Law Review, 
2001-2002, 52, 5-23, p. 8. 
11
 W. Page, above note 7, pp. 10 and 12, E. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, World 
Competition, 2003, 26(2), 149–165, pp. 152-153, B. Kobayashi and T. Muris, above note 10, p. 2, M. Oinonen, 
above note 9, p. 50, I. Lianos, above note 4, p. 2, J. Galloway, The Pursuit Of National Champions: The 
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Chicago school relied on the self-correcting nature of markets and it opposed governmental 
intervention, unless market conduct was provably inefficient
12
. Therefore, these views led to 
the development of a more permissive climate for mergers.  
  
Lastly, the new industrial organisation theorists, i.e. the post-Chicago school, 
identified exceptions and qualified some of the conclusions of the Chicago scholars by 
adopting a less ideological and more technical approach to problems that was based on a 
more sophisticated form of analysis in order to assess the firms’ incentives, their likely 
conduct and effects on the market
13
. Specifically, the industrial organisation theorists 
analysed models of game theory in order to identify the necessary conditions for the 
establishment of successful collusion in oligopolies and rejected the static SCP paradigm that 
advanced a simple causal relationship between structure, behaviour and performance in 
favour of a more sophisticated SCP framework which emphasised on conduct and its 
dynamic interaction with market structure, while they also focused on the evaluation of the 
potential loss of R&D competition and pointed out the importance of dynamic efficiencies
14
. 
These developments pointed towards a more interventionist direction than the Chicago school 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Intersection Of Competition Law And Industrial Policy, E.C.L.R., 2007, 28(3), 172-186, p. 173, A. Weitbrecht, 
above note 4, p. 85 and L. Gormsen, above note 8, p. 228.  
12
 E. Fox, above note 11, p. 153, W. Page, above note 7, p. 2 and D. Hildebrand, The European School In EC 
Competition Law, World Competition, 2002, 25(1), 3–23, p. 4. 
13
 J. Baker, above note 7, pp. 19 and 24, W. Page, above note 7, p. 17, B. Kobayashi and T. Muris, above note 
10, pp. 3 and 15 and R. Pierce, Is Post-Chicago Economics Ready For The Courtroom?, A Response To 
Professor Brennan, The George Washington Law Review, 2000-2001, 1103-1125, p. 1108. 
14
 M. Oinonen, above note 9, pp. 65, 70-71 and 73, D. Hildebrand, above note 4, p. 153, H. Haupt, Collective 
Dominance Under Article 82 E.C. And E.C. Merger Control In The Light Of The Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 
2002, 23(9), 434-444, p. 436 and C. Ahlborn and C. Grave, above note 5, p. 214. 
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dictations, even though such a position was more lenient in relation to the Harvard school era, 
i.e. the post-Chicago school did not suggest a return to the interventionist doctrines of the 
Harvard school, and required the concept of consumer welfare to reflect the actual economic 
position of consumers instead of total economic efficiency
15
.  
 
(2) The Three Phases Of Policy Development   
The policy development in collective dominance under the Merger Regulation can be 
distinguished in three Phases. Phase I concerns the period from Nestle/Perrier until France v. 
Commission (Kali and Salz) (1992-1994) that set the foundation of collective dominance in 
mergers and a static analysis of structural factors was adopted. Phase II refers to the period 
between Gencor/Lonrho up to Airtours (1997-2002) which was characterised by policy 
modifications and evolution related to the move towards a more-economic and effects-based 
approach that examined in a dynamic fashion both structural factors as well as the firms’ 
behaviour. Phase III examines the period from the introduction of the Merger Regulation 
139/2004 up to the decision in ABF/GBI (2004-2009) where the previous policy 
developments were cemented and further qualified. 
 
(3) Phase I – From Nestle/Perrier To France v. Commission 
(I) The Introduction Of Collective Dominance In EU Merger Control  
In 1989 the first Merger Regulation was introduced and formed the basis for the 
assessment of concentrations in the EU. Articles 2(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation 
4064/89 contained the substantive test, which employed a ‘dominance’ standard for the 
appraisal of concentrations and this was in accordance with the ordoliberalists’ ideas, as it 
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 J. Baker, above note 7, p. 22 and S. Waller and J. Woods, Antitrust Transitions, World Competition, 2009, 
32(2), 189-198, p. 194. 
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prevented the emergence of significant market power in order to preserve market rivalry
16
. 
Even though the Merger Regulation 4064/89 embodied no express provisions for the control 
of collective dominant positions, the consideration that EU Merger Control would be 
weakened if it were confined only to the examination of cases concerning single firm 
dominance led the Commission and the Courts to stretch the concept of dominance so as to 
accommodate the theory of collective dominance and this was accomplished by applying the 
substantive test in a teleological manner
17
.  
 
This policy development was firstly established in Nestle/Perrier, where the 
Commission laid down the legal basis for the assessment of collective dominance within the 
boundaries of the Merger Regulation 4064/89
18
. Nonetheless, after that case uncertainties 
remained over the precise scope of the Merger Regulation. Thus, the issue was finally settled 
in France v. Commission, where the ECJ held that, even though the Merger Regulation 
4064/89 did not expressly refer to the concept of collective dominance, it should be 
interpreted widely with reference to its general purpose and structure in order to avoid 
distortions in the Common Market and accordingly the Court confirmed that the control of 
collective dominant positions fell within the boundaries of its provisions
19
. 
                                                          
16
 D. Gerber, Law And Competition In Twentieth Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus, Oxford, First Edition, 
1998, p. 331. 
17
 B. Lyons, above note 3, p. 349. 
18
 Nestle/Perrier (Case IV/M.190 [1992], OJ L356/1 [1992], 4 CMLR M17 [1993]) paras 110-116. See also, I. 
Kokkoris, The Development Of The Concept Of Collective Dominance In The ECMR – From Its Inception To 
Its Current Status, World Competition, 2007, 30(3), 419-448, p. 425. 
19
 France v. Commission paras 165-171. See also, V. Korah, Gencor v. Commission: Collective Dominance, 
E.C.L.R., 1999, 20(6), 337-341, p. 337, M. Motta, E.C. Merger Policy And The Airtours Case, E.C.L.R., 2000, 
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(II) The Influence Of Article 102 Collective Dominance 
In Phase I the theoretical foundation of collective dominance in concentrations was 
formed by drawing parallels and transferring the definition of collective dominance from 
Article 102 precedents to the framework of merger assessment, since the reference to the 
concept of ‘dominance’ in the Merger Regulation 4064/89 created a considerable overlap 
between Article 102 decisions and merger cases
20
. Therefore, the Commission assessed the 
potential collusive effects of concentrations in oligopolies on the basis of the notion of a 
dominant position held by ‘more undertakings’ derived from Article 102 and as was 
established within that context by the GC in Italian Flat Glass
21
.  
 
In the examination of Article 102 abuse of collective dominance cases the 
Commission and the Courts focused on whether a connecting factor existed between the 
undertakings that led them to present themselves or act as a collective entity on the market, 
since it was particularly such a connection which conferred upon them the ability to jointly 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21(4), 199-207, pp. 199 and 204 and V. Rabassa and P. Christensen, The Airtours Decision: Is There A New 
Commission Approach To Collective Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(6), 227-237, p. 227. 
20
 S. Stephanou, Collective Dominance Through Tacit Coordination: The Case For Non-Coordination Between 
Article 82 And Merger Control ‘Collective Dominance’ Concepts, C.P.I., 2009, October, 1-8, p. 4. 
21
 Societa Italiana Vetro v. Commission (Italian Flat Glass) (Cases T-68, 77 and 78/89 [1992], ECR II-1403 
[1992], 5 CMLR 302 [1992]) paras 357-358. See also, L. Vitzilaiou and C. Lambadarios, The Slippery Slope Of 
Addressing Collective Dominance Under Article 82 EC, C.P.I., 2009, October, 1-10, p. 2 and D. Evans and C. 
Grave, above note 8, p. 141. 
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exercise market power
22
. Thus, in Italian Flat Glass the GC emphasised that the structure of 
the market did not solely determine the establishment of a collective dominant position and 
accordingly a certain relationship had to exist between the undertakings in the form of 
economic links
23
. This was confirmed by the ECJ in Almelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, the 
Commission in Transatlantic Conference Agreement and the GC in Compagnie Maritime 
Belge v. Commission where it was held that a collective dominant position could be 
established only if there were structural or economic links between the undertakings
24
.  
 
This reliance on links was directly integrated in collective dominance merger cases. 
Specifically, in Kali and Salz the Commission held that the merger would create a collective 
dominant position by principally relying on the existence of structural links between the 
oligopolists
25
. Also, the necessity of links was underlined in France v. Commission where the 
ECJ held that ‘correlative factors’ and other economic links were essential in establishing 
collective dominance under the Merger Regulation
26
. Hence, structural or economic links 
were considered as a necessary factor for the establishment of collective dominance under the 
                                                          
22
 Note also the discussion on links and the collective entity requirement in the analysis of collective dominance 
under Article 102 at Ch. 6. See also, C. Gordon and R. Richardson, Collective Dominance: The Third Way?, 
E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(10), 416-423, pp. 420 and 422. 
23
 Italian Flat Glass para. 358. See also, M. Jephcott and C. Withers, Where To Go Now For E.C. Oligopoly 
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 Kali and Salz paras 57-61. 
26
 France v. Commission para. 221. See also, D. Evans and C. Grave, above note 8, p. 142, I. Kokkoris, above 
note 18, p. 425 and M. Motta, above note 19, p. 204. 
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Merger Regulation, since it was assumed that the oligopolists had to be linked in a concrete 
way in order to be able to adopt a common policy in the relevant market post-merger
27
.  
 
(III) The Structural (Static) Analysis 
In Phase I the analysis of collective dominance in mergers was influenced by policy 
considerations that were founded on the ideas of the Harvard school. Thus, in accordance 
with the Harvardian approach, the Commission and the Courts emphasised on the 
identification of those structural elements that facilitated collusion. Specifically, a static SCP 
analytical framework was employed that narrowly focused on a ‘checklist approach’ of 
simplistic analysis related to the presence or absence of structural factors typical of markets 
prone to collusion, i.e. market shares and a long list of additional factors. On the contrary, the 
dynamic elements of competition were consistently not taken into account, while no clear-cut 
economic theory was presented as the foundation of the collective dominance analysis and 
such an approach was evident from the fact that the requirement of structural or economic 
links was based on legal as opposed to economic considerations
28
.  
 
The focus on a static analysis of a ‘checklist’ of structural factors is clearly illustrated 
by the relevant decisions in Phase I. Specifically, in Nestle/Perrier the Commission centred 
its analysis of collective dominance on numerous structural factors, such as the fact that the 
post-merger market would be characterised by a duopoly with high market shares, high 
                                                          
27
 A. Nikpay and F. Houwen, Case Comment - Tour De Force Or A Little Local Turbulence? A Heretical View 
On The Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(5), 193-202, p. 197. 
28
 E. Kloosterhuis, Joint Dominance And The Interaction Between Firms, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(3), 79-92, pp. 86-
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homogeneity of products and high entry barriers
29
. On the contrary, the Commission did not 
consider in detail dynamic factors, such as the ability to effectively punish deviations and 
whether the collusive incentives would be sustainable over time, even though considerations 
relating to retaliation as such did enter the competitive assessment, but their examination was 
short, purely theoretical and without granting them any particular weight
30
. Moreover, in Kali 
and Salz the Commission again relied on a static analysis of market characteristics, such as 
the high combined market shares between the largest market participants and the existence of 
links between the oligopolists
31
. Conversely, once more the Commission did not emphasise 
on dynamic considerations in its analysis. In contrast to the Commission, the ECJ in France 
v. Commission shed an increased focus on the dynamic elements of competition, since it 
analysed the firms’ deviation incentives as well as the ability and the incentives of fringe 
competitors to exercise countervailing power, but again not at any high level of sophistication 
and without outlining any particular theory of harm as the foundation of collective 
dominance
32
. 
 
The application of a checklist approach allowed for an interventionist stance towards 
mergers assessed for collective dominance, which was in accordance with the Harvard 
school’s basic beliefs that directed towards an increased level of enforcement. In particular, 
the Commission could establish collective dominance simply by illustrating the presence of a 
large number of structural factors pointing towards such a conclusion, despite the existence of 
one (or more) adverse factors and without focusing on the interaction between those factors 
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 Nestle/Perrier paras 119, 120 and 130. 
30
 Nestle/Perrier paras 122-123. 
31
 Kali and Salz paras 52 and 57-61. See also, G. Zekos, above note 3, pp. 43-44. 
32
 France v. Commission paras 234-239 and 242-248. See also, S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, Making European 
Merger Policy More Predictable, Springer, First Edition, 2005, p. 150. 
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and the firms’ foreseeable conduct. Also, the objective of the Commission was centred on the 
protection of the market participants’ freedom in the competitive process, as its aim was to 
maintain diversified markets with as many players as possible and no dominant competitor. 
Lastly, efficiencies claims were not recognised as a defence to problematic mergers. 
 
(4) Phase II – From Gencor/Lonrho To Airtours 
(I) Dynamic Analysis: Focus On Behaviour And The Effects-Based Approach 
 Phase II signalled a noticeable policy change that resulted to the significant evolution 
in the assessment of collective dominance. Specifically, the Courts implemented the ideas of 
the industrial organisation theorists, which led to the application of a dynamic analysis and 
the abandonment of the old static analysis. This dynamic analysis concerned the factors 
considered in a collective dominance merger assessment, where the Courts examined the 
interaction between the post-merger market structure and the firms’ behaviour, but also the 
concept of restriction to competition where the Courts adopted an effects-based approach. 
   
A core feature of the collective dominance analysis in Phase II was the increased 
focus on the behaviour of the firms in the relevant market post-merger. Specifically, the 
Courts departed from the static analysis of structural characteristics towards a dynamic 
analysis that emphasised on structural but also behavioural factors. This was made crystal 
clear in Airtours where the GC indicated that it will not accept a static analysis that ignores 
dynamic considerations, since the exclusive focus on the examination of structural factors 
was not sufficient to make a thorough evaluation of the circumstances leading to collective 
dominance
33
. Accordingly, the GC applied a dynamic SCP model in the context of repeated 
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 Airtours para. 192. See also, D. Neven and M. De La Mano, Economics At DG Competition 2008-2009, 
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game theory and assessed not only the structural characteristics which were seen as 
favourable for a tacit collusive outcome, but also it gave central consideration to conduct-
related criteria such as cheating incentives. 
 
In the context of a dynamic analysis, an effects-based approach to mergers was 
adopted and particularly in Airtours the GC focused on the impact of the concentration to 
effective competition
34
. Thus, while in Phase I no consideration was attributed to competitive 
effects, the Phase II adoption of an effects-based approach led to the assessment of the 
underlying economic rationale of the merger. Such an approach is advocated by economists 
and to that extent it is related to and forms part of the more economic approach, while it is 
inextricably linked to a consumer welfare standard
35
. 
 
The Behavioural Aspects: Rationality, Incentives, Anticipation And Alignment 
The increased focus on the firms’ conduct forms the foundation of the new approach 
in the analysis of collective dominance and it is in accordance with the principles set out in 
the economic theory of tacit collusion
36
. Specifically, the emphasis is on the foreseeable 
conduct of firms in order to discern whether collusion is likely. The behaviour of the firms is 
assessed in terms of the rationality of their market conduct, their incentives to act on a given 
                                                          
34
 Airtours para. 63. 
 
 
35
 For example, Commissioner Kroes explained that ‘an effects-based approach, grounded in solid economics, 
ensures that citizens enjoy the benefits of a competitive, dynamic market economy’. See also N. Kroes, 
European Competition Policy: Delivering Better Markets And Better Choices, Presentation At European 
Consumer And Competition Day, 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en, 1-6, p. 2 and D. Evans and C. Grave, above note 8, p. 152. 
36
 E. Kloosterhuis, above note 28, pp. 81 and 90.
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market structure, the anticipation of each other’s behaviour and the alignment of their 
conduct in the market. Such an approach was fully implemented in Airtours where the GC 
assessed the rationality and the incentives of the oligopolists to reach a common policy of 
coordination by aligning their market conduct, but primarily it focused on the stability of the 
collusive outcome overtime by appraising the incentives of each firm to deviate from the 
common policy as opposed to the incentives to abide by such a collusive strategy
37
.  
 
The analysis of the rationality of conduct relates to both the adoption of a common 
collusive policy and its sustainability. Thus, the Commission and the Courts examine whether 
it would be economically rational for the firms to adopt a common policy of coordination 
post-merger
38
. Also, the sustainability of coordination depends on whether the oligopolists 
would find deviation less profitable than collusion, as in those circumstances the rational 
choice would be for the firms to stick to the collusive equilibrium
39
. The rationality of the 
firms’ behaviour is determined by the prevailing structural conditions in the relevant market 
post-merger. Therefore, in Gencor the GC held that having regard to the relevant market 
structure ‘anticompetitive parallel conduct would, economically, have constituted a more 
rational strategy than competing with each other’40. Furthermore, in Airtours/First Choice the 
Commission held that in the particular circumstances of the market it would be ‘rational for 
the three major players to avoid or reduce competition between them’41.  
 
                                                          
37
 Airtours paras 61-62.  
38
 Airtours para. 61. 
39
 Airtours para. 62. See also, E. Kloosterhuis, above note 28, p. 85 and F. Mezzanotte, Direct Versus Indirect 
Proof Of The Airtours Criterion In Impala, World Competition, 2008, 31(4), 523-540, p. 529. 
40
 Gencor para. 236. 
41
 Airtours/First Choice para. 56. 
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The analysis of rationality of conduct is aimed at the identification of the oligopolists’ 
incentives which in turn determine whether the alignment of their behaviour is likely post-
merger. Specifically, in order to appraise the likelihood of collective dominance post-merger 
the Commission and the Courts must identify the firms’ incentives and assess their tendency 
to collude by forming a tacit consensus of coordination and by sustaining such an outcome or 
their tendency to compete
42
. The structural features of the relevant market influence the 
firms’ collusive incentives and consequently the focus of the analysis is on whether the 
change in the market structure following the merger increases or decreases such incentives
43
. 
Thus, in Gencor/Lonrho the Commission’s prohibition decision was based on the fact that 
because of structural changes post-merger, such as the removal of a fierce fringe competitor 
and the increase in symmetries among the oligopolists, there would be no incentives between 
the remaining market participants to compete against each other
44
. Also, in Airtours/First 
Choice the Commission held that the presence of a punishment mechanism would increase 
the firms’ collusive incentives45. 
 
The anticipation of the rivals’ conduct in an oligopoly assists the adoption of a 
common collusive policy, since it facilitates the alignment of their market behaviour, and is 
dependent on the structural characteristics of the relevant market. This was made clear in 
Gencor and was confirmed in Airtours, as the GC held that, where the market in question has 
                                                          
42
 Airtours paras 61-62.  
43
 D. Neven and M. De La Mano, above note 33, p. 326 and F. Maier-Rigaud and K. Parplies, EU Merger 
Control Five Years After The Introduction Of The SIEC Test: What Explains The Drop In Enforcement 
Activity?, E.C.L.R., 2009, 30(11), 565-579, p. 571. 
44
 Gencor/Lonrho paras 190 and 205. 
45
 Airtours/First Choice para. 55. 
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the appropriate characteristics, the competitors are in a position to anticipate one another's 
behaviour and eventually align their conduct
46
.  
 
(II) The More Economic Approach 
The Phase II alignment of policy considerations to the ideas of the industrial 
organisation theorists led the analysis of collective dominance to be heavily based on 
economic theory. Specifically, from the initial steps of Phase II, but particularly in Airtours, 
the GC adopted a more economic approach in the assessment of collective dominance in 
mergers. Nevertheless, the application of an economic analysis in itself was not a wholly 
novel concept, as it was a feature of the examination of mergers since the early stages of the 
collective dominance assessment and the Commission had always relied to some extent on 
economics in order to evaluate the compatibility of concentrations with the Common 
Market
47
. Thus, what constituted this new era of assessment was the increased use of 
economic models as a basis for the examination of mergers for collective dominance and the 
adoption of a more economic approach to the concept of restriction of competition
48
.  
 
The adoption of a more economic approach is evident by the fact that the economic 
theory of tacit collusion was integrated in the Courts’ decisions as the foundation of the 
                                                          
46
 Gencor para. 276 and Airtours para. 60. See also, E. Kloosterhuis, above note 28, p. 80 and M. Motta, above 
note 19, p. 204. 
47
 L. Roller, Economic Analysis And Competition Policy Enforcement In Europe, In: Modelling European 
Mergers: Theory, Competition And Case Studies, Elgar, First Edition, 2005, 13-26, p. 13 and D. Evans and C. 
Grave, above note 8, p. 136. 
48
 A. Christiansen, above note 2, p. 2. 
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collective dominance analysis
49
. Therefore, in Gencor the GC clarified that the focus of the 
collective dominance analysis should be on whether the concentration would increase the 
feasibility of tacit collusion post-merger
50
. In particular, the GC held that when certain 
market circumstances are present, the oligopolists may recognise their interdependence and 
align their market conduct, without entering into an agreement or resorting to a concerted 
practice, while the Court also highlighted the colluding firms’ retaliatory reaction in the 
situation where a deviation occurs, i.e. a dictum which mirrors the theory of tacit collusion as 
developed in economics
51
. The Airtours judgment advanced the Gencor ruling, by bringing 
collective dominance explicitly into line with the theory of tacit collusion
52
. Specifically, the 
GC structured the framework for the analysis of collective dominance by placing tacit 
collusion at its centre and specified in accordance with economic dictations the necessary 
conditions for its establishment, i.e. the Airtours criteria
53
. These conditions point directly 
                                                          
49
 Note also the discussion that tacit collusion forms the foundation of the collective dominance analysis in 
mergers at Ch. 2. 
50
 K. Kuhn and C. Caffarra, Joint Dominance: The CFI Judgment On Gencor/Lonrho, E.C.L.R., 1999, 20(7), 
355-359, p. 356 and I. Kokkoris, above note 18, pp. 422-423 and 425. 
51
 Gencor paras 276-277. Note also the discussion on the economic characteristics of tacit collusion at Ch. 3. 
See also, A. Nikpay and F. Houwen, above note 27, pp. 197-198, D. Evans and C. Grave, above note 8, p. 142 
and S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, Collective Dominance Under EC Merger Control - After Airtours And The 
Introduction Of Unilateral Effects Is There Still A Future For Collective Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(3), 
148-160, p. 149. 
52
 Airtours paras 59-62. See also, B. Lyons, above note 3, p. 350. 
53
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours criteria at Ch. 2. See also, A. Amelio, P. Asbo, M. De La Mano, R. 
Maximiano and V. Porubsky, ABF/GBI Business: Coordinated Effects Baked Again, 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2009_1_22.pdf, 1-8, p. 3 and F. Mezzanotte, above note 39, p. 
530. 
130 
                                                                                 Chapter 4 
 
towards more economically founded decisions, because they are in accordance with the 
criteria which industrial economics set out as leading to a tacitly collusive equilibrium
54
.  
   
The change of policy towards a more economic approach was highly influenced by 
the fact that the GC overturned the Commission’s Airtours/First Choice prohibition decision 
due to insufficient economic analysis and heavily criticised its inadequate interpretation of 
economic theory and the absence of economic evidence substantiating its conclusions
55
. 
Essentially, the GC’s criticism was directed at the standard of proof upon which the 
Commission’s decision was based, as it implicitly recognised a low level of intervention and 
introduced a stricter threshold to be met. Thus, the judgment marked a departure from the 
way the standard of proof had been applied in previous cases by increasing such a threshold 
through the cumulative nature of the Airtours conditions, as the Commission could no longer 
prove its case by simply employing a checklist and arguing that the factors which indicate a 
collective dominant position post-merger outweighed the factors pointing against such an 
outcome. This criticism made a huge impact on merger appraisal, since it formed one of the 
                                                          
54
 Note also the discussion on the implementation of the necessary conditions for a tacit collusive outcome as 
prescribed in economic theory to the legal concept of collective dominance at Ch. 3. See also, D. Evans and C. 
Grave, above note 8, p. 144. 
55
 Note also the discussion on the GC’s criticism against the Commission’s Airtours/First Choice decision at Ch. 
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Merger Control Regulation, Queen’s Papers On Europeanization 03/07, 2007, available at 
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New Chief Economist Think?, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(2), 122-125, p. 122, L. Roller, above note 47, p. 15, A. 
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http://www.albertodifelice.com/essays/mergers.php, 1-5, p. 5 and A. Overd, After The Airtours Appeal, 
E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(8), 375-377, p. 376.  
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driving forces behind the reform of the Merger Regulation, whilst post-Airtours the 
Commission’s assessment was altered and in particular it was characterised by a heavy 
reliance on industrial organisation models of game theory and a heightened focus on the 
soundness of economic analysis in order to ensure that merger investigations were firmly 
grounded on economic reasoning
56
. Also, the imposition of a demanding threshold of proof in 
collective dominance merger cases led to a less interventionist stance post-Airtours as the 
level of enforcement declined. Even though such a development was in principle compatible 
with the move from the Harvard influenced era towards the less interventionist industrial 
organisation theorists era, it led to an increased reluctance by the Commission to challenge 
mergers based on the concept of collective dominance. Lastly, the introduction of a more 
economic approach led to the recognition that the objective of EU Merger Control in 
collective dominance cases is the enhancement of consumer welfare, because such an 
approach focuses on evidence related to effects on consumer harm.  
  
(III) Links  
In Phase II there was a change of approach on the issue of links, as the emphasis 
attributed on such a factor was diminished and this was in accordance with the abandonment 
of the purely structural analysis. Specifically, in Gencor the GC held that structural links 
between the oligopolists were not a necessary requirement in order to reach a collective 
dominance finding, but some form of a connecting factor deriving from the oligopolistic 
nature of the market, i.e. oligopolistic interdependence, was in itself sufficient
57
. Hence, 
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 D. Evans and C. Grave, above note 8, pp. 133 and 143. 
57
 Gencor paras 273, 276 and 277. See also, E. Kloosterhuis, above note 28, p. 79, K. Kuhn and C. Caffarra, 
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structural or economic links are to be taken into consideration next to other structural 
circumstances, because if they are present they may increase the likelihood of collusive 
behaviour, but the Courts do not attach any particular weight on them or confer a specific 
requirement for the establishment of such a factor
58
.  
 
(5) Phase III – From The Merger Regulation 139/2004 To ABF/GBI 
(I) The Merger Regulation And The Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 adopted the ‘significant impediment to effective 
competition’ test that confirmed the turn towards a more economic approach, as it signalled a 
clearer emphasis on economic principles in the assessment of concentrations
59
. Also, the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test directed the Commission and the Courts to 
perform an effects-based analysis in order to appraise the compatibility of mergers with the 
Common Market and revealed that the focus of EU Merger Control is on the welfare effects 
of the merger
60
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19, pp. 338, 339 and 341, I. Kokkoris, above note 18, pp. 426 and 433 and C. Gordon and R. Richardson, above 
note 22, pp. 419-420. 
58
 Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier (Case IV/M.1313 [1999], OJ L20/1 [2000]) paras 61 and 110. Note also 
the discussion on links at Ch. 3. See also, V. Rabassa and P. Christensen, above note 19, pp. 232-233. 
59
 B. Lyons, above note 3, pp. 16-17, D. Evans and C. Grave, above note 8, p. 152 and F. Maier-Rigaud and K. 
Parplies, above note 43, p. 565. 
60
 Note also the discussion on the more economic and effects-based approach adopted under the new substantive 
test at Ch. 5. See also, D. Evans and C. Grave, above note 8, p. 152, L. McGowan, above note 55, p. 7 and K. 
Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test For EU Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(5), 277-296, 
pp. 288-289. 
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The Horizontal Merger Guidelines fully endorsed the more economic approach and 
this is illustrated by the detailed criteria set out for the assessment of coordinated effects 
which were directly based on the findings of industrial organisation theorists as well as the 
confirmation that the focus of the analysis is on the identification of tacit collusion between 
the oligopolists post-merger
61
. Furthermore, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines demonstrated 
the Commission's intention to take into account both structural factors and conduct related 
elements in its analysis and implemented the effects-based approach in assessing the 
prospective impact of concentrations on competition which is apparent by the extensive 
discussion of the efficiency enhancing effects that may counterbalance the possible 
anticompetitive impact of a merger
62
. Also, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopted an 
exclusive consumer welfare goal as they directly assert that the purpose of EU Merger 
Control is to protect and enhance consumer welfare
63
. 
 
(II) Impala, Sony And ABF/GBI  
The Impala GC judgment is of great significance from a policy perspective, because 
of its likely effects on the appraisal of future collective dominance merger cases. Specifically, 
the judgment upheld the validity of the analysis set out in Airtours, since it fully 
acknowledged the economic model of tacit collusion and the cumulative Airtours conditions 
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 A. Christiansen, above note 2, p. 7, A. Amelio et al., above note 53, p. 3, S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, above note 
32, p. 113, J. Vickers, Merger Policy In Europe: Retrospect And Prospect, 2004, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0104.pdf, 1-15, p. 14 and I. Kokkoris, above note 18, p. 444. 
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Merger Guidelines at Ch. 5. See also, K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 60, p. 289. 
63
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as the theoretical basis for the assessment of collective dominance
64
. Additionally, the GC 
extended the applicability of the Airtours test, as it held that it applies not only to the 
assessment of the creation of collective dominance, but also to the examination of the 
strengthening of pre-existing collective dominance
65
. Nonetheless, the crucial turning point of 
the Impala judgment relates to the introduction of the indirect test, which suggested that in 
the assessment of pre-existing collective dominance the Airtours conditions may be 
established indirectly and it produced three important policy developments
66
. Firstly, the 
Impala test adopts a more flexible approach in the demonstration of pre-existing collective 
dominance and accordingly it reinforces the Commission’s ability to establish such a 
position, since in that context the fulfilment of the indirect conditions may presume the 
establishment of the Airtours factors
67
. However, such a policy development is somewhat 
diminished due to the exclusive confinement of the indirect test in the examination of the 
strengthening of pre-existing collective dominance and its inapplicability in the assessment of 
the creation of a collective dominant position. Secondly, the indirect test confirms the 
previous focus on the firms’ behaviour along structural indicators. Additionally, the indirect 
test goes one step forward, since on balance it attributes an even more heightened emphasis 
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 Impala paras 246-247. See also, K. Fountoukakos, Case Note: Impala v. Commission (Sony/BMG), E-
Sapience Center For Competition Policy, 2006, available at 
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 Impala paras 251-252. Note also the discussion on the Impala indirect test at Ch. 2. See also, R. 
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on the firms’ conduct as compared to the analysis of the market characteristics68. This is 
illustrated by the fact that all three conditions of the indirect test contain a behavioural 
element, which validates the greater overall weight attributed to the firms’ conduct. In 
particular, the first condition of the Impala test, i.e. ‘price alignment’, focuses directly on the 
firms’ parallel pricing behaviour, the second condition, i.e. ‘other factors indicating 
dominance’, refers to structural factors which influence the oligopolists’ collusive incentives, 
whilst the third condition, i.e. ‘absence of another plausible explanation’, emphasises on the 
fact that the cause of the parallelism in question must be solely based on tacit collusive 
conduct
69
. Thirdly, despite the increased emphasis on the firms’ behaviour and the validation 
of the Airtours test which reflect the relevant economic dictations, the indirect test appears to 
slightly divert from the more economic approach by shifting the focus towards a more ‘finely 
balanced’ approach between the legal and economic components of the collective dominance 
assessment. This is illustrated by the fact that the indirect test focuses directly on the result of 
the oligopolists’ collusive conduct, i.e. parallel pricing above the competitive level held 
overtime, in order to demonstrate pre-existing collective dominance and it overrides the 
detailed examination of the Airtours economics-based criteria, whilst it is also notable that 
economics do not provide any valid theory for the indirect establishment of the necessary 
conditions for coordination along the lines indicated by the Impala test. Nevertheless, the 
indirect test does not abandon the more economic approach as such, but it points towards a 
more balanced analysis in collective dominance where the tools are economic, since the 
appraisal is still based on an economic assessment of the relevant market, while the 
considerations as well as the outcome are purely legal. Overall, the GC in Impala introduced 
the indirect test which qualified the Phase II approach and in particular the Airtours test by 
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 F. Mezzanotte, above note 39, pp. 525 and 538-539. 
69
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inserting a more flexible threshold to be met in the examination of the strengthening of 
collective dominance thereby attempting a reversion towards a more interventionist era in 
such a context. Also, the GC introduced a more ‘finely balanced’ approach that pointed 
towards an analysis based on an increased reliance on legal considerations, thereby aiming to 
overcome the inefficiencies resulting from the inconclusiveness of the game theoretic models, 
which produce complexities on the effective regulation of collective dominance in mergers. 
 
The ECJ in Sony validated the previous policy developments and further advanced the 
analysis of collective dominance in mergers. On the one hand, the Sony judgment upheld the 
Airtours factors as the relevant test in a collective dominance merger assessment and also it 
confirmed in principle the applicability of the Impala indirect test in the analysis of pre-
existing collective dominance
70
. Accordingly, the ECJ essentially took a balancing stance 
between the two policy approaches, i.e. the more ‘demanding’ Airtours test and the more 
‘lenient’ Impala indirect test, in the examination of collective dominance cases. On the other 
hand, the ECJ qualified the analysis of collective dominance by placing the assessment of the 
Airtours conditions and the Impala indirect test in the context of a hypothetical tacit 
coordination mechanism that shed the focus on how and on which terms coordination could 
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 Sony paras 122-124 and 129. See also, S. Volcker, C. O’Daly and A. Israel, European Court Of Justice 
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occur in the circumstances of the case
71
. This requirement to set up a mechanism of 
coordination is in accordance with modern economic thinking and it strengthened the move 
towards a more economic approach
72
.  
 
From a policy perspective the ABF/GBI decision is important to the extent that it is 
the first example as to how the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive standard, together 
with the Airtours test and the ECJ guidance in Sony have rearranged the analysis of 
coordinated effects
73
. In particular, the Commission fully endorsed the more economic 
approach by applying the Airtours conditions for the establishment of coordination in 
conjunction with the Sony guidance as it set up a hypothetical collusive mechanism and 
sought to understand how coordination would actually work in practice
74
. Thus, the 
Commission identified the mechanism and variables on which the firms would tacitly 
coordinate and then it examined whether the Airtours conditions would be fulfilled in such a 
context
75
. Also, the Commission sought to demonstrate that the merger would significantly 
impede effective competition by making coordination easier, more stable or more effective 
and practically employed an effects-based analysis
76
. Therefore, this decision embodies the 
essence of the policy developments that materialised in Phases II and III with one notable 
exception, namely that the Commission missed the opportunity to test the waters by pursuing 
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 Sony paras 125 and 129. Note also the discussion on the Sony requirement of a hypothetical mechanism of 
coordination at Ch. 2. See also, F. Mezzanotte, above note 39, pp. 524-525 and S. Hirsbrunner and C. Kockritz, 
above note 70, pp. 5-6. 
72
 T. Kaseberg, above note 70, p. 260.  
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an analysis based on the Impala indirect test as it relied on the direct establishment of the 
Airtours criteria.  
 
(C) POLICY OBJECTIVES  
The policy goal that underlines the regulation of collective dominance in mergers is 
constituted by the preservation of effective competition in the relevant market as a means to 
protect the consumers’ welfare. Moreover, in the appraisal of collective dominance cases the 
Commission and the Courts emphasise on the price effects of a concentration in order to 
assess its potential adverse impact on effective competition and the consumers’ welfare, 
whilst on the contrary they treat non-price attributes as afterthoughts to the extent that such 
elements of competition are rarely considered. Lastly, non-competition considerations do not 
form part of the analysis in collective dominance merger cases and accordingly the focus of 
the examination centres exclusively on competition related grounds. 
 
(1) Effective Competition As A Means To Protect Consumer Welfare 
(I) Preservation Of Effective Competition  
EU merger policy aims to preserve competitive market structures by preventing the 
emergence of markets which are not conducive to effective competition or the deterioration 
of markets which are already less than effectively competitive
77
. This policy objective has 
been integrated within the Merger Regulation 139/2004, as the substantive test for the 
appraisal of concentrations contained in Articles 2(2) and (3) focuses on the likely 
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 D. Gerber, above note 3, p. 124, M. Monti, EU Competition Policy After May 2004, Fordham Annual 
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impediment caused by a merger on effective competition
78
. Also, Article 2(1)(a) of the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 locates the preservation of competitive market structures at the 
centre of EU Merger Control by stating that when the Commission makes an appraisal, it 
must take into account ‘the need to preserve and develop effective competition’79. The policy 
priority of preserving effective competition has been endorsed in the regulation of mergers 
leading to collective dominance and this was made clear in Airtours where the GC held that 
the degree of effective competition between the oligopolists was a decisive factor in the 
assessment
80
. 
 
Nevertheless, the preservation of effective competition is an intermediary goal and not 
an end in itself, since such a policy motive does not exist in a vacuum but it is an instrument 
designed to achieve a certain policy objective, which takes the form of protecting the 
consumers’ welfare 81 . In particular, there is an integral causal link between these two 
objectives as essentially the concept of harm to competition implies harm to consumers and 
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this is based on the idea that a robust policy of preserving competitive market structures leads 
to an improvement of the firms’ performance and an increase in consumers' welfare, while 
lack of efficient market structures leads to detrimental effects on the consumers
82
. 
 
 (II) Consumer Welfare 
The role of the consumers in the assessment of concentrations has been gradually 
strengthened to such an extent that the consumers are regarded as the ultimate beneficiaries of 
EU merger policy and this position is in accordance with the ideas initially advocated by the 
Chicago school, but is more aligned to the post-Chicago school definition of ‘consumer 
welfare’ 83 . This position is evident by the fact that EU Merger Control prohibits only 
concentrations which would harm the consumers’ welfare, i.e. the criterion for the evaluation 
of the compatibility of mergers is essentially based upon a consumer welfare standard
84
. 
Accordingly, substantial consumer harm must plausibly occur post-merger in order to 
condemn a concentration as anticompetitive
85
. Thus, a merger is prohibited if it appears likely 
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to harm the consumers and reduce their surplus as a result of a significant reduction in 
effective competition, while it is permissible if the consumers in the relevant market are 
likely to be at least as well off after the concentration as they were before it
86
.  
 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 integrates the objective of protecting the 
consumers’ interests by adopting a consumer welfare standard in the assessment of 
concentrations
87
. This can be discerned by Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 
which directs the Commission to take into account the interests of the consumers in 
undertaking a merger analysis. Also, the substantive test contained in Articles 2(2) and (3) of 
the Merger Regulation 139/2004 emphasises on the objective of preserving effective 
competition and accordingly it highlights the interests of the consumers due to the direct 
causal link which exists between these two concepts, i.e. the substantive test is consistent 
with the consumer welfare standard
88
. Furthermore, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines set out 
that mergers will only be prohibited where they significantly increase the firms’ market 
power in such a manner that they are likely to result in adverse effects on the consumers
89
. 
Therefore, as a policy choice, in order to declare a merger incompatible with the Common 
Market, the Commission and the Courts must insist on sound evidence that, on balance, it 
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harms consumers, i.e. the consumer welfare standard provides the basis of the evidentiary 
requirements that the Commission must produce in order to prove anticompetitive effects
90
.  
 
Even though the notion of ‘consumers’ is not expressly defined in the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 or the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 offers an insight on that matter, since it provides that the interests of 
‘intermediate and ultimate consumers’ should be assessed and accordingly it includes within 
the ambit of the concept of consumers both distributors as customers purchasing goods in the 
course of their trade as well as consumers at the end of the relevant distribution chain
91
. Since 
Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 focuses solely on the ‘intermediate and 
ultimate consumers’, the definition of consumer welfare relates to the notion of consumer 
surplus which refers to the difference between consumers’ valuations, i.e. the most they 
would be willing to pay and the price they actually pay, while it attributes zero weight to 
producers’ surplus, thereby reflecting the post-Chicago theorists’ ideas of consumer welfare 
that focused on the actual economic position of the consumers instead of total aggregate 
welfare. Consumer surplus is primarily realised through direct economic benefits received by 
the consumers of a particular product as measured by its price and quality, but it can also 
account for non-price attributes, i.e. choice, quality and innovation
92
. Lastly, it is notable that 
the adoption of a consumer welfare standard embodies wealth distribution considerations, 
since by placing sole weight on the consumers, its aim is to increase redistribution by moving 
some income from richer individuals, i.e. producers, to those who are less well off, i.e. 
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consumers, and prevent adverse redistribution by blocking those mergers likely to result in 
price increases to customers
93
.  
 
In collective dominance cases the consumers have occupied a central role in the 
competitive considerations, as the principal concern of the Commission and the Courts is 
whether the concentration under investigation would facilitate tacit collusion between the 
oligopolists post-merger which would result in higher prices and consequently in decreased 
consumers’ welfare94. Thus, in Gencor/Lonrho the Commission considered that ‘the present 
merger will lead to the elimination of competition and to the creation of oligopolistic 
dominance to the detriment, ultimately, of the consumers’ thereby declaring the concentration 
incompatible with the Common Market
95
. Conversely, in Airtours the GC cleared the merger 
by taking into account the fact that the consumers would not be harmed by the 
concentration
96
. Moreover, the emphasis on the consumers is discerned by the fact that a 
central role to the analysis of tacit coordination is occupied by the assessment of 
countervailing buyer power contained in the last condition of the Airtours test which, due to 
its cumulative nature, asserts that the appraisal of the consumers’ position in the relevant 
market post-merger is an imperative condition
97
. This criterion is mainly concerned with 
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large buyers which fall within the category of ‘intermediary’ consumers, as it was held in 
Enso/Stora and Pilkington/SIV, but it also refers to the ultimate consumers, as it was set out 
in Airtours where the GC considered the likely reaction of the UK travellers to a possible 
price increase
98
.  
 
(III) Efficiencies  
The increased focus on the consumers as a policy objective is evident by the 
recognition in the Merger Regulation 139/2004 and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 
efficiencies as an integral part of merger analysis in the EU, which reflects the Chicago 
school ideas as enriched by the post-Chicago theorists
99
. Therefore, under the current legal 
framework, efficiencies generated by a merger may function as a shield and lead to the 
clearance of a concentration that would otherwise result in anticompetitive effects. This 
would be the case if a concentration enhances the ability as well as the incentive of the 
merged entity to act pro-competitively and generates efficiencies such as costs savings and 
new or improved products that increase the consumers’ welfare and outweigh any adverse 
effects of the transaction
100
. 
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The Horizontal Merger Guidelines impose three cumulative conditions which must be 
fulfilled in order to establish the efficiencies defence
101
. Firstly, the efficiencies must be 
merger specific, i.e. they must be likely to be accomplished by the proposed merger and 
unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of the concentration as well as they should not be 
able to be achieved through alternative means having less anticompetitive effects
102
. 
Secondly, the efficiencies must be verifiable, i.e. the Commission must be in a position to 
assess whether they are likely to materialize and it must be possible to foresee a clearly 
identifiable positive impact on the consumers as opposed to just a mere possibility
103
. 
Thirdly, the efficiencies must directly benefit the consumers, i.e. they must lead to lower 
prices or other net benefits which should be passed-on to the consumers and they must be 
timely as well as substantial enough to outweigh any anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction
104
. This later condition as underlined by the ‘pass-on’ requirement clearly reflects 
wealth distribution considerations from producers to consumers. 
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Accordingly, the formulations in the Merger Regulation 139/2004 and the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines suggest that EU Merger Control adopts a consumer welfare standard, 
instead of a total welfare standard, as the relevant threshold for the assessment of efficiencies. 
In particular, the implementation of a consumer welfare standard is consistent with both 
Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004, which imposes the condition that 
technological and economic progress must be to the ‘consumers’ advantage’ in order to be 
considered in the analysis of concentrations and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines which 
provide that ‘the relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers will not 
be worse off as a result of the merger’105. 
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the efficiencies defence in EU Merger Control is not 
without problems. Specifically, whilst the Horizontal Merger Guidelines embody a trade-off 
between efficiencies and any anticipated anticompetitive effects, the method employed in 
undertaking such a balancing exercise is unclear and minimal guidance is provided
106
. Also, 
the conditions set out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for the assessment of efficiencies 
appear difficult to be fulfilled if not prohibitive and this problem is especially acute in the 
evaluation of dynamic efficiencies. Thus, even though the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
embody the post-Chicago school dictations by acknowledging that dynamic efficiencies may 
form a type of merger-related benefits linked to product or process innovation, its strict 
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requirements can only to a very limited extent accommodate such considerations
107
. In 
particular, the verification requirement demands the quantification of efficiencies and such a 
task is problematic in practice due to the difficulty to positively predict whether a firm’s 
innovative activity will generate a certain output, whilst the condition that efficiencies must 
be timely in conjunction with the sliding-scale approach, i.e. the further in time efficiencies 
are expected to be realised the less weight is attributed to them, is incompatible with the long-
term focused dynamic efficiencies
108
. Lastly, the post-Merger Regulation 139/2004 case 
precedent reveals that there is no single decision in which the Commission relied exclusively 
on efficiencies claims in order to clear a concentration
109
. On the contrary, it appears that the 
Commission takes efficiencies into account as only one among several factors that lead to a 
clearance decision and not as the exclusive condition for a finding of compatibility with the 
Common Market, which renders questionable the extent to which efficiencies justifications 
form in practice an individual de facto ‘defence’ as such to anticompetitive mergers110.  
 
Efficiencies constitute a new element in the assessment of collective dominance 
merger cases and they may theoretically provide a defence to an anticompetitive 
concentration. Specifically, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that efficiencies may 
increase the merged entity’s incentive to raise production and reduce prices thereby 
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decreasing its incentive to coordinate its market behaviour with the other market 
participants
111
. Nonetheless, from a practical point of view, this defence has been 
characterised as ‘terra incognita’ in collective dominance merger cases and this is evident by 
the fact that efficiencies have not been actively taken into account at all in the assessment 
employed in such cases both pre- but also post-Merger Regulation 139/2004
112
. This stance is 
justifiable from a policy perspective, because the Commission and the Courts consider a 
merger that leads to the creation or the strengthening of a collective dominant position as 
likely to result in highly detrimental effects on the consumers and accordingly efficiencies 
could be acceptable as a defence only in rare circumstances, such as where they can be very 
clearly demonstrated and are of particularly substantial weight. The difficulty to establish this 
defence does not mean that any potential benefits to the consumers will not be taken into 
account in the assessment employed in collective dominance merger cases, but on the 
contrary that, having in mind the ultimate goal of protecting the consumers’ welfare, the 
threshold to be met and the quantity as well as the quality of efficiencies required for a 
successful claim could be possibly higher in this situation than in other violations of antitrust 
law. Therefore, this ‘all or nothing’ approach may result in dual benefits to the consumers in 
terms of either enhanced efficiencies or the protection from a particularly damaging 
anticompetitive merger. 
 
(2) Price And Non-Price Factors  
             (I) Price Effects 
In collective dominance cases the Commission and the Courts use prices as the 
variable upon which they assess potential anticompetitive effects and consumer harm. 
                                                          
111
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Specifically, the Commission and the Courts focus on the objective to condemn the loss that 
the consumers may suffer in case the price charged to them rises, in accordance with the 
traditional economic approach to market power which is concerned with power over price
113
. 
Thus, a concentration would be prohibited if it would make coordination a feasible strategy 
post-merger and it would lead to prices higher than those that would have prevailed ‘but for’ 
the merger, because in such circumstances it would distort effective competition and it would 
diminish the consumers’ welfare. Accordingly, in collective dominance cases the focus of the 
analysis is on the oligopolists’ post-merger conduct in relation to prices. In particular, the 
fulfilment of all the Airtours conditions is assessed on the basis of the price factor, since 
coordination usually involves a tacit consensus on a common policy of supra-competitive 
prices
114
, price transparency is a crucial criterion in assessing market transparency
115
, 
retaliation mechanisms have prices as their focal point and price wars constitute a usual 
punishment method, whilst the absence of external countervailing reaction relates to the 
inability of fringe firms, mavericks and potential competitors to impose lower prices or the 
inelasticity of demand by the consumers in response to a price rise.  
 
The case precedent confirms that the Commission and the Courts primarily emphasise 
on the price factor in the assessment of collective dominance merger cases. Specifically, in 
Nestle/Perrier the Commission held that price competition was weakened, that there was a 
high degree of price transparency in the market and price parallelism among the duopolists, 
                                                          
113
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while the absence of effective competition would lead to higher prices
116
. In Gencor/Lonrho 
the Commission considered that the low degree of price competition between the oligopolists 
and the sustained high price levels pointed towards collective dominance
117
. In Gencor the 
GC held that in the context of collective dominance the oligopolists may implicitly align their 
conduct in order to increase their prices
118
. Also, in Airtours the GC held that the aim of a 
collective dominant group is to sell ‘at above competitive prices’119. Moreover, in Impala the 
GC held that a condition for the fulfilment of the indirect test revolved around the alignment 
of prices at a supra-competitive level held over time
120
. Additionally, in Sony the ECJ focused 
on the likelihood of post-merger price increases
121
. Lastly, in ABF/GBI the Commission held 
that prices constituted the variable upon which the coordinated mechanism would operate
122
. 
 
             (II) Non-Price Effects 
The potential anticompetitive non-price effects of a merger assessed for collective 
dominance revolve around the factors of reduced choice, innovation and quality. 
 
EU merger policy considers choice as a necessary element for consumer welfare and 
it intends to ensure that the marketplace remains competitive by preserving a sufficient, 
although not necessarily a perfect, range of options of competing products from which the 
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consumers may choose
123
. A competitive market leads to more choices, since the firms’ goal 
to gain new sales increases the spectrum of available choices
124
. Conversely, an 
anticompetitive horizontal merger may restrict the range of options available to the 
consumers
125
. Nevertheless, even though choice was an issue which was taken into account in 
Nestle/Perrier and Gencor/Lonrho, insubstantial weight is attributed to this factor as 
compared to the price element in the assessment of collective dominance merger cases and 
this is evident by the lack of extensive as well as consistent consideration of such a variable 
in the relevant precedent
126
. 
 
The maintenance of effective competition and the protection of the consumers’ 
welfare are also dependent on the extent to which a merger increases or decreases the firms’ 
incentives to engage in product and/or process innovation post-merger
127
. The relationship 
between competition and innovation is mutual in that competition stimulates the incentives to 
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innovate, while innovation brings about dynamic efficiencies that may increase the 
consumers’ welfare and may counteract any anticompetitive effects128. However, despite the 
fact that in collective dominance cases the Commission and the Courts assess the degree of 
innovation in the relevant market, as such a factor may facilitate or make more difficult the 
adoption and the sustainability of collusive conduct, no further consideration is attributed to 
the potential adverse impact of a merger on innovation and this position contradicts the 
increased emphasis placed by the industrial organisation theorists on the potential loss of  
R&D competition
129
. 
 
Quality detriment occurs where the consumers may purchase a product or a service 
which is not of the quality they assumed ex ante. Quality is also a factor which is not 
extensively considered in the assessment of the potential negative effects of a merger 
analysed for collective dominance on effective competition and the consumers’ welfare. This 
can be demonstrated by the fact that there is no collective dominance case where the 
Commission and the Courts have shed an increased focus on the adverse impact of the 
concentration on product quality as a justification for its prohibition or its conditional 
clearance. 
 
Overall, in the analysis of collective dominance merger cases the Commission’s 
primary if not exclusive focus is on the price effects of a concentration and it is submitted 
that prices do indeed constitute an important parameter of competition. Nevertheless, the 
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Commission’s lack of emphasis on the possibility that a concentration may raise adverse 
competitive effects in relation to non-price variables forms a gap in the current analytical 
framework for the assessment of collective dominance in mergers which extends to two 
specific scenaria. On the one hand, a merger may not result in higher prices but it may bring 
about significant adverse effects to non-price variables and in such a scenario the 
Commission’s sole focus on the price element of competition may cause merger review to 
miss important anticompetitive effects. On the other hand, a merger may produce adverse 
effects as regards both the price and non-price elements of competition and in this scenario 
the consideration of non-price variables is necessary in order to reveal the full extent of 
possible anticompetitive effects so as to perform an adequate counterfactual analysis and 
consider them in the trade-off with potential efficiencies or for the imposition of appropriate 
remedies.  
 
Accordingly, it is suggested that the Commission must integrate in its appraisal and 
seed an increased emphasis on the potential negative impact of concentrations on the non-
price elements of competition, especially in view of the fact that coordination appears 
feasible to occur in relation to non-price variables such as innovation or quality. On the one 
hand, in the assessment of the effects of a merger on innovation a static analysis focusing on 
the short-term perspective of the relevant market is not appropriate, but the Commission must 
take a dynamic analysis emphasising on the longer-term perspective and place an increased 
emphasis on potential competitors as new entrants often drive innovation
130
. Accordingly, the 
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Commission must analyse the likelihood of coordinated effects by identifying the actual 
competitors in the R&D for a future product and assess whether the merger would increase 
their ability as well as their incentive to adopt and sustain a strategy to reduce innovation 
efforts, but primarily in must identify potential competitors and assess their capabilities
131
. 
The attainment and sustainability of a tacitly collusive scheme aimed at the reduction of 
innovation seems difficult, but it is not impossible
132
. In particular, the adoption of an implicit 
policy of coordination in R&D may be complex due to the multi-dimensional elements of 
innovation efforts, but it seems feasible that firms may reach a tacit understanding not to 
conduct any R&D
133
. Also, the sustainability of coordination can be problematic, since R&D 
involves private information and accordingly monitoring of innovation efforts is difficult, 
while in case of deviation due to successful R&D efforts the oligopolists would not be able to 
effectively retaliate if innovation is drastic because the imposition of punishment through the 
development of equally or more innovative products may only happen with long time lags 
and price wars would not be an adequate deterrent towards a radically innovative product
134
. 
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Dynamic Efficiencies In Merger Review, available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/02376.html, 1-39, pp. 18-19, R. Davis, Innovation Markets And Merger Enforcement: Current 
Practice In Perspective, Antitrust L.J., 2003, 71(2), 677-703, p. 686 and R. Gilbert and S. Sunshine, 
Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns In Merger Analysis: The Use Of Innovation Markets, Antitrust L.J. 
1994-1995, 63, 569-601, p. 590. 
132
 R. Gilbert and S. Sunshine, above note 131, p. 597 and R. Gilbert and D. Rubinfeld, Revising the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines: Lessons From The US And The EU, available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/Profile/publications/Merger%20Guidelines%20China%208%20
12%2010.pdf, 1-21, p. 15. 
133
 M. Katz and H. Shelanski, above note 130, p. 47. 
134
 R. Gilbert and S. Sunshine, above note 131, pp. 591-592 and M. Katz and H. Shelanski, above note 130, p. 
48. 
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Nevertheless, in situations of moderate innovation the remaining firms may be able to punish 
the defecting firm in a timely manner through the engagement in aggressive pricing. Lastly, 
since R&D success can come from potential competitors, any collusive agreement to 
suppress innovation would be vulnerable to new entry, even though the presence of high 
barriers to entry or the erection of entry barriers through ‘parallel exclusion’ may be capable 
to stop such entry
135
. On the other hand, the adoption and the sustainability of a collusive 
strategy on a standardised low quality product seems to be more feasible. In particular, 
reaching terms of coordination as well as monitoring would be straightforward in situations 
of standardisation to a low quality product, especially in highly homogeneous markets. 
Moreover, retaliation would consist of either reverting to the previous (higher) quality 
product, as such a response to deviations seems capable to occur in a timely manner in most 
industries, or the colluding firms may also retaliate by engaging in price wars. Also, high 
entry barriers must be present in order to prevent the entry of a competitor that would afford a 
more efficient product quality/price ratio. 
 
(3) Non-Competition Considerations  
A number of arguments have been raised which are both in favour and against the 
inclusion of non-competition considerations as an integral policy objective in the assessment 
of mergers. On the one hand, a more flexible view supports that since EU merger policy 
forms part of the legislative framework of the TFEU, which includes numerous objectives, it 
will always have to contribute towards the overriding political goal of the day, such as the 
global competitiveness of the European industries, thereby leaving the door open for the 
                                                          
135
 A scenario of parallel exclusion is relevant in situations where firms compete in innovation. Note also the 
discussion on parallel exclusion at Ch. 6.  
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inclusion of non-competition considerations in the appraisal of concentrations
136
. On the 
other hand, a more restrictive opinion indicates that a single objective of EU merger policy, 
centred on the preservation of effective competition and its benefit on the consumers’ welfare 
to the exclusion of other goals, improves the effectiveness of the Merger Regulation, it 
provides clearer guidance on the applicable competitive assessment and it leads to more 
consistent and rational decisions
137
. 
 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 implements the restrictive position as it 
demonstrates that non-competition objectives will not enter the assessment of concentrations. 
Specifically, the substantive test of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 is exclusively based on 
competition related considerations, since it focuses on the single objective of the preservation 
of effective competition as a means to protect the consumers’ welfare138. Also, Article 2(1) of 
the Merger Regulation 139/2004 contains a set of criteria to be taken into account in 
determining the compatibility of mergers, which are centred on competition related 
considerations and accordingly it seems that there is no room for the consideration of non-
                                                          
136
 This argument is based on Recital 23 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 which states that ‘the Commission 
must place its appraisal within the general framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred 
to in Article 2 TEU’. See also, J. Galloway, above note 11, pp. 174-175, DG Comp Annual Management Plan 
2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_management_plan/amp_2005_en.pdf, 1-
25, p. 3, A. Murray, A Fair Referee? – The European Commission And EU Competition Policy, Centre For 
European Reform, First Edition, 2004, pp. 3, 4 and 7 and OECD Country Studies, above note 78, p. 15. 
137
 A. Christiansen, above note 2, pp. 19-20, P. Lowe, above note 128, p. 19, C. Ahlborn, Competition Policy In 
The New Economy - Is European Competition Law Up To The Challenge?, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(5), 156-167, pp. 
165-166 and C. Ahlborn and C. Grave, above note 5, p. 210.  
138
 K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 60, p. 279, OECD Country Studies, above note 78, p. 31 and M. 
Motta, above note 19, p. 203. 
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competition objectives
139
. Nonetheless, there might be a possible exception to this principle, 
located in the reference of Article 2(1)(b) to the ‘development of economic progress’, which 
will be examined in order to determine whether it does give rise to the inclusion of non-
competition considerations in the assessment of concentrations.  
 
Industrial Policy Considerations 
The non–competition objectives mainly revolve around industrial policy 
considerations. There are two instances of such considerations that have been urged to be 
included within the analysis of mergers. One such instance is directed towards the promotion 
of ‘national champions’ and it is based on the abovementioned Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004
140
. An alternative expression of such considerations is the failing firm 
defence. 
 
The ‘national champions’ argument constitutes a form of protectionism that is 
advanced by national industrial policy and by which the Member States’ governments 
encourage firms in strategic sectors to merge into a single enterprise in order to increase their 
competitiveness in international markets
141
. However, protectionist goals are in sharp contrast 
with the TFEU rules and in addition EU merger policy regards such practices as highly likely 
to result in the distortion of effective competition at the expense of the national consumers
142
. 
                                                          
139
 D. Banks, above note 79, p. 182. 
140
 L. Hawkes, The EC Merger Control Regulation: Not An Industrial Policy Instrument: The De Havilland 
Decision, E.C.L.R., 1992, 13(1), 34-38, p. 36. 
141
 A. Soares, ‘National Champions’ Rhetoric In European Law Or The Many Faces Of Protectionism, World 
Competition, 2008, 31(3), 353-368, pp. 353, 358 and 368, L. McGowan, above note 55, p. 14 and D. Banks, 
above note 79, p. 185. 
142
 L. McGowan, above note 55, p. 14. 
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Hence, the Commission and the Courts do not treat with favouritism nor promote ‘national 
champions’, as this kind of economic protectionism cannot be justified under any 
circumstances
143
. Accordingly, the aims pursued by industrial policy will have to be achieved 
ultimately by preserving the principle of effective competition
144
.  
 
The failing firm defence revolves around the claimed neutral effects of mergers on 
competition, where one of the merging firms is liquidating due to poor financial 
performance
145
. This defence has been shaped and applied in a very stringent way, since it is 
considered that it might aim to rescue a firm in financial distress by clearing a concentration 
that may prove to be anticompetitive post-merger and also because it principally focuses on 
the firms rather than the consumers. The main requirement that must be fulfilled in order to 
establish the failing firm defence concerns the lack of causality, i.e. that the deterioration of 
the competitive structure that follows the merger cannot be said to be caused by the 
concentration and that it would occur in a similar manner even in the absence of the 
merger
146
. The lack of causality must be verified by the fulfilment of the cumulative 
conditions which the Commission developed in Kali and Salz and provide that but for the 
merger the failing firm would exit the market due to financial difficulties, that there is no less 
anticompetitive alternative purchase than the notified merger and that absent the 
concentration the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit the market
147
.  
                                                          
143
 J. Galloway, above note 11, p. 172 and E. Bannerman, above note 83, p. 11. 
144
 Communication From The Commission, above note 3, p. 4. 
145
 D. Banks, above note 79, p. 184. 
146
 Kali and Salz para. 72 and Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 89.  
147
 Kali and Salz para. 71 and Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 90. See also, P. Lowe, above note 128, p. 18, 
S. Zhu, above note 88, pp. 644-645 and V. Baccaro, Failing Firm Defence And Lack Of Causality: Doctrine 
And Practice In Europe Of Two Closely Related Concepts, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(1), 11-24, p. 13. 
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In the context of collective dominance cases, the Commission in Kali and Salz held 
that the requirements for the establishment of the failing firm defence had been fulfilled and 
it cleared the concentration by holding that it was not the cause of the reinforcement of a 
collective dominant position on the German market
148
. Also, as a matter of principle the 
validity of the application of the failing firm defence in a collective dominance framework of 
analysis was expressly confirmed by the ECJ in France v. Commission
149
. However, these 
cases were decided under the old structural analysis undertaken in Phase I, while the change 
of policy in the assessment of concentrations in Phases II and III and in particular the 
introduction of the effects-based approach would make such a defence difficult to be 
successfully applied in collective dominance merger cases. Specifically, since the effects-
based approach focuses directly on the effects of a concentration on competition, it seems 
difficult to reverse the Commission’s conclusion that the merger under investigation would 
result in an adverse impact on effective competition once such an outcome has been 
established. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the policy objective that focuses on the 
protection of the consumers’ welfare with concentrations that assist inefficient firms. Thus, it 
seems that this defence may be successfully raised only if it is accompanied by efficiencies 
directed towards the benefit of the consumers and flowing from the rescuing of the merger, 
which in turn makes its establishment more difficult and diminishes its applicability in 
collective dominance cases
150
.  
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 Kali and Salz para. 95.  
149
 France v. Commission paras 109-124. See also, G. Zekos, above note 3, p. 40. 
150
 K. Heyer and S. Kimmel, Merger Review Of Firms In Financial Distress, G.C.P., 2009, 5(2), 103-118, pp. 
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(D) CONCLUSION 
Policy considerations have played a central role on the evolution of the analysis of 
collective dominance in mergers and they have set out the objectives pursued by the 
regulation of such anticompetitive positions. 
 
The development of policy considerations has affected the evolution of the collective 
dominance analysis in its various Phases. In Phase I the concept of collective dominance was 
included within the scope of application of the Merger Regulation 4064/89, which adopted a 
‘dominance’ standard for the appraisal of concentrations in accordance with the 
ordoliberalists’ ideas. Also, the foundation of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation was formed by the integration of the principles established in Article 102 
collective dominance cases, as evident by the necessity to demonstrate the presence of links. 
Additionally, policy considerations that were based on the Harvard school ideas led to the 
application of a static SCP framework that focused on the analysis of structural 
characteristics through the employment of a simplistic checklist approach which allowed an 
increased degree of intervention, whilst the respective policy objective emphasised on the 
protection of the freedom of market participants to compete in the relevant industry. In Phase 
II the policy considerations aligned to the ideas of the industrial organisation theorists, which 
resulted to the evolution of the analysis of collective dominance and its departure from its 
former status. Specifically, a dynamic analysis was employed that emphasised on the firms’ 
behaviour along structural factors and led to the adoption of an effects-based approach. Also, 
the Courts employed a more economic approach that was directly expressed by the Airtours 
economics-based criteria and the identification of tacit collusion as the foundation of the 
collective dominance analysis. The cumulative Airtours conditions replaced the checklist 
approach and pointed towards a more demanding threshold of proof that led to a decline in 
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enforcement, whilst the policy objective was directed towards the protection and 
enhancement of consumer welfare. Furthermore, the demonstration of oligopolistic 
interdependence replaced the necessity to prove structural links. In Phase III the previous 
approach was verified and elaborated. Thus, the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test 
and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines confirmed the application of a more economic and 
effects-based approach in the analysis of collective dominance and integrated the consumer 
welfare goal in the analysis of concentrations. Moreover, the Impala indirect test produced 
important policy implications, as it introduced a flexible approach on the establishment of the 
Airtours criteria, it shed an increased focus on the firms’ behaviour and it implemented a 
more finely balanced approach between legal and economic considerations. The ECJ in Sony 
verified the applicability of both the stringent Airtours test as well as the more lenient Impala 
indirect test and pointed out the necessity to establish a hypothetical coordination mechanism 
as a basis of the assessment thereby further adjusting the analysis of collective dominance 
with economic theory. The policy developments that ensued in Phases II and III were applied 
in practice by the Commission in ABF/GBI with the notable exception of the non-application 
of the Impala test. 
 
The policy objective that underlines the regulation of collective dominance in mergers 
is centred on the preservation of effective competition as a means to protect the consumers’ 
welfare. The emphasis on the protection of the consumers’ interests reflects the Chicago but 
is fully aligned to the post-Chicago school ideas and this is evident by the fact that the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopt a consumer 
welfare standard in the assessment of the compatibility of concentrations that solely focuses 
on the consumers’ surplus, whilst the consumers occupy a central role in the consideration of 
mergers assessed for collective dominance. Furthermore, the Merger Regulation 139/2004 
162 
                                                                                 Chapter 4 
 
and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines embodied the dictations of the Chicago and post-
Chicago school theorists by recognising the role of efficiencies in the assessment of 
concentrations and adopted a consumer welfare standard in their quantification. However, the 
demonstration of efficiencies presents complexities, especially as regards dynamic 
efficiencies, whilst they seem difficult to be established as a defence in the assessment of 
collective dominance merger cases. Moreover, in the examination of collective dominance 
cases the Commission and the Courts primarily focus on the price effects of a concentration 
in order to assess its potential detrimental impact on effective competition and the 
consumers’ welfare, while its effects on the non-price elements of competition are trivially 
considered. Nevertheless, it is imperative for the Commission to seed an increased focus on 
the non-price elements of competition, especially in view of the fact that coordination seems 
feasible to occur in relation to variables such as innovation or quality. Lastly, the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 does not integrate non-competition objectives within its provisions and 
accordingly industrial policy considerations do not form part of the assessment of 
concentrations. 
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                                                     CHAPTER 5 
                                                                - 
THE ‘SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENT TO EFFECTIVE COMPETITION’ 
TEST AND THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: EFFECTS 
ON THE ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 
 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
As a result of previous policy developments, in 2004 the ‘new’ Merger Regulation 
139/2004 was introduced that modified the substantive standard for merger appraisal, whilst 
in conjunction with the accompanying Horizontal Merger Guidelines they modernised the 
framework of merger analysis by accommodating the more economic and effects-based 
approach.  
 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 revised the ‘old’ Merger Regulation 4064/89 and 
amended the substantive test for the appraisal of concentrations. The change of the 
substantive test affected the assessment of concentrations in the EU, because such a test lies 
at the heart of any merger investigation, as it is the spectrum through which the Commission 
and the Courts evaluate the compatibility of a concentration with the Common Market. 
Specifically, the substantive test forms the threshold that must be established in order to 
distinguish anticompetitive from pro-competitive concentrations and to that extent it forms a 
central element in the appraisal of mergers. Along with the new Merger Regulation, the 
Commission launched the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Despite the fact that the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines were not legally binding, they provided a methodology for the assessment 
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of potential anticompetitive effects and they defined the criteria on which the Commission 
would focus in order to challenge a concentration. 
 
This Chapter analyses the effects of the ‘significant impediment to effective 
competition’ test and of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines on the appraisal of collective 
dominance merger cases. Section B focuses on the background to the reform of the 
substantive test by presenting the arguments that were raised in favour and against the 
replacement of the ‘dominance’ standard. Section C emphasises on the significant 
impediment to effective competition test contained in the Merger Regulation 139/2004, by 
highlighting its alterations on the form of the appraisal undertaken in concentrations, its 
effects on the substantive analysis of collective dominance merger cases and the resulting 
policy implications. Section D centres on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the analytical 
framework that they introduce for the examination of coordinated effects, while it also 
compares them to the approach of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the assessment 
of such a theory of harm. Section E evaluates the degree of convergence between the EU and 
the US Merger Control systems in the analysis of coordinated effects. Finally, Section F 
outlines the effects of the new merger appraisal test and of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
on the examination of concentrations assessed for collective dominance. 
 
(B) BACKGROUND 
(1) Introduction 
In 2001 the Commission produced a Green Paper on the reform of EU Merger 
Control, which launched a debate as to how the effectiveness of the dominance test, 
contained in the Merger Regulation 4064/89, compared to the substantial lessening of 
competition standard adopted in several other jurisdictions and raised the issue of a possible 
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amendment of the EU substantive test for the appraisal of concentrations
1
. Thereafter, many 
arguments were raised that favoured both the retention of the dominance test as well as its 
replacement by the substantial lessening of competition test. However, to some extent the 
issue was not whether EU Merger Control would employ either test as its merger appraisal 
standard, but whether the Commission and the Courts were prepared to modernize the tools 
used in the analysis of concentrations and interpret the substantive test in such a way as to 
allow a more economic approach in merger assessment, to redirect their focus on the firms’ 
behaviour on the market and to scrutinize the effects of concentrations on competition
2
. The 
arguments presented, besides highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each 
substantive test, they primarily exposed some crucial problems of the old EU Merger Control 
system, which are important to be examined in order to ascertain whether the new merger 
appraisal test and its regulatory framework successfully addressed these issues. 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ forms the substantive standard for the appraisal of 
concentrations in the US (Section 7 of the Clayton Act). See also, M. Litzell, The Appraisal Of Collective 
Dominance Under The Clarified Substantive Test Of The New EC Merger Regulation - A Step Towards Greater 
Global Convergence Of Merger Control?, 2005, available at 
http://www.elsa.org/fileadmin/user_upload/elsa_international/PDF/SPEL/SPEL05_1_MARIA_LITZELL.pdf, 
32-56, p. 35, K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test For EU Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 2005, 
26(5), 277-296, p. 283, N. Reed and P. Camesasca, European Merger Control: Tougher, Softer, Clearer?, 
E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(9), 458-462, p. 458, P. Lowe, The Future Shape Of European Merger Control, Speech At 
The RBB/FIPRA Seminar, 2003, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_045_en.pdf, 
1-10, p. 4 and I. Kokkoris, Do Merger Simulation And Critical Loss Analysis Differ Under The SLC And 
Dominance Test?, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(5), 249-260, p. 250. 
2
 U. Denzel, The US ‘Significant Lessening Of Competition’ Merger Enforcement Standard And The EU 
‘Dominant Position’ Test – A Comparison, Seminar Advanced Antitrust Judge Richard Posner, 2002, available 
at http://home.uchicago.edu/~rposner/denzel2.htm, 1-25, pp. 24-25. 
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(2) Arguments In Favour Of Retaining The Dominance Test 
The principal argument in favour of the retention of the dominance test supported 
that, whilst the substantial lessening of competition test was different to the dominance test as 
regards its wording, in practice both tests pursued the same objective of prohibiting 
anticompetitive mergers and also there was little difference between the analytical processes 
employed under each test, as the focus was shed on the same factors, i.e. market shares, 
barriers to entry etc.
3
. Accordingly, it was argued that these tests produced broadly similar 
outcomes, which led to the proposition that there was no need to change the dominance test 
as the substantive prohibition criterion in the EU
4
. Another argument claimed that the 
considerable body of EU precedent, which had been developed under the dominance 
standard, would be abandoned if a different test would be adopted
5
. Moreover, an argument 
                                                          
3
 M. Monti, Review Of The EC Merger Regulation – Roadmap For The Reform Project, Conference On Reform 
Of European Merger Control, 2002, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/252&format=HTML&aged=1&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en, 1-10, p. 5, P. Lowe, above note 1, p. 5, U. Boege, Speech At The ICN First Annual 
Conference, 2002, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc584.pdf, 1-
6, pp. 3-4, M. Litzell, above note 1, p. 41, U. Denzel, above note 2, p. 23 and White and Case, Draft 
Memorandum - Green Paper On Merger Reform, 2002, available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/2057337d-9436-4562-bdae-
638e79912682/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/12fdd6bd-0507-4c10-9d6f-
644e8899ab69/memo_competition_group.pdf, 1-10, p. 6. 
4
 A. Nourry and S. McNulty, EC Merger Reform – From One-Stop Shop To All Over The Shop?, C.L.I., 2003, 
February, 5-8, p. 6, EU Committee Of The American Chamber Of Commerce In Belgium, Response To The 
Green Paper On The Review Of The Merger Regulation (Council Regulation No. 4064/89), 2002, available at 
http://www.amchameu.eu/ (last visited 17/02/2009), 1-14, p. 6 and M. Litzell, above note 1, p. 35. 
5
 M. Monti, above note 3, p. 5, U. Immenga, Merger Control In Europe And Germany: Recent Developments, 
Competition Policy And Economic Development, 2002, available at 
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against the amendment of the dominance test centred on the claim that the substantial 
lessening of competition standard would be too uncertain in its scope, since it was more 
flexible than the dominance standard and it was open to varying interpretation mainly 
because of the vague meaning of the word ‘substantial’6. Lastly, it was asserted that the 
substantial lessening of competition standard contained lower thresholds than the dominance 
standard and consequently it would increase the Commission’s degree of intervention and its 
margin of discretion in the appraisal of concentrations
7
.  
 
(3) Arguments In Favour Of Switching To The Substantial Lessening Of 
Competition Test 
The principal criticism directed against the retention of the dominance test was 
sourced at the problem of the ‘gap’, i.e. that there were serious competition problems that 
mergers may engender but which were not capable of being tackled by using the dominance 
test because it had certain limitations
8
. In particular, the dominance test focused on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://law.wustl.edu/wugslr/issues/volume3_2/p441Immenga.pdf, 441-453, p. 444, A. Burnside and G. Brooks, 
EC Merger Reform – Substantive Issues In The Draft Notice On Horizontal Mergers: Paramount Confusion?, 
C.L.I., 2003, February, 3-5, p. 3, M. Egge, M. Bay and J. Calzado, The New EC Merger Regulation: Recipe For 
Profound Change Or More Of The Same?, IBA 8
th
 Annual Competition Conference, 2004, available at 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1063_1.pdf, 1-30, p. 5 and White and Case, above note 3, p. 6. 
6
 K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, p. 283 and European Round Table Of Industrialists - Competition 
Policy Task Force, Response To The ‘Green Paper On The Review Of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89’, 
2001, available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2002_council_regulation/ert.pdf, 1-4, p. 2. 
7
 V. Selvam, The EC Merger Control Impasse: Is There A Solution To This Predicament?, E.C.L.R., 2004, 
25(1), 52-67, p. 61 and U. Immenga, above note 5, p. 444. 
8
 The ‘gap’ refers to the scenario where a single firm holding a market share below that required for the 
establishment of single firm dominance, derives benefits from the exercise of unilateral non-collusive behaviour 
on the market. An example of such a situation is the US Heinz-Beechnut case, where the anticompetitive effects 
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question of whether a proposed concentration would create or strengthen a dominant position 
with the consequence that the Commission could not challenge mergers producing unilateral 
effects, as despite the fact that they could be detrimental to competition, they would not result 
in market dominance
9
. Conversely, the substantial lessening of competition standard did not 
emphasise on the establishment of dominance, but instead it centred on the question of how 
much competition would be lost as a result of the concentration under investigation and 
accordingly it was perfectly capable to address the unilateral effects of mergers
10
.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of a merger between the second and third strongest market players resulted from the elimination of competition 
for the second place in the market. See also, A. Heimler, Was The Change Of The Test For Merger Control In 
Europe Justified? An Assessment (Four Years After The Introduction Of SIEC), E.C.J., 2008, 4(1), 85-94, p. 90, 
A. Riesenkampff, The New EC Merger Control Test Under Article 2 Of The Merger Control Regulation, 
Northwestern Journal Of International Law And Business, 2003-2004, 24, 715-728, p. 717, M. Litzell, above 
note 1, p. 41 and J. Vickers, How To Reform The EC Merger Test?, A Speech At The EC/IBA Merger Control 
Conference, 2002, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0802.pdf, 1-4, p. 2. 
9
 M. Motta, EC Merger Policy And The Airtours Case, E.C.L.R., 2000, 21(4), 199-207, p. 202, No Cited 
Author, Council First Pass At Draft Revision Of The Merger Regulation, C.L.I., 2003, June, 22-23, p. 23, V. 
Selvam, The Substantive Test In EC Merger Control: How The Commission’s Proposals Fills The Perceived 
Gaps, C.L.I., 2003, October, 19-21, p. 19 and G. Stirati, The Appraisal Of Collective Dominance And 
Efficiency Gains Under The Substantive Test Of The New EU Merger Regulation, Erasmus Law And Economic 
Review, 2004, 1(3), available at http://www.eler.org/include/getdoc.php?id=44&article=12&mode, 249–286, p. 
256. Nevertheless, it was also claimed that the dominance test, if properly interpreted, was capable of dealing 
with the full range of anticompetitive scenarios which mergers may engender (see also, U. Boge and E. Muller, 
From The Market Dominance Test To The SLC Test: Are There Any Reasons For A Change?, E.C.L.R., 2002, 
23(10), 494-498, p. 496 and P. Lowe, The Future Of EU Merger Control, Comp. Law, 2002, 310-317, p. 312).  
10
 P. Lowe, above note 1, pp. 4-5 and S. Maudhuit and T. Soames, Changes In EU Merger Control: Part 2, 
E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(2), 75-82, pp. 75-76. 
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Furthermore, it was submitted that the dominance test was not capable to take into 
account all relevant economic principles in the appraisal of mergers, since it was a legal test 
without any direct equivalent in economics
11
. Also, it was claimed that the dominance 
standard led the Commission and the Courts to place an excessive emphasis on the structural 
characteristics of the relevant market in the analysis of concentrations, at the expense of an 
examination revolving around the behaviour of the firms post-merger
12
. Additionally, it was 
argued that the dominance test did not focus on the effects of a merger on competition, 
because it was not suitable to evaluate potential efficiencies generated by a merger and 
accordingly it was not capable to weigh the pro-competitive as opposed to the 
anticompetitive effects of a concentration on the relevant market
13
. On the contrary, it was 
considered that the implementation of the substantial lessening of competition standard 
would enhance the Commission’s and the Courts’ ability to undertake a more economic 
analysis, it would better accommodate an effects-based approach and it would also emphasize 
on the post-merger behaviour of the firms
14
.  
 
Another assertion supporting the change of the substantive test centred on the issue 
that the wording of the dominance standard under the Merger Regulation 4064/89 was 
                                                          
11
 M. Litzell, above note 1, p. 40 and L. Roller and M. De La Mano, The Impact Of The New Substantive Test 
In European Merger Control, E.C.J., 2006, 2(1), 9-28, p. 11. 
12
 U. Immenga, above note 5, p. 443, P. Lowe, The Substantive Standard For Merger Control And The 
Treatment Of Efficiencies In Merger Analysis: An EU Perspective, Fordham Annual Antitrust Conference, 
2002, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_039_en.pdf, 1-13, p. 2 and K. 
Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, pp. 283-284. 
13
 G. Stirati, above note 9, p. 256 and White and Case, above note 3, p. 7.  
14
 I. Kokkoris, The Reform Of The European Control Merger Regulation In The Aftermath Of The Airtours 
Case - The Eagerly Expected Debate: SLC v. Dominance Test, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(1), 37-47, p. 43. 
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identical with the abuse of dominance standard under Article 102
15
. This overlap was 
considered possible to result in spill-over effects, i.e. the risk that a flexible and expansive 
interpretation of the dominance standard in mergers could lead to a similarly wide 
interpretation of dominance under Article 102
16
. Conversely, the adoption of the substantial 
lessening of competition would sever the overlap between the substantive standard for merger 
appraisal and the abuse of dominance standard under Article 102
17
.  
  
Also, an important consideration in favour of the adoption of the substantial lessening 
of competition test was related to the desirability to align the EU merger appraisal test with 
that applied in other major jurisdictions such as the US
18
. Specifically, it was considered that 
the adoption of a similar substantive test and its interpretation in a harmonised manner would 
lead to a high degree of global convergence in the evaluation of concentrations
19
.  
 
Overall, both substantive tests encompassed positive and negative features in their 
respective framework for the exercise of merger appraisal and this is logical as it would be 
impossible to find a perfectly suitable solution in such complex cases involving the 
                                                          
15
 Z. Biro and D. Parker, A New EC Merger Test? Dominance v. Substantial Lessening Of Competition, Comp. 
Law, 2002, 1, 157-166, pp. 161 and 164.  
16
 V. Selvam, above note 7, p. 60, No Cited Author, above note 9, p. 23, M. Monti, Merger Control In The 
European Union: A Radical Reform, 2002, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/545&format=HTML&aged=0&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en, 1-11, p. 4 and S. Volcker, Mind The Gap: Unilateral Effects Analysis Arrives In EC 
Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(7), 395-409, pp. 401-402. 
17
 I. Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 43 and Z. Biro and D. Parker, above note 15, p. 165. 
18
 U. Immenga, above note 5, p. 442. 
19
 V. Selvam, above note 7, p. 65, I. Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 43 and P. Lowe, above note 12, p. 3.  
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prospective effects of concentrations on competition and especially in collective dominance 
cases where oligopoly theory is inherently problematic. Nevertheless, the final choice of the 
significant impediment to effective competition test, which was adopted under the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004, seems well placed to take into account the concerns set out above.  
 
(4) The Commission’s Proposal For Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The Commission also proposed to issue Guidelines in order to clarify its approach on 
the assessment of horizontal mergers
20
. In contrast to the reaction on the proposed change of 
the substantive test, there was unanimous recognition of the need to introduce Guidelines for 
the analysis of horizontal concentrations. Accordingly, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
were welcomed as a move towards greater transparency in EU Merger Control, since they 
would help the understanding of the Commission’s practice and method of investigation. 
 
(C) THE SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENT TO EFFECTIVE COMPETITION 
TEST 
(1) Introduction 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 introduces in Articles 2(2) and 2(3) the new 
substantive test for the appraisal of concentrations that focuses on the question of whether a 
merger would ‘significantly impede effective competition’ and replaces the previous test 
contained in Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Merger Regulation 4064/89 which was based on the 
examination of whether a merger would ‘create or strengthen a dominant position’21. The 
                                                          
20
 N. Reed and P. Camesasca, above note 1, p. 458. 
21
 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, New EC Merger Regime: A Director’s Overview, 2004, available at 
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/practices/8289.pdf (last visited 13/01/2009), 1-2, p. 1, J. Vickers, 
Merger Policy In Europe: Retrospect And Prospect, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(7), 455-463, p. 455 and T. Soames, All 
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new substantive test represents a compromise solution, as it contains elements of both the 
‘dominance’ and the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ tests 22 . Specifically, the 
‘significant impediment to effective competition’ test is linguistically similar and embodies 
the essence of the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ standard, while the new merger 
appraisal test also retains the ‘dominance’ part of the old standard and accordingly it provides 
for a form of cohabitation between these standards
23
.   
 
The decision to replace the dominance test and to adopt the significant impediment to 
effective competition test produces important effects on the assessment of concentrations for 
the likelihood to create or strengthen a collective dominant position. In particular, the new 
substantive test alters the form of the appraisal undertaken in concentrations, it strengthens 
the substance of the analysis employed in the examination of collective dominance merger 
cases and it results in important policy implications. 
 
(2) Issues Of Formation - Dominance v. Significant Impediment To Effective 
Competition 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Change: The New World After 1 May 2004, 2004, available at http://www.martindale.com/antitrust-trade-
regulation-law/article_Howrey-LLP_71546.htm, 1-5, p. 2. 
22
 I. Kokkoris, above note 1, p. 250 and Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Antitrust Legal Alert - The New Test Adopted 
For European Union Merger Review, 2003, available at 
http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=305497&id=50966&filename=asr-
50968.pdf, 1-2, p. 1. 
23
 M. Egge et al., above note 5, p. 21, M. Walker, The New Merger Regulation And Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: Will They Make A Difference?, available at 
http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/RELATING_MATERIALS/Publications/Consultant_publications/files/pub
_4117.pdf, 1-4, p. 1 and G. Stirati, above note 9, pp. 253-254. 
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The new substantive test amends the wording of the old test by simply reversing its 
phrasing. Nevertheless, this modification is not merely a semantic change of trivial 
importance, but instead it highly affects the form of the appraisal undertaken in mergers.  
 
            (I) The Dominance Test 
The dominance test under the Merger Regulation 4064/89 entailed a cumulative two-
stage analysis for the assessment of the incompatibility of a concentration with the Common 
Market
24
. Specifically, under the old test the Commission was required to establish firstly that 
the merger ‘created or strengthened a dominant position’ and secondly that it resulted in a 
‘significant impediment to effective competition’25. Additionally, a causal link between the 
first and the second limbs had to be demonstrated and this was evident from the wording of 
the test which directly linked the two elements by the phrase ‘as a result of which’26.  
 
Under the old test the focus was primarily shed on the dominance limb, since without 
the requirement of dominance being met, the Commission would not rely exclusively on the 
significant impediment to effective competition limb in order to challenge a merger and 
                                                          
24
 This two-stage analysis was evident by the wording of Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation 4064/89, which 
provided that ‘a concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared 
incompatible with the Common Market’. See also, L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, pp. 10, 11 and 
13 and V. Selvam, above note 7, p. 53. 
25
 Airtours para. 58. See also, K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, pp. 280 and 288 and No Cited 
Author, above note 9, p. 22. 
26
 R. Thompson, Goodbye To ‘The Dominance Test’? Substantive Appraisal Under The New UK And EC 
Merger Regimes, Comp. Law, 2003, 332-346, p. 335. 
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consequently it only prohibited concentrations that created or reinforced dominance
27
. Thus, 
a finding of dominance was a necessary condition for the prohibition of a merger, but in 
principle it was not in itself sufficient, because a dominant firm would not necessarily lead to 
a significant impediment to effective competition
28
. Nonetheless, in practice and despite the 
relative importance which the Commission attributed to the second limb of the test, often it 
neglected it and maintained that it was sufficient to prove the first limb to also have proven 
the second limb, i.e. in a number of cases it was presumed that a significant impediment to 
effective competition would automatically result from the establishment of the creation or the 
strengthening of a dominant position
29
. Effectively, this meant that the two limbs of the 
Merger Regulation 4064/89 substantive test did not carry equal weights, but the requirement 
of ‘dominance’ preceded in importance in relation to the ‘significant impediment to effective 
competition’.  
 
            (II) The Significant Impediment To Effective Competition Test 
                                                          
27
 K. Tomczykiewicz, Assessing The European Community’s Merger Regulations, 2007, available at 
http://www.lepanoptique.com/sections/politique-economie/assessing-the-european-community%E2%80%99s-
merger-regulations/, 1-4, p. 2. 
28
 Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland (Case IV/M.53 [1991], OJ L334/42 [1991], 4 CMLR M2 [1992]) para. 53. 
See also, L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, p. 13 and M. Motta, above note 9, p. 202. 
29
 A. Renckens, Welfare Standards, Substantive Tests And Efficiency Considerations In Merger Policy: 
Defining The Efficiency Defence, J.C.L.&E., 2007, 3(2), 149-179, p. 165, G. Monti, The New Substantive Test 
In The EC Merger Regulation – Bridging The Gap Between Economics And Law?, LSE Law, Society And 
Economy Working Papers, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153661, 1-
21, p. 3, J. Basedow, The Modernization Of European Competition Law: A Story Of Unfinished Concepts, 
Texas International Law Journal, 2006-2007, 42, 429-439, p. 433, EU Committee Of The American Chamber 
Of Commerce In Belgium, above note 4, p. 7 and U. Denzel, above note 2, p. 18. 
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The Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test contains the same two limbs as the 
old test, but the second limb of the old Articles 2(2) and 2(3) is now the principal criterion in 
the form of a ‘significant impediment to effective competition’, while ‘dominance’ is only the 
prime example of such a situation
30. Specifically, by adding the words ‘in particular’ before 
the ‘dominance’ limb the new substantive test envisages the creation or the strengthening of a 
dominant position as the primary paradigm where a significant impediment to effective 
competition would result
31
. This essentially transforms the previous two-limb test into a 
unified standard that contains a single necessary and sufficient condition for incompatibility, 
i.e. whether the merger would significantly impede effective competition
32
. Accordingly, the 
establishment of a dominant position is no longer a necessary requirement for a prohibition 
decision and even though the new substantive test incorporates the dominance paradigm, it is 
not limited to it, since a merger that does not satisfy the dominance requirement can still be 
prohibited under the significant impediment to effective competition standard
33
. It follows 
that there is no longer a necessity to establish a causal link in all cases.  
                                                          
30
 Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 provides that ‘a concentration which would significantly 
impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the Common Market’. See 
also, B. Fernandez, I. Hashi and M. Jegers, The Implementation Of The European Commission's Merger 
Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis, J.C.L.&E., 2008, 4(3), 791-809, p. 793, I. Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 
44, A. Riesenkampff, above note 8, p. 716, A. Christiansen, The Reform Of EU Merger Control – Fundamental 
Reversal Or Mere Refinement?, 2006, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898845, 
1-60, p. 20, J. Basedow, above note 29, p. 434 and G. Stirati, above note 9, p. 254. 
31
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 2. 
32
 L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, p. 16. 
33
 K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, p. 288, J. Basedow, above note 29, p. 434, S. Voigt and A. 
Schmidt, The Commission’s Guidelines On Horizontal Mergers: Improvement Or Deterioration?, C.M.L.R., 
2004, 41, 1583-1594, p. 1585 and Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, above note 22, p. 2. 
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Thus, the position under the substantive test of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 is as 
follows. On the one hand, the Commission may prohibit a merger by proving ‘directly’ that it 
would significantly impede effective competition without proof of dominance or a causal link 
between them. On the other hand, the Commission may ‘indirectly’ demonstrate the 
incompatibility of a concentration with the Common Market by establishing that it creates or 
strengthens a dominant position which would significantly impede effective competition and 
in such a situation a causal link must be shown
34
.  
 
(3) Issues Of Substance - Collective Dominance Under The New Substantive Test 
The significant impediment to effective competition test successfully addresses and 
resolves most of the concerns that were related to the dominance test and it reinforces the 
substantive analysis employed in collective dominance merger cases. In particular, the new 
substantive test, in conjunction with its interpretation in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
introduces the assessment of unilateral effects in EU Merger Control and formally includes 
coordinated effects within the boundaries of application of the Merger Regulation 139/2004, 
it verifies the shift towards a more economic and effects-based approach in the analysis of 
collective dominance cases, while it also retains the past collective dominance precedent.  
 
            (I) Coordinated And Unilateral Effects 
A fundamental change induced by the Merger Regulation 139/2004 centres on the fact 
that, while the old merger appraisal standard did not explicitly address collective dominance 
concerns, the analysis of such anticompetitive positions is now formally included within the 
ambit of application of the new substantive test. Specifically, collective dominance was 
                                                          
34
 G. Monti, above note 29, p. 4 and K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, p. 290. 
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brought within the boundaries of the Merger Regulation 4064/89 by a teleological 
interpretation of the dominance test, but it was not formally included within its provisions
35
. 
Conversely, the significant impediment to effective competition test, as explained at Recital 
25 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, not only 
verifies the understanding that the concept of collective dominance and the theory of 
coordinated effects reflect each other, but also it recognises the fact that coordinated effects 
form a valid theory of harm in EU Merger Control
36
. Additionally, the new merger appraisal 
test closes the gap contained in the scope of application of the old substantive test by 
removing the strict necessity to prove dominance, which in turn gives to the Commission a 
firm legal basis to assess the unilateral effects of concentrations
37
. In order to clarify this 
point, Recital 25 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 expressly includes unilateral effects 
within the boundaries of application of the new substantive test
38
. 
 
Accordingly, the new substantive test, as explained in the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, acknowledges that unilateral and coordinated effects are the main and only 
                                                          
35
 Note also the discussion on the inclusion of collective dominance within the boundaries of application of the 
Merger Regulation 4064/89 at Ch. 4.  
36
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 22 and 39. 
37
 L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, p. 9, M. Egge et al., above note 5, p. 17, S. Baxter and F. 
Dethmers, Unilateral Effects Under The European Merger Regulation: How Big Is The Gap?, E.C.L.R., 2005, 
26(7), 380-389, p. 380 and A. Zutven and H. Urlus, Greenberg Traurig LLP Client Alert - New EU Merger 
Regulation And Reform Of EC Antitrust Enforcement, 2004, available at 
http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/Alerts/2004/vanzutvena_06.asp, 1-6, p. 3. 
38
 Recital 25 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 explains that ‘the notion of 'significant impediment to effective 
competition' should be interpreted as extending, beyond dominance, only to the anticompetitive effects of a 
concentration resulting from the non-coordinated behaviour of undertakings which would not have a dominant 
position on the market concerned’. 
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theories of harm in EU Merger Control and this recognition gives to the Commission a firm 
ability to regulate all possible anticompetitive effects which may result from horizontal 
concentrations
39
. Moreover, the new merger appraisal test, as interpreted in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, inserts a clear distinction between coordinated and unilateral effects as 
these anticompetitive theories reflect differing situations and circumstances
40
.  
 
            (II) The More Economic And Effects-Based Approach 
The significant impediment to effective competition standard is directly rooted in 
economic theories and accordingly it leads the Commission to take economic factors into 
account in the examination of concentrations
41
. Thus, the Merger Regulation 139/2004 test 
shifts the emphasis from the former more legalistic approach under the dominance standard 
to an analysis which is in accordance with contemporary economic thinking, i.e. the ‘more 
economic approach’42. The more economic approach was a necessary step forward in the 
assessment of collective dominance in mergers, since the GC in Airtours harmonized the 
requirements for the establishment of such an anticompetitive position with economics and 
                                                          
39
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 22. See also, K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, pp. 277, 288 
and 290, I. Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 44, M. Egge et al., above note 5, p. 26 and ICN Merger Working Group, 
Project On Merger Guidelines, Report For The Third ICN Annual Conference In Seoul, 2004, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc488.pdf, 1-19, p. 8. 
40
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 22.  
41
 B. Fernandez et al., above note 30, pp. 791, 793 and 794, I. Kokkoris, above note 1, p. 250, J. Basedow, above 
note 29, p. 433 and E. Damme and J. Pinkse, Merger Simulation Analysis: An Academic Perspective, 2005, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869737, 1-14, p. 2. 
42
 A. Christiansen, above note 30, p. 27, G. Monti, above note 29, pp. 10-11 and G. Stirati, above note 9, p. 250. 
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this analytical methodology needed legislative authority in order to be cemented
43
. This is 
achieved by the introduction of the new merger appraisal standard and its analysis in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which brings the concept of collective dominance fully in line 
with the economic theory of tacit collusion.  
 
The new substantive test also leads the Commission to scrutinize the effects of 
mergers on competition. Specifically, in order to assess whether a ‘significant impediment to 
effective competition’ may arise as a result of the concentration under investigation, the 
Commission must perform an effects-based analysis and weigh the anticompetitive as 
opposed to the pro-competitive effects of the merger
44
. In that context, the analytical 
framework established under the new substantive test integrates the consideration of 
efficiencies in the appraisal of concentrations and this development constitutes an 
advancement in relation to the treatment of efficiencies under the dominance standard. In 
particular, under the dominance test the Commission consistently dismissed the notifying 
parties’ claims to rely on efficiencies arguments in order to counterbalance the 
anticompetitive effects of proposed mergers and, what is more, sometimes efficiencies 
appeared to count against a concentration as an offence
45
. Conversely, the Merger Regulation 
                                                          
43
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours judgment where the Court adopted a more economic approach at Ch. 
4. 
44
 G. Monti, above note 29, p. 10, M. Walker, above note 23, p. 2, L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, 
p. 20, K. Tomczykiewicz, above note 27, p. 3 and K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, pp. 288-289. 
45
 For example, in General Electric/Honeywell (Case COMP/M.2220 [2001], OJ L48/01 [2004]) the 
Commission held that cost efficiencies resulting from the concentration would reinforce the dominant position 
of the merged entity. Also, in AT&T/NCR (Case IV/M.50 [1991]) para. 30 the Commission examined whether 
advantages flowing from synergies would lead to a dominant position. Lastly, in Aérospatiale-
Alenia/DeHavilland paras 65-71 cost savings were considered to count against the materialisation of the merger. 
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139/2004 explicitly acknowledges the role of efficiencies arguments in the assessment of 
mergers
46
. Thus, Article 2(1)(b) along with Recital 29 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 
form the basis of the efficiencies defence in EU Merger Control and introduce the 
understanding that efficiencies should be taken into account in the appraisal of concentrations 
provided that they produce benefits to the consumers
47
. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See also U. Immenga, above note 5, p. 447, J. Davies, R. Schlossberg, M. Jaspers and K. Scholomiti, 
Efficiencies – A Changing Horizon In Horizontal Merger Control, 2007, available at 
http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/narrative_pdf.php?id=11 (last visited 04/12/2010), 3-13, p. 4, M. Motta, 
above note 9, p. 203, EU Committee Of The American Chamber Of Commerce In Belgium, above note 4, p. 7, 
ICC, Comments On European Commission Draft Notice On The Appraisal Of Horizontal Mergers, 2003, 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2003/Comments-on-
European-Commission-Draft-Notice-on-the-Appraisal-of-Horizontal-Mergers/, 1-11, p. 8, U. Denzel, above 
note 2, pp. 20 and 22, M. Walker, Have The Economic Approaches To Merger Control In The EC And US 
Converged?, ICGL To Merger Control, 2005, available at 
http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/RELATING_MATERIALS/Publications/Consultant_publications/files/pub
_4104.pdf, 20-24, p. 23 and Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, European Commission Adopts Merger Control 
Reform Package, 2002, available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/7178d077-068a-4bd2-9976-
cb2dcf73db4d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bef3d442-7bcc-48a2-99a9-50a85b9c7490/ACFD854.pdf, 1-
6, p. 4. 
46
 L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, p. 17 and A. Renckens, above note 29, p. 166.  
47
 Article 2(1)(b) provides that in the analysis of concentrations the Commission ‘shall take into account the 
development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form 
an obstacle to competition’. Also, Recital 29 states that it ‘is possible that the efficiencies brought about by a 
concentration counteract the effects on competition and in particular the potential harm to consumers’. Note also 
the discussion on efficiencies at Ch. 4. See also, A. Christiansen, above note 30, p. 25, J. Basedow, above note 
29, p. 435 and N. Reed and P. Camesasca, above note 1, p. 461. 
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Lastly, the more economic approach advocated by the new substantive test, directs the 
Commission to divert from an examination based purely on structural indicators and to 
analyse in a dynamic context a blend of structural factors and behavioural incentives in order 
to assess the likelihood of coordinated effects post-merger, thereby essentially verifying the 
analysis employed by the GC in Airtours
48
.  
 
            (III) Past Precedent And Spill-Over Effects 
The new merger appraisal test resolves the problem revolving around the validity of 
the pre-Merger Regulation 139/2004 collective dominance decisions by preserving such 
precedent
49
. In particular, the fact that dominance forms the prime example of a significant 
impediment to effective competition ensures the continued validity of past precedent as 
guidance to future decisions and such a position is expressly affirmed by Recital 26 of the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004
50
. Indeed, in its post-Merger Regulation 139/2004 decisions the 
Commission follows the past precedent and this was clearly demonstrated in ABF/GBI where 
it applied the Airtours and Sony judgments, which were decided under the dominance 
standard, in a coordinated effects examination under the new substantive test
51
.  
 
However, the new substantive test does not firmly resolve the potential spill-over 
effects problem between collective dominance under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 and 
                                                          
48
 Note also the discussion on the GC’s focus in Airtours on a mixture of structural conditions and behavioural 
incentives at Ch. 4. See also, A. Weitbrecht, EU Merger Control In 2006 - The Year In Review, E.C.L.R., 2007, 
28(2), 125-133, p. 126. 
49
 K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, above note 1, p. 291. 
50
 Recital 26 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 refers to the preservation of ‘the guidance that may be drawn 
from past judgments of the European Courts and Commission decisions pursuant to Regulation 4064/89’. 
51
 ABF/GBI paras 141-145. 
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the abuse of collective dominance under Article 102. In principle, the substantive test under 
the Merger Regulation 139/2004 appears to avoid confusion with the wording of the 
prohibition under Article 102, since the assessment of concentrations would be based on the 
significant impediment to effective competition standard and accordingly such an appraisal 
would not be linked with any interpretations of dominance given by the Courts in cases 
falling within the ambit of Article 102
52
. Nonetheless, it seems that the dominance paradigm 
contained in the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test will continue to play an 
influential role in the assessment of collective dominance merger cases and accordingly there 
is an on-going link with the Article 102 collective dominance standard, i.e. there is not a 
complete detachment between the respective standards applied under each legal provision
53
.  
 
(4) Issues Of Policy – Effects Of The Merger Regulation 139/2004 Substantive  
Test 
The amendment of the substantive test under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 
produces important policy implications, as it alters the threshold of intervention applicable in 
horizontal concentrations, it influences the significance attributed to unilateral as opposed to 
coordinated effects and it affects the enforcement policy in mergers, whilst in this later 
context remedies enjoy a prominent role. 
 
             (I) The Intervention Threshold 
                                                          
52
 I. Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 44. 
53
 This view is in accordance with the Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 4 which asserts that the concept of 
dominance ‘provides an important indication as to the standard of competitive harm that is applicable when 
determining whether a concentration is likely to impede effective competition to a significant degree’. 
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An important policy issue revolves around the question of whether the change of the 
substantive test modifies the intervention threshold applied in horizontal mergers assessed for 
the likelihood of resulting in unilateral or coordinated effects.   
 
Unilateral Effects 
The amendment of the substantive test leads to a lowering of the intervention 
threshold applicable in horizontal mergers, as it introduces greater flexibility in establishing 
incompatibility. Such flexibility emerges from the fact that the new substantive test gives to 
the Commission the ability to regulate the unilateral effects ‘gap’ cases and challenge 
mergers at levels of market shares below the traditional threshold required for a finding of 
single firm dominance, since the Commission may ‘directly’ demonstrate the incompatibility 
of a concentration by focusing on the establishment of the sole condition of a significant 
impediment to effective competition instead of the old more demanding test which 
additionally required the proof of dominance
54
. Thus, the intervention threshold is lower 
under the new substantive test, because the elimination of the necessity to establish 
dominance introduces the unilateral effects theory of harm in the assessment of horizontal 
mergers and opens the way for the Commission’s intervention to a significantly larger 
number of concentrations, i.e. those concentrations which could not be challenged under the 
dominance test as they fell within the ‘gap’ of such a standard55.  
                                                          
54
 Note also the discussion on the relationship between the unilateral effects theory of harm and the concept of 
single firm dominance at Ch. 7. See also, M. Walker, above note 23, p. 2 and D. Ridyard, The Commission’s 
New Horizontal Merger Guidelines - An Economic Commentary, 2005, available at 
http://www.coleurope.eu/content/gclc/documents/GCLC%20WP%2002-05.pdf, 1-13, p. 2. 
55
 Note that, for the reasons stated, such a position holds firm despite the fact that Recital 26 of the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 refers to the maintenance of ‘consistency with the standards of competitive harm which 
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Coordinated Effects 
The lowering of the intervention threshold under the amended substantive test is 
exclusively attributed to the inclusion of the unilateral effects theory of harm in the 
assessment of horizontal mergers and specifically to the ability conferred on the Commission 
to regulate the ‘gap’ cases by ‘directly’ proving the incompatibility of a concentration. On the 
contrary, despite the amendment of the substantive test, the threshold of intervention 
applicable in horizontal mergers assessed for the likelihood of coordinated effects remains 
unaltered and this position holds firm irrespective of whether the Commission would rely on 
the ‘direct’ or the ‘indirect’ demonstration of incompatibility of a concentration.  
 
In the examination of coordinated effects cases the Commission may ‘indirectly’ 
prove the incompatibility of a notified merger with the Common Market
56
. The ability to 
indirectly demonstrate the incompatibility of a concentration under the Merger Regulation 
139/2004 illustrates that the introduction of the new substantive test does not alter the validity 
of the analytical model in terms of dominance as developed under the Merger Regulation 
4064/89
57
. In particular, dominance is still a feature of the new merger appraisal test, since it 
forms the principal example of a significant impediment to effective competition, and 
accordingly the applicability of the dominance analytical model in the assessment of 
concentrations has been preserved. Such a position is expressly affirmed by the Horizontal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with the Common Market’. See also, S. Bishop and D. Ridyard, Prometheus Unbound: Increasing The Scope 
For Intervention In EC Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(8), 357-363, p. 360, S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, above 
note 33, pp. 1583 and 1585, H. Kuhnert, Widening The Gap – The Impact Of The T-Mobile/tele.ring Decision, 
C.L.I., 2007, January, 9-10, p. 9 and D. Ridyard, above note 54, pp. 4-5. 
56
  Note also the earlier discussion on the ‘indirect’ proof of incompatibility at this Chapter. 
57
 L. Roller and M. De La Mano, above note 11, pp. 10 and 27 and K. Tomczykiewicz, above note 27, pp. 2-3. 
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Merger Guidelines which place an increased emphasis on the dominance paradigm, since 
paragraph 4 provides that ‘most cases of incompatibility will continue to be based on a 
finding of dominance’58. Therefore, in the situation where the Commission would rely on the 
‘indirect’ demonstration of incompatibility in concentrations analysed for the likelihood of 
coordinated effects under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive standard, the threshold 
for intervention would remain unaltered.  
 
In ABF/GBI the Commission sought to ‘directly’ prove the incompatibility of the 
concentration on the basis of coordinated effects, as it focused exclusively on the 
establishment of the significant impediment to effective competition condition under the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test
59
. Nevertheless, the ‘direct’ proof of 
incompatibility has different impact on the intervention threshold employed in horizontal 
mergers examined for coordinated as opposed to unilateral effects. Specifically, the 
applicability of the ‘direct’ proof of incompatibility regulates the unilateral effects ‘gap’ cases 
that fall below the standards required to establish single firm dominance under the old merger 
appraisal test and accordingly it lowers the intervention threshold. Conversely, the reliance on 
the ‘direct’ proof of incompatibility in coordinated effects cases does not lower the 
intervention threshold, because there is no ‘gap’ between the regulatory boundaries of the 
concept of collective dominance as developed under the dominance test and the theory of 
coordinated effects as analysed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines under the new 
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 The validity of the dominance model of analysis is also illustrated by Recital 25 of the Merger Regulation 
139/2004, which states that the significant impediment to effective competition standard comprises ‘dominance’ 
cases and ‘non-coordinated effects’ cases within its ambit. 
59
 ABF/GBI paras 144 and 146. 
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substantive test, but on the contrary they closely correspond to each other
60
. This position is 
underpinned by the fact that in ABF/GBI the Commission’s analysis of coordinated effects 
under the significant impediment to effective competition test was heavily based on the 
substantive assessment and the legal requirements employed in the examination of collective 
dominance cases under the dominance standard, i.e. the Airtours criteria and the Sony 
hypothetical mechanism of coordination
61
. Thus, in the situation where the Commission 
would rely on the ‘direct’ demonstration of incompatibility in coordinated effects cases 
examined under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test, there would be no 
lowering of the intervention threshold. 
 
            (II) A Predominant Theory Of Harm? 
A policy implication resulting from the amendment of the substantive test and the 
introduction of unilateral effects in EU Merger Control relates to the Commission’s tendency 
to principally rely on such a theory of harm in order to appraise the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects resulting from horizontal concentrations. On the contrary, the 
Commission’s incentive to challenge horizontal mergers on the ground of coordinated effects 
has been reduced and this is demonstrated by the negligible intervention rate under such a 
theory of harm post-Merger Regulation 139/2004. As a policy matter, this tendency can be 
attributed to the fact that the intervention threshold applicable in mergers assessed for 
unilateral effects is lower than the threshold applied in coordinated effects cases and 
accordingly the Commission would prefer to rely on the former theory of harm in order to 
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 Note also the discussion on the relationship between the concept of collective dominance and the coordinated 
effects theory of harm at Ch. 2 as well as the analysis of coordinated effects under the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines later at this Chapter.  
61
 ABF/GBI paras 141-145.  
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successfully challenge a concentration
62
. Moreover, it seems that the problematic economic 
background of coordinated effects has resulted in their marginalization, since such a theory of 
harm appears less likely to lead to enforcement as compared to unilateral effects
63
. This is 
illustrated by the fact that in unilateral effects the mechanism of harm is clear cut, whilst 
collusion based theories are complex
64
. Furthermore, better and more accurate instruments 
for the examination of unilateral effects have been developed, as this is evident by the use of 
econometric models in the assessment of such a theory of harm, in contradiction to 
coordinated effects where these analytical methods are of limited, if any, assistance
65
.  
 
Nonetheless, the emergence of unilateral effects as a theory of anticompetitive harm 
in EU Merger Control has not diminished the significance of coordinated eff1ects as an 
economic phenomenon centred on collusion in the particular circumstances of a case, i.e. 
concerns revolving around tacit collusion have not declined in importance. What is more, the 
legal framework for the assessment of coordinated effects has been reinforced by the 
introduction of the new substantive test and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which confirm 
that such a theory of harm forms an integral part of EU Merger Control and clarify the 
methodology as well as the factors relevant in its analysis. Therefore, despite the increased 
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 S. Volcker, above note 16, p. 397 and S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, Collective Dominance Under EC Merger 
Control – After Airtours And The Introduction Of Unilateral Effects Is There Still A Future For Collective 
Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(3), 148-160, p. 159. 
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 S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, above note 62, p. 160 and M. Coate, Economic Models In Merger Analysis: A 
Case Study Of The Merger Guidelines, 2005, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=726515, 1-44, p. 30. 
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 Note also the discussion on the mechanism of harm under each anticompetitive theory at Ch. 7. 
65
 Note also the discussion on the application of econometrics in the assessment of unilateral and coordinated 
effects at Ch. 7. 
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emphasis placed by the Commission on unilateral effects as a policy choice, in principle no 
theory of harm is predominant in EU Merger Control.  
 
 (III) Enforcement Policy Post-Merger Regulation 139/2004 
Effective enforcement policy is essential in order to maintain an efficient EU Merger 
Control system. However, the analysis of the overall rate of prohibition and conditional 
clearance decisions in concentrations demonstrates a low level of intervention post-Merger 
Regulation 139/2004. Also, numerous considerations reveal that effective enforcement of the 
concept of collective dominance in horizontal mergers seems questionable.  
 
The enforcement statistics before and after the introduction of the Merger Regulation 
139/2004 substantive test demonstrate that during the period 1994-2003 on average 1% of the 
notified concentrations were prohibited, while the same proportion fell to 0,1% in the period 
2004-2008
66
. Also, in interventions including prohibition decisions, clearances with remedies 
in Phase II and Phase II withdrawals, the intervention rate has fallen between pre-2004 and 
post-2004 from 4.6% of all notified mergers to 2.2% respectively
67
. Accordingly, since the 
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 For example, in 2002 and 2003 there were no prohibition decisions, while even the ‘record’ number of five 
prohibitions in 2001 amounted to only 1.7% of the annual decisions on concentrations. See also, European 
Commission XXXIInd Report On Competition Policy 2002, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2002/en.pdf, 1-310, p. 65, European Commission 
XXXIIIrd Report On Competition Policy 2003, available at 
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adoption of the new substantive test, the Commission has imposed conditions after a Phase II 
investigation in fewer cases on average than under the dominance standard and a significantly 
smaller percentage of notified concentrations has been prohibited
68
. In that regard, the 
Commission has recognized that pre-Merger Regulation 139/2004 ‘outright prohibitions are 
relatively rare’, whilst post-Merger Regulation 139/2004 ‘the percentage of notified 
concentrations resulting in a prohibition decision remains modest’ 69 . Also, it should be 
highlighted that this drop in the percentage of intervention decisions is inconsistent with the 
assumption that the introduction of the analysis of unilateral effects in EU Merger Control 
under the new substantive test would lead to a higher degree of enforcement. Nevertheless, 
these statistics cannot automatically justify a conclusion pointing towards an ineffective 
enforcement policy post-Merger Regulation 139/2004, since this drop in the Commission’s 
intervention may be explainable by the implementation of the more accurate in results 
economics-based approach and the refinement of the analysis which has at its centre the 
effects of mergers on competition. Thus, even though it is evident that the overall percentage 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conditional clearance decisions in Phase II. Finally, in 2006 there was no prohibition decision. See also, 
European Commission Report On Competition Policy 2004, Vol. 1, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2004/en.pdf, 1-202, p. 65, European Commission 
Report On Competition Policy 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2005/en.pdf, 1-210, p. 89, European Commission 
Report On Competition Policy 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2006/en.pdf, 1-35, p. 14 and F. Maier-Rigaud and K. 
Parplies, above note 66, p. 568. 
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 J. Briones, A Balance Of The Impact Of Economic Analysis On The EU Competition Policy, World 
Competition, 2009, 32(1), 27-39, p. 29. 
69
 European Commission Report On Competition Policy 2005, above note 67, p. 89 and A. Papaioannou, U. 
Diez, S. Ryan and D. Sjoblom, Green Paper On The Review Of The Merger Regulation, Competition Policy 
Newsletter, 2002, Vol. 1, 65-68, p. 65. 
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of intervention decisions has been marginalised post-Merger Regulation 139/2004, these 
results in themselves are inconclusive. 
  
Nonetheless, a number of considerations point towards an insufficient enforcement of 
collective dominance in horizontal concentrations post-Merger Regulation 139/2004. Firstly, 
it should be emphasised that there has been no intervention decision on the basis of 
coordinated effects under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test, with the 
exception of ABF/GBI. Secondly, despite the fact that since 2006 the GC in Impala launched 
the indirect test and introduced a degree of flexibility in the establishment of the strict 
Airtours conditions, thereby widening the ability to enforce the concept of collective 
dominance in mergers, the Commission has not yet relied on that test in order to examine a 
coordinated effects case, i.e. enforcement is still lacking in order to fully apply such an 
analysis in practice. Thirdly, the lack of precedent tackling tacit collusion under Article 102 
and the absence of provisions controlling the abuse of collective dominance in the Guidance 
Paper, generate an imperative need to strengthen the applicability of collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation in order to effectively regulate tacit collusive conduct within the 
EU Competition Law framework and this is in contradiction with the minimal enforcement of 
such a concept in horizontal concentrations
70
.  
 
The limited enforcement of collective dominance post-Merger Regulation 139/2004 is 
to some extent explainable by the difficulties rooted on the imperfect economic 
understanding as related to the inconclusiveness of game theory which creates complications 
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 Note also the discussion on the focus of the Article 102 precedent on the abusive conduct of explicitly 
colluding firms and the absence of provisions for the analysis of the abuse of collective dominance in the 
Guidance Paper at Ch. 6. 
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on the regulation of coordination and by the fact that the threshold for intervention in 
concentrations examined for coordinated effects is high. However, the arguments set out 
above, and particularly the non-application of the Impala indirect test, highlight not only a 
limited, but primarily an insufficient enforcement policy that points towards the conclusion of 
possible under-enforcement of collective dominance in horizontal concentrations post-Merger 
Regulation 139/2004.  
 
(IV) Remedies 
As a policy choice, the Commission has gradually attributed an increased role to 
remedies in merger review and this is evident by the fact that both pre- but mostly post-
Merger Regulation 139/2004 the number of cases in which a concentration was cleared 
subject to remedies has been much higher than the number of prohibition decisions
71
. The 
legal basis for the acceptance of remedies as a means to eliminate anticompetitive problems is 
contained in Articles 6(2) and 8(2) along with Recital 30 of the Merger Regulation 139/2004, 
while the Merger Remedies Notice provides a detailed guidance on the types of commitments 
which are considered acceptable to resolve anticompetitive concerns and reflects the 
recommendations of the Merger Remedies Study that carried out a detailed ex-post review on 
the effectiveness of various types of commitments
72
. However, the issue of remedies directed 
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 H. Vasconcelos, Efficiency Gains And Structural Remedies In Merger Control, J.Ind.Econ., 2010, 742-766, p. 
760 and P. Ormosi, Determinants Of The Success Of Remedy Offers: Evidence From European Community 
Mergers, CCP Working Paper 09-11, 2009, available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.138543!ccp09-
11.pdf, 1-43, p. 3. 
72
 Commission Notice On Remedies Acceptable Under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, ([2008], OJ 
C267/1 [2008]), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/files_remedies/remedies_notice_en.pdf and Merger 
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to solve coordinated effects concerns in horizontal concentrations is characterised by the lack 
of any provision in the relevant legislative instruments which specifically focuses on the type 
of commitments required to eliminate the risk of tacit collusion post-merger. Thus, the 
framework of remedies applicable in coordinated effects cases is provided by the general 
principles and provisions that underpin the totality of merger remedies as well as by the 
relevant case precedent. 
 
General Principles 
       Merger remedies are underlined by a number of fundamental principles. Specifically, 
in the appraisal of remedies the Commission must take into account the principle of 
proportionality between the intensity of the remedy and the competition problem that it 
intends to solve in order to avoid the risk of underfixing, i.e. where the commitments fail to 
successfully eliminate the anticompetitive concerns, or overfixing, i.e. where the remedy is 
wider than necessary
73
. Furthermore, in principle the objective of remedies is to restore the 
level of competition that prevailed in the relevant market before the concentration and not to 
enhance pre-merger competition as this would lead to overfixing
74
. Moreover, the 
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 Recital 30 Merger Regulation 139/2004 and Merger Remedies Notice para. 85. See also, F. Louis, New EU 
Commission Notice On Remedies In Merger Cases, 2008, available at 
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commitments must be effective and capable to eliminate entirely the anticompetitive 
concerns arising from the concentration under investigation
75
. Lastly, there is no specific type 
of remedy that would be applicable in each and every case and accordingly the suitability of 
commitments must be considered on a case-by-case basis by taking into account the context 
of the market, the nature of the merger under scrutiny and the theory of harm arising from the 
concentration
76
.  
 
        The Commission must fulfil the Airtours criteria in order to establish a coordinated 
effects theory of harm in horizontal mergers. It follows that in the situation where the 
Commission proves that the concentration would create or reinforce a situation of tacit 
collusion post-merger, the proposed remedy must be capable to ‘eliminate entirely’ the 
coordinated effects concerns raised by the concentration and this would be accomplished by 
cancelling at least one of the Airtours conditions. In particular, the cumulative and necessary 
nature of the Airtours conditions dictates that a remedy directed towards the cancelation of 
only one of those criteria would suffice, even though it is possible that a remedy package 
might simultaneously affect more or all of those factors. In that regard, it should be 
emphasised that in circumstances where the Commission establishes that the concentration 
under investigation would lead to the creation of a situation of tacit collusion post-merger, a 
remedy directed towards the elimination of one or more Airtours criteria would return the 
market to the competitive pre-merger status. However, in the situation where the Commission 
establishes the reinforcement of tacit collusion as a result of the merger, a remedy aimed to 
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 Recital 30 Merger Regulation 139/2004 and Merger Remedies Notice para. 9. 
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 Merger Remedies Notice para. 16 and Gencor para. 320. See also, S. Papon, Structural v. Behavioural 
Remedies In Merger Control: A Case To Case Analysis, E.C.L.R., 2009, 30(1), 36-48, p. 37 and K. Paas, Non-
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cancel one or more Airtours conditions would return the market not to the status quo ante, 
since this would be characterised by an element of tacit coordination, but to a more 
competitive outcome than the level of competition that prevailed in the pre-merger market. 
This later situation constitutes a deviation from the principle that the remedy must strictly 
return the market to its pre-merger status, while it would also contravene the proportionality 
principle. Nevertheless, it is justifiable on the basis of the consideration that otherwise the 
proposed remedies would not be able to effectively intervene against the Airtours conditions 
in such a context. Also, it would be illogical to permit the continuation of a pre-merger tacit 
collusion situation to the post-merger market considering the ineffective enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 against such anticompetitive conduct and bearing in mind the 
underlying aim to maintain effectively competitive market structures
77
. 
 
Classification 
            The Merger Remedies Notice endorses a basic distinction between divestitures, other 
structural remedies and commitments relating to the future behaviour of the merged entity, 
where essentially the Commission distinguishes between structural, quasi-structural and 
behavioural remedies
78
. Quasi-structural commitments represent an intermediary category, 
since they entail both structural and behavioural characteristics, but they tend to be 
categorised within the behavioural remedies group and they are generally treated as such. In 
any case, these types of remedies are not mutually exclusive, since in order to effectively 
address anticompetitive concerns the Commission may adopt a remedy package that 
comprises a combination of different types of commitments as primary and supplementary 
undertakings. 
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Structural remedies influence competition by directly changing the structure of the 
relevant market. The most important structural remedy is divestiture of either an entire 
business, a production facility or assets such as intellectual property rights and supply or 
distribution contracts. In coordinated effects cases divestitures are capable to induce a 
simultaneous general modification of the structural features in the relevant market thereby 
adversely affecting the necessary conditions for coordination. Specifically, the principal aim 
of divestitures is to establish a new entrant or to strengthen an existing competitor in order to 
exercise a sufficient competitive constraint towards the oligopolists and counteract or 
destabilise a collusive strategy post-merger
79
. At the same time, a divestiture is capable to 
render the market less conductive to collusion by diminishing the collective market shares 
held by the oligopolistic group and reduce the degree of market concentration, it could 
maintain the number of pre-merger market players or remove the symmetries between the 
largest oligopolists
80
. Another type of structural remedy relates to commitments that sever 
structural links between competitors. These mainly concern exit commitments through which 
the merging parties undertake to withdraw from a joint venture by divesting their shares, 
commitments to divest a minority shareholding stake in a competitor and undertakings to 
waive the exercise of shareholders’ rights in a rival firm81. The employment of this type of 
commitments removes the structural links that would otherwise facilitate collusion thereby 
                                                          
79
 Merger Remedies Notice para. 22, Merger Remedies Study p. 18, Nestle/Perrier para. 137 and ABF/GBI 
paras 387 and 391. 
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 ABF/GBI paras 386 and 390 (number of firms), ABF/GBI para. 387 (asymmetries) and Rexam 
(PLM)/American National Can (Case COMP/M.1939 [2000]) para. 33 (asymmetries). 
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 Merger Remedies Notice paras 58-59, Merger Remedies Study pp. 18-19 and 121. See also, N. Petit, 
Remedies For Coordinated Effects Under The European Union Merger Regulation, 2010, available 
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reducing the oligopolists’ ability as well as their incentive to adopt and sustain a collusive 
outcome. Lastly, an undertaking to grant an irrevocable long-term exclusive licence of 
intellectual property rights shares the characteristics of structural remedies, since it causes the 
transfer of intangible assets to a third party and produces the same result as the divestiture of 
such rights
82
.  
 
Behavioural remedies are obligations that set constraints on the conduct of the 
merging firms in order to prevent competition from being undermined. Two types of 
commitments fall within the scope of behavioural remedies. On the one hand, undertakings to 
provide non-discriminatory access to infrastructure and networks or to key technology and 
intellectual property rights as well as commitments to terminate or limit the duration of 
exclusive supply or distribution agreements are quasi-structural remedies to the extent that 
they are behavioural commitments as they aim to control the merging firms’ market conduct, 
but they also cause a structural effect on the market
83
. These commitments are capable to 
eliminate coordinated effects concerns, since their direct goal is to facilitate new entry or to 
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 Merger Remedies Study p. 18. See also, A. Ezrachi, Behavioural Remedies In EC Merger Control – Scope 
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prevent the foreclosure of competitors that post-remedy would exert a competitive constraint 
upon the largest oligopolists, while they can also affect other structural features such as the 
number of market participants. On the other hand, purely behavioural undertakings consist in 
mere promises to abstain from behaving in a certain anticompetitive manner, i.e. 
commitments not to charge excessive prices or to remove facilitating practices such as the 
flow of information between competitors, and do not induce any structural change in the 
market
84
.  
 
Preference 
The Commission and the Courts illustrate a strong preference towards structural 
remedies in the situation where the aim is to resolve coordinated effects concerns in 
horizontal mergers which, even though explainable by the specific attributes of such 
commitments, in principle it is contradictory to a fully-fledged case-by-case approach.  
 
Specifically, in the Merger Remedies Notice the Commission reveals a clear 
preference towards structural remedies in the form of divestitures when the goal is to 
eliminate anticompetitive concerns in horizontal mergers, based on the findings of the Merger 
Remedies Study which, even though it identified some problematic structural remedies 
principally due to the inadequate scope of the divested package or the selection of an 
unsuitable purchaser, it concluded that this type of commitments has been largely effective 
and superior to alternatives in such concentrations
85
. Also, the relevant case precedent 
illustrates that structural remedies form the preferred remedial solution in coordinated effects 
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 Nestle/Perrier para. 137 and Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier para. 236. See also, S. Papon, above note 76, 
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cases and this was clearly evidenced by the Merger Remedies Study which demonstrated that 
a large number of commitments revolved around divestitures when the aim was to resolve 
collusion concerns, whilst it identified exit commitments as being a particularly important 
and frequently used solution in these cases
86
. Such preference is attributed to the fact that the 
emphasis of the Commission is on the merger-induced changes on the market structure that 
would increase the oligopolists’ ability as well as their incentives to collude, which imposes a 
straitjacket on the range of available remedies and leads to the acknowledgement that 
commitments should be primarily structural in nature, i.e. despite the gradual evolution 
towards a heightened emphasis on the firms’ behaviour, remedies remain primarily focused 
on structural alterations in order to combat collusion and do not directly address the firms’ 
behavioural incentives to collude. Additionally, the preference towards structural remedies is 
supported by the consideration that strong merger remedies are necessary in situations where 
the Commission identifies coordinated effects concerns, because ex-post enforcement under 
Articles 101 and 102 is ineffective against tacit collusion. Accordingly, structural remedies 
would be more suitable to address the risk of tacit collusion for the reason that they are more 
radical and durable than behavioural commitments, since they entail an immediate as well as 
permanent alteration on the structure of the market that prevents once and for all the 
competition concerns raised by the concentration and also they do not require post-merger 
monitoring
87
.  
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Conversely, the Merger Remedies Notice illustrates the Commission’s scepticism 
towards behavioural commitments that reflects the Merger Remedies Study’s findings which 
identified such remedies as rather ineffective and concluded that they ‘have only worked in a 
very limited number of instances’ principally due to complexities in their design that impede 
their purpose, whilst they entail the disadvantage of burdensome post-merger monitoring in 
order to ensure compliance
88
. Specifically, even though the Merger Remedies Notice 
acknowledges in principle that quasi-structural remedies may be effective to remove 
anticompetitive concerns, it delimits their application by strictly requiring that they are 
equivalent in their effects to divestitures and be capable of being effectively monitored
89
. 
This rather inflexible position towards quasi-behavioural commitments is clearly mirrored in 
coordinated effects cases, as the Commission has only occasionally accepted access 
commitments, while it has never accepted commitments relating to the termination or 
shortening of exclusive agreements
90
. As regards purely behavioural undertakings, their 
scope in the context of horizontal mergers has been limited in Gencor where the GC held that 
behavioural commitments amounting merely to a promise not to abuse the dominant position 
created or strengthened by the concentration will not be suitable, since the Commission has 
the power to accept only undertakings which ensure that the merger will not lead to such a 
position
91
. Also, the Merger Remedies Notice seems to suggest that in principle any mere 
promise to behave in a certain way and not only promises not to abuse a dominant position 
will not be considered sufficient to eliminate anticompetitive concerns resulting from 
                                                          
88
 Merger Remedies Notice paras 17 and 61 and Merger Remedies Study pp. 164-165 and 171. See also, S. 
Papon, above note 76, pp. 38-39. 
89
 Merger Remedies Notice paras 13, 17, 61, 66 and 130. 
90
 Merger Remedies Study p. 21. See also, M. Motta et al., above note 83, p. 13 and W. Wang and M. Rudanko, 
above note 83, p. 575. 
91
 Gencor paras 316-318. See also, D. Went, above note 83, p. 458. 
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horizontal mergers
92
. Thus, purely behavioural commitments are unlikely to be accepted as a 
stand-alone remedy in order to resolve coordinated effects concerns in horizontal mergers, 
but it is possible that such undertakings may form a supplementary measure in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of other primary remedies
93
. 
 
(D) THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(1) Introduction  
The development of detailed Guidelines was a necessary step in order to smooth the 
introduction of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test. The reason for this lies in 
that, while the Merger Regulation 139/2004 gives little guidance as to how to carry out in 
practice a merger appraisal under the significant impediment to effective competition test, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines clarify its applicability by explaining in detail the factors 
which the Commission views as potentially raising competition concerns under each theory 
of harm and they present the Commission’s analytical methodology in the assessment of 
horizontal concentrations thereby offering legal certainty as well as predictability
94
. It must 
be pointed out that, since the Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not legally binding, their 
                                                          
92
 Merger Remedies Notice paras 17 and 69.  
93
 N. Petit, above note 81, p.  7 and W. Wang and M. Rudanko, above note 83, pp. 567 and 575. 
94
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 5. See also, S. Maudhuit and T. Soames, above note 10, p. 77, I. 
Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 45, A. Weitbrecht, EU Merger Control In 2004 - An Overview, E.C.L.R., 2005, 
26(2), 67-74, p. 68, Baker and McKenzie Client Alert, New EC Merger Regulation To Take Effect On 1 May 
2004, 2004, available at http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/8159EBBC-45D8-482C-942B-
C7991454454C/36970/NewECMRClientAlertFebruary2004.pdf (last visited 11/08/2011), 1-4, p. 3 and S. 
Bishop, A. Lofaro and F. Rosati, Turning The Tables: Why Vertical And Conglomerate Mergers Are Different, 
E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(7), 403-406, p. 403. 
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successful application ultimately depends on how they are applied in practice
95
. In that regard 
the Commission’s tendency is to closely follow the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and to 
reinforce them with the legal precedent developed by the Courts
96
. 
 
(2) The Horizontal Merger Guidelines Analysis Of Coordinated Effects 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines present the analytical legal framework within 
which the likelihood of competitive harm resulting from coordination is going to be assessed 
in prospective cases. Thus, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines define the coordinated effects 
theory of harm and they set out strict requirements for its establishment. 
 
            (I) Past Precedent 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines set up the framework for the assessment of 
coordinated effects by following the analysis prescribed in previous Courts’ decisions in a 
systematic way. Therefore, they preserve the value of past precedent and confirm the pre-
existing practice on a number of issues by adopting the principles embodied therein
97
. As an 
illustration of that point, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines effectively codify the Airtours 
criteria and present them as the basic building blocks for the establishment of coordination
98
.  
                                                          
95
 D. Ridyard, S. Bishop and S. Baker, Full Marks? The Draft EC Notice On The Appraisal Of Horizontal 
Mergers, RBB Economics, 2003, available at http://www.rbbecon.com/publications/downloads/rbb_brief07.pdf, 
1-4, p. 4 and G. Stirati, above note 9, p. 278. 
96
 For example, in ABF/GBI the Commission applied the analysis of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines on 
coordinated effects in conjunction with the ECJ guidance in Sony.  
97
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 6.  
98
 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines present the Airtours conditions as the relevant test in a coordinated effects 
merger investigation (para. 41) and they analyse the factors of common policy (paras 44-48), monitoring (paras 
49-51), retaliation (paras 52-55) and absence of countervailing reactions (paras 56-57). See also, A. Klees, From 
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            (II) The More Economic And Effects-Based Approach 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines clearly reflect the shift towards a more economic 
approach in the appraisal of mergers examined for collective dominance and strengthen the 
Commission’s ability to address such a concept more accurately by the adoption of an 
improved economic analysis
99
. In essence, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines follow the 
Airtours decision and they firmly establish that the examination of collective dominance in 
concentrations involves an assessment of the scope for tacit collusion among the market 
participants
100
. Specifically, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines at paragraph 39 refer to the 
firms’ ability to coordinate their behaviour ‘even without entering into an agreement or 
resorting to a concerted practice’ and therefore this wording does not expressly reveal a 
specific focus on tacit collusion nor does it clearly exclude explicit collusion from the ambit 
of coordinated conduct. Nevertheless, the type of analysis employed on the condition of 
common policy and the spirit of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, as underpinned by the 
implementation of the Airtours test, demonstrate that the coordinated effects theory of harm 
as formulated therein focuses exclusively on the possibility of tacit collusion post-merger
101
. 
Furthermore, the adoption of a more economic approach is evident by the criteria that the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines set out as necessary to be examined in the appraisal of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Airtours’ To ‘Impala’ – Collective Dominance Under European Merger Control, Panoptica Journal, 2007, June, 
351-367, pp. 356-357. 
99
 S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, above note 33, p. 1588, Baker and McKenzie Client Alert, above note 94, p. 3 and 
D. Ridyard, above note 54, p. 1. 
100
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 39 and 41.  
101
 For example, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 41 and 48 refer to the adoption of ‘a common 
understanding on the terms of coordination’ and para. 44 focuses on a ‘common perception as to how 
coordination should work’, i.e. terminology consistent with an implicit consensus to coordinate. 
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coordinated effects, i.e. the Airtours conditions, which are directly based on economic 
principles
102
. Additionally, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines outline and explain the basic 
economic principles that underline each Airtours condition and they also focus on the 
structural factors prescribed in economics that must be present in order to establish these 
criteria
103
.  
 
Moreover, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopt an effects-based approach in the 
assessment of concentrations and this is illustrated by the fact that they employ a 
counterfactual analysis which compares ‘the competitive conditions that would result from 
the notified merger with the conditions that would have prevailed without the merger’104. 
Also, in the context of the effects-based approach, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
introduce the analysis of the efficiencies defence and they present in detail the conditions 
which must be fulfilled for its successful establishment
105
.  
  
Lastly, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines signal the Commission's intention to move 
beyond an examination based purely on structural indicators and to place an increased focus 
on the behaviour of the market participants post-merger. Thus, the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines again follow the Airtours judgment and apply an analytical approach that 
evaluates how the merger changes both the structural features of the relevant market and the 
firms’ behavioural incentives in order to determine whether the concentration alters the 
                                                          
102
 Note also the discussion on the relationship between economic theory and the Airtours conditions at Ch. 3. 
103
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 44-57. Note also the discussion on the structural factors examined in 
order to assesss the likelihood of coordination at Ch. 3. See also, I. Kokkoris, above note 14, p. 46. 
104
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 9 and ABF/GBI para. 144. 
105
 Note also the discussion on efficiencies at Ch. 4. See also, I. Kokkoris, above note 14, pp. 46-47. 
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nature of competition between competitors so as to increase the likelihood of coordination 
post-merger
106
.  
 
(3) The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
The Commission issued in 2007 the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines in order to 
present its analytical approach on the assessment of vertical and conglomerate 
concentrations
107
. The Commission set out the framework for the appraisal of non-horizontal 
mergers by following the methodology employed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and 
distinguished possible anticompetitive outcomes between unilateral and coordinated 
effects
108
.  
 
The analysis of coordinated effects in the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines does not 
contain any provision that alters or exceeds the methodology established in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines
109
. Specifically, the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines set up the 
framework for the examination of coordinated effects by focusing on the Airtours test and the 
assessment of the ability as well as the incentive of the oligopolists to adopt a common policy 
                                                          
106
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours judgment where the GC focused on a mixture of structural factors 
and behavioural incentives in the analysis of coordination at Ch. 4. 
107
 Guidelines On The Assessment Of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under The Council Regulation On The Control 
Of Concentrations Between Undertakings ([2007], OJ C265/6 [2008], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:265:0006:0025:en:PDF). 
108
 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 17. See also, J. Church, The Church Report’s Analysis Of Vertical 
And Conglomerate Mergers: A Reply To Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien And Vita, J.C.L.&E., 2005, 1(4), 797-802, p. 
797. 
109
 The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 79–90 analyse coordinated effects in the context of vertical 
mergers and paras 119-121 set out the framework for the assessment of such a theory of harm in conglomerate 
mergers. 
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of tacit collusion and to sustain such an outcome over time
110
. Moreover, the Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines present a number of structural factors identical to those contained in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines that facilitate the establishment of the necessary conditions for 
coordination. Thus, the contribution of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines to the 
theoretical analysis of coordinated effects is virtually absent, since they closely resemble the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines and they do not bring about any improvement to such a theory 
of harm. Nonetheless, since the introduction of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
coordinated effects have played a negligible role in the Commission's enforcement practice in 
vertical and conglomerate mergers, because in these types of concentrations coordination 
                                                          
110
 The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 79 adopts an identical definition for coordinated effects to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 22. Also, the Airtours test, as contained in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
para. 41, is integrated in the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 81 in relation to the analysis of vertical 
mergers and para. 119 as regards the examination of conglomerate mergers. The Commission used the Airtours 
test in TomTom/TeleAtlas (Case COMP/M.4854 [2008]) paras 277-283 where it dismissed coordination as a 
concern, because it was unlikely that the market participants would reach a common policy of collusion, while 
monitoring and deterrence could also not be established. See also, McDermott, Will and Emery, New Draft 
Guidelines Facilitate Acquisitions In Europe, 2007, available at 
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/cf3e47d2-a74f-4e17-adf9-
f3db354a78c7.cfm, 1-3, pp. 2-3, A. Petrasincu, The European Commission's New Guidelines On The 
Assessment Of Non-Horizontal Mergers - Great Expectations Disappointed, E.C.L.R., 2008, 29(4), 221-228, pp. 
225-226 and 228 and M. Hughes and D. Wirth, The Assessment Of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under EC And UK 
Merger Control, 2010, available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3237.pdf (last visited 
24/02/2011), 1-9, pp. 6 and 8. 
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may materialise in exceptional circumstances if at all, to the extent that such anticompetitive 
effects may only exist at a theoretical level
111
.  
 
(E) EU-US MERGER CONTROL CONVERGENCE  
(1) Introduction 
The EU and US Merger Control systems have traditionally evolved with varying 
backgrounds and this has resulted to substantial divergences in the past on the assessment of 
horizontal concentrations
112
. Nonetheless, the EU substantive standard contained in the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 reflects the US merger appraisal test and the EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines closely matched the 1992 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which led to 
an increased degree of convergence that standardised the framework for the assessment of 
horizontal concentrations and the examination of coordinated effects
113
. However, such 
convergence has been disrupted by the introduction of the 2010 US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, which are divergent to the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the analysis of 
coordination
114
. 
 
(2) Significant Impediment To Effective Competition v. Substantial Lessening Of 
Competition 
                                                          
111
 ICC, Comments On Draft EC Guidelines On The Assessment Of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under The 
Council Regulation On The Control Of Undertakings Between Undertakings, 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/files_non_horizontal_consultation/icc.pdf, 1-13, pp. 8-9. 
112
 V. Selvam, above note 7, p. 52. 
113
 U.S. Department Of Justice And The Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines ([1992], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm). 
114
 U.S. Department Of Justice And The Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines ([2010], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf). 
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The old EU ‘dominance’ standard was inconsistent with the US ‘substantial lessening 
of competition’ test and this divergence led to conflicting decisions and created 
controversies
115
. Nevertheless, the adoption of the EU ‘significant impediment to effective 
competition’ standard under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 reflects the US merger 
appraisal test and gives rise to a new era characterised by a high degree of convergence 
between the respective Merger Control systems
116
. On the one hand, the wording of the 
significant impediment to effective competition standard is broadly synonymous to the 
substantial lessening of competition test and despite the fact that the EU substantive test still 
refers to dominance, there is convergence on the essence of the EU and the US tests
117
. On 
the other hand, the EU and the US merger appraisal tests are similar as regards their 
substantive analysis, because the Merger Regulation 139/2004 test closes the gap in theories 
of competitive harm between the former EU dominance test and the US substantial lessening 
                                                          
115
 Examples of such conflicting outcomes are the decisions in General Electric/Honeywell and 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (Case IV/M.877 [1997], OJ L336/16 [1997], 5 CMLR 270 [1997]). See also, V. 
Selvam, above note 7, pp. 58 and 61, A. Weitbrecht, EU Merger Control In 2001 - The Year Of Controversy, 
E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(8), 407-412, p. 407 and M. Egge, M. Bay and J. Calzado, The New EC Merger Regulation: 
A Move To Convergence, Antitrust, 2004, Fall, 37-42, pp. 37-38. 
116
 M. Walker, above note 45, p. 21, M. Monti, Convergence In EU-US Antitrust Policy Regarding Mergers 
And Acquisitions: An EU Perspective, 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/107&format=HTML&aged=1&language
=EN&guiLanguage=en, 1-4, p. 3, ICN Report On Merger Guidelines, Coordinated Effects Analysis Under 
International Merger Regimes, 2004, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc560.pdf, 1-25, p. 4, A. Renckens, above 
note 29, p. 165, A. Zutven and H. Urlus, above note 37, p. 3 and S. Megregian and D. Garrod, EU And US 
Merger Control: Transatlantic Convergence Rolls On, Comp. Law, 2005, 4(2), 124-157, p. 143.  
117
 M. Egge et al., above note 115, p. 40, M. Litzell, above note 1, pp. 52-53 and A. Weitbrecht, above note 94, 
p. 68. 
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of competition test by the introduction of unilateral effects in the analysis of concentrations 
and the embracement of concerns over the coordinated effects of mergers. Accordingly, these 
jurisdictions nowadays employ a similar substantive framework for the examination of 
horizontal mergers, which encourages the respective competition authorities to address the 
same types of anticompetitive effects and paves the way for largely convergent 
assessments
118
.  
 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that, despite the convergence between the EU and US 
merger appraisal standards, there may still be divergent decisions due to different factual 
circumstances or to different effects of concentrations on each particular market
119
. Also, 
there may be divergences in the way the regulators apply these standards in each individual 
case, as competition authorities looking at the same facts can at times reasonably come to 
different conclusions
120
. Moreover, divergences may arise for the reason that each 
competition system follows its own policy goals and purposes of protection
121
. Such 
divergences are currently more likely to occur in the assessment of coordinated effects, 
                                                          
118
 M. Egge et al., above note 115, p. 41 and H. Erdem, Critic Of Turkish Competition Law In The Light Of EU 
Merger Regulation, 2006, available at 
http://oldweb.yeditepe.edu.tr/7tepe/egitim/lisans/hukuk/UNCTAD/tebligler/ercumenterdem-article.doc, 1-18, 
pp. 11-12. 
119
 S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, Switching To Substantial Impediments Of Competition (SIC) Can Have Substantial 
Costs - SIC!, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(9), 584-590, p. 588 and R. Whish, Analytical Framework Of Merger Review - 
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Conference, 2002, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc565.pdf, 1-
4, pp. 1-2. 
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 M. Litzell, above note 1, p. 53 and A. Riesenkampff, above note 8, p. 726. 
121
 U. Boege, above note 3, p. 4. 
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because the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 2010 US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines are to an important extent distinctive in the analysis of such a theory of harm.  
 
(3) EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines v. 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
Coordinated Effects  
The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines correspond to the 1992 US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines to the extent that they all embrace 
coordinated effects as a theory of competitive harm that may result from horizontal 
concentrations
122
. However, even though the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 1992 
US Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopted a similar framework for the assessment of 
coordinated effects, the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines employ an analysis that is 
significantly divergent to the examination of such a theory of harm under the EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines.  
 
            (I) Types Of Anticompetitive Parallel Behaviour 
An important divergence between the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 2010 
US Horizontal Merger Guidelines relates to the types of anticompetitive parallel conduct that 
are included within the legal theory of coordination. 
 
                                                          
122
 Section 7 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Sections 2.1-2.12 1992 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
and EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 39-57. See also, H. Wellford and G. Wells, The ‘Litigation 
Mulligan’ In The 2010 Merger Guidelines: Better Economics But Not (Necessarily) More Clarity Before The 
Agencies And The Courts, C.P.I., 2010, October, 1-11, p. 4, E. Matto, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: 
How The Guidelines Will Change The FTC/DOJ Analysis Of U.S. Mergers, 2011, available at 
http://www.terralex.org/publication/3d5a6959f9, 1-6, pp. 1-2 and C. Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: Evolution, Not Revolution, Antitrust L.J., 2011, 77(2), 651-660, pp. 651 and 660.  
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The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines focus on the notion that coordinated effects are 
based on the likelihood of sustainable tacit collusion and to that extent they are convergent 
with the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines which also encompass tacit collusion as one 
type of coordinated conduct
123
. Nevertheless, the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
additionally focus on explicit collusion as a type of anticompetitive parallel behaviour which 
is included within the ambit of coordinated interaction
124
. Such an assertion is contradictory 
to the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, since they do not expressly include explicit 
collusion within the scope of coordinated behaviour and this is an important difference in 
form. However, it is not an important difference in substance, because the ECJ in Sony 
embraced the theoretical possibility to establish explicit collusion as the cause of parallelism 
in a coordinated effects merger assessment and accordingly there is a degree of convergence 
in the wider framework of the EU and US Merger Control systems on that issue
125
.  
 
Nonetheless, the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines expand the analysis of 
coordination by including within its ambit a theory of parallel accommodating conduct which 
does not require a prior understanding between the oligopolists, it is based on individual 
rationality of conduct, there is no retaliation and it leads to higher prices as well as it weakens 
the firms’ competitive incentives126. On the one hand, this theory introduces an important 
element of divergence, as it is not only outside the boundaries of the EU Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines analysis of coordination, but also it comprises elements such as the absence of 
retaliation and its foundation solely on rationality of conduct, which are in direct 
                                                          
123
 Section 7 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines and EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 39 and 41.  
124
 Section 7 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
125
 Note also the discussion on the Sony dictum on explicit collusion at Ch. 2. 
126
 Section 7 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
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contradiction with the relevant EU precedent, since they reflect the Commission’s 
formulations in Airtours/First Choice that were expressly rejected by the GC in Airtours
127
. 
On the other hand, the theory of parallel accommodating conduct presents some problematic 
features that may raise a caution flag in its potential implementation in the analysis of 
coordinated effects under the EU Merger Control framework. Thus, such a concept 
introduces an important ‘labelling’ problem, since even though it is classified within the 2010 
US Horizontal Merger Guidelines as a coordinated effects scenario, it exposes a substantial 
degree of overlap with the dynamics of unilateral effects
128
. In particular, besides the fact that 
the theory of unilateral effects includes within its ambit an anticompetitive scenario of price 
leadership followed by accommodating responses of rivals as reflected in the EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines paragraph 24, both parallel accommodating conduct as well as unilateral 
effects present the common element that they are not induced or ‘motivated by’ the threat of 
retaliation
129
. However, the absence of necessity for a retaliation mechanism puts forward 
another problem, since it has been claimed that punishment is necessary for the sustainability 
of parallel accommodating conduct and in particular the stability of such conduct depends on 
                                                          
127
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours/First Choice Commission decision at Ch. 2. 
128
 E. Reed and R. Higgins, Economic Theories Of MFNs: Harms And Efficiencies, 2012, available at 
https://www.healthlawyers.org/Members/PracticeGroups/Documents/Benefits/PGs_ExSumm_MFN_Clauses.pd
f, 1-21, p. 6, D. Neven, First Impressions On The Revised US And UK Merger Guidelines, GRC Conference, 
2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/dn_conference_september_2010.pdf, 1-16, p. 
10, N. Petit, The ‘Oligopoly Problem’ In EU Competition Law, 2012, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999829, 1-78, p. 23 and C. Shapiro, Update From The 
Antitrust Division, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf, 1-34, pp. 27-28. 
129
 J. Ordover, Thinking About Coordinated Effects, 2012, available at 
http://www.concurrences.com/spip.php?action=acceder_document&arg=15590&cle=d63e5bcd1cacd556e19c49
41456e4930345028b3&file=pdf%2F_concurrences_3-2012_editorial_ordover.pdf, 1-2, p. 2. 
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the ability of the merged firm to inflict lower future profit upon the non-compliant firm(s)
130
. 
This is evident by the fact that in order to decide its strategy, i.e. whether to match and abide, 
each follower employs a trade-off between current and future profits that is essentially 
determined by the leader’s resignation from the price increase and its reversion to a lower 
price if there is lack of accommodation, i.e. no matching or cheating, which essentially forms 
a punishment measure
131
. Furthermore, another problematic feature relates to the fact that it is 
questionable whether it would be appropriate to introduce in the EU Merger Control 
framework a novel theory of harm that is heavily based on rationality of conduct, bearing in 
mind the emergence and potential further expansion of behavioural economics that contradict 
such an assumption
132
. Nevertheless, it is notable that the theory of parallel accommodating 
conduct, as it has been formulated in the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, points 
towards more flexible evidentiary requirements than the standardised requirements necessary 
for the demonstration of tacit collusion and in addition its assessment is facilitated by the 
applicability of econometric analysis. Specifically, the CPPI (coordinated pricing pressure 
index) focuses on the analysis of the firms’ incentives to engage in parallel accommodating 
conduct in differentiated product markets and is related to the quantification measures for the 
assessment of unilateral effects in such markets that were introduced by the 2010 US 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines
133
. The CPPI depends on the price margins, own-price 
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 J. Harrington, Evaluating Mergers For Coordinated Eﬀects And The Role Of ‘Parallel Accommodating 
Conduct’, 2012, available at http://krieger2.jhu.edu/economics/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp601_harrington.pdf, 1-17, pp. 6 and 15. 
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 J. Harrington, above note 130, pp. 4-5 and J. Ordover, above note 129, p. 2. 
132
 Note also the discussion on behavioural economics at Ch. 3. 
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 The CPPI essentially forms an index of upwards pricing pressure and in particular it corresponds to the 
GUPPI. Note also the discussion on the pricing pressure indexes applicable in the analysis of unilateral effects at 
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elasticity and volume shares of the two potentially coordinating firms as well as on the 
diversion ratio between their products when one of those firms raises its price and assesses 
the extent to which the firms are prone to parallel accommodating conduct pre-merger, while 
this index is then compared to the post-merger index
134
. The difference between the pre-
merger CPPI and the post-merger CPPI forms the Delta CPPI that represents the impact of 
the merger on parallel accommodating conduct and is related to the change in the price 
pressure resulting from the concentration, i.e. it calculates the increase in the maximum 
parallel price that the firms can achieve by engaging in such conduct post-merger versus pre-
merger
135
. In the situation where such an analysis demonstrates that the largest market players 
would have an increased incentive to engage in parallel accommodating conduct post-merger 
and the products offered by the smaller rivals are distant substitutes, the Commission would 
then have to consider each firm’s cheating incentives, the likelihood of product repositioning 
by actual competitors or of entry by potential competitors as well as possible efficiencies 
resulting from the concentration which could lead the merged entity to prefer lower prices
136
. 
Overall, the theory of parallel accommodating conduct could facilitate the establishment of 
coordinated effects due to the absence of a necessity to establish a prior coordinated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Concerns With The CPPI, 2011, available at 
http://crai.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Publications/Gauging_Parallel_Accomodating_Conduct_Concerns_with_the_CP
PI(2).pdf, 1-40, p. 5 and W. Page and J. Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers And Recent Scholarship, 2011, 
available at http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/oct11_papertrail_10_24_woodbury(1).pdf, 1-8, p. 
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 S. Moresi et al., above note 133, pp. 10 and 28, W. Page and J. Woodbury, above note 133, pp. 5 and 7 and 
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 S. Moresi et al., above note 133, p. 6 and W. Page and J. Woodbury, above note 133, p. 7. 
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understanding, the alleged lack of need to demonstrate a retaliation mechanism and the ability 
to employ econometric analysis in the assessment of mergers in differentiated markets. 
Nonetheless, complexities relating to the fact that such a theory contradicts the established 
EU precedent, its classification problem and the nubilous position on the requirement of 
punishment as well as its heavy reliance on rationality point towards a ‘wait and see’ 
approach in relation to how this concept will be implemented in EU Merger Control. 
 
            (II) The Test For Coordinated Effects, Market Characteristics And Behaviour 
The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines declare that the cumulative conditions of a 
common policy, monitoring, retaliation and absence of external countervailing reactions form 
the test that is employed in the assessment of coordinated effects
137
. The 2010 US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines set out the identical criteria of a common understanding, detection of 
cheating and punishment of deviations in order to define tacit collusion, but they do not assert 
that these factors form the test that is employed in the assessment of coordinated effects
138
. 
On the contrary, the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines are divergent to the EU 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, since they employ a differentiated cumulative three-prong 
test, which focuses on whether the merger would significantly increase concentration and 
lead to a moderately or highly concentrated market, whether the market shows signs of 
vulnerability to coordinated conduct and whether there is a credible basis on which to 
conclude that the merger may enhance that vulnerability
139
.  
                                                          
137
 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 41 and ABF/GBI para. 143.  
138
 Section 7 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
139
 Section 7.1 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. See also, O’Melveny and Myers LLP, U.S. Antitrust 
Agencies Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010, available at http://omm.com/us-antitrust-agencies-
issue-revised-horizontal-merger-guidelines-08-20-2010/, 1-3, p. 2 and Covington and Burling LLP, U.S. 
Antitrust Agencies Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010, available at 
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Nevertheless, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 2010 US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines are overlapping to the extent that they examine the same structural 
characteristics of the relevant market
140
. Also, both Horizontal Merger Guidelines centre on 
the post-merger behaviour of the firms in terms of their incentives to coordinate or to 
compete
141
. However, the framework within which these conditions are analysed is divergent. 
Specifically, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines examine such factors in order to assess 
whether the oligopolists would adopt and sustain a common collusive policy, whereas the 
2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines focus on these criteria in order to evaluate the 
presence of market vulnerability to coordinated conduct. 
  
(F) CONCLUSION 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 modifies the substantive test for the appraisal of 
concentrations and in conjunction with the Horizontal Merger Guidelines they modernise the 
framework for the analysis of collective dominance merger cases. 
 
Before the introduction of the Merger Regulation 139/2004, a number of arguments 
were raised that supported both the continuance of the assessment of concentrations on the 
basis of the dominance test as well as its replacement with the substantial lessening of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/c9851377-6281-4815-9695-
061adad98ce9/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2e7bffd0-eb90-44cf-87fe-
0f2ddbc13a67/U.S.%20Antitrust%20Agencies%20Issue%20Revised%20Horizontal%20Merger%20Guidelines.
pdf, 1-5, p. 3. 
140
 Section 7.2 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines and EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 42-57.  
141
 Sections 7.1 and 7.2 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (incentives to collude) and EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines paras 48 and 54 (incentives to coordinate or retaliate). 
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competition test. The Merger Regulation 139/2004 finally adopts the ‘significant impediment 
to effective competition’ substantive standard, which addresses and resolves most of the 
problems identified in the old test. 
 
The introduction of the significant impediment to effective competition test alters the 
form of the appraisal undertaken in the examination of concentrations, it strengthens the 
substance of the analysis in collective dominance merger cases and it produces important 
policy implications. As a matter of form, the substantive test embodied in the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 replaces the two-stage test contained in the Merger Regulation 4064/89 
and requires only the significant impediment to effective competition criterion to be 
established in order to reach a prohibition decision, while dominance is merely the principal 
example of such a situation. In relation to the substantive analysis of concentrations, the new 
merger appraisal test, as explained in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, explicitly recognises 
that coordinated effects form a valid theory of harm in EU Merger Control and it introduces 
the assessment of the unilateral effects of concentrations. Moreover, the new substantive test 
verifies the turn towards a more economic approach in the analysis of collective dominance 
in mergers, it paves the way towards an assessment based on the effects of concentrations on 
competition and it directs the Commission to consider both the relevant structural 
characteristics as well as the firms’ behavioural incentives in its examination. Also, the new 
merger appraisal test preserves the precedent developed under the dominance standard, but it 
does not entirely eliminate the potential overlap between the analysis of collective dominance 
in mergers and the assessment of the abuse of collective dominance under Article 102. As a 
matter of policy, the amendment of the substantive test lowers the intervention threshold that 
is applicable in horizontal mergers assessed for unilateral effects, whilst there is no such 
lowering in coordinated effects cases and this position holds firm irrespective of whether the 
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Commission would rely on the ‘direct’ or the ‘indirect’ demonstration of incompatibility. 
Furthermore, even though the Commission relies to a greater extent on unilateral effects in 
the appraisal of horizontal concentrations under the new substantive test, such a theory of 
harm is not predominant as collusion concerns remain valid. On the issue of enforcement, 
numerous considerations point towards possible under-enforcement of collective dominance 
in horizontal concentrations post-Merger Regulation 139/2004. Also, remedies enjoy an 
important role in the post-Merger Regulation 139/2004 context of enforcement and in 
coordinated effects cases the Commission illustrates a strong preference for structural 
commitments aimed to cancel one or more of the Airtours criteria. 
 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines establish a clear methodology for the assessment 
of coordinated effects. Such methodology verifies the past collective dominance precedent, it 
implements a more economic approach in the analysis of coordinated effects, it employs an 
assessment which emphasises on the effects of mergers on competition and it focuses on the 
firms’ behaviour along structural indicators. The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines closely 
reflect the analysis of coordinated effects as embodied in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
and accordingly they do not alter nor expand the foundation set out in the latter Guidelines.  
 
 Lastly, the EU significant impediment to effective competition and the US substantial 
lessening of competition standards are similar as regards their wording but also in relation to 
their substantive analysis and such overlaps lead to an increased degree of convergence 
between the EU and the US Merger Control systems. Nonetheless, the EU Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines present divergences on the types 
of anticompetitive parallel conduct that are included within the legal theory of coordination 
and on the test employed in the assessment of coordinated effects.    
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  CHAPTER 6 
                                                                - 
THE COMPARATIVE ANGLE I: COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IN 
MERGERS v. ARTICLE 102 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE AND 
ARTICLE 101 CONCERTED PRACTICES 
 
  
(A) INTRODUCTION 
The introduction and the development of the legal concepts of concerted practices 
under Article 101, collective dominance under Article 102 and collective dominance under 
the Merger Regulation aimed at the regulation of collusive behaviour.  
  
Specifically, the concept of concerted practices was launched in order to control 
collusive conduct arising under the circumstances specified in Article 101(1). Nevertheless, 
there was a gap in the enforcement of EU Competition Law, because concerted practices 
applied to the situation where the firms explicitly coordinated their behaviour, while tacit 
collusion would be caught only in exceptional circumstances, if at all, and consequently this 
concept was not in itself a sufficient tool to regulate every instance of anticompetitive 
conduct that arose in oligopolies. Moreover, despite the fact that the subsequent introduction 
and evolution of the concept of collective dominance under Article 102 conferred on the 
Commission and the Courts the competence to control both tacit and explicit collusion, their 
focus was shed on the latter form of coordination. As a result, the concept of collective 
dominance under the Merger Regulation was developed in order to close this gap and 
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regulate behaviour that arose beyond explicit collusion and took the form of tacitly collusive 
market conduct. 
 
This Chapter compares the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation to the concepts of collective dominance under Article 102 and concerted practices 
under Article 101 in relation to their respective treatment of tacit collusion. Section B 
examines the concept of collective dominance under Article 102 as it presents the necessary 
conditions for its establishment and emphasises on its overlapping conceptual substance, but 
divergent enforcement, on tacit collusion in relation to the concept of collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation, whilst it also briefly highlights the lack of emphasis on 
exclusionary conduct in the later context. Section C analyses the concept of concerted 
practices under Article 101 by presenting the elements that need to be established in order to 
demonstrate concertation and accentuates its divergent perception of tacit collusion as 
opposed to the concept of collective dominance in mergers. Lastly, Section D concludes by 
underlining the main features of the analysis. 
 
(B) COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE: ARTICLE 102 v. MERGER 
REGULATION 
(1) The Three-Prong Test Under Article 102 
The Commission and the Courts apply a three‐prong test in order to establish 
collective dominance under Article 102 that analyses separately whether the undertakings 
hold a collective position, whether such a collective position is dominant and whether such a 
collective dominant position has been abused
1
. 
                                                          
1
 Compagnie Maritime Belge v. Commission (Cases C-395 and 396/96P [2000], ECR I-1365 [2000], 4 CMLR 
1076 [2000]) para. 39. See also, M. Jephcott and C. Withers, Where To Go Now For E.C. Oligopoly Control?, 
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(I) Collective Position  
In Italian Flat Glass the Commission introduced and the GC verified the application 
of the concept of collective dominance under Article 102 to several legally and economically 
independent undertakings united by some form of economic links, which caused them to 
adopt the same market conduct and act as a collective entity vis-a-vis the other operators on 
the relevant market
2
. Accordingly, it can be inferred that the establishment of the collective 
position criterion depends on the fulfilment of two requirements. Firstly, there needs to be a 
connecting factor in the form of links between the market participants
3
. Secondly, this 
connecting factor must be such as to lead several independent undertakings to present 
themselves or act as a collective entity in the relevant market
4
. However, this two-fold test is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(8), 295-303, p. 300 and F. Depoortere and G. Motta, The Doctrine Of Collective 
Dominance: All Together Forever?, G.C.P., 2009, October, 1-8, p. 2. 
2
 Italian Flat Glass para. 358. See also, D. Pope, Case Comment - Some Reflections On Italian Flat Glass, 
E.C.L.R., 1993, 14(4), 172-175, p. 175, B. Rodger, Oligopolistic Market Failure: Collective Dominance Versus 
Complex Monopoly, E.C.L.R., 1995, 16(1), 21-29, pp. 23-24, F. Depoortere and G. Motta, above note 1, pp. 2-
3, D. Ridyard, Joint Dominance And The Oligopoly Blind Spot Under The EC Merger Regulation, E.C.L.R., 
1992, 13(4), 161-164, p. 164 and S. Stroux, Case Comment - Collective Dominance Under The Merger 
Regulation: A Serious Evidentiary Reprimand For The Commission, E.L.Rev., 2002, 27(6), 736-746, p. 737. 
3
 C. Gordon and R. Richardson, Collective Dominance: The Third Way?, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(10), 416-423, pp. 
417-418 and T. Vecchi, Unilateral Conduct In An Oligopoly According To The Discussion Paper On Article 82: 
Conscious Parallelism Or Abuse Of Collective Dominance?, World Competition, 2008, 31(3), 385-400, p. 389.  
4
 A. Onuma, To What Extent Is The Concept Of Collective Dominance Applicable Under The ECMR?, 2005, 
available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/html/car8_article10.pdf, 1-25, pp. 16-17, G. Monti, The Scope 
Of Collective Dominance Under Article 82 EC, C.M.L.R., 2001, 38, 131-157, p. 133, B. Hawk and G. Motta, 
Oligopolies And Collective Dominance: A Solution In Search Of A Problem, Fordham University School Of 
Law, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301693, 59-104, p. 77, T. Vecchi, 
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in substance one and the collective entity requirement is the principal condition, while links 
play only a subordinate role
5
. In particular, the presence of links is a necessary condition for 
the establishment of a collective position only when they are the means by which the 
collective entity requirement is fulfilled, whilst the mere existence of such a connecting factor 
is legally inconsequential
6
. 
 
Links  
In order to establish the collective entity requirement, the Commission must examine 
the economic links or factors which give rise to a connection between independent 
undertakings
7
. On the one hand, the existence of economic links may be based on the fact that 
the undertakings have concluded an agreement or adopted a concerted practice within the 
meaning of Article 101. On the other hand, in Compagnie Maritime Belge the ECJ held that 
economic links do not need to be strictly contractual or structural in nature, but instead the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
above note 3, p. 390, F. Bektashi, Collective Dominance In EC Competition Law: Role Of Structural Links - 
Case Law Analysis Under The EC Merger Regulation, VDM Verlag, First Edition, 2008, p. 33, T. Feaster and 
P. Treacy, Case Comment - Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v. Commission Of The European 
Communities, E.C.L.R., 1997, 18(7), 467-472, p. 471 and S. Stroux, Is EC Oligopoly Control Outgrowing Its 
Infancy?, World Competition, 2000, 23(1), 3-50, p. 21. 
5
 Compagnie Maritime Belge Opinion (Opinion Of Advocate General Fenelly, Compagnie Maritime Belge v. 
Commission [1998], ECR I-1365 [2000]) para. 28. See also, B. Hawk and G. Motta, above note 4, pp. 77-79 and 
S. Stroux, US And EC Oligopoly Control, Kluwer, First Edition, 2004, p. 103. 
6
 L. Vitzilaiou and C. Lambadarios, The Slippery Slope Of Addressing Collective Dominance Under Article 82 
EC, G.C.P., 2009, October, 1-10, pp. 2-3. 
7
 Compagnie Maritime Belge para. 41 and Almelo para. 42. Note also the discussion on links in the analysis of 
collective dominance under Article 102 at Ch. 4. See also, L. Hancher, Gemeente Almelo And Others v. 
Energiebedrijf, C.M.L.R., 1995, 32, 305-325, p. 317 and S. Stroux, Compagnie Maritime Belge And Others v. 
Commission, C.M.L.R., 2000, 37, 1249-1264, p. 1258. 
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collective entity requirement may be established on the basis of ‘other connecting factors’, 
which would depend on an economic assessment of the structure of the market in question
8
. 
Therefore, the ECJ implied that the existence of mere oligopolistic interdependence could 
constitute the requisite connecting factor and consequently the members of an oligopoly may 
act as a collective entity because of their reactions to the market structure and even if there 
were no contractual or structural links between them
9
.  
 
Collective Entity 
For a collective position to be established under Article 102, two or more  
independent economic entities must present themselves or act as a collective entity on the 
relevant market
10
. Accordingly, there must be absence of effective competition within the 
                                                          
8
 Compagnie Maritime Belge para. 45 and Discussion Paper (DG Competition Discussion Paper On The 
Application Of Article 82 Of The Treaty To Exclusionary Abuses, 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf) para. 46. See also, C. Gordon and R. 
Richardson, above note 3, pp. 418-419, B. Hawk and G. Motta, above note 4, p. 90, S. Preece, Case Comment - 
Compagnie Maritime Belge: Missing The Boat?, E.C.L.R., 2000, 21(8), 388-393, p. 390, P. Fernandez, Case 
Comment, Increasing Powers And Increasing Uncertainty: Collective Dominance And Pricing Abuses, 
E.L.Rev., 2000, 25(6), 645-653, p. 647 and D. Waelbroeck and P. Colomo, Laurent Piau - Order Of The Court 
Of Justice, C.M.L.R., 2006, 43, 1743-1756, p. 1753. 
9
 S. Stroux, above note 7, p. 1260, D. Geradin, P. Hoferm, F. Louis, N. Petit and M. Walker, The Concept Of 
Dominance In EC Competition Law, Global Competition Law Centre - Research Paper On The Modernization 
Of Article 82 EC, 2005, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=770144, 1-31, p. 22, M. 
Jephcott and C. Withers, above note 1, p. 303, A. Llorens, Case Comment - Collective Dominance: A 
Mechanism For The Control Of Oligopolistic Markets?, Cambridge Law Journal, 2000, 59(2), 253-257, p. 256, 
S. Stroux, above note 2, pp. 737-738 and P. Fernandez, above note 8, pp. 648-649. 
10
 Laurent Piau v. Commission (Case T-193/02 [2005], ECR II-209 [2005]) para. 110 and Compagnie Maritime 
Belge para. 36. See also, B. Hawk and G. Motta, above note 4, p. 84. 
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internal relationship of the undertakings forming the collective entity in order for such firms 
to behave in an identical or similar manner on the market
11
. However, the total elimination of 
competition is unnecessary, since the formation of a collective entity requires that the 
undertakings should not compete in relation to at least one parameter of competition, for 
example prices, while the existence of some competition on factors other than price does not 
per se preclude a finding of a collective position
12
.   
 
(II) Collective Dominant Position  
The second condition of the Article 102 test focuses on the demonstration of 
dominance. In particular, the establishment of a collective dominant position requires an 
economic assessment of the relevant industry where the emphasis is on the determination of 
whether the undertakings jointly hold substantial market power as this is defined in 
economics
13
. Thus, according to the definition developed under Article 102, two or more 
undertakings are collectively dominant if they enjoy a position of economic strength which 
                                                          
11
 H. Haupt, Collective Dominance Under Article 82 E.C. And E.C. Merger Control In The Light Of The 
Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(9), 434-444, pp. 437 and 439. 
12
 TACA I para. 522, Atlantic Container Line AB And Others v. Commission (TACA II) (Cases T-191 and 212-
214/98 [2003], ECR II-3275 [2003], 5 CMLR 1283 [2005]) paras 653-654 and Compagnie Maritime Belge 
Opinion para. 34. See also, G. Monti, above note 4, p. 137, S. Preece, above note 8, p. 390, S. Stroux, above 
note 5, p. 99, D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 23 and J. Lang, Oligopolies And Joint Dominance In 
Community Antitrust Law, In: Annual Proceedings Of The Fordham Corporate Law Institute - International 
Antitrust Law And Policy 2001, Edited By B. Hawk, 2002, 269-359, p. 315. 
13
 S. Bishop and P. Marsden, The Article 82 Discussion Paper: A Missed Opportunity, E.C.J., 2006, 2(1), 1-7, p. 
2., M. Vatiero, An Institutional Explanation Of Joint Dominance, World Competition, 2009, 32(2), 221-226, p. 
222, Ş. Ardıyok, Comparative Analysis Of Collective Dominance, 2006, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1162187, 1-39, p. 21 and G. Monti, The Concept Of 
Dominance In Article 82, E.C.J., 2006, Supplement, 31-52, p. 38. 
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enables them to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by 
affording them the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of their 
competitors, their customers and their consumers
14
. It follows that there are two elements in 
this definition which constitute indicators of a collective dominant position. Firstly, the 
undertakings must have the ability to prevent effective competition from being maintained in 
the relevant market by distorting the competitive process
15
. Secondly, the undertakings must 
have the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of the external competitive 
forces, i.e. they are not required to be absolutely free from such competitive constraints but 
that freedom must be significant, while this condition principally refers to their ability to 
profitably raise their prices substantially above the competitive level
16
. However, these two 
elements overlap to the extent that they are simply regarded as one and the same thing, 
                                                          
14
 Italian Flat Glass para. 358, Piau para. 109, TACA I para. 532, Compagnie Maritime Belge para. 34, United 
Brands (Case C-27/76 [1978], ECR 207 [1978], 1 CMLR 429 [1978]) para. 65, Hoffmann La Roche (Case C-
85/76 [1979], ECR 461 [1979], 3 CMLR 211 [1979]) para. 38 and Guidance Paper (Communication From The 
Commission - Guidance On The Commission’s Enforcement Priorities In Applying Article 82 Of The EC 
Treaty To Abusive Exclusionary Conduct By Dominant Undertakings, 2009, OJ C45/7 [2009], available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF) para. 10. See also, 
D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 2, S. Stroux, above note 5, p. 87, G. Monti, above note 4, p. 136, K. Bacon, 
State Regulation Of The Market And EC Competition Rules: Articles 85 And 86 Compared, E.C.L.R., 1997, 
18(5), 283-291, p. 290, F. Bektashi, above note 4, pp. 18-19 and F. Mezzanotte, Tacit Collusion As Economic 
Links In Article 82 EC Revisited, E.C.L.R., 2009, 30(3), 137-142, p. 138. 
15
 D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 4. 
16
 Guidance Paper para. 11. See also, Competition Law Forum Article 82 Review Group, The Reform Of Article 
82: Comments On The DG-Competition Discussion Paper On The Application Of Article 82 To Exclusionary 
Abuses, E.C.J., 2006, 2(1), 169-178, p. 175 and F. Mezzanotte, Can The Commission Use Article 82 EC To 
Combat Tacit Collusion?, CCP Working Paper 09-5, 2009, available at 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.111282!ccp09-5.pdf, 1-36, pp. 9-10. 
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because they both refer to instances of market power and the Courts have never drawn any 
distinction between them
17
. Lastly, the Commission’s analysis focuses on the structural 
characteristics of the relevant industry in order to assess whether the undertakings 
collectively possess the market power to distort the competitive process and behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of the external competitive constraints
18
. 
 
(III) Abuse 
The existence of a collective dominant position is not in itself sufficient to establish a 
violation of Article 102, since this provision punishes a group of firms only if they are 
engaging in abusive behaviour
19
. Article 102 lists four non-exhaustive courses of conduct that 
may be abusive and the collective dominant firms may in principle exercise such 
anticompetitive behaviour either by exploiting their position in order to gain supra-
competitive profits, i.e. exploitative abuses, or by driving the other competitors out of the 
market, i.e. exclusionary abuses
20
. 
 
(2) Tacit Collusion 
                                                          
17
 D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 3. 
18
 B. Allan, Article 82 - A Commentary On DG Competition's Discussion Paper, C.P.I., 2006, 2(1), 43-82, pp. 
51-52, H. Haupt, above note 11, pp. 438-439, T. Feaster and P. Treacy, above note 4, p. 469, Competition Law 
Forum Article 82 Review Group, above note 16, p. 175 and No Cited Author, Case Comment - Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transports SA v. Commission Of The European Communities, E.L.Rev., 1997, 22 Supp., CC42-
54, p. 47. 
19
 M. Jephcott and C. Withers, above note 1, p. 296, F. Depoortere and G. Motta, above note 1, p. 4 and M. 
Vatiero, above note 13, p. 222. 
20
 Compagnie Maritime Belge para. 112. See also, P. Fernandez, above note 8, p. 648, Ş. Ardıyok, above note 
13, p. 31, S. Stroux, above note 5, pp. 87-88, F. Mezzanotte, above note 14, p. 137 and J. Lang, above note 12, 
pp. 335-336. 
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(I) Collusion Under Article 102 Collective Dominance 
Article 102 has been interpreted so as to encompass the abuse of collective dominance 
within its ambit by relying on its reference to ‘one or more undertakings’ and such a 
provision may theoretically regulate the abusive conduct by the members of a collective 
entity which do not only explicitly but also tacitly collude
21
. However, the relevant precedent 
reveals that in each collective dominance case examined under Article 102, the Commission 
and the Courts held that the connection between the firms acting as a collective entity was 
established by the implementation of an agreement to participate in the industry’s conference, 
trade association or regulatory body, whilst there is no decision where the connecting factor 
was inferred from the existence of mere oligopolistic interdependence
22
. Therefore, the past 
precedent demonstrates that in practice the Commission and the Courts have focused on the 
regulation of the abusive conduct by explicitly colluding firms, while on the contrary tacit 
                                                          
21
 S. Stephanou, Collective Dominance Through Tacit Coordination: The Case For Non-Coordination Between 
Article 82 And Merger Control ‘Collective Dominance’ Concepts, G.C.P., 2009, October, 1-8, p. 4. 
22
 Compagnie Maritime Belge paras 46-48, CEWAL (Cases IV/32.448 and 32.450 [1992], OJ L34/20 [1993], 5 
CMLR 198 [1995]) para. 49, TACA I paras 525-531, TACA II paras 598-602, French-West African Shipowners’ 
Committee (Case IV/32.450 [1992], OJ L134/1 [1992], 5 CMLR 446 [1993]) paras 56-58, Almelo paras 43 and 
45, Piau paras 113-114 and Discussion Paper para. 76. See also, D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 27, H. Haupt, 
above note 11, p. 438, B. Hawk and G. Motta, above note 4, pp. 79 and 103, A. Onuma, above note 4, p. 16, A. 
Winckler and M. Hansen, Collective Dominance Under The EC Merger Control Regulation, C.M.L.R., 1993, 
30, 787-828, pp. 800-802, T. Soames, An Analysis Of The Principles Of Concerted Practice And Collective 
Dominance: A Distinction Without A Difference?, E.C.L.R., 1996, 17(1), 24-39, p. 37, F. Mezzanotte, above 
14, p. 139 and F. Mezzanotte, above note 16, pp. 12-14. 
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collusion has not played any role at all in the enforcement of collective dominance under 
Article 102
23
.  
 
The Commission’s and the Courts’ tendency to focus exclusively on the control of 
explicit collusion could have been altered by the application of the GC’s dictum in Laurent 
Piau v. Commission. In Piau the GC incorporated the Airtours test as established in the 
analysis of collective dominance in mergers to the assessment of the abuse of collective 
dominance under Article 102 and accordingly it extended the mutual correspondence 
between these two concepts that was evident by the judgments in Gencor and Compagnie 
Maritime Belge where the Courts concurred on the possibility that oligopolistic 
interdependence may form the relevant connecting factor
24
. The Piau dictum constituted an 
important development as, even though the case in itself was not decided on the basis of tacit 
collusion, the GC employed the Commission with the legal test necessary to effectively 
address such conduct and it opened up the potential to regulate tacit collusion in the context 
of Article 102 collective dominance
25
. Notably, such a test was subsequently reiterated in the 
Discussion Paper’s analysis of collective dominance under Article 10226. 
 
                                                          
23
 N. Petit and D. Henry, Why The EU Merger Regulation Should Not Enjoy A Monopoly Over Tacit Collusion 
– A Close Look At Five Common Misconceptions, In: Changes In Competition Policy Over The Last Two 
Decades, 2010, available at http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download.php?plik=8562, 181-197, p. 182. 
24
 Piau para. 111. 
25
 N. Petit and D. Henry, above note 23, pp. 182-183 and D. Geradin, Oligopoly Control After Laurent Piau 
And Tetra Laval – Shifting Paradigm Or Just The Same Old Song?, 2005, available at 
http://professorgeradin.blogs.com/professor_geradins_weblog/2005/03/oligopoly_contr.html (last visited 
21/06/2011), 1-2, p. 1. 
26
 Discussion Paper paras 47-50. 
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Nonetheless, the Guidance Paper on exclusionary abuses departed from the 
Discussion Paper, as it did not contain any provisions that focused on the abuse of collective 
dominance and this ‘omission’ must be interpreted as an acknowledgment that the regulation 
of the abuse of such positions is not within the Commission’s enforcement priorities in 
exclusion cases examined under Article 102
27
. Such a position is compatible with the analysis 
prescribed in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines which, even though in the assessment of 
unilateral effects they shed focus on the likelihood that the merged entity could behave in an 
exclusionary manner, they did not contain any analogous provision in the examination of 
coordinated effects
28
. Thus, it can be inferred from both the Guidance Paper and the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines that the Commission’s focus on exclusionary behaviour is 
principally related to the assessment of an individual firm’s market conduct, while in 
collective dominance cases its primary emphasis is on exploitative pricing behaviour
29
. 
Accordingly, the lack of focus on collective dominance under the Guidance Paper does not 
offer any general policy observations, such as an indication of the Commission’s tendency to 
possibly abandon the enforcement of such a concept altogether. Nevertheless, the absence of 
provisions on collective dominance under the Guidance Paper clearly illustrates the 
                                                          
27
 Guidance Paper para. 4. See also, N. Petit and D. Henry, above note 23, p. 182, F. Depoortere and G. Motta, 
above note 1, pp. 2 and 4 and L. Vitzilaiou and C. Lambadarios, above note 6, p. 10. 
28
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 36. See also, G. Monti, The New Substantive Test In The EC Merger 
Regulation – Bridging The Gap Between Economics And Law?, LSE Law, Society And Economy Working 
Papers, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153661, 1-21 pp. 13-14. 
29
 This position is precisely reflected by Hemphill and Wu which state that ‘our experience suggests that 
enforcement agencies may decline to even consider the investigation of exclusionary conduct if practiced by 
multiple firms’ and that exclusion ‘is broad enough to embrace exclusion by multiple incumbents, but in 
practice it has often been limited to exclusion by a single, dominant firm’. See also, S. Hemphill and T. Wu, 
Parallel Exclusion, Yale Law Journal, 2013, available at 
http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/parallel_exclusion_yale_law_journal.pdf, 1182-1253, pp. 1187-1188. 
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Commission’s continued and ongoing lack of emphasis on enforcement against tacit 
collusion, as the control of such conduct is evidently outside its priorities. Lastly, it is notable 
that, in contrast to the absence of emphasis in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines as well as in 
the relevant past precedent, exclusionary behaviour can (and should) form part of the analysis 
in collective dominance merger cases under the theory of ‘parallel exclusion’. 
 
(II) Conceptual Overlap On Tacit Collusion 
The concepts of collective dominance under Article 102 and collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation are convergent in their theoretical substance on tacit collusion. 
In particular, both concepts include tacit collusion within their boundaries and the 
Commission would apply an identical test for its establishment. On the one hand, the Piau 
dictum opened up the possibility to address tacit collusive conduct in an Article 102 
collective dominance context of assessment. Thus, the GC converged the substance of the 
concept of collective dominance under Article 102 to the concept of collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation, as both concepts include situations of tacit collusion within 
their ambit
30
. On the other hand, the Piau dictum converged the test that is applicable in order 
to establish tacit collusion under both concepts. Specifically, in the appraisal of collective 
dominance merger cases the fulfilment of the Airtours test demonstrates the likelihood of 
tacit collusion post-merger, whilst in the assessment of Article 102 collective dominance 
cases the establishment of tacit collusion would also be based on the proof of the cumulative 
presence of the Airtours conditions
31
. Additionally, the cumulative establishment of the 
Airtours conditions would facilitate the Commission to fulfil at least the first and second 
                                                          
30
 Note also the discussion on the relationship between tacit collusion and the concept of collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation at Ch. 2. 
31
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours conditions at Ch. 2. 
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element of the Article 102 three-prong test. Firstly, the establishment of the condition 
focusing on a common policy of tacit collusion would presuppose the existence of a 
connecting factor in the form of oligopolistic interdependence. Also, the establishment of the 
conditions revolving around a common policy, transparency and retaliation would imply the 
absence of effective internal competition between the oligopolists. Therefore, the fulfilment 
of these Airtours conditions would lead to the conclusion that the undertakings present 
themselves or act as a collective entity on the market and accordingly they would satisfy the 
collective position criterion under the Article 102 test. Secondly, the establishment of the 
condition emphasising on the absence of countervailing power of competitors, customers and 
consumers would necessitate the lack of effective external competition. Moreover, the 
cumulative establishment of all the Airtours conditions would lead to a finding of a 
sustainable tacit collusive policy, which would enable the undertakings to impair effective 
competition in the relevant market. Thus, in such a situation the oligopolists would possess 
significant market power, whilst the relevant structural characteristics would be favourable 
towards such an outcome, and consequently the collective dominant position criterion under 
the Article 102 test would be fulfilled. Lastly, in those circumstances where the market 
structure allows the oligopolists to collude tacitly and enjoy a collective dominant position, 
any conduct exploiting that market would in fact exploit their position and would lead to a 
finding of abuse. For example, the typical effect of tacit collusion that consists of the 
imposition of supra-competitive prices in the market would constitute abuse of collective 
dominance on the basis of an excessive pricing conduct.  
 
Nevertheless, despite such conceptual overlap, in the enforcement of each legal 
concept the emphasis is on the control of different types of collusion. Thus, even though the 
past precedent illustrates that the Commission’s and the Courts’ emphasis is on the control of 
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tacit collusion in the application of the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation, in the enforcement of Article 102 collective dominance their focus is on the 
regulation of explicit collusion, while on the contrary there is total lack of precedent tackling 
tacit collusive conduct and the Piau dictum has not been applied yet in an actual case 
examination. At first sight, such a conceptual overlap but distinctive enforcement on tacit 
collusion would appear to be a paradox. Nevertheless, it is explainable by the specific 
features that would underline an Article 102 collective dominance analysis centred on tacit 
collusion.  
 
 (III) Distinctive Enforcement On Tacit Collusion And The Reasons For Such 
Divergence  
Proof             
The principal reason for the absence of Article 102 enforcement against tacit collusion 
relates to the applicability of a higher evidentiary threshold in the assessment of collective 
dominance cases under Article 102 in relation to the threshold of proof employed in mergers. 
Specifically, in the examination of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation the 
Commission adopts an ex-ante analysis and this predictive nature of the assessment leads to 
the adoption of a flexible standard of proof that is based on probabilities, which due to the 
strictness of the Airtours test it is adjusted upwards at a ‘reasonable likelihood’ threshold32. 
                                                          
32
 Note also the discussion on the prospective analysis applied in the assessment of collective dominance merger 
cases and the reasonable likelihood threshold at Ch. 8. See also, B. Vesterdorf, Standard of Proof In Merger 
Cases : Reflections In The Light Of Recent Case Law Of The Community Courts, E.C.J., 2005, 1(1), 3-33, p. 
27, D. Bailey, Standard Of Proof In EC Merger Proceedings: A Common Law Perspective, C.M.L.R., 2003, 40, 
845–888, pp. 869 and 874-875, H. Haupt, above note 11, p. 438, J. Lang, above note 12, pp. 270 and 311, A. 
Scott, ‘An Immovable Feast’?: Tacit Collusion And Collective Dominance In Merger Control After Airtours, 
CCR Working Paper CCR 02-6, 2006, available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104458!ccr02-6.pdf, 1-
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Conversely, three factors point towards the applicability of a higher standard of proof in the 
potential enforcement against tacit collusion cases under the Article 102 collective 
dominance concept and these relate to the ex-post nature of the assessment, the quasi-
criminal nature of infringements and the increased stringency related to the establishment of 
the Airtours factors in an ex-post context. On the one hand, even though in Article 102 cases 
the requisite legal standard has never been explicitly stated, the ex-post nature of the 
appraisal and the presumed availability of evidence that is related to the fact that the 
assessment would focus on whether the undertakings concerned have actually abused their 
collective dominant position in the past (as opposed to future predictions) makes it possible to 
aim at a higher degree of cognition and leads to the application of a more rigorous standard of 
proof in relation to the threshold of proof employed in the examination of mergers
33
. On the 
other hand, such a higher threshold of proof is correlated to the fact that, in contradiction to 
merger cases which are administrative in nature and especially in horizontal concentrations 
there is no presumption of compatibility with the Common Market due to the employment of 
a symmetrical standard of proof, Article 102 cases relate to infringements that involve 
penalties of a quasi-criminal nature for which the principle of the ‘presumption of innocence’ 
is applicable and could even justify a standard close to the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21, pp. 13-14, Y. Botteman, Mergers, Standard Of Proof And Expert Economic Evidence, J.C.L.&E., 2006, 
2(1), 71-100, p. 77, D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 28 and S. Stephanou, above note 21, p. 7. 
33
 E. Fournier, The Elusive Standard Of Proof In EU Competition Cases, World Competition, 2010, 33(2), 187-
207, p. 196, D. Geradin et al., above note 9, p. 28, L. Vitzilaiou and C. Lambadarios, above note 6, p. 9, D. 
Bailey, above note 32, pp. 868 and 874, S. Stroux, above note 4, p. 4, H. Haupt, above note 11, p. 438, J. Lang, 
above note 12, p. 270 and N. Petit, The ‘Oligopoly Problem’ In EU Competition Law, 2012, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999829, 1-78, pp. 59-61. 
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threshold employed in criminal law cases
34
. Nevertheless, such a standard is adjusted at a 
high degree of likelihood, because in Article 102 cases the Courts have consistently upheld 
and practically applied a limited review of the Commission’s complex economic assessments 
that are subject to a manifest error standard and accordingly they have recognised at least to 
some extent its margin of discretion in such matters, which means that the threshold of proof 
should be accommodated accordingly due to the interaction between those components of 
proof
35
. Most importantly, the inherently strict evidentiary requirements related to the 
establishment of the cumulative Airtours conditions combined with an ex-post context of 
assessment forms an onerous burden for the Commission. This becomes evident by the 
consideration that the requirement to establish such criteria has created complexities even 
under the more lenient ex-ante review and accordingly those conditions would be much more 
difficult to fulfil in a more demanding ex-post context of assessment where the Commission 
would be obliged to demonstrate the direct fulfilment of the Airtours criteria by the 
                                                          
34
 Note also the discussion on the symmetrical standard of proof at Ch. 8. See also, P. Hellstrom, A Uniform 
Standard Of Proof In EU Competition Proceedings, 2009, available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2009/2009-COMPETITION-Hellstrom.pdf, 1-9, 
p. 6 and B. Vesterdorf, above note 32, p. 27. 
35
 Kingdom of Spain v. Commission paras 60-61 (Case T-398/07 [2012], ECR II-000 [2012]), AstraZeneca v. 
Commission para. 32 (Case T-321/05 [2010], ECR II-2805 [2010]) and Microsoft v. Commission paras 87-88 
(Case T-201/04 [2007], ECR II-3601 [2007]). Note also the discussion on the interrelationship between the 
standard of proof and judicial review at Ch. 8. See also, M. Melicias, ‘Did They Do It? The Interplay Between 
The Standard Of Proof And The Presumption Of Innocence In EU Cartel Investigations, World Competition, 
35(3), 2012, 471-510, p. 505, E. Paulis, The Burden Of Proof In Article 82 Cases, Fordham Conference, 2006, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_014_en.pdf, 1-9, p. 1 and D. Geradin and N. 
Petit, Judicial Review In European Union Competition Law: A Quantitative And Qualitative Assessment, 2010, 
available at http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/143359/1/GERADIN_PETIT_Judicial%20Review.pdf, 1-39, p. 
22. 
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presentation of pragmatic evidence on each condition and every market characteristic due to 
the cumulative nature of such conditions, whilst in order to establish an infringement it would 
also have to satisfy the abuse element. The distinctive and more onerous evidentiary 
requirements that must be presented in an ex-post as opposed to an ex-ante context of 
assessment are illustrated by the fact that in Article 102 tacit collusion cases a ‘specific’ 
retaliation mechanism would have to be demonstrated by showing past instances of deviation 
and consequent punishment, whilst in the assessment of collective dominance under the 
Merger Regulation the Commission does not have to prove the presence of a specific 
retaliation mechanism post-merger, but it must merely provide sufficient evidence that 
adequate deterrents would exist
36
. Overall, if one attempts to weigh these three factors, it is 
obvious that the stringency of the Airtours test plays the most prominent role on the upwards 
adjustment of the standard of proof towards the highest degree  of probabilities, i.e. an ‘all 
likelihood’ threshold, and the hindrance of enforcement against tacit collusion under the 
Article 102 collective dominance concept, as the mere presence of the other two features is 
common in Article 102 investigations, but it has not barred effective deterrence against 
alternative types of anticompetitive conduct. 
 
A solution to this problem may be found by the application of the Impala indirect test 
which could introduce a degree of flexibility in the demonstration of tacit collusion in 
collective dominance cases under Article 102. As a preliminary point it should be noted that 
the indirect test is theoretically capable to be applied in the analysis of Article 102 collective 
dominance, because it relies on past conduct in order to establish pre-existing collective 
                                                          
36
 Note also the discussion on the proof of retaliation in mergers at Ch. 8. See also, D. Geradin et al., above note 
9, p. 28 and F. Mezzanotte, Using Abuse Of Collective Dominance In Article 102 TFEU To Fight Tacit 
Collusion: The Problem Of Proof And Inferential Collusion, World Competition, 2010, 33(1), 77-102, p. 93.  
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dominance and it requires the Commission to prove actual tacit collusive behaviour, which is 
compatible with the ex-post examination of collective dominance in Article 102 cases and the 
type of analysis employed under such a provision
37
. From a substantive point of view the 
employment of the Impala test to Article 102 collective dominance cases would deprive the 
establishment of tacit collusion from the necessity to fulfil the Airtours factors directly, as 
each one or all of those criteria could be established indirectly through the fulfilment of the 
Impala conditions and accordingly it would facilitate the Commission to discharge its burden 
of proof by transfusing some needed flexibility from the realm of merger assessment
38
. Such 
flexibility is evident by the fact that under the Impala test there would be no need to 
demonstrate a ‘specific’ retaliation mechanism as such a factor could be inferred indirectly in 
the situation where the Commission would establish the cumulative presence of the Impala 
conditions
39
. Furthermore, in the context of Article 102 the fulfilment of the Impala test may 
simultaneously establish not only that the observed conduct is tacitly collusive, but also that it 
is abusive. Therefore, if the Commission would initially establish tacit collusion through the 
fulfilment of the Impala test, then the simultaneous proof of the first Impala condition that 
incorporates the conduct-related element of high parallel prices held over time, could 
demonstrate that the tacitly colluding firms had also abused their collective dominant position 
by engaging in exploitative abuses
40
. Nevertheless, a potential problem in the application of 
the Impala indirect test in such a context relates to the establishment of its third condition 
which is associated with the ‘problem of identification’ faced by the Commission in Article 
102 cases, i.e. it must prove that tacit collusion and not another explanation, such as 
                                                          
37
 Note also the discussion on the focus of the Impala indirect test on past market conduct at Ch. 2.  
38
 Note also the discussion on the flexibility of the indirect test at Ch. 2. 
39
 Note also the discussion on the ability to indirectly establish each one or all of the Airtours criteria at Ch. 2. 
40
 In that regard the Commission would have to produce evidence such as a systematic pattern of prices which 
are not determined by external demand and supply shocks. 
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unconscious parallelism, was the cause of the firms’ observed conduct41. However, since the 
Commission does not have to prove its case at a ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ threshold in 
Article 102 cases, it is not required to establish at a high level of certainty that tacit collusion 
was the underlying reason for the observed parallel behaviour, but it must positively prove at 
a high degree of likelihood that such conduct forms the explanation for the observed parallel 
behaviour
42
. Specifically, such a requirement must be interpreted in light of the Sony 
judgment where the ECJ examined the situation of pre-existing collective dominance under 
the Merger Regulation by employing an analysis which had common elements to an Article 
102 assessment and this is evident by the fact that it cited Compagnie Maritime Belge as a 
legal precedent relevant in this type of examination
43
. In Sony the ECJ shed emphasis on the 
fact that in the application of the Impala test the Commission is required to ‘adopt an 
approach based on the analysis of such plausible coordination strategies as may exist in the 
circumstances’44. The applicability of this requirement of ‘plausibility’, as established by the 
ECJ in the context of an ex-post assessment that is relevant not only in the examination of 
pre-existing collective dominance in mergers, but also in Article 102 cases, must be 
interpreted as extending beyond the relevant coordination strategies to the actual application 
of the Impala test and specifically on its third condition thereby excluding the necessity to 
prove such a criterion at a high degree of certainty and leaving to the Commission a degree of 
flexibility in the establishment of tacit collusion through the indirect test. 
 
                                                          
41
 F. Mezzanotte, above note 36, p. 77, N. Petit, above note 33, p. 62, T. Vecchi, above note 3, p. 388 and G. 
Monti, above note 4, pp. 144-146 and 152. 
42
 N. Petit, above note 33, pp. 62-63. 
43
 Sony para. 119.  
44
 Sony para. 129. 
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The more lenient threshold of proof employed in collective dominance merger cases 
currently renders such a framework preferable to Article 102 in order to tackle tacit collusion, 
despite its complexities, and explains the development of this concept towards the specific 
aim to control such anticompetitive conduct. This position is reinforced by the formal 
availability to employ the Impala indirect test in the assessment of the strengthening of pre-
existing collective dominance that derives from the recognition of its validity by the ECJ in 
Sony. Nevertheless, it seems that the Impala indirect test is suitable to be applied in an Article 
102 collective dominance context and accordingly it could prospectively introduce a more 
flexible era and facilitate the enforcement against tacit collusion in such a context.  
 
Effects-Based Approach 
The lack of enforcement against tacit collusion under Article 102 is also related to the 
absence of implementation of an effects-based approach in such a context. Specifically, even 
though the Commission’s Guidance Paper introduced a new era that focused on consumer 
harm as the overall criterion relevant in the determination of abusive behaviour and it 
endorsed an effects-based approach in the examination of whether a given practice is 
detrimental to consumer welfare, the GC still relies on a formalistic analysis and is reluctant 
to embrace an effects-based approach within the realm of Article 102, since it restates the 
traditional precedent whereby the effects of the contested practices do not have to be 
demonstrated in order to establish an infringement
45
. As a matter of principle, this framework 
                                                          
45
 Guidance Paper paras 2, 5 and 19, Tomra v. Commission (Case T-155/06 [2010], ECR 11-000 [2010]) paras 
16 and 219 and France Telecom v. Commission (Case T-340/03 [2007], ECR II-00107 [2007]) para. 195. See 
also, G. Zohios, Commission Guidance Paper On The Application Of Article 82: A Step Towards 
Modernization Or A Step Away?, G.C.P., 2009, February, 1-7, p. 4, Y. Botteman and K. Ewing, Guidance On 
Enforcement Priorities Regarding Exclusionary Abuses: A Comparative Overview, G.C.P., 2009, February, 1-
15, p. 5, J. Gual, M. Hellwig, A. Perrot, M. Polo, P. Rey, K. Schmidt and R. Stenbacka, An Economic Approach 
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of analysis is contradictory to the assessment employed in Airtours where the GC made clear 
that the application of a more-economic and effects-based approach linked to a consumer 
welfare standard underlines the assessment of concentrations for tacit collusion, which means 
that the examination of such conduct can only be undertaken in that specific context, as 
opposed to a context underlined by a form based approach
46
. However, the recent Post 
Danmark v. Konkurrenceradet judgment signals a change of analysis, since the ECJ leaned 
towards an effects-based approach by explicitly clarifying that the core criterion to determine 
abusive conduct under Article 102 is its anticompetitive effects ‘on competition, and thereby 
on the consumers’ interests’47. Thus, it is submitted that this apparent increased willingness to 
implement a modernised framework of assessment, especially if combined with the recent 
restatement of the Airtours criteria in EFIM v. Commission, may also open up a new era in 
the potential enforcement against tacit collusion under Article 102
48
. 
 
Remedies 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
To Article 82, Report By The EAGCP, 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf, 1-53, p. 3, Y. Katsoulacos, Some Critical 
Comments On The Commission’s Guidance Paper On Article 82 EC, G.C.P., 2009, February, 1-11, pp. 5-6, F. 
Etro and I. Kokkoris, An Economic Approach To Abuse Of Dominance, 2010, available at 
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper190.pdf, 1-47, pp. 1, 37 and 43 and D. Geradin and N. 
Petit, above note 35, pp. 2, 31, 34 and 38.  
46
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours direction towards a more economic and effects-based approach at Ch. 
4. 
47
 Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrenceradet (Case C-209/10 [2012], ECR I-0000 [2012]) para. 44. See also, E. 
Rousseva and M. Marquis, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change For Assessing Exclusionary Conduct Under 
Article 102 TFEU, Journal Of European Competition Law & Practice, 2012, available at 
http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/10/25/jeclap.lps059.full.pdf, 1-19 , p. 11.  
48
 EFIM v. Commission (Case T-296/09 [2011], ECR II-00425 [2011]) para. 71. 
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An aggregating reason for the lack of enforcement against tacit collusion under 
Article 102 relates to the fact that, even if the Commission would be able to discharge its 
burden of proof by demonstrating such conduct, it would face difficulties in fashioning an 
appropriate and effective remedy. On the one hand, behavioural remedies form the preferable 
solution in Article 102 decisions, but they are problematic to the extent that they require 
continuous monitoring that would essentially put the Commission in the undesirable position 
to act as a regulatory body, especially if the infringing parties would undertake commitments 
not to charge excessive prices that would also involve complexities on the determination of 
the appropriate price level, whilst their effectiveness is questionable for the reason that they 
would not directly target the root of the problem in tacit collusion cases which is correlated to 
the relevant market structure
49
. On the other hand, structural remedies are generally 
considered to be an unsuitable solution in Article 102 cases, since they are only employed if 
it is not possible to use behavioural commitments, and particularly in collective dominance 
cases they are perceived as a risky and aggressive intervention to the market structure which 
leads to the result that they would only be employed in exceptional circumstances
50
. Lastly, 
alternative sanctions such as punishment measures in the form of fines are ineffective to 
                                                          
49
 Article 7(1) and Recital 12 Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 On The Implementation Of The Rules On 
Competition Laid Down In Articles 81 And 82 Of The Treaty, 2002, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001. See also, B. Hawk And M. Motta, above note 4, p. 64, E. Wind, 
Remedies And Sanctions In Article 82 Of The EC Treaty, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(12), 659-668, p. 560 and G. 
Monti, above note 4, p. 145.  
50
 Article 7(1) and Recital 12 Regulation 1/2003. See also, B. Hawk And M. Motta, above note 4, p. 64, M. 
Zymler, Tacit Collusion: A Solution In Search Of A Problem, 2011, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1751545, 1-9, p. 8, N. Petit, above note 33, p. 44 and G. 
Monti, above note 4, pp. 146 and 157. 
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restore competition and do not put the infringement to an end
51
. This uncertainty as to 
whether an appropriate and effective remedy would be available in order to eliminate the 
abusive conduct of tacitly colluding firms would render the Commission very sceptical to 
initiate an examination of such anticompetitive concerns, bearing in mind the length and costs 
of Article 102 investigations, whilst this position is aggregated especially by the marginal 
availability of structural commitments which contradicts the position under the Merger 
Regulation where these remedies are both available and optimal in tacit collusion cases, a 
factor which makes the framework of collective dominance in mergers more suitable to 
tackle such conduct
52
. Nevertheless, such a problem could be solved if the Commission 
would be willing to lift its precautions and seed greater emphasis on structural remedies in 
the specific context of tacit collusion cases under Article 102. In particular, the Commission 
should recognise that structural commitments would be the optimal solution in situations of 
tacit collusion due to the inextricable link of collusive conduct to the relevant market 
structure and thereby effectively implement the position employed in mergers within the 
context of Article 102. 
 
(3) Exclusion  
Despite the absence of any relevant provision in the Guidance Paper, the past 
precedent illustrates that a collective dominant group may sometimes violate Article 102 by 
engaging not in exploitative, but in exclusionary abuses, through the adoption of a variety of 
practices that aim to deny rivals access to a raw material or technology, cut off their access to 
                                                          
51
 P. Hellstrom, F. Maier-Rigaud and F. Bulst, Remedies In European Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Journal, 76, 
2009, 43-63, pp. 44-45. 
52
 Note also the discussion on the preference for structural remedies in the context of collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation at Ch. 5. 
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customers or otherwise raise their costs
53
. On the contrary, in horizontal mergers assessed for 
collective dominance the Commission’s focus is exclusively on the likelihood of 
anticompetitive parallel price increases and this exposes an enforcement gap under the 
Merger Regulation that relates to the situation of parallel exclusion. Specifically, there can be 
exclusionary effects resulting from a horizontal merger, since if such a concentration 
improves the ability or raises the likelihood of the remaining firms to engage in parallel 
exclusion, i.e. conduct engaged uniformly by multiple firms within an oligopoly that harms 
competition by blocking the entry of a potential competitor or by inducing the exit of an 
existing rival, this would lead to the prohibition of the transaction on the basis of coordinated 
effects
54
. In particular, implicit coordination of exclusionary practices is possible, since even 
though tacit collusion is mainly focused on price elevation, it embraces a variety of strategies 
and can include exclusionary schemes
55
. Thus, firms in an oligopoly may collude in order to 
exclude, whilst the objective of parallel exclusion may be either to sustain higher prices or to 
slow/block innovation and especially the likelihood that a concentration may cause this later 
                                                          
53
 For example, in Compagnie Maritime Belge the ECJ held that the collective dominant group aimed to achieve 
the exclusion of its rivals by the simultaneous use of several types of abusive conduct. See also, E. Iacobucci 
and R. Winter, Abuse Of Joint Dominance In Canadian Competition Policy, University Of Toronto Law 
Journal, 2010, available at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/documents/iacobucci/Iacobucci%20-
%20Abuse%20-%20UTLJ.pdf, 219-237, p. 220 and S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, p. 1239. 
54
 For example, the issue of parallel exclusion was raised in the assessment of the US horizontal merger between 
AT&T and T-Mobile. See also, S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, pp. 1186, 1236 and 1248-1250, S. Besen, 
S. Kletter, S. Moresi, S. Salop and J. Woodbury, An Economic Analysis Of The AT&T-T-Mobile USA Wireless 
Merger, Journal Of Competition Law And Economics, 2013, 9(1), 23–47, pp. 24 and 35-36, A. Grunes and M. 
Stucke, Antitrust Review Of The AT&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Federal Communications Law Journal, 2011-
2012, 64, 47-85, pp. 75-79 and E. Iacobucci and R. Winter, above note 53, p. 231. 
55
 E. Iacobucci and R. Winter, above note 53, p. 221 and S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, pp. 1188 and 
1190. 
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type of adverse non-price effects reveals the critical importance for the Commission to 
employ outmost attention on parallel exclusion, as diminished innovation is considered to 
result in more detrimental impact on the consumers in the long run than price increases
56
. For 
a finding of coordinated effects on the basis of parallel exclusion the Commission must 
establish that after the completion of the concentration the oligopolists would have the ability 
and the incentive to adopt and sustain a strategy directed towards the exclusion of their actual 
or potential rivals. On the one hand, the oligopolists would have the incentive to adopt a 
parallel exclusion scheme if such a strategy would be advantageous for each one of those 
firms, whilst the ability to identify and implement such a scheme may be straightforward as 
each firm would either engage or refrain to engage in a specific exclusionary practice, i.e. the 
adoption of a parallel exclusion strategy could present less complexities than if the 
oligopolists would have to choose a specific price level that would be suitable for each and 
every member of the coordinating group
57. On the other hand, the oligopolists’ ability as well 
as their incentive to sustain a strategy of parallel exclusion is facilitated by the fact that 
cheating in the form of allowing the entry of a new competitor would normally be 
                                                          
56
 Note that there is a qualitative difference between collusion in innovation as identified at Ch. 4 and the 
exclusion of innovative firms discussed above. Specifically, under the former scenario the oligopolists would 
collude in order to diminish ‘internal’ innovative efforts, i.e. innovation generated by firms within the collusive 
group, whilst in the second scenario the market participants would collude in order to exclude ‘external’ 
innovative efforts from the relevant market, i.e. innovation generated by actual or potential competitors. In both 
situations the end objective is identical, i.e. to replicate the enjoyment of the ‘quiet life’ of a monopolist at the 
expense of the consumers. See also, S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, pp. 1182, 1185 and 1210-1211 and 
J. Baker, Exclusion As A Core Competition Concern, 2012, available at 
http://www7.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/antitrust/pdfs/events/baker.pdf, 1-73, pp. 34 and 61. 
57
 J. Rybnicek, ‘Parallel Exclusion: Is It Time For A Theory Of Shared Monopoly?’, 2013, available at 
http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/159026_October%2018%20FINAL%20ABA%20Monopoly%20Matters%20-
%20Fall%202013.pdf, 21-22, p. 21 and S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, pp. 1222-1223. 
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immediately noticeable and therefore detectable, whilst punishment is reinforced by the 
reason that permitting entry is permanent and thus severe as it eliminates the cheater’s ability 
to revert to the exclusionary scheme after a temporary period of defection
58
. Also, since 
parallel exclusion is associated with the erection of entry barriers that would be directed 
towards outsiders, it would exclude by definition competition from external destabilising 
factors such as actual or potential competitors, save in circumstances where the existing 
competitor or new entrant is a powerful firm
59
. Hence, a situation of parallel exclusion is 
feasible to result from a horizontal concentration and accordingly it is imperative for such 
conduct to form a central part of the analysis of potential merger effects, especially in view of 
the fact that it can cause adverse impact on innovation, whilst its establishment could be 
straightforward and would not impose an unbearable burden on the Commission.  
 
A rather exceptional situation of exclusion occurred in the case of Irish Sugar where 
the Commission and the GC found Article 102 to be infringed by abuses of a collective 
dominant position held by firms in a vertical relationship. In particular, the Commission and 
the GC adopted a peculiar definition of the relevant market that comprised both the 
production and distribution segments of the relevant industry and established a ‘vertical’ 
collective dominant position by relying on several connecting factors in the form of economic 
links which generated a ‘parallelism of interest’ and showed that the vertical competitors had 
the power to adopt a common market policy
60
. Furthermore, the GC expressly stated that the 
mere fact that companies were in vertical relationship did not affect the finding of a collective 
                                                          
58
 S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, pp. 1220 and 1223. 
59
 S. Hemphill and T. Wu, above note 29, p. 1225. 
60
 Irish Sugar v. Commission (Case T-228/97 [1999], ECR II-02969 [1999]) paras 50-52 and 59. 
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dominant position
61
. Such a finding was also unaffected by the fact that the collective 
position was held jointly by a non-dominant distributor along with the dominant producer. 
Also, the GC highlighted that in a situation of vertical collective dominance, not only the 
collective, but also the individual conduct of the oligopolists can be deemed abusive, despite 
the fact that it is not the joint action of all the undertakings in question, if such behaviour 
forms a manifestation of the collective dominant position and relates to the exploitation of 
such a position
62
. Thus, parallelism in a vertical relationship does not require the 
establishment of a complete convergence of behaviour, but it is compatible with a certain 
degree of conduct differentiation, provided that such conduct is directed towards the 
achievement of the common objective, i.e. the exclusion of rivals. The principles derived 
from the Irish Sugar case can affect the assessment of horizontal mergers for the likelihood to 
create or enhance a situation of parallel exclusion between vertically related firms, i.e. the 
merged entity and a downstream or upstream rival. In such a situation the Commission would 
seek to demonstrate a collective interest to exclude through reliance on the vertical 
competitors’ relationship, i.e. the presence of economic links or possibly illustrate an 
‘interdependence of interests’, that would generate a commonality of incentives to adopt an 
exclusionary strategy and also prove that the merger would confer upon them the ability to 
effectively enforce exclusionary schemes by collective and/or individual actions, provided 
that in the latter case such schemes would serve the joint objective. Nevertheless, it is notable 
that such a scenario is more likely to be established in the assessment of the strengthening of 
collective dominance where evidence could be readily available in the pre-merger market, 
while on the contrary the rather exceptional circumstances under which such a situation may 
                                                          
61
 Irish Sugar para. 63. 
62
 Irish Sugar para. 66 and Discussion Paper para. 74.  
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arise would render its demonstration most difficult in an assessment focusing on the creation 
of collective dominance. 
 
(C) ARTICLE 101 CONCERTED PRACTICES v. MERGER REGULATION 
COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE 
(1) Concerted Practices: Concept And Requirements 
Article 101(1) applies to formal agreements and to concerted practices
63
. The concept 
of concerted practices refers to ‘a form of coordination between undertakings which, without 
having been taken to the stage where an agreement properly so-called had been concluded, 
knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition’64. 
Thus, concerted practices concern parallel behaviour based on collaboration, which has been 
implemented between undertakings without resorting to binding agreements, and it aims to 
prevent, restrict or distort competition. Moreover, for a concerted practice to arise there must 
be a consensus between the parties to cooperate rather than compete and even though a 
                                                          
63
 T. Hays, Anticompetitive Agreements And Extra-Market Parallel Importation, E.L.Rev., 2001, 26(5), 468-
488, p. 476 and F. Alese, Legislative Comment - The Economic Theory Of Non-Collusive Oligopoly And The 
Concept Of Concerted Practices Under Article 81, E.C.L.R., 1999, 20(7), 379-383, p. 379. 
64
 Cooperatieve Vereniging v. Commission (Suiker Unie) (Cases C-40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 and 114/73 
[1975], ECR 1663 [1975], 1 CMLR 295 [1976]) para. 26, Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission (Woodpulp) (Cases C-89, 
104, 114, 116, 117 and 125-29/85 [1993], ECR I-1307 [1993], 4 CMLR 407 [1993]) para. 63, Zuchner v. 
Bayerische Vereinsbank (Case C-172/80 [1981], ECR 2021 [1981], 1 CMLR 313 [1982]) para. 12 and Imperial 
Chemical Industries v. Commission (Dyestuffs) (Cases C-48, 49 and 51-57/69 [1972], ECR 619 [1972], CMLR 
557 [1972]) para. 64. See also, O. Black, Concerted Practices, Joint Action And Reliance, E.C.L.R., 2003, 
24(5), 219-228, p. 222 and T. Soames, above note 22, p. 25. 
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common behavioural plan need not be drawn, it is required that such cooperation influences 
each economic operator's ability to decide independently its market policy
65
.  
 
(I) Contact  
The aim of Article 101(1) is to prevent collusive practices, the policy being that 
economic operators should determine independently their market behaviour
66
. This 
requirement of independence precludes any direct or indirect contact between rivals in the 
form of communications, price announcements and exchange of sensitive information or of 
assurances, whereby the competitors disclose to each other an intended course of conduct 
with the object or effect of influencing their market behaviour
67
. Hence, where contact 
                                                          
65
 Suiker Unie para. 173. See also, O. Black, above note 64, p. 222, B. Rodger, above note 2, p. 21 and R. 
Petriccione and V. Leone, Recent Developments Concerning Exchange Of Information, E.L.Rev., 1988, 13(3), 
196-201, p. 197. 
66
 Woodpulp para. 63, T-Mobile v. Raad Van Vestuur Van De Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Mobile 
Operators) (Case C-8/08 [2009], ECR I-4529 [2009]) para. 32, Zuchner para. 13, Commission v. Anic (Case C-
49/92P [1999], ECR I-4125 [1999]) para. 116 and Suiker Unie para. 173. See also, F. Torre, Evidence, Proof 
And Judicial Review In Cartel Cases, World Competition, 2009, 32(4), 505-578, p. 509 and No Cited Author, 
Case Comment - Woodpulp, E.L.Rev., 1993, Supplement, 12-22, pp. 14-15. 
67
 Suiker Unie para. 174, Huls AG v. Commission (Case C-199/92P [1999], ECR I-4287 [1999], 5 CMLR 1016 
[1999]) para. 160, Enichem Anic v. Commission (Case T-6/89 [1991], ECR II-1623 [1991]) para. 200 and SA 
Hercules Chemicals v. Commission (Case T-7/89 [1991], ECR II-1711 [1991], 4 CMLR 84 [1992]) para. 258. 
See also, A. Jones, Case Comment - Woodpulp: Concerted Practice And/Or Conscious Parallelism?, E.C.L.R., 
1993, 14(6), 273-279, p. 275, Ş. Ardıyok, above note 13, p. 20, No Cited Author, Case Comment - Horizontal 
Agreements: Judgments Of The Court Of First Instance And The Court Of Justice, E.L.Rev., 1991, Supplement, 
4-9, p. 6, G. Gerven and E. Varona, The Wood Pulp Case And The Future Of Concerted Practices, C.M.L.R., 
1994, 31, 575-608, p. 591, No Cited Author, Case Comment - Cartels, E.L.Rev., 1990, Supplement, 2-6, pp. 4-
5, F. Alese, above note 63, p. 381, J. Lang, above note 12, p. 274, M. Franzosi, Oligopoly And The Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: Concerted Practices And ‘As If’ Behaviour, E.C.L.R., 1988, 9(4), 385-389, p. 388, C. Osti, Case 
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between rivals has occurred and it is of such a nature as to influence their competitive 
conduct by eliminating uncertainty as to their future market behaviour, a concerted practice 
will be found, i.e. such contact converts a mere parallel behaviour into a concerted practice
68
. 
It is not necessary for the contact to result in a full understanding between competitors, since 
that would be an agreement
69
. Nonetheless, it is imperative that such contact must concern 
the future intended competitive behaviour of the rivals and consequently it must occur prior 
to any conduct on the market
70
. 
 
(II) Parallel Behaviour  
The Article 101 precedent reveals that it is almost impossible for a concerted practice 
to be inferred from evidence focusing solely on parallel behaviour. Specifically, in Imperial 
Chemical Industries v. Commission (Dyestuffs) the Court stated that a concerted practice 
should not be interpreted so broadly as to include only parallel behaviour and in Cooperatieve 
Vereniging v. Commission (Suiker Unie) the Court held that purely parallel conduct would 
not be caught under Article 101(1)
71. Also, according to the AG’s Opinion in Ahlstrom Oy v. 
Commission (Woodpulp), parallel behaviour can at most constitute circumstantial evidence of 
a concerted practice, where such conduct leads to conditions of competition which do not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Comment - Information Exchanges In The Obscure Light Of Woodpulp, E.C.L.R., 1994, 15(3), 176-182, p. 178 
and O. Black, above note 64, p. 221. 
68
 Dyestuffs para. 118, Enichem Anic v. Commission paras 200-201 and SA Hercules Chemicals v. Commission 
paras 259-260. See also, I. Lianos, Collusion In Vertical Relations Under Article 81 EC, C.M.L.R., 2008, 45, 
1027-1077, p. 1052, C. Osti, above note 67, pp. 178-180, F. Alese, above note 63, p. 382 and No Cited Author, 
above note 66, p. 21. 
69
 No Cited Author, above note 66, p. 21. 
70
 G. Gerven and E. Varona, above note 67, p. 600.  
71
 Dyestuffs para. 66 and Suiker Unie para. 174. See also, F. Alese, above note 63, p. 380. 
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correspond to the normal conditions of the market
72
. Moreover, the ECJ in Woodpulp stated 
that a concerted practice can be inferred from parallelism if it is the ‘only plausible 
explanation’ for such conduct, while there is no concerted practice if another economic 
rational explanation for the observed parallel behaviour exists
73
. Accordingly, a conclusion of 
concerted practices might be inferred from an economic analysis of the parallel behaviour in 
question, where the prevailing market conditions are such that price parallelism without 
colluding is inherently unlikely
74
. However, a finding of concerted practices based on such 
circumstantial evidence alone will be rebutted if there is another explanation for the 
parallelism of behaviour
75
. In particular, parallel behaviour does not constitute an 
infringement of Article 101(1) if it results from the normal operation of the market and is 
arrived at merely through the oligopolists’ recognition of their interdependence and their 
consequent adaptation to the competitors’ conduct, because it constitutes ‘another plausible 
                                                          
72
 Woodpulp Opinion (Opinion Of Advocate General Darmon, Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (Woodpulp) 
[1992], ECR I-1307 [1993]) para. 191. See also, I. Rubli, Case Comment - The Advocate-General's Opinion In 
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527. 
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 G. Gerven and E. Varona, above note 67, p. 602 and S. Stroux, above note 4, p. 15. 
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 Woodpulp para. 126. See also, B. Rodger, above note 73, p. 38 and A. Jones, above note 67, pp. 276-277. 
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explanation’, i.e. intelligent alignment is a legitimate explanation of parallel behaviour which 
escapes condemnation under Article 101(1)
76
. 
 
(2) Tacit Collusion  
The concepts of concerted practices under Article 101 and collective dominance 
under the Merger Regulation regulate different types of collusion. Therefore, while the 
concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation is centred on the control of 
tacit collusion, the concept of concerted practices focuses on the control of explicit collusion 
that is formed through contact between rivals and subsequent market conduct
77
. On the 
contrary, the concept of concerted practices is not receptive to the control of tacit collusion 
and this position is interlinked to the evidentiary requirements set out by the Courts in order 
to demonstrate such an infringement. Specifically, in Suiker Unie and Dyestuffs the Courts 
expressly held that proof of parallel behaviour alone is insufficient to establish concertation, 
while in Woodpulp the Court referred to an unrealistic situation where the Commission could 
infer the existence of concertation by relying on circumstantial evidence deduced from 
parallel behaviour which demonstrate that tacit collusion constitutes the only plausible 
explanation for such conduct
78
. However, the Commission’s reliance on economic evidence 
derived solely from parallelism would leave room for an alternative competitive explanation 
in the specific context of oligopolies where interdependence forms part of the normal 
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 Woodpulp para. 71, Suiker Unie para. 174 and Zuchner para. 14. See also, J. Lang, above note 12, p. 275, Ş. 
Ardıyok, above note 13, p. 20, V. Korah, Gencor v. Commission: Collective Dominance, E.C.L.R., 1999, 20(6), 
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 E. Fournier, above note 33, p. 197, Ş. Ardıyok, above note 13, pp. 20-21 and T. Soames, above note 22, p. 25. 
250 
                                                                                 Chapter 6 
 
operation of such markets and would in most cases (or in all cases if we consider the lack of 
precedent tackling tacit collusion in oligopolies under Article 101(1)) lead to a finding of 
mere parallel behaviour
79
.  
 
This strict stance on the proof of tacit collusion in the context of Article 101 is also 
interlinked with and reflects the substantially higher evidentiary threshold that must be met in 
the ex-post appraisal of Article 101(1) infringements, as compared to the standard of proof 
employed in mergers. Specifically, the Courts’ judgments have expressly declared the 
applicability of a standard of proof equivalent to the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ threshold in 
Article 101 cases, as they have refrained to conclude that the Commission has established the 
existence of an infringement if they retained any reasonable doubt
80
. Also, the Courts have 
stated that in case of doubt, the benefit of that doubt must be given to the defendant 
undertakings and this principle derives from the quasi-criminal nature of fines in cartel cases 
that gives rise to a presumption of innocence and suggests that any reasonable doubt must be 
overcome before an infringement is established
81
. Such a high threshold of proof is clearly 
imitated in the formulation of the ‘only plausible explanation’ test which essentially requires 
the Commission to produce an undisputable economic analysis which unequivocally 
demonstrates that tacit collusion led to concertation at a high degree of certainty, as such 
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 M. Melicias, above note 35, p. 485. 
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 JFE Engineering v. Commission (Case T-67/00 [2004], ECR II-02501 [2004]) para. 177 and Dresdner Bank 
v. Commission (Case T-44/02 [2006], ECR II-03567 [2006]) paras 60 and 144. See also, M. Melicias, above 
note 35, p. 484. 
81
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evidence must be capable to prevail over any reasonable doubt including any plausible 
alternative explanation for the observed behaviour
82
. The difficulty to prove tacit collusion 
under Article 101 is also reflected by the fact that even though in principle the Courts have 
pronounced the exercise of limited review to the Commission’s complex economic 
evaluations and theoretically take into consideration its margin of appreciation, in practice the 
status quo is quite different
83
. In particular, the fact that ‘any’ alternative plausible 
explanation would raise a doubt that would be resolved in favour of the defendant 
undertakings and would set aside the Commission’s analysis suggests the absence of a 
margin of discretion, whilst this is also evident by the Woodpulp case where the ECJ took an 
interventionist position in reviewing the economic evidence and reasoning submitted by the 
Commission as it rejected the Commission’s views, hired its own experts and relied on their 
reports
84
. 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that even though the formulation of the Woodpulp and 
Impala tests is to some extent overlapping, their actual application would be divergent. In 
particular, the formulation of the tests in Woodpulp and Impala presents some general 
common elements, since they are both based on a positive condition centred on the presence 
of parallel behaviour, a negative condition that in principle focuses on the absence of an 
alternative plausible explanation than anticompetitive conduct, but in essence it entails an 
important qualitative difference, and they are at least theoretically capable to establish 
previous tacit collusive behaviour. Nonetheless, this overlap is purely semantic as a careful 
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 E. Fournier, above note 33, p. 198 and M. Melicias, above note 35, pp. 483, 485 and 486. 
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analysis reveals that the Court’s intent in drafting the Woodpulp test was negative towards the 
use of circumstantial evidence related to parallel conduct as proof of concertation, since in 
essence it excluded such evidence and left only an exceptional possibility where tacit 
collusion forms the only plausible explanation for the parallel behaviour in question. 
Conversely, the language of the GC in Impala is broader and positively points towards a 
finding of collective dominance, even in the absence of direct evidence of transparency, 
thereby attempting to include within its ambit of enforcement situations of tacit collusion 
where no sufficient direct evidence would be available and possibly other types of ‘grey area’ 
cases
85
. Moreover, the underlying threshold of proof also points towards their distinctive 
applicability, as the Woodpulp test must be read in light of and reflects the Article 101 
rigorous standard of proof which requires the establishment at a high degree of certainty that 
tacit collusion is the ‘only plausible’ explanation, whilst ‘any’ alternative plausible 
explanation will raise a doubt that would automatically rebut the Commission’s analysis. On 
the contrary, the Impala test must be interpreted in light of the ECJ’s requirement of 
‘plausibility’ in Sony that reveals the applicability of a degree of flexibility in the 
establishment of its third condition and implies that in case the defendants present ‘another’ 
plausible explanation, which contradicts the Commission’s analysis and its positive exclusion 
of such an explanation, the Court would have to make a decision on the merits. Both of these 
elements reveal the substantive distinctiveness between those tests and illustrate that the 
ineffectiveness of the Woodpulp test to control situations of tacit collusion under Article 101 
does not affect the applicability of the Impala test in the context of mergers.  
 
(D) CONCLUSION 
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 Note also the discussion on the application of the Impala test in ‘grey area’ cases at Ch. 2. 
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The concepts of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation, collective 
dominance under Article 102 and concerted practices under Article 101 are characterised by a 
lack of uniformity on the treatment of tacit collusion.  
 
The concept of collective dominance under Article 102 revolves around the fulfilment 
of the criteria of a collective position, a collective dominant position and the abuse of such a 
position. The establishment of a collective position requires the presence of a connecting 
factor between independent undertakings which must lead the firms to present themselves or 
act as a collective entity on the market. The criterion of dominance focuses on whether the 
undertakings collectively hold significant market power and this is determined by assessing 
the structural characteristics of the relevant market. Lastly, the analysis of abuse emphasises 
on the anticompetitive behaviour of the undertakings holding a collective dominant position. 
The Article 102 collective dominance precedent illustrates an exclusive focus on explicit 
collusion, whilst the Guidance Paper reveals that the abuse of collective dominance and 
therefore tacit collusion cases are not within its enforcement priorities. Accordingly, even 
though post-Piau collective dominance in mergers and its corresponding theory under Article 
102 are conceptually convergent on tacit collusion, their enforcement against such conduct is 
divergent as the Commission and the Courts have never addressed situations of tacit 
collusion under the later theory. This lack of enforcement is principally related to the higher 
evidentiary threshold that would be applicable in tacit collusion cases under Article 102 and 
derives from the ex-post nature of investigations as well as the quasi-criminal nature of 
infringements, but principally by the increased stringency in the application of the Airtours 
test in an ex-post context of assessment. However, the potential application of the Impala test 
could introduce a degree of flexibility in the demonstration of tacit collusion through the 
indirect fulfilment of the Airtours criteria, whilst it is also capable to simultaneously establish 
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the abuse element. Furthermore, the GC’s lack of implementation of an effects-based 
approach in Article 102 cases creates problems in the application of the Airtours framework 
of analysis in this context, but the ECJ’s recent inclination towards such an approach could 
also revive the prospect of enforcement against tacit collusion. Additionally, the Commission 
would be reluctant to challenge tacit collusion cases under Article 102 due to difficulties 
related to the formulation of an appropriate and effective remedy and in that regard it is 
suggested that the Commission could show greater willingness to accept structural 
commitments in the specific context of tacit collusion due to the inextricable link of such 
conduct to the relevant market structure. These fundamental problematic features of 
collective dominance under Article 102 reveal that, despite its own complexities, the concept 
of collective dominance in mergers is currently the preferable framework for the control of 
tacit collusion. Conversely, in the enforcement of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation the Commission has not attributed any emphasis on exclusionary practices. 
Nevertheless, the Commission should embrace considerations focusing on parallel exclusion 
as a horizontal concentration is capable to strengthen the ability or increase the likelihood of 
the remaining firms to engage in such conduct, whilst the principles derived from the Irish 
Sugar case can facilitate the establishment of post-merger parallel exclusion between 
vertically related firms. 
 
In contrast to the concept of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation, the 
concept of concerted practices under Article 101 is not receptive to control situations of tacit 
collusion, as it requires the demonstration of contact between competitors and subsequent 
market conduct in order to establish an infringement, whereas parallelism alone can lead to a 
finding of concertation in circumstances where the Commission could prove that tacit 
collusion constitutes the single plausible explanation for the parallel conduct in question. 
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However, this is unrealistic in view of the fact that oligopolistic interdependence forms part 
of the normal operation of such markets and would constitute ‘another plausible explanation’ 
that would lead to a finding of mere parallel behaviour. The difficulty to establish tacit 
collusion is interlinked to the application of a standard of proof equivalent to the beyond 
reasonable doubt in Article 101 cases which is reflected in the formulation of the ‘only 
plausible explanation’ test and essentially requires the Commission to bring forward an 
economic analysis that would be capable to overcome any reasonable doubt. Lastly, the 
overlap in the formulation of the Woodpulp and Impala tests should be considered as merely 
semantic and does not have any limiting effect on the application of the Impala test in 
mergers. 
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                                                     CHAPTER 7  
                                                                - 
THE COMPARATIVE ANGLE II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
COORDINATED AND UNILATERAL EFFECTS  
 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
The substantive test of the Merger Regulation 139/2004, as explained in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, introduced the assessment of unilateral effects in EU Merger 
Control and confirmed that coordinated effects form an integral part of merger analysis in the 
EU
1
.  
 
Accordingly, the current framework of EU Merger Control demonstrates that 
horizontal concentrations may give rise to two types of anticompetitive concerns. On the one 
hand, anticompetitive effects may arise in oligopolies where after the completion of the 
concentration the remaining market participants would not compete with each other, but 
instead they would resort to tacit collusion. The effects of such mergers are termed 
coordinated effects and refer to circumstances where a concentration causes changes in the 
market characteristics that affect the future behaviour of the firms, which would either 
reinforce a pre-existing situation of tacit collusion or increase the likelihood of such conduct 
between rivals that would collectively reduce the effectiveness of competition in the relevant 
market and raise their prices post-merger. On the other hand, under certain market 
                                                          
1
 Note also the discussion on the analysis of unilateral and coordinated effects under the Merger Regulation 
139/2004 at Ch. 5.   
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circumstances there can be a discretionary margin on the merged entity to individually raise 
its prices post-merger, particularly in situations where very few firms would be left in the 
industry, but none of them would have enough market power to be considered dominant and 
it is unlikely that the remaining firms would collude, in which case anticompetitive effects 
may arise from the fact that the merged entity would have increased market power combined 
with the lack of effective competitive constraints. The effects of such mergers are termed 
unilateral effects and they would result in price increases imposed by the merged entity, 
regardless of the response of the other competitors.  
 
This Chapter examines the relationship between coordinated and unilateral effects in 
horizontal mergers. Section B illustrates the distinctive economic principles which underline 
each theory of harm. Section C focuses on the dissimilar set of necessary conditions that are 
relevant in the assessment of coordinated as opposed to unilateral effects. Section D 
emphasises on the divergent applicability of market definition and econometrics in each type 
of anticompetitive effects. Lastly, Section E concludes by outlining the relationship between 
these theories of harm.  
 
(B) ECONOMIC THEORY 
(1) Unilateral Effects And Single Firm Dominance v. Coordinated Effects And 
Collective Dominance 
An important difference revolves around the fact that, while the concept of collective 
dominance matches closely and reflects the coordinated effects theory of harm, the concept of 
single firm dominance does not correspond entirely to the theory of unilateral effects
2
. In 
particular, single firm dominance and unilateral effects are distinctive concepts as they are 
                                                          
2
 Note also the discussion on the relationship between collective dominance and coordinated effects at Ch. 2.  
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based on different economic theories, i.e. the concept of single firm dominance is based on 
the monopoly model whilst the theory of unilateral effects has its foundation on the oligopoly 
model
3
. Thus, in order to establish single firm dominance the merged firm must be dominant 
with very high market shares approaching those of a monopolist. Conversely, unilateral 
effects concern circumstances where the merged entity, while not being individually 
dominant post-merger, has the ability to increase its prices or reduce its output because of the 
elimination of important competitive constraints. Also, under the theory of unilateral effects 
the merged entity does not need to be the leading player in terms of market shares held in the 
relevant market post-merger, but it suffices if it is the second largest player in the market, i.e. 
unilateral effects apply below the market share level which is necessary for the establishment 
of single firm dominance
4
. Therefore, the establishment of single firm dominance entails 
stricter requirements than those which are sufficient for the demonstration of unilateral 
effects and to that extent the introduction of the later theory of harm in the examination of 
concentrations under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test relaxed the threshold 
of intervention in situations where competition concerns revolve around the likelihood that 
the merged entity would afford the ability to individually exercise market power post-
merger
5
.  
                                                          
3
 S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, Unilateral Effects Under The European Merger Regulation: How Big Is The Gap?, 
E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(7), 380-389, pp. 380-381.  
4
 A. Christiansen, The Reform Of EU Merger Control – Fundamental Reversal Or Mere Refinement?, 2006, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898845, 1-60, p. 23, S. Volcker, Mind The Gap: 
Unilateral Effects Analysis Arrives In EC Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(7), 395-409, p. 396, A. 
Weitbrecht, EU Merger Control In 2005 – An Overview, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(2), 43-50, p. 45 and S. Baxter and 
F. Dethmers, above note 3, p. 384. 
5
 Note also the discussion on the lower intervention threshold applicable under the theory of unilateral effects at 
Ch. 5. 
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(2) Tacit Collusion And Recognition Of Interdependence v. Unilateral Action 
The analysis of both unilateral and coordinated effects is based on the non-
cooperative oligopoly model of economic theory. Moreover, in oligopolies the positions of 
the firms are interdependent due to the particular market structure, which means that each 
firm cannot act without taking into account the likely reactions of its competitors and such a 
factor is relevant not only in the analysis of coordinated effects, but also in the assessment of 
unilateral effects concerning homogeneous markets as well as where the rivals firms’ 
products are close substitutes to the merged entity’s products in differentiated markets 6. 
Nevertheless, these similarities are of trivial importance in view of the fact that the substance 
of each anticompetitive theory is underlined by a set of significantly different economic 
principles. In particular, while coordinated effects are based on the recognition of 
oligopolistic interdependence and the adoption of tacit collusive behaviour which leads the 
market participants to act collectively, such requirements are not relevant in a unilateral 
effects merger examination, as in the latter situation the merged entity acts individually in its 
effort to raise its prices.  
 
Specifically, the coordinated effects theory of harm refers to the situation where the 
oligopolists recognize their interdependence, align their conduct in the market and cease to 
compete effectively by resorting to tacit collusive behaviour post-merger
7
. Thus, coordinated 
effects arise in oligopolies where after the completion of the concentration the remaining 
market participants would act collectively by adopting and sustaining a tacit collusive 
                                                          
6
 M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright and J. Tirole, The Economics Of Unilateral Effects, Interim Report 
For DG Competition, 2003, available at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2003/economics_unilaterals.pdf, 1-105, p. 3. 
7
 Gencor paras 276-277, Airtours para. 60 and Sony para. 121. 
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strategy in order to maximise their joint profits
8
. Accordingly, such a theory of harm refers to 
the collective exercise of market power, as the merged entity cannot raise its prices 
individually, but there must be a switch in behaviour from competition to coordination for all 
the major market participants post-merger, i.e. the non-merging rivals must tacitly collude 
with the merged entity
9
. On the contrary, unilateral effects refer to situations where the 
competitive constraints on individual firms are weakened by the concentration, which 
removes the pre-merger competitive pressure exercised from a rival that is part of the merged 
entity post-merger. This can lead to increased market power for the merged entity, thereby 
widening the scope to profitably increase its prices or reduce its output. Thus, unilateral 
effects focus on the likelihood that the merging firm would exercise market power 
individually and in the absence of any coordinated response from the remaining rivals, which 
means that such a theory of harm is not based on the recognition of oligopolistic 
interdependence neither on a requirement of an aligned reaction by its competitors
10
. Hence, 
in the theory of unilateral effects there is no requirement for an alteration in the behaviour of 
the non-merging rivals post-merger in comparison to their pre-merger conduct, as the focus is 
                                                          
8
 Airtours paras 61-62. See also, E. Kloosterhuis, Joint Dominance And The Interaction Between Firms, 
E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(3), 79-92, p. 81. 
9
 R. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory And Merger Guidelines, In: Microeconomics: 
Brookings Papers, 1991, p. 292, B. Dubow, D. Elliott and E. Morrison, Unilateral Effects And Merger 
Simulation Models, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(2), 114-117, p. 115, H. Haupt, Collective Dominance Under Article 82 
EC And EC Merger Control In The Light Of The Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(9), 434-444, pp. 434-
435, M. Ivaldi, B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright and J. Tirole, The Economics Of Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral 
And Coordinated Effects, 2003, available at http://www.een.sk/docs/KD7105150ENS_002.pdf, 1-163, p. 19 and 
L. White, Market Power: How Does It Arise? How Is It Measured?, 2012, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056708, 1-50, p. 10. 
10
 A. Christiansen, above note 4, p. 23 and S. Voigt and A. Schmidt, The Commission’s Guidelines On 
Horizontal Mergers: Improvement Or Deterioration?, C.M.L.R., 2004, 41, 1583-1594, p. 1585. 
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exclusively on the alteration of the merging firms’ behaviour, and irrespective of the fact that 
the non-merging rivals may anticipate that the concentration would lead to higher prices set 
by the merged entity and individually increase their prices as well
11
. Accordingly, the 
unilateral effects theory of harm focuses on strategies that the merged entity can implement 
independently of its competitors and evaluates its ability to raise its prices exclusively 
through its individual decisions, without implementing a tacit collusive strategy together with 
the remaining market players post-merger
12
.  
 
Lastly, since the unilateral effects theory of harm results from the situation of non-
collusive oligopolies, the firms are best responding in every period to prices that are expected 
to be set by their rivals and each competitor tries to maximize its own short run profits post-
merger
13
. Conversely, when firms tacitly coordinate they adopt a parallel conduct in order not 
to maximize their short run profits, but to raise their prices above their short run best 
responses
14
. Hence, while in both theories of harm the analysis focuses on the feasibility of 
price increases post-merger, the actual level at which prices may rise differs in each 
circumstance.  
                                                          
11
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 24. See also, A. Christiansen, above note 4, p. 23, J. Baker, Market 
Concentration In The Antitrust Analysis Of Horizontal Mergers, 2010, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092248, 1-27, p. 17, K. Kuhn, Closing Pandora’s Box? 
Joint Dominance After The Airtours Judgment, 2002, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=349521, 1-20, p. 4 and M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, pp. 38-
39.  
12
 S. Volcker, above note 4, p. 396, K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test For EU Merger 
Control, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(5), 277-296, p. 282 and I. Kokkoris, Do Merger Simulation And Critical Loss 
Analysis Differ Under The SLC And Dominance Test?, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(5), 249-260, p. 251. 
13
 K. Kuhn, above note 11, p. 5. 
14
 K. Kuhn, above note 11, p. 5. 
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(3) The Mechanism Of Harm 
A fundamental difference between unilateral and coordinated effects revolves around 
the issue that while the mechanism of harm in unilateral effects cases is clear cut, i.e. if the 
facts in a merger examination support a unilateral effects theory of harm it is obvious as a 
matter of economic logic why such a concentration would lead to higher prices, the 
mechanism of harm by which a merger would increase the likelihood of coordination is 
complex
15
. 
 
The analysis of the unilateral effects theory of harm focuses on the pre-merger price 
which each merging firm charged for a product and the constraint imposed upon it by the 
presence of competition from its rivals’ products, including those of its future merged 
partner. Such a constraint is removed by the concentration which brings together the former 
rivals and gives to the merged entity an incentive to raise its prices unilaterally post-merger. 
By contrast, the economic mechanism by which a merger enables or makes it easier for the 
remaining market players to implicitly coordinate their actions is dubious and consequently it 
is particularly complex to predict the future effects of a concentration
16
. As a direct result of 
such complexity, in coordinated effects there are no clear market share thresholds nor 
econometric methods which can assist the Commission and the Courts to reach a conclusion. 
In such circumstances, the idea that coordination is more likely constitutes only an empirical 
observation about probabilities, but it cannot explain why any particular merger is harmful or 
definitely distinguish those concentrations that would make coordination more likely from 
                                                          
15
 J. Baker, Why Did The Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects?, George Mason Law Review, 2003-
2004, 12, 31-37, pp. 35-36. 
16
 Note also the discussion on the oligopoly problem at Ch. 3. 
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those that would not. Therefore, the mechanism of harm is straightforward in unilateral 
effects, while it is complex and difficult to be established in coordinated effects. Such 
divergence and the incumbent complexities of collusion theory adversely affect the 
Commission’s ability to demonstrate coordinated effects, whilst the straightforward nature of 
the unilateral effects theory of harm renders it more suitable for application and enforcement.  
 
(C) THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
The conditions which are necessary to be established in the assessment of coordinated 
as opposed to unilateral effects are largely distinctive and such divergence derives directly 
from the diverse economic principles that underline each theory of harm. Thus, while in the 
assessment of coordinated effects the emphasis is on the establishment of the Airtours factors, 
the Commission focuses on the fulfilment of a set of differentiated conditions in the analysis 
of unilateral effects. 
 
(1) Coordinated Effects 
In the analysis of coordinated effects the Commission carries out its assessment by 
evaluating the cumulative fulfilment of the Airtours factors, i.e. the establishment of a 
common policy, monitoring, retaliation and absence of external countervailing reactions, in 
order to reach a finding on whether the market participants would have the ability and the 
incentive to adopt a common collusive policy and to sustain such an outcome after the 
completion of the concentration
17
. 
 
(2) Unilateral Effects 
                                                          
17
 Note also the discussion on the Airtours criteria at Ch. 2.  
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The unilateral effects theory of harm illustrates the conditions which must be assessed 
in order to determine whether the merged entity would have the individual ability as well as 
the incentive to profitably increase its prices at an anticompetitive level post-merger and 
these conditions revolve around two parameters. On the one hand, the incentive of the 
merged entity to raise its prices after the completion of the concentration is related to the 
proportion of lost sales that each merging firm would be expected to recapture in increased 
sales of the other merging firm’s product. On the other hand, a unilateral price increase also 
depends on how much of a competitive constraint the remaining rivals would impose on the 
merged entity after the completion of the concentration
18
. Consequently, in the analysis of 
unilateral effects the Commission focuses on the degree of substitution between the merging 
firms’ products pre-merger, the degree of differentiation between the merged entity’s 
products and its competitors’ products post-merger and the ability of competitors to 
reposition their products or the possibility of new entry in the market post-merger
19
.  
 
(I) Substitutability Of The Merging Firms’ Products 
A key question in a unilateral effects merger appraisal concerns the closeness of 
competition between the merging firms, which is defined by assessing the degree of 
substitutability between their products before the completion of the concentration
20
. The 
                                                          
18
 M. Pflanz, Oracle/PeopleSoft: The Economics Of EC Review, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(3), 123-127, p. 125, S. 
Voigt and A. Schmidt, above note 10, p. 1587 and K. Kuhn, above note 11, p. 3. 
19
 S. Volcker, above note 4, p. 402 and F. Alese, Foreclosing The Gap: The Commission’s Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines – A ‘Response’ To Simon Bishop, E.C.L.R., 2008, 29(3), 196-200, p. 198.  
20
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 28. On the one hand, in SCA/Metsä Tissue (Case COMP/M.2097 [2001], 
OJ L57/1 [2002]), Volvo/Scania (Case IV/M.1672 [2000], OJ L143/74 [2001]), Siemens/Drägerwerk/JV (Case 
COMP/M.2861 [2003], OJ L291/1 [2003]), Barilla/BPS/Kamps (Case COMP/M.2817 [2002]), DuPont/ICI 
(Case IV/M.214 [1992], OJ L7/13 [1993]), GE/Instrumentarium (Case COMP/M.3083 [2003], OJ L109/1 
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extent of product substitutability between the merging firms pre-merger determines the 
likelihood of price increases by the merged entity post-merger
21
. In particular, when the 
merging firms produce highly substitute goods, it will be rational for them to raise their prices 
post-merger, because they will recapture some of the customers who would have switched 
away from one product in favour of the previously competing product pre-merger and this 
factor removes a constraint on pricing and may lead to higher prices
22
. Thus, the more closely 
the merging firms compete pre-merger, i.e. offer products which are close substitutes, the 
more likely it is that the concentration will appreciably reduce competition post-merger
23
. 
Therefore, the elimination of rivalry that results from the completion of a merger between 
firms which produce close substitutes may lead to increased market power and higher prices, 
particularly in cases where this rivalry has been in the past an important source of 
competition on the relevant market
24
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[2004]) and KNP/Bührmann-Tetterode/VRG (Case COMP/M.291 [1993], OJ L217/35 [1993]) the Commission 
intervened on the basis of unilateral effects, because the concentrations would eliminate the closest substitutes 
which were the basic alternatives from the point of view of the customers and formed the only competitive 
constraint on the merging firms pre-merger. On the other hand, in Adidas/Reebok (Case COMP/M.3942 [2006]), 
Korsnas/AD Cartonboard, Amer/Salomon (Case COMP/M.3765 [2005]), Volvo/Renault (Case IV/M.1980 
[2000]) and Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions (Case COMP/M.2256 [2001]) the Commission held that the 
merging firms’ products were not particularly close substitutes and therefore the concentrations would not lead 
to unilateral effects. See also, K. Kuhn, above note 11, p. 3, M. Pflanz, above note 18, p. 125 and O. Budzinski 
and A. Christiansen, The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models And Econometrics In 
Contemporary Merger Control, 2007, available at http://www.uni-
marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2007-02_budzinski-christiansen.pdf, 1-34, p. 3. 
21
 M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, p. 36. 
22
 J. Baker, above note 11, pp. 19-20. 
23
 S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, above note 3, p. 387 and M. Pflanz, above note 18, p. 125. 
24
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 25 and 28. 
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The consumers play an important role in the analysis of the degree of substitutability 
between the merging firms’ products 25 . Specifically, the closeness of substitution is 
determined by assessing the proportion of customers that would rank the merging firms’ 
products as their first and second choices and would be less likely to switch to the products of 
the remaining market players in response to a price increase imposed by the merged entity on 
one of its two brands
26
. Therefore, the higher the ratio of buyers which view the merging 
firms’ products as highly interchangeable the greater the price rise is likely to be, because in 
such circumstances the merged entity would have a greater incentive to impose a price 
increase post-merger and such an increase would be more profitable.  
 
(II) Product Differentiation Between The Merged Entity And Its Competitors 
A decisive factor in a unilateral effects analysis revolves around the degree of product 
differentiation between the products supplied by the merged entity as compared to those 
supplied by its rivals and such a factor also determines the extent to which the merged entity 
may increase its prices post-merger
27
. As a general rule, unilateral effects are more likely to 
                                                          
25
 C. Shapiro, Mergers With Differentiated Products, Antitrust, 1996, Spring, 23-29, p. 23. 
26
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 28. See also, S. Volcker, above note 4, p. 396. 
27
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 28. For example, in Oracle/PeopleSoft (Case COMP/M.3216 [2004], OJ 
L218/6 [2005]) the Commission held that an important element in the assessment of unilateral effects was the 
extent to which the merged entity would be constrained by the non-merging rivals post-merger. See also, O. 
Budzinski and A. Christiansen, Simulating The Unilateral Effects Of Mergers: Implications Of The 
Oracle/Peoplesoft Case, 2006, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924375, 1-34, p. 
3, M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, pp. 36-37 and R. Starek and S. Stockum, What Makes Mergers 
Anticompetitive?: ‘Unilateral Effects’ Analysis Under The 1992 Merger Guidelines, Antitrust L.J., 1994-1995, 
63, 801-821, p. 805.  
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occur in differentiated product markets, because in such markets an increase in the price 
charged for the relevant product is more feasible and profitable
28
. Specifically, in a 
homogeneous market the merged firms’ ability to increase their prices post-merger would be 
limited due to the high degree of substitution between the merged entity’s products and the 
products supplied by its non-merging rivals, while on the contrary the greater the degree of 
product differentiation between the merged undertaking and its competitors the greater the 
ability to unilaterally raise prices
29
. The amount of market power enjoyed by a merged entity 
due to its differentiated products again depends on the degree to which the customers 
consider its products to be preferable to the products of its competitors
30
.  
 
(III) Repositioning And New Entry 
An important factor in the assessment of unilateral effects concerns the ability of the 
non-merging rivals to replace lost competition post-merger, in which case the Commission’s 
analysis focuses on the likelihood of product repositioning by actual competitors or the 
feasibility of new entry by potential competitors
31
. Accordingly, the Commission examines 
whether the possibility of repositioning or new entry may influence the merged entity’s 
incentive to raise its prices and whether the merged entity is able to hinder such repositioning 
or new entry
32
. In particular, the possibility of product repositioning may render a price 
                                                          
28
 C. Shapiro, above note 25, p. 23, A. Christiansen, above note 4, p. 23, J. Baker, above note 11, p. 17 and G. 
Werden and L. Froeb, The Effects Of Mergers In Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand And Merger 
Policy, J.L.Econ.&Org., 1994, 10(2), 407-426, p. 407. 
29
 R. Starek and S. Stockum, above note 27, p. 803 and C. Shapiro, above note 25, p. 23. 
30
 R. Starek and S. Stockum, above note 27, p. 806, B. Dubow et al., above note 9, p. 115 and S. Volcker, above 
note 4, p. 396. 
31
 S. Volcker, above note 4, p. 397.  
32
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 30.   
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increase imposed by the merged entity unprofitable, while a decreased likelihood of 
repositioning increases the merged entity’s incentive to raise its prices. An analysis of the 
rivals’ cost of repositioning their products and an assessment of the buyers’ preferences must 
be carried out in the appraisal of such a condition
33
.   
 
The criterion of product repositioning or new entry reflects the condition focusing on 
the external countervailing reactions in the analysis of coordinated effects, as both criteria 
emphasise on the foreseeable reaction of outsiders post-merger. Accordingly, in the analysis 
of both theories of harm the Commission examines the factors of barriers to entry, maverick 
firms and countervailing buyer power
34
. Barriers to entry form an important aspect of the 
unilateral effects analysis, as in the absence of high entry barriers the ability of the merging 
firms to increase their prices would be significantly constrained by a new entrant that may 
come into the market and set lower prices for a closely substitutable product
35
. Also, in the 
assessment of unilateral effects the existence of a maverick firm constitutes a crucial 
consideration, since such a firm may attempt to reposition its products in case a price increase 
occurs. Lastly, the assessment of countervailing buyer power is relevant in the analysis of 
                                                          
33
 R. Starek and S. Stockum, above note 27, pp. 819-820. 
34
 Note also the discussion on barriers to entry, maverick firms and countervailing buyer power in the context of 
coordinated effects at Ch. 3. See also, M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, p. 4. 
35
 In EDP/ENI/GDP (Case COMP/M.3440 [2004], OJ L302/69 [2005]) it was held that the concentration would 
strengthen EDP’s dominant position in the electricity wholesale and retail markets, as it would remove GDP as a 
potential entrant to such markets. Conversely, in Korsnas/AD Cartonboard the Commission held that 
competition from outside the EEA would act as a constraint on the merged entity's behaviour. Also, in 
Adidas/Reebok the fact that barriers to entry in the industry were low led the Commission to clear the merger.  
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unilateral effects, since the presence of a strong buyer may render unprofitable the merged 
entity’s price increase by switching to other suppliers36.  
 
(D) MARKET DEFINITION AND ECONOMETRICS 
The coordinated and unilateral effects theories of harm are divergent on the exercise 
of market definition, as even though it forms an integral part of the examination of mergers 
for coordinated effects, in the assessment of unilateral effects cases the link between market 
delineation and competitive effects is much less direct. Also, econometric methods of 
analysis have been developed and are fully applicable in the examination of unilateral effects 
thereby facilitating the assessment of such a theory of harm, whereas these analytical tools 
are of limited, if any, assistance in the examination of coordinated effects.  
 
(1) Market Definition 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the practice of the Commission illustrate that 
market definition forms an integral part of any merger analysis
37
. Accordingly, the first step 
in the assessment of mergers for coordinated effects in homogeneous product industries is 
consisted by the definition of the relevant market, which assists the Commission to identify a 
set of firms that may raise anticompetitive concerns, but also to measure market shares or 
concentration levels so as to make inferences about the likely effects of the concentration on 
the relevant market under investigation
38
. Conversely, the exercise of market definition is less 
                                                          
36
 For example, in Korsnas/AD Cartonboard the Commission held that the buyers' bargaining strength would 
eliminate unilateral effects concerns. 
37
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 10. See also, A. Christiansen, above note 4, p. 7. 
38
 No Cited Author, Analysing Differentiated Product Mergers: The Relevance Of Structural Analysis, Harvard 
Law Review, 1997-1998, 111, 2420-2437, p. 2420, C. Shapiro, above note 25, p. 23 and J. Baker and C. 
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attractive in the assessment of concentrations for unilateral effects in differentiated product 
markets, since there is a widespread preference among economists and competition 
authorities to consider directly the extent of competition between the merging firms and the 
degree to which the rivals’ products are close substitutes to the merged entity’s products 
through the use of econometric techniques that can produce reliable as well as accurate 
predictions of the effects of the merger and do not depend on market delineation
39
. The 
validity of such practice is reinforced by the fact that market definition in differentiated 
markets is a difficult exercise, since products that are close substitutes for the merging firms’ 
products are included within the relevant market, while distant substitutes are excluded, and 
this approach may lead to ambiguous results, as heterogeneous markets are characterised by a 
large variety of goods with varying degrees of distinction
40
. Also, the exercise of market 
delineation in order to measure market shares and concentration indices is less important in 
the assessment of unilateral effects in differentiated markets, as these thresholds are a poor 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 2007, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=991588, 1-44, p. 37. 
39
 For example, the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines analysis of differentiated markets identifies 
econometric methods that are designed to predict unilateral price effects, i.e. the UPP, GUPPI and IPR, and it is 
explicitly stated that such analytical tools ‘need not rely on market definition’ (Section 6.1 2010 US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines). See also, S. Baxter and F. Dethmers, above note 3, p. 385, H. Wellford and G. Wells, The 
‘Litigation Mulligan’ In The 2010 Merger Guidelines: Better Economics But Not (Necessarily) More Clarity 
Before The Agencies And The Courts, C.P.I., 2010, October, 1-11, p. 4, S. Volcker, above note 4, p. 396, C. 
James, Rediscovering Coordinated Effects, Paper Presented At The American Bar Association Annual Meeting, 
2002, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.pdf, 1-12, p. 8 and O’Melveny and Myers 
LLP, U.S. Antitrust Agencies Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010, available at 
http://omm.com/us-antitrust-agencies-issue-revised-horizontal-merger-guidelines-08-20-2010/, 1-3, p. 1. 
40
 R. Mills and R. Weinstein, Unilateral Effects Of Mergers: The Simulation Approach, 1999, available at 
http://www.micronomics.com/articles/Merger_Paper.pdf, 1-18, pp. 4-5. 
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indicator of competitive harm in such industries, i.e. they overstate potential adverse effects if 
the merging firms’ products are relatively distant within the relevant market and understate 
such effects if their products are especially close within that market
41
.  
 
Despite these views, the Commission’s practice largely remains attached to the 
traditional approach of market definition in unilateral effects cases, whilst econometrics do 
not constitute a substitute, but a complement, to the market delineation exercise. However, 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines leave open the possibility to examine a merger without the 
exercise of market delineation, because they state that the Commission’s assessment 
‘normally’, i.e. not always, entails the definition of the relevant market42. This position in 
conjunction with the constant developments in econometric analysis afford to the 
Commission the ability to gradually depart from the necessity to define the relevant market 
and move towards the direct assessment of unilateral effects in differentiated markets. 
Conversely, the assessment of coordinated effects is not capable to be carried out in the 
absence of market definition, as there are no applicable econometric methods that can directly 
assess the likelihood of collusion in homogeneous markets. 
 
(2) Econometric Techniques 
Econometric techniques have been integrated and play an important role in the 
assessment of unilateral effects in differentiated product markets, i.e. the principal scenario 
where such anticompetitive effects may arise. Therefore, the ‘traditional’ econometric 
                                                          
41
 R. Mills and R. Weinstein, above note 40, p. 4, J. Baker, above note 11, p. 21, J. Baker and C. Shapiro, above 
note 38, pp. 33-34 and I. Kokkoris, The Reform Of The European Control Merger Regulation In the Aftermath 
Of The Airtours Case – The Eagerly Expected Debate: SLC v. Dominance Test, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(1), 37-47, p. 
43. 
42
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 10. 
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techniques facilitate the unilateral effects analysis as they may predict the extent to which 
buyers consider the products in question to be close substitutes so as to ascertain the extent to 
which one firm’s products constrain the pricing of rival products and determine whether a 
merger among rivals would lead to higher prices by removing those constraints
43
. Also, the 
‘new’ econometric techniques provide an important insight in the assessment of unilateral 
effects, since they offer a direct preliminary estimation of the merging firms’ pricing 
incentives. On the contrary, in the examination of coordinated effects in homogeneous 
product markets, i.e. the predominant scenario where this theory of harm may arise, there is 
no corresponding set of econometric tools which may quantify the increased likelihood of 
collusion resulting from a merger and accordingly the Commission’s difficulty to establish 
this theory of harm is also reflected by the limited assistance offered by these methods of 
analysis
44
. Specifically, coordinated effects cannot simply be inferred from current data and 
accordingly, with one exception, there has never been applied any detailed econometric 
analysis in the assessment of such a theory of harm
45
. 
 
(I) Traditional Econometric Techniques  
Merger Simulation 
Merger simulation models afford the ability, by using industry data and based on 
demand estimates, to simulate the effects of a merger on prices and/or output as well as on 
consumer welfare and examine whether the exercise of unilateral market power would be 
                                                          
43
 J. Baker, above note 15, p. 34 and I. Kokkoris, above note 12, p. 249. 
44
 C. Shapiro, above note 25, p. 24 and M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, p. 26. 
45
 In Sony/BMG the Commission undertook a price correlation analysis. See also, K. Kuhn, above note 11, p. 14. 
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feasible post-merger
46
. Merger simulation models do not rely on market definition, but 
instead they directly analyse the closeness of the merging firms’ products and the extent to 
which the availability of substitutes may constrain their ability to raise their prices 
unilaterally
47
. The simulated prices are subsequently compared to the prices that would 
prevail in the market ‘but for’ the merger, in order to determine the impact of the 
concentration under investigation on the relevant market. Simulation models have played an 
important role in the Commission’s decisions in unilateral effects and the assessment of such 
a theory of harm has been improved through the systematic use of these models, because their 
analysis is accurate, they identify asymmetric price effects and they provide a means for 
trading off possible merger efficiencies
48
. However, merger simulation should be looked at 
with caution, since it has limitations in that it needs large amounts of data, it only looks at 
static competition, it requires a significant number of assumptions and it is highly sensitive to 
the chosen assumptions
49
. 
 
In the analysis of coordinated effects in differentiated products markets, Davis has 
presented a merger simulation model and set out a methodology that focused on the returns 
achieved by each market participant in three scenaria, i.e. ‘collusion’, ‘Nash equilibrium’ and 
‘defection’, in order to determine whether the rivals would have the incentive to tacitly 
                                                          
46
 Oracle/PeopleSoft paras 191-196. See also, R. Mills and R. Weinstein, above note 40, p. 6 and I. Kokkoris, 
above note 12, p. 251. 
47
 R. Mills and R. Weinstein, above note 40, p. 6. 
48
 In Volvo/Scania, Philip Morris/Papastratos (Case COMP/M.3191 [2003]), Oracle/PeopleSoft and 
Lagardere/Natexis/VUP (Case COMP/M.2978 [2004], OJ L125/54 [2004]) merger simulation models were 
used in order to quantify the price effects of the concentration. See also, I. Kokkoris, above note 12, p. 254. 
49
 B. Dubow et al., above note 9, p. 117. 
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collude in prices post-merger
50
. Conversely, economists have not developed an adequate 
model for the evaluation of coordinated effects in homogeneous markets, whilst the 
prospective development of simulation models in such a context seems difficult to 
materialise, and this forms a gap in the Commission’s ability to assess such a theory of harm. 
 
Elasticities Of Demand 
In the assessment of unilateral effects the merged entity’s ability to exercise market 
power and raise its prices individually depends on the elasticities of demand that it faces, 
whilst the employment of econometric methods is particularly useful in such a context. 
Specifically, the use of econometric techniques focusing on the own-price elasticities of 
demand and the cross-price elasticities of demand facilitate the measurement of both the 
degree of substitutability between the merging firms’ products pre-merger as well as the 
degree of substitutability between the merged entity’s products and the products of its 
competitors post-merger. On the one hand, the own-price elasticity of demand reflects the 
responsiveness on the quantity of a product required by consumers as related to changes in its 
price, i.e. where the price of a product is increased such econometric method describes the 
extent to which the sales volume of that product falls
51
. Accordingly, the ability of the 
merged entity to raise its prices post-merger partly depends on the own-price elasticity of 
demand for its products. On the other hand, the cross-price elasticity of demand reflects the 
degree to which customers substitute across products and how strongly the demand for a 
product changes in response to alterations in the price of another product, assuming that all 
                                                          
50
 P. Davis, Coordinated Effects Merger Simulation With Linear Demands, 2006, available at 
http://www.biicl.org/files/2757_peter_davis_-
_coordinated_effects_merger_simulation_with_linear_demands.pdf, 1-22, pp. 1, 3 and 11. 
51
 R. Mills and R. Weinstein, above note 40, p. 8. 
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other conditions remain constant
52
. Therefore, high cross elasticities between the merging 
firms’ products generate higher prices, whereas high cross elasticities between the merged 
entity’s products and those of its rivals lead to lower prices53. The diversion ratio is a proxy 
used for measuring cross-price elasticities of demand, as it provides the proportion of sales 
lost by the price rise of one product that is captured by a competing product and it can be 
computed through the consumers’ first and second choices54.  
 
Elasticities of demand also form part of the analysis of coordinated effects
55
. 
However, the Commission does not systematically use econometric methods to measure 
demand elasticities in the examination of coordinated effects and in addition, even though 
demand is a relevant factor in the assessment of such a theory of harm, it plays a non-
determinative and therefore less important role to the overall analysis in relation to the 
assessment of unilateral effects.  
 
Critical Loss Analysis 
The critical loss analysis estimates how much the hypothetical monopolist's sales 
would have to fall in order to make a price increase unprofitable
56
. This econometric model is 
applicable in the assessment of unilateral effects. Specifically, in the analysis of such a theory 
of harm, if the evidence on the likely loss of sales associated with a price increase suggest 
that the actual loss is greater than the critical loss, unilateral price effects are not of any 
                                                          
52
 R. Mills and R. Weinstein, above note 40, p. 8. 
53
 M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, p. 38. 
54
 A. Christiansen, above note 4, p. 23 and M. Ivaldi et al., above note 6, p. 81. 
55
 Note also the discussion on the assessment of demand elasticities at Ch. 3. 
56
 I. Kokkoris, Critical Loss Analysis: Critically Ill, E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(9), 518-525, p. 519. 
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concern
57
. Conversely, if the reduction in sales is less than the critical loss, a price rise would 
increase the profits of the hypothetical monopolist and unilateral effects are a possible 
anticompetitive outcome of the merger.  
 
The critical loss analysis may also be used in the assessment of coordinated effects, 
because a firm's incentive to cheat is significantly influenced by the level of its individual 
critical loss
58
. In particular, the incentive to cheat is measured by the level of sales a cheating 
firm can afford to lose by the retaliatory action of the colluding group before deviation 
becomes unprofitable. Accordingly, if a firm expects that cheating would increase its sales at 
a higher level than its critical loss, it would deviate from the collusive policy
59
. Nevertheless, 
despite its usefulness, the critical loss analysis has not been systematically applied in practice 
by the Commission in the assessment of coordinated effects. 
 
(II) New Econometric Techniques  
UPP, GUPPI And IPR 
The new econometric techniques for the assessment of unilateral effects in 
differentiated product markets are comprised by the UPP (upwards pricing pressure), the 
GUPPI (gross upwards pricing pressure index) and the IPR (indicative price rise). These 
‘pricing pressure indexes’ have been embraced by the Commission and constitute 
sophisticated tools for merger screening that indicate whether an in-depth examination of a 
                                                          
57
 I. Kokkoris, above note 12, p. 255. 
58
 In VNU/WPP/JV (Case COMP/M.3512 [2004]), Alcoa/British Aluminium (Case COMP/M.2111 [2000]) and 
Pirelli/BICC (Case COMP/M.1882 [2000], OJ L070/35 [2003]) the Commission used critical loss analysis so as 
to assess the incentive to collude and it relied on the outcome of such econometric models in order to conclude 
that there would be no scope for collective dominance. 
59
 Note also the discussion on the critical discount factor which determines the possibility of deviation at Ch. 2. 
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concentration under examination would be required
60
. Such indexes evaluate directly the 
merging firms’ incentives to raise their prices post-merger, whilst some of them offer an 
estimation on the scale of price increases, by combining the measurement of the merging 
firms’ closeness of competition assessed through the diversion ratio between their products 
with a measure of profitability that is assessed through the gross price margin, i.e. the 
difference between prices and marginal costs.  
 
The UPP compares the loss of direct competition between the merging parties which 
creates UPP in relation to merger-related efficiencies which create DPP (downwards pricing 
pressure) and a merger is flagged for further scrutiny if the net effect of the two forces creates 
UPP
61
. Specifically, a merger creates net UPP on Product 1 if the diversion ratio from 
Product 1 to Product 2 multiplied by the gross profit margin of Product 2 is larger than the 
merger-induced marginal cost savings for Product 1
62
. The UPP test does not estimate the 
                                                          
60
 The Commission used the GUPPI in Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria (Case COMP/M.6497 [2012]), 
whilst in Unilever/Sara Lee (Case COMP/M.5658 [2010]) UPP indices were calculated. 
61
 J. Farrell and C. Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation Of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative To Market 
Definition, The B.E. Journal Of Theoretical Economics, 2010, available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf, 1-39, pp. 2 and 9, S. Moresi and S. Salop, Incentive 
Scoring In Merger Review, 2013, available at 
https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2014conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=990, 1-32, pp. 6-7 and S. Moresi, The 
Use Of Upward Price Pressure Indices In Merger Analysis, 2010, available at 
http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/the-use-of-UPPIs-in-merger-analysis.pdf, 1-12, pp. 2-3. 
62
 UPP1 = D12 (P2 – C2) – E1C1, where D12 is the pre-merger diversion ratio from Product 1 to Product 2, P2 - 
C2 represents the margin between the price and the marginal cost of product B and E1C1 is the merger-induced 
marginal cost efficiency for product A. See also, A. Swan and R. Murgatroyd, Developments In Unilateral 
Effects Analysis: Price Pressure Tests, available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fifth-
Annual-Conference/Murgatroyd-Swan-Developments-in-Unilateral-Effects-Analysis-Final.pdf, 1-13, p. 4, Lear 
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percentage magnitude of the price increase, as it is only informative on the likelihood of a 
post-merger price rise, and it should be performed for both merging firms’ products in order 
to evaluate the merged entity’s incentive to raise its prices63. The GUPPI is a modified 
version of the UPP, but measures only the upward pricing component, i.e. it does not take 
into account efficiencies. This sole focus on the upward pricing pressure means that any 
merger between firms selling substitute products would result in a GUPPI greater than zero 
and accordingly it has to be interpreted against a threshold of 5% or 10%, above which the 
concentration would raise competition concerns
64
. It follows that the GUPPI does not merely 
offer an indication of the merging firms’ incentives to raise their prices, but it also facilitates 
the estimation of the scale of potential price effects
65
. The GUPPI for Product 1 is given by 
the diversion ratio from Product 1 to Product 2, multiplied by the gross profit margin of 
Product 2 and divided by the ratio of Product 1’s price66. Again there will be two GUPPI 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Competition Note, Merger Screen And The Use Of Price Pressure Tests, 2013, available at 
http://www.learlab.com/pdf/lcn_merger_screen_price_pressure_test_1360694100.pdf, 1-10, p. 3 and D. 
Hildebrand, CCR, UPP, GUPPI And IPR – Merger Screening Tools, 2013, available at http://www.ee-
mc.com/uploads/media/CCR_Spring_20130306.pdf, 1-6, p. 3. 
63
 D. Hildebrand, above note 62, p. 3, Oxera Economics Council, Unilateral Effects Analysis And Market 
Definition: Substitutes In Merger Cases?, 2011, available at 
http://www.oxera.com/Oxera/media/Oxera/downloads/Agenda/Unilateral-versus-market-
definition_1.pdf?ext=.pdf , 1-4, p. 2 and A. Swan and R. Murgatroyd, above note 62, p. 5. 
64
 S. Moresi and S. Salop, above note 61, pp. 10 and 26 and C. Shapiro, Update From The Antitrust Division, 
2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf, 1-34, p. 24.  
65
 A. Oldale and J. Padilla, Economist’s Note EU Merger Assessment Of Upward Pricing Pressure: Making 
Sense Of UPP, GUPPI, And The Like, Journal Of European Competition Law And Practice, 2013, 4(4), 375-
381, p. 379. 
66
 GUPPI1 = D12 (P2 – C2) / P1 where D12 is the diversion ratio from firm A to firm B, P1 and P2 are firm A 
and firm B’s prices respectively, C2 represents firm B’s marginal costs, with all values evaluated at their pre-
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measures for a merger involving firms’ A and B respective Products 1 and 2 and they should 
be both assessed in order to evaluate potential anticompetitive concerns. The IPR measures 
directly the magnitude of price increase that will arise from the merger and accordingly it 
must be assessed against a certain price increase threshold, for example a 5% threshold
67
. 
Even though the IPR test essentially uses the same information as the UPP and the GUPPI, 
i.e. diversion ratios and margins, it is distinctive in that it combines the incentives of the 
merging parties to set the prices of both products, it requires detailed information or 
assumptions on the demand function, i.e. linear or isoelastic demand, and assumes that the 
merging firms are symmetric, i.e. they have identical margins, prices and diversion ratios
68
. 
 
Effects And Criticism 
The introduction and use of pricing pressure indexes in the assessment of unilateral 
effects in differentiated markets brings about two principal benefits. On the one hand, such 
econometric techniques facilitate the Commission to accurately identify critical mergers at 
the screening stage, since they serve as a simple and straightforward ‘diagnostic tool’ that 
addresses the prospect of likely anticompetitive effects by indicating whether the merging 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
merger levels. See also, A. Swan and R. Murgatroyd, above note 62, p. 5 and 3, S. Moresi and S. Salop, above 
note 61, p. 8. 
67
 Lear Competition Note, above note 62, pp. 4-5.  
68
 The IPR tests for symmetric firms with linear or isoelastic demand are given by IPRlinear = M * D / 2 * (1 - 
D) and IPRisoelastic = M * D / (1 – M - D) where m is the pre-merger symmetric margin of Firms 1 and Firm 2 
and d is the pre-merger diversion ratio from product A to product B which is assumed to be equal to the level of 
pre-merger diversion from product B to product A. See also, D. Hildebrand, above note 62, p. 5, Lear 
Competition Note, above note 62, pp. 4-5, A. Swan and R. Murgatroyd, above note 62, pp. 6-7, Oxera 
Economics Council, above note 63, p. 3. 
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firms would have an incentive to increase their prices post-merger
69
. In that regard, such 
indexes are advantageous because they do not require market definition and are not 
burdensome in the sense that they do not demand voluminous data in order to be applied, 
whilst such data would normally be readily available
70
. On the other hand, these indexes 
provide some initial prima facie quantitative evidence on the merging firms’ pricing 
incentives and to that extent, the availability of such evidence offers some assistance to the 
Commission’s effort to establish unilateral effects71. Nevertheless, caution is needed as the 
evidential value of these quantitative tools must not be overstated. In particular, these indexes 
do not reflect the results of a complete merger analysis, because they do not consider factors 
that may prevent the occurrence of price rises post-merger such as potential supply-side 
responses, i.e. entry or repositioning, or responses by customers, i.e. countervailing buyer 
power
72
. Thus, the Commission must not heavily rely on the evidential value of pricing 
pressure indices, since they do not constitute dispositive evidence and need to be 
complemented with further qualitative or quantitative analysis
73
.  
 
Also, despite their largely beneficial effects, there is an inherent lacuna in the pricing 
pressure indexes that is related to their sole focus on the scenario of unilateral effects in 
differentiated markets where the firms compete in prices and their inability to constitute a 
sufficient screen to assess the risks of tacit collusion or unilateral effects in homogeneous 
                                                          
69
 D. Hildebrand, above note 62, p. 1. 
70
 D. Hildebrand, above note 62, p. 3. 
71
 S. Moresi, above note 61, p. 7 and Lear Competition Note, above note 62, p. 3. 
72
 A. Oldale and J. Padilla, above note 65, p. 376, Lear Competition Note, above note 62, pp. 3 and 9 and A. 
Swan and R. Murgatroyd, above note 62, p. 3. 
73
 S. Moresi, above note 61, p. 2, Oxera Economics Council, above note 63, p. 2, Lear Competition Note, above 
note 62, p. 9 and A. Swan and R. Murgatroyd, above note 62, p. 12. 
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markets as well as anticompetitive effects where the rivals compete in other competitive 
variables such as innovation
74
. To that extent, the price pressure indexes and the advantages 
they contain essentially direct the analysis towards the specific scenario of unilateral effects 
in differentiated product markets, despite the fact that this is merely one of the situations 
encountered in the assessment of concentrations. Nevertheless, caution is needed as the 
Commission must objectively use the appropriate theories of harm to challenge mergers, 
which means that the model of unilateral effects in differentiated product markets where the 
firms compete in prices must be truly appropriate for the merger under examination in order 
to make use of the pricing pressure indexes, because a resort to a ‘forced fit’ could entail the 
danger of misguided judgments, as for example the Commission may clear mergers assessed 
for unilateral effects that would not meet the pricing pressure indexes (or meet those indexes 
and fail on other grounds such as entry or repositioning) but could raise collusion problems.   
  
In contrast to the improvements brought about in the assessment of unilateral effects 
in differentiated markets through the development of the price pressure indexes, there is lack 
of any equivalent advanced quantitative method to act as a screening tool and address the 
market participants’ collusive incentives in the predominant scenario for coordinated effects 
that concerns the situation of tacit collusion in homogeneous markets. On the one hand, even 
though some limited attempts have been made to develop quantitative techniques for 
determining the magnitude of coordinated effects and identify the firms’ collusive incentives, 
these are problematic to the extent that their focus is solely on differentiated markets. For 
                                                          
74
 G. Werden and L. Froeb, Choosing Among Tools For Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects, 2011, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1804243, 1-28, pp. 1 and 27, A. Oldale and J. Padilla, above 
note 65, p. 376 and W. Gayle, R. Marshall, L. Marx and J. Richard, Coordinated Effects In The 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, 2010, available at http://people.virginia.edu/~wg4b/MergerDraft7.pdf, 1-20, pp. 2 and 6-8. 
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example, Kovacic et al. propose that the quantification of the incremental profits to firms 
from post-merger collusive conduct gives an indirect measure of the probability of collusion, 
based on the assumption that increased profitability intensifies the firms’ collusive incentives, 
whilst calculations of the payoffs to deviate facilitate the assessment of the stability of 
collusion among various subsets of firms in order to identify which firms have the greatest 
incentive to coordinate on prices in differentiated markets
75
. Also, Moresi et al. have 
developed the CPPI, which indicates the firms’ incentives to collude through price leadership 
in differentiated markets, i.e. the US concept of ‘parallel accommodating conduct’76. Thus, 
none of these models can facilitate the assessment of the firms’ incentive to adopt and sustain 
a tacit collusive strategy in homogeneous markets. On the other hand, two types of screening 
measures could be applied in order to address coordinated effects concerns in homogeneous 
markets, i.e. the HHI and the TCAI (‘tacit collusion asymmetry index’). Nevertheless, both of 
these screening tools present individual problems, as the HHI fails to take into account 
asymmetries, whilst the TCAI forms an improved screening mechanism based on market 
shares that focuses on whether asymmetries enhance or offset merger effects but it has not 
gained any wide appraisal or application by the Commission
77
. Also, both of these screening 
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 W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, L. Marx and S. Schulenberg, Coordinated Effects In Merger Review: Quantifying 
The Payoffs From Collusion, available at 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~marx/bio/papers/FordhamChapter%2013.pdf, 271-285, pp. 271-273, 274-276, 
278, 281 and 284 and W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, L. Marx and S. Schulenberg, Quantitative Analysis Of 
Coordinated Effects, 2009, available at 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~marx/bio/papers/KovacicMarshallMarxSchulenbergALJ2009.pdf, 397-430, pp. 
399, 402, 405 and 426. 
76
 Note also the discussion on parallel accommodating conduct at Ch. 5. 
77
 Note also the discussion on the HHI at Ch. 3. See also, D. Parker, A Screening Device For Tacit Collusion 
Concerns, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(8), 424-433, pp. 426 and 433. 
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measures are inferior to the pricing pressure indexes as they require market definition and 
they are not capable to directly identify the firms’ collusive incentives. Overall, the lack of 
quantitative tools equivalent to the pricing pressure indexes retains the absence of any 
reliable screening mechanism, it restricts the Commission’s analytical tools to the 
employment of a strictly qualitative analysis in order to assess the firms’ collusive incentives 
and accordingly it maintains the difficulty to identify as well as establish tacit collusion in 
homogeneous markets.  
 
(E) CONCLUSION 
Coordinated and unilateral effects are complementary theories of harm as they are 
characterised by substantial differences both in terms of substance as well as in relation to the 
tools available for their demonstration. 
 
Coordinated and unilateral effects are founded on different economic principles. Thus, 
coordinated effects correspond to the concept of collective dominance, they are based on the 
market participants’ recognition of oligopolistic interdependence and the adoption as well as 
the sustainability of a tacit collusive policy that leads to a collectively ability to exercise 
market power and raise their prices above their short-run best responses. Conversely, 
unilateral effects contain more flexible requirements than those which are necessary for the 
establishment of single firm dominance, they are centred on the individual ability of the 
merged entity to exercise market power due to the removal of an important competitive 
constraint and relate to the raise of short run profits. Also, an important distinction concerns 
the mechanism of harm which is straightforward in unilateral effects, whilst it is complex in 
coordinated effects and this factor is strongly linked to the difficulty to establish the later 
theory of harm.  
284 
                                                                                 Chapter 7 
 
 
Coordinated and unilateral effects are also largely divergent on the necessary 
conditions that must be established under each theory of harm. Therefore, the assessment of 
coordinated effects emphasises on the establishment of the Airtours criteria. Conversely, the 
examination of unilateral effects focuses on the closeness of competition between the 
merging firms’ products pre-merger, the extent to which the merged entity’s products are 
differentiated to the non-merging rivals’ products post-merger and the feasibility of 
repositioning by actual competitors or new entry by potential competitors.  
 
Lastly, these theories of harm are distinctive on the issue of market definition and the 
applicability of econometric analysis. Specifically, the definition of the relevant market forms 
an integral part in the examination of mergers for coordinated effects, whereas in the 
assessment of unilateral effects in differentiated product markets the direct analysis of the 
closeness of substitution by the use of econometric techniques can replace market 
delineation. Also, econometric methods of analysis have been fully developed and are applied 
regularly in the examination of unilateral effects, which means that the establishment of such 
a theory of harm has been assisted by the employment of simulation models, own-price and 
cross-price elasticities of demand as well as critical loss analysis. Conversely, such analytical 
methods are of no or only limited assistance in the examination of coordinated effects in 
homogeneous markets. Moreover, the development and application of pricing pressure 
indexes, i.e. the UPP, GUPPI and IPR, facilitates the assessment of unilateral effects in 
differentiated markets, as they constitute an initial screening mechanism to identify 
problematic concentrations and provide some prima facie quantitative evidence of the 
merging firm’s incentives to raise their prices post-merger. Conversely, the lack of any 
corresponding set of tools that would act as a screening mechanism and identify collusive 
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incentives in the scenario of tacit collusion in homogeneous markets maintains the difficulty 
to establish coordinated effects.   
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                                                     CHAPTER 8 
                                                                - 
                               STANDARD OF PROOF 
          PROOF IN COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE MERGER CASES 
 
 
(A) INTRODUCTION 
The framework of proof in collective dominance merger cases revolves around the 
burden of proof, the standard of proof and judicial review. The burden of proof determines 
who has to discharge the evidentiary threshold in a given case
1
. The standard of proof relates 
to the actual evidentiary threshold that has to be met before a decision can be reached on 
whether a concentration is compatible or incompatible with the Common Market
2
. Lastly, 
judicial review refers to the review of the Commission’s decisions by the Courts for potential 
errors. 
 
                                                          
1
 D. Demougin and C. Fluet, Deterrence v. Judicial Error: A Comparative View Of Standards Of Proof, 2004, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=585770, 1-14, p. 9 and D. Bailey, Standard Of 
Proof In EC Merger Proceedings: A Common Law Perspective, C.M.L.R., 2003, 40, 845–888, p. 849. 
2
 Y. Botteman, Mergers, Standard Of Proof And Expert Economic Evidence, J.C.L.&E., 2006, 2(1), 71-100, p. 
74, B. Vesterdorf, Standard Of Proof In Merger Cases: Reflections In The Light Of Recent Case Law Of The 
Community Courts, E.C.J., 2005, 1(1), 3-33, p. 6, F. Polverino, Assessment Of Coordinated Effects In Merger 
Control - Between Presumption And Analysis, 2006, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901688, 1-41, pp. 24-25 and L. Prete and A. Nucara, 
Standard Of Proof And Scope Of Judicial Review In EC Merger Cases: Everything Clear After Tetra Laval?, 
E.C.L.R., 2005, 26(12), 692-704, p. 693. 
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These components of proof are not separate one to another, but on the contrary there 
is a close link and a certain degree of overlap between them. In particular, the standard of 
proof is interrelated to the burden of proof, since the standard of proof affects the ability of 
the Commission to discharge its burden of proof, while together those concepts determine 
whether the infringements alleged are held to be proved as a matter of law
3
. Also, the 
standard of proof is closely related to the degree of judicial review, because the intensity of 
judicial review fluctuates and depends on the underlying standard of proof
4
. 
  
This Chapter analyses the issue of proof in collective dominance merger cases. 
Section B presents the requirements that the Commission must prove in order to prohibit a 
concentration on the basis of collective dominance. Section C focuses on the allocation of the 
burden proof between the Commission and the merging firms throughout the various stages 
of the assessment of concentrations. Section D examines the standard of proof and in that 
context it analyses the ‘requisite legal standard’, it ascertains the level of likelihood at which 
the Commission must establish its case, it emphasises on the ‘convincing evidence’ 
requirement, while it also highlights the introduction of a symmetrical standard of proof in 
clearance and prohibition decisions. Section E centres on judicial review, since it scrutinises 
the ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard of review, it examines the margin of discretion 
conferred on the Commission in undertaking complex economic assessments as well as the 
extent to which such discretion has been reduced by the Courts’ decisions in Airtours and 
Impala and it also highlights the Commission’s duty to state adequate and detailed reasons. 
Lastly, Section F offers a conclusion on this subject. 
 
                                                          
3
 D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 849. 
4
 B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, pp. 31-32, D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 850 and Y. Botteman, above note 2, p. 77. 
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(B) THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF 
In the appraisal of collective dominance merger cases the Commission’s focus is on 
the establishment of the necessary conditions for coordination and the fulfilment of the 
Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test. Specifically, the Commission examines 
whether the concentration under investigation would significantly impede effective 
competition either by increasing the likelihood of tacit collusion after its completion or by 
reinforcing an existing situation of tacit collusion post-merger.  
 
(1) The Substantive Standard 
The Commission must satisfy the substantive test for the appraisal of concentrations 
in order to prohibit a merger. In that regard, the substantive test contained in the Merger 
Regulation 139/2004 altered the requirements for demonstrating the incompatibility of a 
concentration with the Common Market. Specifically, the ‘significant impediment to 
effective competition’ has become the only necessary requirement for proving 
incompatibility, whilst the establishment of ‘dominance’ is no longer a prerequisite to 
blocking a merger, even though it is still the prime example of a significant impediment to 
effective competition
5
. Therefore, the Commission may prove the incompatibility of a 
                                                          
5
 Note also the discussion on the form of the substantive test under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 at Ch. 5. 
See also, K. Fountoukakos and S. Ryan, A New Substantive Test For EU Merger Control, E.C.L.R., 2005, 
26(5), 277-296, p. 288, S. Hornsby, Can Enhanced Merger Control Solve The Oligopoly Problem?, C.L.I., 
2004, February, 17-20, p. 17, A. Weitbrecht, EU Merger Control In 2005 - An Overview, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(2), 
43-50, p. 44, S. Zhu, Converge? Diverge? A Comparison Οf Horizontal Merger Laws Ιn Τhe United States And 
European Union, World Competition, 2006, 29(4), 635-651, p. 637, F. Enrique and G. Diaz, The Reform Οf 
European Merger Control: Quid Novi Sub Sole?, World Competition, 2004, 27(2), 177-199, p. 188 and R. 
Thompson, Goodbye To ‘The Dominance Test’? Substantive Appraisal Under The New UK And EC Merger 
Regimes, Comp. Law., 2003, 332-346, p. 339. 
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concentration either ‘directly’, i.e. by establishing the sole element of a significant 
impediment to effective competition, or ‘indirectly’, i.e. by establishing the creation or the 
strengthening of a dominant position that would significantly impede effective competition
6
. 
 
(2) Tacit Collusion 
In Airtours the GC prescribed the Commission’s evidentiary burden and made clear 
the elements which it needs to fulfil in order to demonstrate collective dominance in 
mergers
7
. In particular, the Airtours judgment asserted that the Commission must consider 
whether the materialization of the concentration would increase the likelihood of 
coordination post-merger and in order to reach a positive finding on collective dominance it 
must establish that the remaining firms would have the incentive as well as the ability to 
adopt a common policy of tacit collusion and to sustain such an understanding over time
8
.  
 
According to the Airtours decision, tacit coordination would arise in oligopolistic 
markets when four cumulative and necessary conditions have been fulfilled. In particular, the 
Commission must firstly prove that the merger would lead the firms to adopt a tacit common 
understanding on a mutual acceptable profit maximising strategy of elevated prices and/or 
reduced output post-merger, i.e. that the undertakings involved in the concentration and one 
or more other undertakings would be able to adopt together the same course of conduct in the 
                                                          
6
 Note also the discussion on the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ proof of incompatibility at Ch. 5.   
7
 A. Overd, After Τhe Airtours Appeal, E.C.L.R., 2002, 23(8), 375-377, p. 375 and B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, 
Is The Standard Of Proof Imposed By The Community Courts Undermining The Efficiency Of EC Merger 
Control? The Sony/BMG Joint Venture Case In Perspective, EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, 
2007, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/8013/1/rompuy-b-02g.pdf, 1-33, p. 8. 
8
 Airtours paras 61-62. See also, S. Volcker, Mind The Gap: Unilateral Effects Analysis Arrives In EC Merger 
Control, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(7), 395-409, p. 408 and F. Polverino, above note 2, pp. 22-23. 
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relevant market
9
. Secondly, the Commission must prove that the coordinating firms would be 
able to monitor each other and in that regard there must be sufficient transparency for each 
undertaking concerned to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which 
the market conduct of the other firms is evolving
10
. Thus, the Commission is not required to 
prove that the market would be transparent in all respects, i.e. perfect transparency is not 
necessary, but it must establish that the market would be sufficiently transparent on the key 
parameters of competition such as prices and quantities
11
. The GC in Impala qualified this 
requirement in the assessment of the strengthening of collective dominance by stating that, 
even in the absence of direct evidence of market transparency, such a factor could be inferred 
indirectly provided that the three cumulative conditions of the indirect test have been 
fulfilled
12
. Thirdly, a retaliation mechanism must be present in order to sustain the common 
policy over time and guarantee its enforcement
13
. The GC in Airtours and Impala specified 
the requirements of proof for the establishment of punishment mechanisms. Specifically, the 
GC in Airtours held that, in the assessment of the creation of collective dominance, the 
Commission does not need to prove the presence of a specific retaliation mechanism post-
merger nor to describe in detail how the punishment mechanism would operate, but it must at 
least provide sufficient evidence that adequate deterrents would exist, which would be such 
                                                          
9
 Note also the discussion on common policy at Ch. 2. See also, F. Polverino, above note 2, p. 7. 
10
 Airtours paras 62 and 156, Impala para. 247 and Sony para. 123. 
11
 Note also the discussion on transparency at Ch. 2. See also, A. Scott, ‘An Immovable Feast’?: Tacit Collusion 
And Collective Dominance In Merger Control After Airtours, CCR Working Paper CCR 02-6, 2006, available 
at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104458!ccr02-6.pdf, 1-21, p. 17 and V. Rabassa and P. Christensen, The 
Airtours Decision: Is There A New Commission Approach To Collective Dominance?, E.C.L.R., 2001, 22(6), 
227-237, p. 231. 
12
 Impala paras 252-253.  
13
 Airtours para. 62, Impala para. 247 and Sony para. 123. Note also the discussion on retaliation at Ch. 2. 
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that it would not worth the while for any member of the dominant oligopoly to depart from 
the common course of conduct
14
. Moreover, the GC in Impala held that, in the analysis of the 
strengthening of collective dominance, the mere existence of punishment mechanisms in the 
form of a demonstrated possibility of deterrents is sufficient to establish the condition of 
retaliation, rather than evidence of their exercise by proving the actual punishment of deviators in 
the past, since if the members of the oligopoly conformed with the common policy, there was no 
need to resort to the exercise of a sanction
15
. Consequently, it is sufficient to establish the 
existence of a potential mechanism for deterrence and the Commission is not required to 
show instances of actual punishment of deviators in the past, because the most effective 
deterrent is that which has not been used
16
. Furthermore, the GC in Impala held that the 
Commission has to satisfy two cumulative elements in order to establish that the lack of 
punishment in the past leads to the conclusion that the condition relating to retaliation 
has not been satisfied, i.e. there must be proof of deviation from the common policy and 
                                                          
14
 Airtours paras 62 and 195. See also, A. Scott, above note 10, p. 18, J. Langer, The Airtours Judgment: A 
Welcome Lecture On Oligopolies, Economics And Joint Dominance, C.J.E.L., 2003, 10, 105-117, p. 111, A. 
Nucara, Schneider/Legrand And Tetra Laval/Sidel, Fast Track Towards Merger Reform?, E.B.L.R., 2003, 
14(2), 193-200, p. 195, A. Overd, above note 7, p. 376 and A. Nikpay and F. Houwen, Case Comment - Tour 
De Force Or A Little Local Turbulence? A Heretical View On The Airtours Judgment, E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(5), 
193-202, pp. 198-199. 
15
 Impala para. 466. See also, B. Rompuy, Case Comment - Implications For The Standard Of Proof In EC 
Merger Proceedings: Bertelsmann And Sony Corporation Of America v. Impala, E.C.L.R., 2008, 29(10), 608-
612, p. 610, S. Volcker and C. O'Daly, Case Comment - The Court Of First Instance's Impala Judgment: A 
Judicial Counter-Reformation In EU Merger Control?, E.C.L.R., 2006, 27(11), 589-596, p. 591 and K. Wright, 
Case Comment - Perfect Symmetry? Impala v. Commission And Standard Of Proof In Mergers, E.L.Rev., 2007, 
32(3), 408-418, p. 413. 
16
 Impala para. 466. See also, S. Pilsbury, The Impala Decision: An Economic Critique, E.C.J., 2007, 3(1), 31-
47, pp. 35 and 40. 
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then actual proof of the absence of retaliatory measures
17
. According to the fourth Airtours 
condition, the Commission must establish that the foreseeable reaction of current and future 
competitors, customers and consumers would not jeopardise the results expected from the 
common policy
18
. Therefore, the Commission must prove that the collusive group would be 
sufficiently insulated from external destabilising forces, i.e. there would be absence of 
countervailing competitive or buyer power, in order to establish this requirement. 
 
The post-Airtours developments on the issue of proof were marked by the Impala 
judgment where the GC launched the indirect test which introduced a degree of flexibility in 
proving the strengthening of pre-existing collective dominance, as it held that in the 
assessment of an existing collective dominant position the Airtours criteria may be 
established indirectly
19
. Consequently, the Court relaxed the requirement of proof by 
reverting from the Airtours judgment which set out the cumulative conditions for 
coordination in a strict manner, since it asserted that in the appraisal of pre-existing collective 
dominance it is not necessary for the Commission to establish directly the presence of these 
conditions as it may fulfil each one or all of those criteria indirectly
20
. Thus, the indirect test 
afforded an alternative and more flexible way to establish the Airtours criteria. Conversely, in 
Sony the ECJ imposed an additional requirement for the establishment of collective 
dominance in mergers, as it held that the Commission must firstly set up a hypothetical 
                                                          
17
 Impala para. 469. See also, B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 27 and I. Kokkoris, Assessment Of 
Mergers Inducing Coordinated Effects In The Presence Of Explicit Collusion, World Competition, 2008, 31(4), 
499-522, p. 506. 
18
 Airtours para. 62, Impala para. 247 and Sony para. 123. Note also the discussion on the absence of external 
countervailing reactions at Ch. 2. 
19
 Impala paras 251-252. Note also the discussion on the Impala indirect test at Ch. 2. 
20
 B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, pp. 25-26. 
293 
                                                                                  Chapter 8 
coordination mechanism suitable to the circumstances of the case and then assess the Airtours 
factors or apply the Impala indirect test on that basis
21
. Thus, the hypothetical functioning of 
the market must be demonstrated on a plausible basis, which raises the requirements of proof 
imposed on the Commission.  
 
Lastly, it is notable that proving the creation of a collective dominant position is a 
more onerous task than proving the strengthening of such a position
22
. Specifically, in the 
analysis of the creation of collective dominance the Commission must prove that the 
alteration which the concentration brings about in the relevant market structure and the firms’ 
collusive incentives is substantial, i.e. the nature of competition changes to such an extent so 
that the firms participating in a competitive market pre-merger would coordinate post-merger. 
Conversely, a lower degree of modification of the market characteristics and the competitors’ 
behaviour suffices for the establishment of the strengthening of collective dominance, i.e. the 
concentration eliminates any remaining competitive constraints and leads the firms operating 
in a market characterised by a degree of coordination between them pre-merger to adopt a 
fully-fledged coordinated strategy post-merger.  
 
(C) BURDEN OF PROOF 
                                                          
21
 Sony paras 125, 126 and 129. Note also the discussion on the Sony requirement of a hypothetical mechanism 
of coordination at Ch. 2. 
22
 Note also the discussion on the creation or the strengthening of collective dominance at Ch. 2. See also, J. 
Lang, Oligopolies And Joint Dominance In Community Antitrust Law, In: Annual Proceedings Of The 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute - International Antitrust Law And Policy 2001, Edited By B. Hawk, 2002, 
269-359, p. 338 and G. Robert and C. Hudson, Past Coordination And The Commission Notice On The 
Appraisal Of Horizontal Mergers Under The Council Regulation On The Control Of Concentrations Between 
Undertakings, E.C.L.R., 2004, 25(3), 163-168, p. 164. 
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The burden of proof revolves around the question of whether the Commission or the 
merging firms bear the onus of proof in each phase of the merger analysis. In particular, the 
anticompetitive assessment of a concentration scrutinized for collective dominance consists 
of three steps: the delineation of the relevant market, the determination of whether the 
proposed concentration would significantly impede effective competition by tacitly 
coordinating with the other market participants post-merger and the evaluation of any 
relevant defences in the situation where anticompetitive effects have been found likely to 
arise. The general principle underlying the burden of proof is that it should be allocated to the 
party which has greater access to information and available resources as regards the particular 
issue under investigation. Accordingly, the burden of proof is incumbent on the Commission 
to prove its case, except for the merger defences where the merging firms bear the onus to 
establish their arguments. 
 
Specifically, as regards the issue of market delineation, the Notice On Market 
Definition implies that the Commission bears the burden to prove the relevant product and 
geographic markets
23
. Therefore, the onus is incumbent on the Commission to gather all the 
necessary evidence in order to define the relevant market, whilst the merging firms contribute 
to this assessment by giving to the Commission any available information at their disposal 
but they do not bear any proportion of the burden of proof. Also, at the stage of the 
substantive assessment, the Commission bears the onus to prove that a concentration would 
significantly impede effective competition in the relevant market and this can be discerned 
                                                          
23
 Notice On Market Definition (Commission Notice On The Definition Of The Relevant Market For The 
Purposes Of Community Competition Law, [1997], OJ C372/5 [1998], 4 CMLR 177 [1998], available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997Y1209(01):EN:HTML) paras 25-31. 
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from the wording of Article 2(1) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004
24
. This position is in 
accordance with the decisions in France v. Commission, Price Waterhouse/Coopers & 
Lybrand and Airtours where the Commission and the Courts agreed that the burden of proof 
falls on the Commission to prove a collective dominant position in mergers
25
. Conversely, in 
the assessment of potential defences to an anticompetitive concentration, the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines determine that the merging firms bear the burden to substantiate the 
claimed efficiencies or the failing firm defence
26
. Thus, where the Commission proves that 
the merger would give rise to coordination after its completion, the burden of proof reverses 
and the onus lies on the merging firms to prove any available defence. In this case the 
undertakings must demonstrate that the claimed efficiencies are of such a magnitude as to 
                                                          
24
 Article 2(1) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 implies that the onus of proof falls on the Commission as it 
states that ‘in making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account…’. See also, L. Prete and A. 
Nucara, above note 2, p. 694 and B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 17. 
25
 France v. Commission para. 228, Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand para. 104 and Airtours paras 77 and 
294. See also, C. Ahlborn and J. Ysewyn, EC Merger Control Regulation – Problems And Solution – The EC: Is 
The Turkey Really Voting For Christmas?, Comp. Law, 2002, 301-309, p. 304, D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 849, 
B. Etter, The Assessment Of Mergers In The EC Under The Concept Of Collective Dominance – An Analysis 
Of The Recent Decisions And Judgments By An Economic Approach, World Competition, 2000, 23(3), 103-
139, p. 130 and J. Schmidt, EC Merger Control – Airtours: Is There A Right To Merge?, C.L.I., December 
2002/January 2003, 3-4, p. 4. 
26
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 87 and 91. See also, D. Wood, The Standard And Burden Of Proof In 
Article 82 Cases, C.L.I., 2008, March, 4-6, p. 5, M. Alfter, S. Bishop and E. Mahr, New Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, Plugging The Gap Or Opening The Floodgates?, Business Law International, 2004, 5(3), 385-399, 
p. 398 and D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 878. 
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outweigh the negative effects of the merger on competition or that the firm involved in the 
acquisition is failing
27
.  
 
(D) STANDARD OF PROOF 
 (1) Introduction 
The standard of proof that may be applicable in merger cases can be differentiated 
according to the threshold that must be met in order to establish anticompetitive effects. On 
the one hand, the standard of proof may be set at a relatively low threshold and it is being 
defined under the balance of probabilities, in which case a claimant’s assertion is deemed to 
be established if it appears ‘more likely than not’ according to the evidence presented to the 
Court
28
. A crucial feature of the probabilities standard is that it is flexible in its nature, as its 
intensity can vary according to the interests at stake and it can move across the spectrum of 
probabilities, i.e. from a ‘pure’ balance of probabilities to the highest degree of probability 
that can be required under this standard
29
. On the other hand, the standard of proof may be set 
at a very high threshold, in terms of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard, which 
approximates the degree of certainty
30
. This standard of proof is not suitable for the appraisal 
                                                          
27
 The merging firms claiming that efficiencies will materialize as a result of the concentration must prove the 
fulfilment of the conditions set out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines paras 79-86. The merging firms may 
also rely on the failing firm defence and in such a case the concentration will be cleared if it satisfies the 
conditions contained in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines para. 90. Note also the discussion on the requirements 
that need to be met for the establishment of the efficiencies and the failing firm defences at Ch. 4. See also, P. 
Lowe, The Future Of EU Merger Control, Comp. Law, 2002, 310-317, p. 314. 
28
 D. Demougin and C. Fluet, above note 1, p. 1, Y. Botteman, above note 2, p. 74 and D. Bailey, above note 1, 
p. 852. 
29
 D. Bailey, above note 1, pp. 852-853 and B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 6. 
30
 D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 852 and B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 6. 
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of concentrations, because if the Commission would be required to establish its case at such a 
high threshold, it would be almost impossible to prohibit a merger
31
. Specifically, this 
threshold would demand the Commission to base its conclusions on very solid evidence and 
such a requirement would be in contradiction with the prospective nature of analysis 
undertaken in concentrations, whilst it would imply that mergers which were likely to harm 
the consumers would be permitted.  
 
(2) The Standard Of Proof In Collective Dominance Cases 
The assessment of collective dominance merger cases is characterised by an 
ambiguity on the precise degree of likelihood at which the Commission must establish that a 
concentration would lead to tacit coordination between the market participants post-merger. 
In particular, the Merger Regulation 139/2004 does not make any express reference on the 
standard of proof applied in merger proceedings
32
. Also, the past collective dominance 
precedent reveals that the Courts have always referred to the ‘requisite legal standard’, 
without however explaining in detail how high this standard was
33
. Consequently, the 
Commission is confronted with the fact that the evidentiary threshold that it must meet before 
reaching a decision on the compatibility or incompatibility of a concentration with the 
Common Market has not been precisely specified. Nevertheless, it is possible to indirectly 
ascertain the level of such a threshold by focusing on some judicial inferences as regards the 
standard of proof applied in collective dominance merger cases and by emphasising on some 
factors inherent in such an assessment. 
 
                                                          
31
 B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 17. 
32
 B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 18. 
33
 L. Prete and A. Nucara, above note 2, p. 694. 
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(I) The Courts’ Decisions 
The Courts have repeatedly declared that in collective dominance cases the 
Commission has to establish to the ‘requisite legal standard’ the assertions it seeks to make in 
assessing whether a merger would be compatible or incompatible with the Common 
Market
34
. Therefore, in France v. Commission the ECJ stated that the Commission must 
establish to the ‘necessary legal standard’ the anticompetitive behaviour of the market 
participants, while in Airtours the GC held that the Commission failed to prove to the 
‘requisite legal standard’ that the concentration would give rise to a collective dominant 
position
35
. Also, in Impala the GC annulled the Sony/BMG decision, because the Commission 
did not meet the ‘requisite legal standard’ in authorizing the merger36 . Nonetheless, the 
‘requisite legal standard’ expression does not reveal a clear standard of proof and it seems 
that the Courts have deliberately avoided to precisely define such a threshold, in order to 
retain a flexibility in its application given the case-by-case assessment of collective 
dominance in mergers
37
. Also, it must be noted that, despite the Courts’ consistent use of the 
‘requisite legal standard’ terminology, the actual application of such a standard presents 
variations. This is evident by the fact that the standard of proof for prohibition decisions was 
raised in Airtours where the GC set out in a strict manner the cumulative and necessary 
conditions that must be established in order to reach a coordinated outcome and was relaxed 
                                                          
34
 B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 19 and B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 18. 
35
 France v. Commission para. 228 and Airtours para. 294. See also, C. Ahlborn and J. Ysewyn, above note 25, 
p. 304 and B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 2. 
36
 Impala paras 294, 449, 459, 475 and 535. See also, C. Harris, European Merger Review - Tightening Control 
While Expanding Third Party Power, North Carolina Journal Of International Law And Commercial Regulation, 
2007-2008, 33, 337-357, p. 342. 
37
 D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 848, B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 19 and C. Ahlborn and J. Ysewyn, above note 
25, p. 307. 
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in Impala where the GC introduced the indirect test, while simultaneously in the latter 
judgment the threshold of proof for clearance decisions was raised by the establishment of a 
symmetrical standard for both authorisation and prohibition decisions
38
.  
 
Even though the Courts’ judgments have not expressly agreed and settled to a definite 
standard of proof, they do offer some indications on the actual level of the threshold of proof 
that is applied in collective dominance merger cases. Thus, in France v. Commission the ECJ 
held that the merger’s effects on competition must be assessed on the basis of a sufficient 
degree of probability
39
. Also, according to the AG’s Opinion in Sony, the Commission should 
base its decision on the market development which, on the balance of probabilities, it 
considers most likely at the end of its investigation of a concentration
40
. Moreover, the ECJ in 
Sony adopted the formulation of the ‘most likely outcome’ arising from a concentration and 
its effects on the market
41
. Accordingly, since the Courts’ focus is on a degree of 
‘probabilities’ or ‘likelihood’, it must be submitted that the standard of proof faced by the 
Commission in collective dominance cases is to establish on the balance of probabilities the 
compatibility or incompatibility of a concentration with the Common Market.  
 
 (II) Factors Affecting The Standard of Proof 
Various factors have affected the formulation of the standard of proof in collective 
dominance merger cases. These factors revolve around the prospective nature of the analysis, 
                                                          
38
 B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 18.  
39
 France v. Commission para. 246.  
40
 Sony Opinion (Opinion Of Advocate General Kokott, Sony v. Impala [2007], ECR I-4951 [2008]) para. 208.  
41
 Sony paras 51-52.  
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the time restrictions imposed on the Commission and the complexity of the economic 
assessments.  
 
Specifically, the Commission employs a prospective analysis in the appraisal of 
collective dominance merger cases and accordingly the decision to clear or to prohibit a 
concentration depends on an assessment of probability which is made ex-ante
42
. In a 
prospective analysis it is not possible to speak of certainties, as the likelihood of a future 
event must be based on plausible inferences that may be drawn from an existing situation, 
and the standard of proof should endorse the difficulties inherent in an ex-ante analysis
43
. 
Also, the relatively short time frame within which the decisions must be made under the 
Merger Regulation affects the Commission’s ability to satisfy the evidentiary standard of 
proof
44
. Therefore, the standard of proof applicable in collective dominance merger cases 
must take into account the limited period of time that is available to the Commission in order 
to collect the evidence and properly assess a concentration. Lastly, even though in Sony the 
ECJ held that the degree of complexity of an anticompetitive theory may not in itself 
influence the formulation of the standard of proof, it seems that the Court implied that such 
complexity is a factor which in combination with other elements may contribute to the 
adjustment of the standard of proof, i.e. the complexity inherent in the theory of coordination 
that is related to the oligopoly problem may affect the level of the threshold of proof
45
. Also, 
this is illustrated by the fact that the Commission enjoys a margin of discretion in undertaking 
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 France v. Commission para. 221, Gencor para. 163, Airtours para. 63, Impala para. 248, Sony Opinion para. 
205 and Sony para. 120. Note also the discussion on the prospective analysis undertaken in mergers at Ch. 2. 
43
 Y. Botteman, above note 2, p. 77 and B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 27. 
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 D. Bailey, above note 1, pp. 880-881. 
45
 Sony para. 51. 
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complex economic assessments, which reflects the difficulty to reach a conclusion in such 
cases and affects the adjustment of the standard of proof.  
 
All these factors point towards the conclusion that the balance of probabilities is the 
threshold suitable in the adjudication of collective dominance merger cases, because it does 
not render impossible or minimize the Commission’s ability to satisfy the requisite standard 
of proof. Specifically, such a standard enables the Commission to face the difficulties which 
characterise a prospective analysis, it takes into account the short time limits available to the 
Commission in order to reach a decision, it recognises the complexities involved in the 
establishment of tacit collusion and leaves to the Commission a margin of discretion in 
performing complex economic assessments.  
 
(III) Pure Balance Of Probabilities Or Reasonable Likelihood? 
Given the flexibility that is inherent in the balance of probabilities standard, as 
illustrated by the varying degrees of such probabilities, an important question concerns the 
actual level of likelihood which the Commission should meet in its fact-finding and analysis 
of mergers assessed for collective dominance.  
 
In that regard, the AG’s Opinion in Sony focused on the ‘most likely’ outcome of the 
concentration and interpreted it in such a manner as to deduce that there is a ‘pure’ balance of 
probabilities standard of proof, i.e. the AG adhered to a pure ‘more likely than not’ 
formulation
46
. Nonetheless, it seems that the standard of proof in collective dominance 
merger cases is slightly higher than that but still certainly below the beyond reasonable doubt 
                                                          
46
 Sony Opinion paras 208, 209 and 218. 
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standard and the relevant judicial inferences support this opinion
47
. Specifically, the Airtours 
criteria point towards a heightened standard of proof, because the cumulative presence of the 
four necessary conditions has to be established and accordingly every piece of evidence 
regarding the characteristics of the market and the firms’ behaviour must point positively 
towards coordination
48
. This heightened standard of proof is evident by the Sony/BMG 
decision where the Commission inferred from the Airtours judgment that the evidentiary 
threshold was considerably high and despite the fact that it found a high degree of 
concentration in the music industry as well as high market transparency therein, with the 
exception of transparency as regards discounts, it concluded that the available evidence was 
not sufficiently strong to prove tacit coordination and consequently it approved the merger
49
. 
Also, even though the ECJ in Sony adopted the AG’s formulation of the ‘most likely’ 
outcome, it did not interpret it in such a manner as to infer the applicability of a pure balance 
of probabilities standard
50
. On the contrary, the ECJ held that the Commission must assess 
‘the plausibility of the various consequences such a concentration may have, in order to 
identify those which are most likely to arise’ and also it required the analysis of ‘plausible 
coordination strategies’51. Thus, the ECJ interpreted the ‘most likely’ formulation as being 
related to a plausibility threshold, which implies a standard of proof higher than a pure 
balance of probabilities.  
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 D. Wood, above note 26, p. 5 and B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 31. 
48
 F. Polverino, above note 2, p. 28. 
49
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Therefore, in view of the strictness derived from the cumulative nature of the Airtours 
criteria, the Commission’s application of the Airtours judgment in Sony/BMG and by taking 
into account the ECJ’s focus on ‘plausibility’ in Sony, it is concluded that the standard of 
proof employed in collective dominance merger cases takes the form of a reasonable 
likelihood threshold. Accordingly, the standard of proof is higher than a mere 51% of 
probabilities, as in a pure balance of probabilities threshold, but it would be impossible and 
meaningless to give any estimate of a precise percentage. 
 
(3) ‘Cogent And Consistent’ As Opposed To ‘Convincing’ Evidence 
The Commission is under an obligation to gather and produce all the relevant facts 
which support its conclusion on the compatibility or incompatibility of a merger with the 
Common Market. The facts which form the basis of the Commission’s decision must be 
accurate and solid and they must be capable to substantiate the conclusions drawn from them, 
as failure to do so will result in the annulment of its decision by the Courts, while the 
Commission must take into account all the relevant circumstances in assessing potential 
collusive behaviour after the completion of the concentration
52
. However, the Commission is 
bound to provide evidence only for those facts on which it has based its conclusions and 
estimations as regards the post-merger effects of the concentration under investigation on the 
relevant market
53
.  
 
                                                          
52
 For example, the GC in Impala found that the evidence relied upon by the Commission was not capable to 
substantiate its conclusion that the Sony/BMG joint venture would not create or strengthen a collective dominant 
position (paras 311 and 377). See also, Y. Botteman, above note 2, p. 78. 
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The collective dominance precedent reveals that the Courts have extensively focused 
on the evidence which the Commission is required to produce. Specifically, in France v. 
Commission and Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand the ECJ asserted and the 
Commission accepted that its decisions must be supported by a sufficiently ‘cogent and 
consistent’ body of evidence54. However, in Airtours the GC required the Commission to 
produce ‘convincing’ evidence in order to meet the evidentiary standard of proof55. Thus, an 
important issue is whether this change of direction signalled an adjustment of the evidentiary 
threshold imposed on the Commission or whether it constituted only a trivial semantic 
difference without any actual effect on the standard of proof. 
 
On the one hand, some commentators support the proposition that the difference 
between the expression ‘convincing’ evidence as opposed to ‘cogent and consistent’ evidence 
is not reflecting any significant departure in Airtours from the approach adopted in previous 
judgments, since the convincing evidence formulation is simply a reflection of the essential 
function of evidence, which is to establish convincingly the merits of a merger decision
56
. On 
the other hand, there is a widespread opinion that in Airtours the GC departed from the way 
the evidentiary standard of proof had been applied in previous decisions and that it raised that 
standard at a higher threshold, because the ‘convincing evidence’ formulation was more 
demanding than what the Commission had been accustomed to
57
. Accordingly, the 
Commission was required to rely upon very strong evidence in order to establish that Article 
                                                          
54
 France v. Commission para. 228 and Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand paras 104-105.  
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 Airtours para. 63. 
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 B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, p. 22. 
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2(3) of the Merger Regulation had been satisfied
58
. The latter opinion seems more justified 
and the departure from the previous case law was evident not so much from the language 
used, but from the actual approach adopted in Airtours, since the GC rejected virtually all of 
the Commission’s findings as unsubstantiated59. Moreover, the Sony/BMG decision could be 
seen as an attempt by the Commission to take into account such a higher evidentiary standard 
imposed by the Court
60
. Also, the Sony/BMG decision was reversed and annulled in Impala, 
where the GC seems to have implicitly accepted the ‘convincing evidence’ formulation, as it 
placed the same heightened evidentiary standard on the Commission’s clearance decisions by 
the introduction of the symmetrical standard of proof
61
.  
 
Thus, the Commission should not merely rely on assumptions, but it must produce 
strong and convincing evidence, which justify the conclusion that tacit collusion would take 
place between the market participants post-merger, by carrying out a close examination of the 
circumstances that are relevant in the assessment of the effects of the concentration on 
competition
62
.  
 
(4) The Symmetrical Standard Of Proof 
(I) Symmetry In Clearance And Prohibition Decisions 
                                                          
58
 D. Bailey, above note 1, pp. 846-847. 
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 D. Bailey, above note 1, pp. 860-861. 
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An important development in the area of proof in collective dominance merger cases 
is consisted by the establishment of a symmetrical standard of proof. In that regard, while 
prior reversals in collective dominance cases such as Airtours involved concentrations that 
had been prohibited by the Commission, in Impala the GC annulled the Commission’s 
decision on the ground that it did not satisfy the required standard of proof for clearing the 
concentration and accordingly the Court raised the standard of proof for declaring a merger 
compatible with the Common Market at the same level as that required for a prohibition 
decision
63
. This was made clear in Sony where the ECJ expressly referred to and applied a 
symmetrical standard of proof between compatibility and incompatibility decisions.  
 
In particular, the ECJ in Sony followed the AG’s Opinion by holding that there was no 
difference between the legal requirements that were necessary to be established in order to 
reach a clearance or a prohibition decision, because Articles 2(2) and (3) of the Merger 
Regulation were linguistically structured in a perfectly symmetrical manner and consequently 
there was nothing which presumed the application of a different standard of proof in each 
type of decision
64
. The ECJ derived from this equal obligation a symmetrical standard of 
proof, as it held that the Commission had to meet the same threshold in both instances, i.e. 
although the Commission had to satisfy the conditions of Article 2(3) of the Merger 
Regulation in order to prohibit a concentration the same was true in relation to the conditions 
of Article 2(2) in order to reach a clearance decision
65
. Accordingly, the Merger Regulation 
does not contain any presumption of legality or illegality in the appraisal of horizontal 
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 B. Rompuy and C. Pauwels, above note 7, pp. 3-4 and 22. 
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mergers, but on the contrary it is underpinned by a principle of neutrality towards the 
lawfulness of concentrations examined for collective dominance
66
.  
 
The current position, which consists of a symmetrical standard of proof, contradicts 
the former position adopted in cases such as Airtours, where there was a presumption that, if 
the Commission could not establish the prohibition of a merger, it would have to issue a 
clearance decision. However, if such a presumption would be accepted as a feature of the 
Merger Regulation, the standard of proof would be asymmetrical with a correspondingly 
higher standard for prohibitions and a lower standard for authorisations. Such a position 
would lead to the unjustified clearance of anticompetitive concentrations, because the 
Commission would have to clear a transaction in the absence of sufficient evidence of its 
incompatibility, even if it believed that the risks that the merger would significantly impede 
effective competition in the relevant market were similar to the probabilities that this would 
not happen
67
. Specifically, the Sony/BMG decision demonstrates the drawbacks of an 
asymmetrical standard of proof, since the Commission cleared the merger for the reason that 
the evidence was not sufficient in all respects to support a prohibition decision
68
. 
Nonetheless, after the Impala and Sony judgments, the Commission must not find in favour 
of the concentration in case of doubt and it cannot clear mergers that are not demonstrably 
objectionable, but rather it must take a fully reasoned decision based on sound evidence and it 
must meet the same standard of proof in both prohibition decisions as well as in decisions 
declaring a concentration compatible with the Common Market
69
. 
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(II) Exclusive Application Of Symmetry To Horizontal Mergers 
The standard of proof in mergers is not uniform, since much will depend on the type 
of concentration assessed
70
. Specifically, the symmetrical standard of proof applies only to 
horizontal mergers, which are underlined by a presumption of neutrality as regards their 
effects on the relevant market under investigation. Conversely, such symmetry is not 
applicable to vertical and conglomerate mergers, because in these types of concentrations 
there is a presumption in favour of a clearance decision that derives from the provisions of 
the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
71
. This was clearly illustrated in Tetra Laval v. 
Commission, where the GC held that a higher standard of proof would have to be established 
in prohibition as opposed to clearance decisions in conglomerate mergers and it recognized 
that the effects of such mergers were in principle considered to be neutral or even beneficial 
to competition
72
. In the appeal, the ECJ in Commission v. Tetra Laval drew attention to the 
difficulties of proving leveraging and pointed towards a higher standard indispensable in 
prohibition as opposed to clearance decisions in conglomerate mergers, thereby essentially 
holding that an asymmetrical standard of proof is applicable in such concentrations
73
.  
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(III) The ‘Grey Area’ Cases 
The ‘grey area’ cases refer to those situations in which there is neither sufficient 
evidence for the existence of anticompetitive effects, nor sufficient evidence for the absence 
of such effects
74
. Thus, there is a problem as to how to reach a decision in those 
circumstances, which centres on the question of who should be given the benefit of the doubt 
in a close case
75
. This issue is all the more important after the establishment of the 
symmetrical standard of proof in horizontal mergers, since the Commission cannot clear a 
concentration when confronted with ambiguous evidence and retains its doubts as to the 
precise impact of the merger on the market, but it must take a positive decision and prove its 
case. 
 
The AG’s Opinion in Tetra Laval stated that in grey area cases the Commission 
should authorise the notified transaction, thereby essentially holding that there exists a 
presumption of compatibility in the assessment of vertical and conglomerate mergers
76
. 
Accepting this line of argument, even though partly mitigating its application, the AG’s 
Opinion in Sony identified such a situation where a presumption in favour of a clearance 
decision in horizontal mergers could exist, but confined this exception only in a very limited 
                                                          
74
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class of borderline cases
77
. The AG asserted that in such cases the unclear state of available 
evidence meant that it was impossible to make any reliable estimation as to whether or not a 
dominant position would be created or strengthened and submitted that these ought to be 
cleared
78
.  
 
However, the GC decision in Impala and the ECJ ruling in Sony suggest that a grey 
area where the merging firms are given the benefit of the doubt does not exist, since in 
neither of these cases is there any express provision for an exception to the symmetrical 
standard of proof
79
. Hence, there should be no presumption in favour of the legality of 
horizontal mergers, as symmetry is absolute and grey area cases should still be decided 
positively in order to reach either a clearance or a prohibition decision according to the 
relevant standard of proof. The justification for such a position is centred on the fact that a 
presumption in favour of clearance decisions in grey area cases would create a precedent 
pointing towards the compatibility of horizontal mergers, which would affect the wider 
framework of assessment in horizontal concentrations examined for collective dominance and 
at least partly reverse the established symmetrical standard of proof. 
 
(IV) Standard Of Proof And Types Of Errors 
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 Errors are likely in the decision making as the imperfect economic and legal 
understanding limits the Commission’s ability to accurately weigh the anticompetitive costs 
and the pro-competitive benefits of mergers in each and every case
80
. Specifically, errors are 
highly likely in collective dominance cases, because the inconclusiveness of game theory 
leads to an inability to accurately determine the outcome of a concentration in each and every 
oligopolistic market structure. Moreover, since in the assessment of mergers for collective 
dominance the Commission must examine ex-ante the future behaviour of the firms, it is 
difficult to have enough information in order to distinguish pro-competitive from 
anticompetitive concentrations with complete accuracy and accordingly some mistakes are 
inevitable
81
. Therefore, the adjustment of the standard of proof must take into account the fact 
that there will always be doubts as to the precise impact of a merger on competition and it 
should make an effort to minimize the costs of judicial mistakes according to the ‘error cost 
approach’ which is used in the analysis of the welfare effects of the rule making, i.e. the cost 
of error depends on the consequence of error
82
. In that regard, since the cost of error in 
collective dominance merger cases is considered to be enormous, having in mind on the one 
hand the hugely detrimental effects of the existence and exercise of a collective dominant 
position post-merger to the consumers’ welfare and on the other hand the costs of the 
prohibition of a pro-competitive concentration in an oligopolistic market, it is essential to 
minimize any errors in the outcome of such cases. 
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Moreover, the determination of the standard of proof is closely connected with the 
‘false negatives’, i.e. Type I errors which refer to welfare increasing mergers that are wrongly 
prohibited, and the ‘false positives’, i.e. Type II errors where concentrations that are welfare 
reducing are wrongly allowed, weighing in the decision making
83
. In that regard, there are 
conflicting opinions as to which type of error is more harmful to the consumers. One view is 
that it is far more detrimental to the consumers’ welfare if the Commission and the Courts 
commit Type II errors, on the basis that in borderline cases the overall objective of the 
Merger Regulation may be better served by a prohibition or a conditional clearance decision 
rather than by an unconditional clearance, because permitting a merger to harm the market 
structure, i.e. a Type II error, is far worse than prohibiting a harmless concentration, i.e. a 
Type I error
84
. The opposite view asserts that the occurrence of a Type I error is more 
detrimental to the consumers’ welfare than the occurrence of a Type II error, since in the case 
of a prohibition decision the merger would evaporate forever, whereas in the case of an 
authorisation judgment, if competition problems later arise, they can be controlled ex-post by 
the application of Article 102
85
. In principle, any legal standard is likely to make both types 
of errors and consequently the Commission and the Courts have faced the dilemma of having 
to trade-off these types of errors against each other
86
. In that regard, the Commission and the 
Courts adhered to the latter approach, i.e. they focused on the minimisation of Type I errors 
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and on balance they regarded as less detrimental the occurrence of Type II errors, because 
they were based on the assumption that firms merge with the goal of improving their 
efficiency and also they relied on the premise that the cost of a false conviction on consumer 
welfare greatly outweighs that of a false acquittal
87
. 
 
The adoption of a symmetrical standard of proof in Impala and Sony modified the 
position on which type of error is more detrimental to the consumers in the examination of 
collective dominance merger cases. Specifically, since the Commission is bound to prove at 
the same standard of proof both clearance and prohibition decisions and this is absolute in the 
sense that it applies even in ‘grey area’ cases, the favouritism towards either Type I or Type 
II errors has currently diminished in importance, i.e. neither type of error prevails but on the 
contrary they carry equal weight. Accordingly, this development facilitates the removal of 
any presumption in favour of the compatibility of horizontal mergers.  
 
(E) JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1) Introduction  
Article 21(2) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004 confers on the Courts the power to 
review the legality of the Commission’s decisions, as it provides that the Commission’s 
exclusive jurisdiction in the field of concentrations is subject to judicial review by the Courts. 
Also, Article 263 TFEU states that the role of the Courts is limited to simply verify whether 
the Commission’s decisions are lawful or not.  
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The Courts review the Commission’s decisions for errors of law, i.e. whether the legal 
principles of the concept of collective dominance were applied correctly, errors of fact, i.e. 
whether the factual evidence used is convincing and adequately supports the application of 
the coordinated effects theory of harm, manifest errors in the Commission’s assessment, i.e. 
whether its assessment was sound, absence of reasoning and whether the proper procedure 
was followed
88
.  
 
The intensity of judicial review varies, since it depends on whether the Courts are 
reviewing the correctness of facts and the correct application of the law or whether they are 
reviewing the correctness of the Commission’s appreciation in complex economic matters. 
Specifically, in the first situation the Courts have full jurisdictional control and there is no 
room for the Commission’s discretion, whilst in the second situation the Courts have 
restrained control and they must respect the Commission’s margin of discretion by not 
exceeding the boundaries of their review, which is limited to the determination of whether 
there is a manifest error of assessment
89
.  
 
(2) Standard Of Judicial Review: The Manifest Error Of Assessment 
The standard of judicial review refers to the standard applied by the Courts when they 
are reviewing the legality of a Commission’s decision on appeal90. The standard applied in 
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those circumstances is the manifest error of assessment, which centres on the question of 
whether the Commission has based its conclusions on evidence that is factually accurate, 
reliable and consistent as well as whether the relevant evidence is capable to substantiate its 
analysis and conclusions
91
. Therefore, where the evidence does not support the Commission’s 
conclusions, the Courts must find that the Commission has committed a manifest error of 
assessment and consequently annul all or portion of its decision
92
. The manifest error of 
assessment standard is limited to ascertain whether the error is so erroneous or irrational as to 
amount to an infringement of the provisions of the TFEU and/or EU secondary legislation, 
while it presupposes that the failure to observe legal provisions is so serious that it appears to 
arise from an obvious error in the evaluation of the situation
93
.  
 
The manifest error of assessment standard has been widely used in the Courts’ 
exercise of judicial review in collective dominance merger decisions. Thus, in Airtours the 
GC overturned the Commission’s decision on the ground that it was vitiated by a series of 
errors of assessment in the evaluation of the concentration for the likelihood of collective 
dominance
94
. Also, in Impala the GC annulled the Commission’s decision on the basis of a 
manifest error in the assessment of market transparency, as it was held that the factual basis 
of the decision was incomplete and incapable to substantiate the Commission’s conclusions 
on the absence of transparency
95
.  
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(3) The Commission’s Discretion In Complex Economic Assessments 
The Commission performs complex economic assessments in order to evaluate the 
likely effects of a proposed concentration on the relevant market
96
. Within that context the 
Commission is required to adopt a prohibition or a clearance decision in accordance with its 
assessment of the economic outcome of the concentration, while its selection and use of 
economic theories must be supported by the relevant facts
97
. The Commission enjoys a 
margin of discretion in analysing complex economic situations in order to determine whether 
a concentration would give rise to a risk of collective dominance, while the judicial review 
exercised by the Courts must take into account the Commission’s discretion. Such discretion 
dictates that in performing economic assessments the Commission is not required to apply or 
rely on the criteria developed in prior cases
98
. The rationale of the Commission’s discretion 
lies on the inherent complexity in carrying out economic assessments as well as on the 
prospective nature of merger analysis
99
. Lastly, it should be emphasised that the 
Commission’s margin of discretion depends on the underlying standard of proof, because the 
higher the standard of proof the higher the degree of judicial review and consequently the 
lower the level of its discretion
100
.  
 
                                                          
96
 B. Vesterdorf, above note 2, p. 15. 
97
 Sony para. 52. 
98
 B. Etter, above note 25, p. 128. 
99
 D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 869. 
100
 For example, the AG in Sony Opinion para. 210 stated that ‘it would be difficult to reconcile a higher 
standard of probability (than the ‘more likely than not’ standard) with the margin of discretion allowed to the 
Commission in its assessment of complex economic situations’ thereby affirming the close connection of the 
standard of proof with the degree of judicial review and the extent of the Commission’s discretion.  
317 
                                                                                  Chapter 8 
The Courts have acknowledged that the Commission enjoys a margin of appreciation 
in the assessment of the economic effects of mergers examined for collective dominance
101
. 
Thus, in France v. Commission, Gencor and Airtours the Courts held that the Commission 
enjoys a certain degree of discretion in undertaking assessments of an economic nature
102
. 
Also, in Sony the ECJ recognized the Commission’s margin of appreciation in matters which 
required the exercise of economic analysis, as it held that review by the GC is limited to the 
establishment of whether the evidence relied upon are factually accurate and whether there is 
absence of a manifest error of assessment
103
. Therefore, in the absence of a manifest error of 
assessment, the Commission’s findings should remain undisturbed, provided that they are 
capable of explanation by reference to the relevant facts, and this provision holds firm even 
where it might be possible for the Courts to reach a different conclusion on those facts, since 
the Commission’s discretionary margin implies that the same evidence may result in more 
than one equally plausible conclusion
104
. Hence, the role of the Courts is merely to review the 
legality of the Commission’s decisions and they should not substitute their opinion as to the 
economic assessment conducted in a case examination for that of the Commission’s on the 
sole basis that they would have reached a different conclusion on whether the merger is 
compatible with the Common Market, i.e. the Courts should abstain from entering into the 
merits of the Commission’s complex economic assessments 105 . Accordingly, the Courts 
exceed their limits of judicial review where the facts and the evidence of a case reasonably 
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allow different evaluations, the Commission adopts one of them, and the Courts substitute 
their own different assessment for that of the Commission’s106.  
 
However, in practice it seems that the Commission’s margin of discretion is not 
unfettered, as the Courts have indirectly minimized such discretion in collective dominance 
merger cases by repeatedly relying on the basis that the conclusions of its economic 
assessments were not supported by economic theory or the facts of the particular case
107
. 
Specifically, in Airtours the GC rejected most of the Commission’s findings partly for lack of 
evidence to substantiate them and party because it was held that the Commission made errors 
of assessment in the application of certain economic theories concerning coordination
108
. 
Also, even though in Impala the GC acknowledged the wide discretion enjoyed by the 
Commission in carrying out the prognosis of a merger’s potential competitive effects, it held 
that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by facts that were sufficiently ‘accurate, 
reliable and consistent’109. Furthermore, the AG in Sony asserted that it would be an error to 
assume that the Commission’s margin of discretion precludes the Courts from giving their 
own analysis of the facts and the relevant evidence
110
. Also, the ECJ in Sony held that, 
despite the Commission’s wide margin of discretion on matters which require economic 
analysis, the Courts must evaluate whether the Commission has used all the necessary and 
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most reliable data to substantiate its underlying conclusion
111
. Accordingly, these cases reveal 
that in practice the GC and the ECJ have a tendency to carefully examine whether the quality 
of the factual evidence underpinning the Commission’s economic theories is sufficiently 
convincing to discharge the standard of proof, i.e. the need to respect the Commission’s 
margin of discretion does not prevent the Courts from looking closely at its analysis
112
. 
Nevertheless, it seems that in carrying out such an examination the Courts have interfered 
with the Commission’s discretion in complex economic matters.  
 
Case Study On The Extent Of The Commission’s Discretion: Impala And Airtours 
The Impala judgment is a characteristic example of the GC’s interference with the 
Commission’s discretion, as the Commission and the Court adopted different views on the 
assessment of the most decisive issue for the outcome of the case, i.e. market transparency
113
. 
Also, in Airtours the GC took a radical departure from the Commission’s economic 
assessments in Airtours/First Choice
114
. 
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substitute the Commission’s views for those of its own and hinder the Commission’s boundaries of discretion 
(Tetra Laval Opinion para. 93). Furthermore, in Schneider the GC examined almost every element of the 
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In Sony/BMG the Commission found that net wholesale prices, average prices, 
published prices to dealers and list prices appeared to be aligned and developed in parallel, 
which raised the question of whether there was increased market transparency that facilitated 
a collusive outcome. However, as regards the transparency of discounts, while the 
Commission found that the majors had some knowledge of their competitors’ file discounts, 
it concluded that it could not be established that there was a sufficient degree of transparency 
of the rivals’ campaign discounts. According to the Commission, the flexible use of 
campaign discounts and the resulting reduced transparency undermined a sufficient alignment 
of invoice discounts. Thus, the Commission’s economic assessment led it to the conclusion 
that although pieces of evidence pointed at past or future collusion because the various prices 
presented some indications of price parallelism, such evidence could not be conclusive 
enough to prove the creation or the strengthening of a collective dominant position, because 
the analysis of discounts pointed towards the clearance of the merger since they were not 
sufficiently aligned and varied over time and from album to album, i.e. they were not 
sufficiently transparent to facilitate coordination
 115
. 
 
The GC’s judgment in Impala, the appeal to Sony/BMG, entailed a comprehensive 
review of the evidence upon which the Commission relied, particularly those related to its 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commission’s economic analysis and annulled its decision, because the Court found several errors, omissions 
and inconsistencies in the Commission’s economic reasoning. See also, C. Harris, above note 36, pp. 344-345, 
D. Bailey, above note 1, p. 864, No Cited Author, Schneider And Tetra Judgments - Court Strikes Down Two 
European Merger Prohibitions, C.L.I., 2002, November, 9-10, p. 9, F. Ragolle, Case Comment - Schneider 
Electric v. Commission: The GC's Response To The Green Paper On Merger Review, E.C.L.R., 2003, 24(4), 
176-181, pp. 176-178 and C. Ahlborn and J. Ysewyn, above note 25, pp. 302-303. 
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economic findings. The GC disagreed and criticized the Commission’s economic assessment 
by concluding that the market was adequately transparent to permit the competitors to 
monitor each other’s prices, thereby possibly substituting its views for those of the 
Commission’s116. Specifically, the GC did not accept the Commission’s economic theories 
regarding market transparency
117
. Thus, the GC pointed to the weekly hit charts, the presence 
of list prices in the majors’ catalogues, the fact that the average transaction prices were 
closely linked to the list prices, the issue that the discounts were low and showed little 
variation while the majors had some knowledge of the levels of each other’s discounts, the 
close alignment of the industry net prices for 6 years as well as their maintenance at a stable 
level despite a fall in demand and concluded that these factors constituted indications that the 
market was sufficiently transparent to allow tacit coordination in prices. It is notable that the 
GC was of the opinion that the Commission’s assessment not only did not lead to the 
conclusion that the market was insufficiently transparent, but on the contrary that its 
assessment mentioned only factors which were capable to give rise to high market 
transparency, with the sole exception of the rather limited and unsubstantiated assertion that 
campaign discounts could reduce transparency and make tacit collusion more difficult
118
. 
Moreover, the GC disagreed that the discount systems reduced market transparency to the 
point of preventing the existence of a collective dominant position and held that the 
Commission did not adduce any evidence in relation to the opacity of campaign discounts, 
while such discounts had only a limited impact on prices
119
. Accordingly, the GC held that 
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the Commission’s findings were vitiated by a manifest error of assessment, since they were 
not capable to support the conclusion that the market was not sufficiently transparent to 
establish a collective dominant position
120
.  
 
The GC’s assessment of market transparency in Impala was accepted by both the AG 
and the ECJ in Sony. According to the AG, although the GC undertook its own assessment of 
the factual and evidential position, it clearly remained within the proper limits of judicial 
review of a Commission’s decision in the context of merger control121. Consequently, the AG 
stated that the GC did not substitute its own assessment of market transparency for an equally 
reasonable assessment of the Commission, but that the Court merely held that the conclusions 
drawn by the latter were not supported by the factual basis of its decision
122
. Also, the AG 
asserted that the assessment carried out by the GC is part of its analysis of the facts and 
therefore it did not fail to respect the Commission's margin of discretion
123
. Concurring with 
this line of argument, the ECJ in Sony held that the GC carried out an in-depth examination of 
the evidence underpinning the contested decision and in that context it acted in conformity 
with the requirements of the case-law relating to the observation of the Commission’s 
discretion in economic matters
124
.  
 
However, despite these submissions by the AG as well as the ECJ and although the 
GC appeared to rely on the absence of reasoning and the absence of facts substantiating the 
Commission’s conclusions, it seems that the annulment of its decision was also based on a 
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different economic assessment. In particular, the GC found that the market was sufficiently 
transparent for effective monitoring to take place, a conclusion contradicting the 
Commission’s economic assessment. Furthermore, even though the GC seemed to base its 
reasoning for the annulment on the inadequacy of facts to support the Commission’s 
conclusions as to the lack of transparency, it is clearly evident from the judgment that the GC 
simply had a different view on each factor affecting monitoring, i.e. the transparency of 
prices and discounts. This can be primarily demonstrated by the GC’s statement that certain 
factors in the Commission’s analysis instead of pointing towards the lack of transparency 
they were in favour of such a conclusion, i.e. the GC interpreted the same facts in such a 
manner that it reached a contradictory conclusion to the Commission’s outcome. Thus, it 
seems that the GC intervened and replaced the Commission’s economic assessment of 
transparency thereby effectively minimizing the discretion embodied to the latter in 
undertaking economic assessments.   
  
In Airtours the GC extensively scrutinized the Commission’s decision, it rejected 
almost all of its findings and criticized its economic analysis and the quality of its economic 
reasoning by concluding that it had incorrectly analysed the market
125
. Specifically, the GC 
went systematically through each of the deterrents identified in the decision and concluded 
that none represented a credible punishment mechanism, for example it found that the 
Commission was wrong to conclude that the mere possibility of reverting to a situation of 
oversupply would act as a deterrent. Also, the GC criticized the Commission’s methodology 
employed in the assessment of the extent to which capacity decisions adopted by each major 
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tour operator for the coming seasons were sufficiently transparent for collusive behaviour to 
arise post-merger. Lastly, it held that the analyses of demand growth and demand volatility 
were flawed and that the Commission failed to give sufficient weight to the reaction of fringe 
players and consumers to a hypothetical reduction in output and increase in prices. Therefore, 
the GC concluded that the Commission's decision was vitiated by a series of errors of 
assessment as to whether a collective dominant position would be created
126
. The judgment 
demonstrates the GC's willingness to rigorously and completely reassess a Commission 
decision, since despite recognizing the latter’s discretion as regards assessments of an 
economic nature, the Court reversed every instance of its analysis
127
.  
 
Overall, the discretion conferred on the Commission in carrying out its economic 
assessments is important, especially in light of the current employment of a more economic 
approach, which has elevated the economic analysis of concentrations appraised for 
collective dominance to a central issue. Within that context, the increased effort of the Courts 
to diminish the Commission’s margin of appreciation in matters requiring economic 
assessment may be interpreted as a willingness to refrain from allocating full jurisdiction to 
the Commission in such issues, so as to retain a significant role in the decision making 
through the exercise of judicial review. Also, the limitation of the Commission’s discretion in 
Airtours and Impala is explainable by the raised threshold of proof imposed by the GC in 
prohibition and clearance decisions respectively due to the interrelationship between these 
components of proof. Nevertheless, such limitation creates difficulties on the Commission’s 
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ability to establish collective dominance which is solely based on the employment of an 
economic analysis and reasoning. 
 
(4) The Duty To State Reasons 
The Commission is under a duty to provide sufficient reasoning in relation to both its 
clearance as well as its prohibition decisions, while such a duty derives from Article 296 
TFEU and it is intended to enable acts of the Commission to be subject to review by the 
Courts
128
. According to the duty to state reasons, if in its assessment of a concentration the 
Commission attaches particular importance to certain factors, it must not only identify these 
factors in its decision, but it must also describe precisely their effects on the functioning of 
the market in question
129
. Consequently, an inadequate Commission explanation as to the 
reasoning underlying its findings in a case examination results in the annulment of its 
decision by the Courts
130
. The duty to state reasons was a factor that led to the annulment of 
the Sony/BMG decision, as the GC in Impala noted that the Commission’s findings on 
transparency and retaliation were vitiated by insufficient statements of reasons
131
.  
 
The principles underlying the duty to state reasons dictate that such reasons must be 
appropriate to the measure at issue
132
. Furthermore, the Commission’s reasoning in deciding 
whether the concentration in question should be declared compatible or incompatible with the 
Common Market must be disclosed in a clear and unequivocal manner so as to enable the 
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competent Court to exercise its power of review
133
. However, the Commission is not under an 
obligation to provide precise reasoning on aspects which appear to it to be irrelevant or of 
secondary importance in the assessment of the concentration under investigation, neither it is 
necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law
134
. Conversely, 
what is important is that the factual and legal considerations, which are of decisive 
importance to the outcome of the decision, must be capable of being understood from the 
reasons given
135
. Accordingly, such reasoning must not be so laconic as to endanger the 
clarity and persuasiveness of the underlying considerations, but it must be logical and it must 
not disclose any inconsistencies
136
. Thus, it is necessary for the Commission in collective 
dominance cases to substantiate the effects of each factor in its decision with specific details 
and it cannot simply rely on the reason that a condition could make tacit collusion easier or 
more difficult
137
. 
 
(G) CONCLUSION 
The issue of proof in collective dominance merger cases revolves around the 
questions of who bears the burden of proof, how high the standard of proof is and the 
intensity of judicial review, whilst there is a close interrelationship between these concepts.  
 
In order to reach a prohibition decision in collective dominance merger cases the 
Commission must prove that the concentration under investigation would significantly 
impede effective competition by leading to tacit collusion between the oligopolists post-
                                                          
133
 Sony para. 166 and Sony Opinion para. 115.  
134
 Sony paras 167 and 180 and Sony Opinion paras 116 and 118.  
135
 Sony para. 169. 
136
 Sony para. 169 and Sony Opinion para. 119. 
137
 Sony Opinion para. 129. 
327 
                                                                                  Chapter 8 
merger. On the one hand, the Commission must satisfy the significant impediment to 
effective competition standard in order to demonstrate the incompatibility of a concentration 
with the Common Market under the Merger Regulation 139/2004. On the other hand, proof 
of tacit collusion revolves around the cumulative fulfilment of the Airtours conditions, while 
the GC in Impala held that in the assessment of pre-existing collective dominance such 
criteria may be established indirectly thereby relaxing the evidentiary obligations that the 
Commission must meet and the ECJ in Sony imposed the requirement to form a hypothetical 
coordination mechanism as the basis for the assessment of these tests. 
 
The Commission bears the onus to define the relevant market and to prove that the 
probability of harm deriving from the anticompetitive effects of a collective dominant 
position is greater than the substantive threshold for the appraisal of mergers. If the 
Commission meets its burden of proof, the onus of proof reverses and the merging firms must 
demonstrate any available defences, i.e. efficiencies or the failing firm defence.  
 
The Merger Regulation 139/2004 does not contain any reference on the applicable 
standard of proof, while the Courts have consistently referred to the ‘requisite legal standard’ 
in an imprecise manner. Nevertheless, in France v. Commission and Sony the ECJ adopted 
the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof employed in collective dominance 
merger cases. Also, numerous factors that characterise the assessment of mergers for 
collective dominance, such as the prospective nature of assessment, verify that the standard 
of proof should be based on the balance of probabilities. Moreover, the cumulative nature of 
the Airtours conditions as well as the ECJ’s formulation in Sony of the ‘most likely outcome’ 
of a merger on competition illustrate that the standard of proof is higher than the pure balance 
of probabilities threshold and takes the form of a reasonable likelihood. Additionally, the 
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‘convincing evidence’ requirement, as was established in Airtours, constituted a departure 
from the ‘cogent and consistent evidence’ formulation that was adopted pre-Airtours and 
highlighted a rise on the standard of proof. Furthermore, the GC in Impala and the ECJ in 
Sony established a symmetrical standard of proof between clearance and prohibition 
decisions in horizontal mergers examined for the likelihood of collective dominance, whilst 
such symmetry is absolute and accordingly there should be no exception in grey area cases in 
favour of a clearance decision, in contradiction to the position in non-horizontal mergers 
where the standard of proof is asymmetric. Additionally, the symmetrical standard of proof 
altered the weighing of Type I and Type II errors by equalizing the importance attached to 
each type of error.  
 
The Courts have the power to review the Commission’s decisions in mergers and the 
relevant standard of judicial review is consisted by the ‘manifest error of assessment’. The 
Commission does not have any discretion on factual or legal matters where the Courts are 
capable to exercise full jurisdiction, but it enjoys a margin of appreciation in undertaking 
complex economic assessments. This margin of discretion has been recognized by the Courts 
which are required not to substitute their views for those of the Commission’s. However, in 
practice the Courts examine closely the Commission’s analysis and in Airtours and Impala it 
seems that the GC has minimized the discretion granted to the Commission [which is 
compatible with the respective raising of the standard of proof in prohibition and clearance 
decisions]. Moreover, in the context of judicial review the Commission is under a duty to 
state reasons and to provide explanations for its arrival at a certain conclusion in each 
particular case.  
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                                                     CHAPTER 9  
                                                           - 
 CONCLUSION: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
  
 
 
  (A) CURRENT STATUS  
This thesis focused on the issue of collective dominance in horizontal concentrations 
and analysed its legal, economic and policy elements in order to examine how evidential 
requirements and capabilities have influenced its development.  
 
(1) Legal Context 
The proof of collective dominance in horizontal mergers is interlinked to its 
conceptual framework that is underpinned by the theory of tacit collusion and to the 
substantive threshold for intervention as set out in the Merger Regulation 139/2004. 
Specifically, in the appraisal of collective dominance merger cases the Commission bears the 
burden to demonstrate that the concentration under investigation would significantly impede 
effective competition either by creating or by reinforcing a situation of tacit collusion 
between the market participants post-merger. On the one hand, in order to reach a prohibition 
decision the Commission must satisfy the substantive standard contained in Article 2(3) of 
the Merger Regulation 139/2004 which amended the threshold employed under the Merger 
Regulation 4064/89, as it removed the strict necessity to establish dominance by declaring 
that the demonstration of a significant impediment to effective competition is the single 
necessary and sufficient condition in order to prove the incompatibility of a concentration 
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with the Common Market, whilst dominance is merely the prime example of such a situation. 
This afforded to the Commission the ability to prove the incompatibility of a concentration 
either ‘directly’, i.e. by the sole establishment of a significant impediment to effective 
competition, or ‘indirectly’, i.e. by the demonstration of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position that would significantly impede effective competition. Nonetheless, in 
contrast to unilateral effects cases, the amendment of the substantive test did not alter the 
intervention threshold applicable in coordinated effects cases since if the Commission would 
rely on the indirect demonstration of incompatibility it would still have to establish 
dominance, whilst if it would seek to directly demonstrate the incompatibility of a 
concentration it would have to fulfil the same legal test and requirements that were necessary 
and relevant under the dominance threshold. On the other hand, proof of tacit collusion is 
inherently problematic, as it concerns anticompetitive market conduct that is formed by an 
implicit understanding to coordinate without any type of communication and accordingly it 
can only be established by economic analysis and must be distinguished from mere parallel 
behaviour which constitutes legally acceptable conduct. The development of the concept of 
collective dominance in mergers was directed towards the aim to tackle tacit collusion in 
order to close an enforcement gap in EU Competition Law, since it was considered to be the 
most suitable framework to regulate such conduct, as opposed to ex-post legal instruments, 
due to the applicability of a more lenient threshold of proof linked to the employment of a 
prospective analysis, while it shed minimal emphasis on explicit collusion for the reason that 
in an ex-ante assessment hard evidence of an agreement or a concerted practice could be 
demonstrated only in marginal circumstances concerning the situation of pre-existing 
collective dominance and also because of the applicability of effective ex-post review for this 
type of collusion. The GC in Airtours fully equated the concept of collective dominance with 
the economic theory of tacit collusion. Thus, in order to prove collective dominance in 
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mergers and establish that the remaining firms would tacitly collude post-merger the 
Commission must fulfil the Airtours test so as to demonstrate that the oligopolists would 
have the ability and the incentive to adopt a common policy of coordination and to sustain 
such an understanding overtime, whilst these components are assessed by analysing the 
structural characteristics of the relevant market that would affect the firms’ behavioural 
incentives. Evidential requirements played a central role to the introduction of the Airtours 
test, since the GC implicitly recognised the application of a low evidentiary threshold in the 
Commission’s Airtours/FirstChoice decision and aimed to raise such a threshold. 
Accordingly, the Airtours test is characterised by its inherently stringent nature that has set 
the standard of proof applicable in the assessment of collective dominance in mergers at a 
higher threshold than a pure balance of probabilities standard and took the form of a 
reasonable likelihood threshold. Such stringency relates to the requirement that the 
Commission must directly demonstrate the cumulative presence of the necessary Airtours 
conditions, whilst the cumulative nature of these criteria essentially means that every piece of 
evidence regarding the structural characteristics of the market and the future behaviour of the 
firms must point towards coordination in order to establish collective dominance. Therefore, 
this test pointed to a higher evidentiary threshold than the early approach in the 
demonstration of collective dominance which was based on the application of a mere 
‘checklist’ of descriptive factors that focused on whether a sufficient number of market 
characteristics pointed in favour of collusion. In addition, the Airtours judgment requested the 
Commission to bring forward ‘convincing evidence’ in order to satisfy the relevant standard 
of proof and this also points towards a higher evidentiary threshold than the ‘cogent and 
consistent’ evidence required pre-Airtours, as it essentially demanded the Commission to 
base its conclusions on strong evidence derived from a sound and detailed economic analysis. 
Furthermore, this heightened evidentiary threshold lowered the degree of the Commission’s 
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discretion in undertaking complex economic assessments due to the interrelationship between 
these components of proof, i.e. the higher the threshold of proof the higher the degree of 
judicial review and consequently the lower the level of its discretion, thereby adversely 
affecting its ability to establish collective dominance since such a discretion is of outmost 
importance in tacit collusion cases where proof heavily relies on economic analysis and 
reasoning. The overall effect of the Airtours judgment is related to the imposition of 
demanding evidential requirements that in turn pointed towards a limitation in the 
enforcement of collective dominance. This was clearly illustrated in the Sony/BMG decision 
where the Commission adopted an exact application of the Airtours test and cleared the 
concentration simply because all the evidence were not in favour of coordination. Also, the 
effects of the Airtours test were extended by the fact that it was eventually integrated in the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines as the relevant test for the establishment of coordinated effects. 
The heightened evidential requirements imposed by the Airtours test led to the introduction 
of the Impala indirect test. Specifically, as a response to the stringency attached to the 
Airtours test and in order to prevent the limitation in the enforcement of collective 
dominance, the GC in Impala introduced the indirect test which held that in the assessment of 
pre-existing collective dominance the Airtours conditions may be established indirectly 
thereby inserting a degree of flexibility in the establishment of coordination and relaxing the 
evidentiary threshold required in order to reach a prohibition decision. Additionally, the 
Court in Impala launched the application of a symmetrical standard of proof between 
compatibility and incompatibility decisions in horizontal mergers which essentially raised the 
standard of proof for clearance decisions so as to alleviate fears of an increasing number of 
‘false positives’ that resulted from the demanding evidentiary threshold imposed for 
prohibition decisions in Airtours, but it maintained the GC’s tendency to intervene in matters 
which arguably fall within the Commission’s margin of appreciation. In Sony the ECJ 
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acknowledged the applicability of both the stringent Airtours test and the more lenient Impala 
indirect test in collective dominance merger cases, it accepted the validity of the symmetrical 
standard of proof and imposed an additional requirement of a contextual nature since it set 
out that the Commission must establish a hypothetical coordination mechanism as a basis for 
the application of such tests. The Commission’s response to these later developments was 
made clear in ABF/GBI where it set up a coordination mechanism related to the 
circumstances of the case and on that basis it assessed the fulfilment of the Airtours test, but 
it refrained to examine the applicability of the Impala indirect test, even though such a test 
could be suitable to be examined on the facts of the case that focused on the reinforcement of 
tacit collusion. The total outcome of those developments marked by the GC’s stringent 
Airtours test that raised the evidential requirements needed in order to establish collective 
dominance and the Commission’s lack of application of the flexible Impala test, despite its  
authoritative approval by the ECJ, has led to a drop in the enforcement of collective 
dominance, as ABF/GBI forms the only intervention decision post-Airtours. 
 
The concept of collective dominance in mergers is divergent to the concepts of Article 
102 collective dominance and Article 101 concerted practices on the treatment of tacit 
collusion. On the one hand, even though collective dominance under the Merger Regulation 
and its corresponding theory under Article 102 are conceptually convergent on tacit 
collusion, their enforcement is divergent as there is total lack of precedent to address 
situations of tacit collusion under the concept of Article 102 collective dominance. Also, the 
Guidance Paper’s absence of provisions on the abuse of collective dominance expressly 
reveals that enforcement against tacit collusion is not within the Commission’s priorities. The 
lack of enforcement against tacit collusion under the Article 102 collective dominance 
concept is primarily related to the higher evidentiary threshold that would be applicable in 
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tacit collusion cases within such a context, as compared to the standard of proof employed in 
mergers, and derives from the ex-post nature of investigations, the quasi-criminal nature of 
infringements, but principally by the increased stringency in the application of the Airtours 
test in an ex-post context that would require pragmatic evidence on each condition and every 
structural characteristic pointing towards tacit collusion. Also, other relevant factors relate to 
the lack of implementation of an effects-based approach as well as difficulties related to the 
formulation of appropriate and effective remedies under Article 102 against tacit collusion. 
On the other hand, in contrast to the position in collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation, the concept of concerted practices under Article 101 is not receptive to the 
control of tacit collusion as in principle it requires the establishment of contact between 
competitors. Conversely, parallelism alone may lead to a finding of concertation only if the 
Commission could prove that tacit collusion constitutes the single plausible explanation for 
the parallel conduct in question, which is unrealistic in view of the fact that interdependence 
forms part of the normal operation of oligopolies and would lead to a competitive explanation 
based on mere parallel behaviour. Also, the formulation of the ‘only plausible explanation’ 
test reflects the application of a standard of proof equivalent to the beyond reasonable doubt 
in Article 101 cases as it essentially requires the Commission to bring forward an 
undisputable economic analysis that would be capable to overcome any reasonable doubt. 
Overall, the highly demanding evidential requirements needed in order to establish tacit 
collusion under Articles 101 and 102 render them incapable to regulate such conduct. This 
explains the development of the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation towards the specific goal to tackle situations of tacit collusion as, due to the 
applicability of a more lenient threshold of proof, it was considered more suitable to address 
such conduct. 
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Coordinated and unilateral effects are conceptually distinctive theories of harm as 
they are founded on different economic principles and a largely divergent set of necessary 
conditions that must be fulfilled in order to establish each anticompetitive theory. Also, 
coordinated and unilateral effects are divergent on the ability to demonstrate each theory of 
harm. Specifically, the introduction of the significant impediment to effective competition 
test under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 launched the theory of unilateral effects and gave 
to the Commission the ability to regulate the ‘gap’ cases through the ‘direct’ demonstration of 
incompatibility, i.e. without proof of dominance, thereby lowering the intervention threshold 
as such a theory of harm contains more flexible requirements than those which were 
necessary to be fulfilled in order to establish single firm dominance. This position contradicts 
the fact that, despite the alteration of the substantive test, the threshold of intervention 
applicable in coordinated effects cases remained unaltered. Also, the mechanism of harm is 
straightforward in unilateral effects and therefore it is receptive to enforcement, while the 
mechanism of harm is complex in coordinated effects and this factor creates difficulties in the 
establishment of such an anticompetitive theory. Lastly, the examination of unilateral effects 
has been facilitated by the development and application of the traditional econometric 
techniques, whilst the evolution of pricing pressure indexes further assists the assessment of 
such a theory of harm as they constitute an initial screening mechanism and provide some 
prima facie quantitative evidence of the merging firm’s incentives to raise their prices post-
merger. Conversely, the lack of any corresponding set of econometric tools applicable in the 
scenario of coordinated effects in homogeneous markets maintains the difficulty to 
demonstrate such a theory of harm. Overall, these divergences on the ability to demonstrate 
each theory of harm explain the Commission’s increased focus on unilateral effects post-
Merger Regulation 139/2004 and the respective decline in the enforcement of coordinated 
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effects, despite the fact that in principle no theory of harm is predominant in EU Merger 
Control and each applies in its own individual circumstances. 
 
(2) Economic Context 
Economic analysis plays a central role in the establishment of collective dominance in 
mergers as such a concept is based on the findings of game theory in relation to tacit 
collusion. Game theoretic analysis on tacit collusion facilitates the demonstration of 
collective dominance in mergers to the extent that it dictates the necessary conditions for 
coordination which essentially comprise the Airtours test and sets out the structural 
characteristics that must be assessed in order to determine the firms’ ability and incentive to 
collude. Nevertheless, game theory is problematic as it produces multiple possible equilibria 
and accordingly it is unable to precisely predict the future effects of a concentration on the 
specific market under investigation. Moreover, the fact that game theory is merely a 
‘possibility’ theory has given rise to the proposition that a strict falsification framework 
would be needed to be met for the admittance of game theoretic models in merger 
proceedings. Also, behavioural economics contradict the assumption underlying game theory 
that market participants behave rationally, since they emphasise on irrational conduct which 
leads to results contradictory to game theoretic predictions. Moreover, experimental 
economics expose laboratory evidence which contradict some standard insights of game 
theory. Overall, despite the significance of game theoretic analysis, the multiplicity of 
equilibria produces complexities in the establishment of collective dominance under the 
Merger Regulation, whilst alternative economic theories diminish the unitary value of game 
theory as a tool to combat collusive effects, even though such theories also expose 
problematic features. 
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(3) Policy Context 
The early analysis employed in collective dominance merger cases was based on the 
Harvard school static SCP paradigm that focused on a simplistic assessment of a checklist of 
structural factors and this led to an increased level of enforcement which was in accordance 
with the Harvardian beliefs, whilst the objective was to protect the market participants’ 
freedom to compete in the relevant market. Nevertheless, a gradual policy evolution 
materialised that aligned the analysis of collective dominance to the dictations of the 
industrial organisation theorists. Most clearly, the GC in Airtours employed a more 
sophisticated analysis based on a dynamic application of the SCP paradigm. Thus, instead of 
a static analysis of structural factors, the GC employed a dynamic assessment that focused on 
the interaction between structural factors and behavioural incentives which essentially 
attributed central focus on the likely behaviour of the market participants post-merger. Also, 
in contrast to the previous approach which did not focus on competitive effects, the GC 
emphasised on the demonstration of the impact of a concentration on competition in order to 
discern its welfare effects on the consumers. Lastly, the adoption of a more economic 
approach brought the concept of collective dominance in line with the economic theory of 
tacit collusion, as evident by the insertion of the Airtours economics-based test at the centre 
of the collective dominance assessment, and directed the Commission towards an increased 
reliance on evidence drawn from a solid and detailed economic analysis based on industrial 
organisation models. The totality of the requirements revolving around a dynamic, more 
economic and effects-based approach pointed towards a more demanding assessment that led 
to a decline in the enforcement of collective dominance in mergers and was in accordance 
with the move towards the less interventionist framework provided by the industrial 
organisation theorists, despite the eventual effort by the GC in Impala to reverse such an 
outcome through the introduction of the indirect test. This type of analysis was eventually 
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affirmed by the Merger Regulation 139/2004 substantive test and the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines which also integrated the underlying policy objective that focused on the 
preservation of effective competition as a means to protect the welfare of the consumers. 
Accordingly, a consumer welfare standard is employed in the determination of the 
compatibility of concentrations with the Common Market that requires evidence of consumer 
harm in order to prohibit a concentration, whilst efficiencies directed towards the welfare of 
the consumers have been recognised as a defence to anticompetitive mergers.  
 
 (B) FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
The prospective enforcement of the concept of collective dominance under the 
Merger Regulation needs to be strengthened and the justification for such a necessity relies 
on two parameters. On the one hand, the concept of collective dominance under the Merger 
Regulation currently constitutes the only legal mechanism by which the Commission can 
prevent the emergence of tacit collusion in EU Competition Law as the past precedent of 
collective dominance under Article 102 illustrates the total lack of decisions focusing on tacit 
collusive behaviour, while the concept of concerted practices under Article 101 is incapable 
to adequately control such conduct. On the other hand, the coordinated effects theory of harm 
constitutes the sole means by which the Commission can penalise tacit collusive behaviour in 
EU Merger Control, since unilateral effects exclusively focus on the individual non-collusive 
market conduct of the merged entity.  
  
The prospective ability to prove collective dominance in mergers and the increase in 
future enforcement against tacit collusion may lie in the application of old methodological 
tools. Specifically, it is imperative for the Commission and the Courts to explore and apply 
the Impala indirect test in prospective collective dominance cases, as it would open up a new 
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era in the enforcement of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation and it would 
advance the applicability of such a concept, because it offers a more lenient avenue to 
demonstrate a collective dominant position beyond the strictness of the Airtours test. 
Specifically, the Impala test is capable to establish indirectly each one or all of the Airtours 
criteria, it introduces a flexible framework for proving the strengthening of collective 
dominance, it facilitates its enforcement in ‘grey area’ cases, it may prevent undetected or 
problematic Article 102 tacit collusion cases, it directs the analysis towards a more finely 
balanced approach between economic theory and legal considerations that facilitates the 
overcoming of the inconclusiveness of game theoretic models and leads towards a more 
interventionist direction. Moreover, the problematic feature of the indirect test that is related 
to its rather vague formulation may be resolved by its systematic application in the decisions 
of the Commission and the Courts as its formal integration in the assessment of collective 
dominance cases would facilitate its interpretation and it would resolve any ambiguities in its 
articulation. Therefore, the only remaining significant limitation of the indirect test would be 
related to the fact that it exclusively applies to the strengthening of pre-existing collective 
dominance.  
 
An alternative or cumulative solution that would facilitate the proof of coordinated 
effects and would result in increased enforcement relates to the evolution of econometric 
analysis or the revolution of economic theory, despite the recognised difficulties in the 
materialisation of such objectives. On the one hand, the tools used in the analysis of 
coordinated effects should be sharpened by the advancement of suitable econometric 
techniques in the assessment of tacit collusion in homogeneous markets and accordingly 
economists should attribute increased efforts towards this goal, since it would greatly 
facilitate the examination as well as the establishment of such a theory of harm. On the other 
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hand, the advancement of game theoretic models is of critical importance for the future 
evolution of the coordinated effects analysis, and in that regard such models need to evolve 
beyond case-specific results by aiming at more generalised findings, while they should also 
be reinforced by systematic empirical testing. In addition, the assessment of coordinated 
effects may be enriched by the gradual integration of tested insights from behavioural 
economics or by results drawn from experimental analysis. In any case, the future 
examination of coordinated effects is expected to be firmly grounded on the consistent use of 
economic principles and analysis and to that extent it is suggested that the Courts should 
leave to the Commission a wider degree of discretion to carry out its economic assessment, 
but at the same time they should maintain the appropriate checks and balances.  
 
Another important aspect concerns the prospective relationship between the concept 
of collective dominance in mergers as opposed to the concepts of Article 102 collective 
dominance and Article 101 concerted practices as well as the relationship between 
coordinated and unilateral effects. On the one hand, the prospective relationship between the 
concepts of collective dominance under the Merger Regulation and collective dominance 
under Article 102 may evolve due to the potential application of the Impala test in an Article 
102 context that could introduce a more flexible era and facilitate the enforcement against 
tacit collusion in such a context through the indirect fulfilment of the Airtours criteria and the 
capability to simultaneously establish the abuse element. On the other hand, no modification 
is expected to materialise in the prospective relationship between the concepts of concerted 
practices under Article 101 and collective dominance under the Merger Regulation on the 
issue of tacit collusion as the requirement of contact and the Courts’ precedent on the 
evidential value of parallel behaviour coupled with an extremely high threshold of proof do 
not leave room for an effective enforcement against such conduct. Lastly, the way forward in 
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the relationship between unilateral and coordinated effects will be characterised by a clear cut 
distinction between these theories of harm which together they will continue to form the 
framework for the control of all anticompetitive mergers, whilst the degree of enforcement 
would vary and depend on the potential application of the Impala test and the development of 
econometric analysis or the progress of collusion theory.  
 
Lastly, it is imperative that the Commission should direct its policy focus towards the 
inclusion of considerations relating to dynamic competition in coordinated effects cases. 
Thus, the assessment of the potential anticompetitive impact of concentrations should 
progressively move away from the strict consideration of price effects and involve an 
extended focus on the evaluation of adverse non-price effects, especially in view of the fact 
that coordination seems difficult but possible to occur in relation to innovation, whilst the 
Commission should also seed emphasis on the likelihood of parallel exclusion directed 
towards the blocking of innovation. Also, the policy goal of EU-US convergence on merger 
assessment is of central concern and to that extent it is expected that the theory of parallel 
accommodating conduct will be eventually included within the EU Merger Control 
framework but the question is how exactly this concept will be formulated in such a context. 
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